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This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  action	  in	  the	  policy	  practice	  of	  border	  
management	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  regional	  economic	  integration.	  Using	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  most	  
developed	  form	  of	  regional	   integration,	  as	  a	  point	  of	  reference,	   it	  examines	  five	  stories	  of	  policy	  
practice	   relating	   to	   the	   joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	   announcement	  on	  2	  March	  2009	   that	   committed	  
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  to	  ‘reduce	  remaining	  barriers	  at	  the	  borders	  to	  ensure	  that	  people	  and	  
goods	  can	  move	  more	  easily	  between	  the	  two	  countries’	  (Key	  &	  Rudd,	  2009a).	  	  
Actor-­‐network	  theory	  (ANT)	   is	  the	  theoretical	   frame,	  drawing	  particularly	  on	  the	  works	  of	  Bruno	  
Latour,	   John	   Law	   and	   Vicky	   Singleton,	  Michel	   Callon,	   and	   Barbara	   Czarniawksa,	   enhanced	   with	  
aspects	   of	   the	   narrative	   theory	   of	  Hannah	  Arendt	   and	   Paul	   Ricoeur.	   This	   frame	   aligns	  with	   and	  
builds	   on	   the	   policy	   narrative	   work	   of	   Rod	   Rhodes	   and	   Maarten	   Hajer	   and	   is	   applied	   to	   both	  
regional	  integration	  and	  policy	  practice.	  
New	  knowledge	  comes	  from	  identifying	  border	  management	  as	  a	  domain	  of	  policy	  practice,	  and	  
extending	  Callon’s	  concept	  of	  marketization	  to	  border	  management,	  which	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  part	  of	  
the	   global	   trading	   narrative	   that	   underpins	   regional	   integration.	   In	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	  
economic	  integration,	  narratives	  are	  revealed	  as	  a	  mix	  of	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  matters	  
of	  concern	  that	  are	  enacted	  with	  different	  types	  of	  separation	  and	  integration	  effects.	  The	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  relationship	  features	  as	  a	  macro-­‐actor	  from	  which	  a	  mix	  of	  narrative	  effects	  emerges.	  	  
The	  combination	  of	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  narratives	  revealed	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  regional	  
economic	  integration	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  EU,	  but	  with	  different	  emphases	  and	  effects	  arising	  from	  
the	  interaction	  between	  them.	  This	  finding	  suggests	  a	  potential	  anatomy	  of	  border	  management	  
policy	  in	  regional	  integration.	  	  	  
Through	   tracing	   the	   actions	   of	   officials,	   this	   thesis	   reveals	   Trans-­‐Tasman	  policy	   narratives	   to	   be	  
performative,	  made	  up	  of	  the	  many	  little	  translations	  that	  occur	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  policy	  practice,	  into	  
which	  are	  woven	  the	  above	  broader	  connections.	  It	  also	  reveals	  that	  narrative	  is	  not	  only	  a	  way	  to	  
tell	   the	   stories	   of	   what	   is	   being	   done,	   but	   that	   the	   narratives	   of	   matters	   of	   concern	   drive	   the	  
action,	  and	  the	  action	  itself	  tells	   its	  own	  story.	  Narratives	  thus	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  action.	  




negatively,	  depending	  on	  the	  matters	  of	  concern,	  the	  relational	  power	  (who’s	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  
of	  whom	  or	  what)	  and	  how	  they	  interact	  with	  one	  another.	  	  
A	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  use	  of	  ANT	  to	  explore	  policy	  narrative,	  and	  the	  potential	  
for	  applying	  the	  concept	  of	  performativity	  to	  other	  approaches	  of	  policy	  narrative.	  	  The	  narrative	  
aspect	  of	  ANT	  is	  underemphasised	  yet	  it	  is	  a	  powerful	  analytical	  tool	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  add	  
to	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  practice	  of	  policy.	   Incorporating	  aspects	  of	  narrative	   theory	   together	  
with	  ANT	  is	  shown	  to	  enhance	  the	  insights.	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   Upper	   case	   indicates	   a	   specific	  
agreement.	  
DAFF	   Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries	  and	  Forestry	  (Australia)	  –	  former	  name	  
of	   what	   is	   now	   the	   Department	   of	   Agriculture.	   Responsible	   for	  
administering	  biosecurity	  and	  quarantine	  functions.	  Refer	  also	  to	  MAF.	  
DFAT	   Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  (Australia).	  
DIBP	   Department	   of	   Immigration	   and	  Border	   Protection	   (Australia),	   responsible	  
for	  immigration	  functions.	  Refer	  also	  to	  DoL.	  
DoL	   Department	  of	  Labour	  (New	  Zealand)	  responsible	  for	  immigration	  functions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Information about the Agreement available from http://www.asean.fta.govt.nz/ 
2 Discussion on this linkage available from http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/the-afta-
cer-linkage 




(now	   included	   in	   MBIE).	   When	   upper	   case,	   Immigration	   refers	   to	   the	  
organisational	   units	   within	   DoL	   responsible	   for	   administering	   immigration	  
functions,	  and	  to	  DIBP	  in	  Australia.	  
DPMC	   Department	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Cabinet	  (New	  Zealand).	  
EC	   European	   Commission:	   ‘The	   European	   Commission	   is	   the	   EU's	   executive	  
body.	  It	  represents	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  (not	  the	  
interests	  of	  individual	  countries).	  The	  term	  "Commission”	  refers	  to	  both	  the	  
College	  of	  Commissioners	  and	  to	  the	  institution	  itself.4	  	  
FTA	   Free	  Trade	  Agreement.	  
MAF	   Ministry	   of	   Agricuture	   and	   Forestry	   (New	   Zealand),	   now	  MPI,	   responsible	  
for	   administering	  biosecurity	   and	  quarantine	   functions.	  When	  upper	   case,	  
Biosecurity	  or	  Quarantine	  refers	  to	  the	  relevant	  New	  Zealand	  or	  Australian	  
agency;	   when	   lower	   case,	   they	   refer	   to	   biosecurity	   and	   quarantine	  
functions.	  	  
MFAT	   Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  (New	  Zealand).	  
MPI	   Ministry	  of	  Primary	  Industries.	  See	  MAF	  above.	  
OECD	   Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development.	  




‘the	   opening	   and	   development	   of	   trade	   between	   heretofore	   autonomous	  
markets	  and	  their	   integration	  into	  a	  single	  operative	  entity’	  (Jacks	  2000,	  p.	  
2).	  
Rules	  Of	  Origin	   ‘Rules	  of	  origin	  are	  the	  criteria	  needed	  to	  determine	  the	  national	  source	  of	  a	  
product.	   Their	   importance	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   duties	   and	  
restrictions	  in	  several	  cases	  depend	  upon	  the	  source	  of	  imports’.5	  	  
TPP	   Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership.	  This	  is	  an	  iterative	  negotiation	  that	  ‘aims	  to	  create	  
a	   regional	   free	   trade	   agreement	   involving	   12	   Asia	   Pacific	   countries’	   that	  
‘would	  deepen	  economic	  ties	  between	  its	  diverse	  members’.6	  	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	   A	   term	   used	   to	   represent	   the	   relationship	   between	   Australia	   and	   New	  
Zealand.	  
WCO	   World	   Customs	   Organization.	   International	   organisation	   that	   provides	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Retrieved from EU website: http://ec.europa.eu/about/index_en.htm 
5 Retrieved from WTO website:	  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm 





global	  technical	  standards	  and	  guidelines	  on	  customs	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
international	  network.	  	  
WTO	   World	  Trade	  Organization.	  Responsible	  for	  international	  trade	  rules.	  
	  
	  




Chapter 1  
Introducing the research 
1.1 Setting	   the	   scene	   –	   trans-­‐Tasman	   borders,	   and	   stories	   and	   action	   in	   policy	  
practice	  
This	   thesis	   explores	   policy	   practice	   within	   the	   world	   of	   border	   management	   in	   the	   regional	  
economic	  integration7	  environment	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  Borders	  are	  everywhere	  in	  our	  
lives	   –	   the	   edges	   of	   a	   page,	   the	   boundaries	   of	   acceptable	   social	   behaviour,	   the	   fences	   that	  
separate	   suburban	   plots	   of	   land.	   	   The	   matter	   of	   concern	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   in	   borders	   as	   state	  
boundaries,	   in	   particular,	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   management	   of	   state	   boundaries	   between	   and	  
within	   states	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   economic	   integration.	   	   Involving	   the	   interaction	   of	   two	  
governments	  with	  both	  shared	  and	  differing	  agendas	  and	   two	  sets	  of	  officials,	   this	  environment	  
adds	  a	  dimension	  of	  complexity	  to	  policy	  practice.	  
The	  theoretical	  area	  of	  policy	  practice	  explored	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  
and	  action.	  Why	  is	  this	  important?	  In	  Western	  democracies,	  governments	  (politicians)	  and	  officials	  
have	   a	   symbiotic	   relationship.	   Politicians	   are	   elected	   to	   serve	   and	   deliver	   results	   to	   their	  
constituents	   based	   on	   their	   political	   party’s	   policy	   agenda.	   While	   they	   might	   have	   their	   own	  
sources	  of	  policy	  advice,	  in	  the	  main	  they	  still	  rely	  on	  public	  servants	  to	  provide	  advice	  and	  to	  act	  
on	   the	   decisions	   they	   make.	   Public	   servants,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   rely	   on	   politicians	   to	   make	  
decisions	  and	   create	  an	  environment	   that	  enables	   them	   to	  act.	  Both	   sides	   rely	  on	   ‘things	  being	  
done’.	   The	   interplay	   between	   these	   interests	   creates	   a	   dynamic	   and	   challenging	   authorising	  
environment	  (Moore,	  1995).	  	  
A	  lot	  of	  the	  ‘things	  being	  done’	  occurs	  at	  the	  computers	  and	  within	  the	  meeting	  rooms	  of	  policy	  
officials.	  They	  are	  every-­‐day,	  and	  often	  unremarkable,	  activities.	  But	  these	  are	  the	  activities	  that	  
lead	  to	  the	  policy	  advice	  and	  the	  tangible	  results	  that	  follow	  (or	  not,	  as	  the	  case	  may	  be).	  Much	  of	  
this	  every-­‐day	  action	   involves	   telling	  stories,	  as	  explained	  by	   Jay	  White:	   ‘policy	  analysts	  must	  be	  
able	   to	   tell	   a	   story	   that	   mixes	   statements	   about	   present	   facts,	   future	   predictions,	   and	   valued	  
possibilities	  in	  a	  way	  that	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  action’	  (White,	  1999,	  p.	  22).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	   relationship	   between	   stories	   and	   action	   in	   public	   policy-­‐making	   has	   not	   been	   widely	  
researched.	   Understanding	   the	   effect	   of	   everyday	   actions	   is	   necessary	   to	   understanding	   how	  
results	   are	   delivered;	   understanding	   the	   role	   of	   the	   stories	   officials	   tell	   one	   another	   and	   their	  
politicians,	  and	  the	  underpinning	  narratives	  that	  shape	  their	  intentions	  and	  drive	  their	  actions,	  is	  
an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  this.	  	  
1.2 Origins	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  research	  question	  
This	  research	  arose	  out	  of	  my	  personal	  experience	  and	  frustrations,	  as	  a	  senior	  policy	  advisor,	  with	  
policy	  practice	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  environment.	  In	  2002,	  I	  had	  led	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
international	  strategy	  for	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Service	  (New	  Zealand	  Customs),	  out	  of	  which	  
an	  Australia	   Strategy	  was	   subsequently	  developed.	   From	   interviews	  with	   staff	   at	   that	   time,	   and	  
from	  my	   own	   involvement	  with	   Australian	   bilateral	   relations,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   while	   close,	   the	  
relationship	  of	  the	  two	  Customs	  administrations	  did	  not	  evidence	  much	  joint	  action.	  	  A	  story	  that	  
typifies	   this	   situation	   is	   about	   Australia’s	   introduction	   of	   an	   ‘Australians	   and	   New	   Zealanders’	  
passport	   clearance	   line	   in	   2005.	   New	   Zealand	   had	   included	   Australians	   into	   the	   New	   Zealand	  
passport	  clearance	  line	  a	  decade	  earlier,	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s8	  –	  a	  decade	  during	  which	  New	  Zealand	  
officials	   had	   been	   trying,	   unsuccessfully,	   to	   get	   Australia	   to	   reciprocate.9	  What	  were	   Australian	  
officials’	   narratives	   that	   prevented	   the	   change	   happening	   earlier?	   What	   were	   New	   Zealand	  
officials’	  narratives	  that	  made	  them	  make	  the	  change	  back	  in	  c.1995	  and	  want	  the	  Australians	  to	  
reciprocate?	  	  
Why	  should	  this	  matter?	  There	  is	  no	  customs	  union	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  despite	  a	  world-­‐
leading	   trade	   agreement	   that	   has	   evolved	   into	   ‘beyond	   the	   borders’	   integration	   and	   has	   been	  
reinvented	  as	  an	  objective	  to	  create	  a	  Single	  Economic	  Market;	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  separated	  by	  
a	  stretch	  of	  water	  that	  takes	  at	  least	  three	  hours	  to	  cross	  by	  air;	  and	  they	  are	  greatly	  different	  in	  
geographical	  and	  economic	  size.	  What	  leads	  me	  to	  think	  that	  there	  is	  anything	  puzzling	  about	  the	  
absence	  of	  joined	  up	  action	  between	  border	  agencies?	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 New Zealand Customs staff. 




Figure	  1. Map	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand10	  
	  	  
Various	  authors	  have	  painted	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  many	  interwoven	  strands	  that	  connect	  Australia	  and	  
New	   Zealand	   and	   their	   peoples,	   as	   well	   as	   those	   that	   separate	   (McLean,	   2003;	   Mein	   Smith,	  
Hempenstall,	  &	  Goldfinch,	  2008;	  Sinclair,	  1987).	  A	  tension	  between	  connection	  and	  separation	  is	  
well	   told	   in	   their	  stories,	  such	  as	   the	  Australian	  government’s	  challenge	   in	   the	   late	  1990s	  to	  the	  
freedom	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel,	   arising	   from	   the	   high	   numbers	   of	   New	   Zealanders	   moving	   to	  
Australia;	   and	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   merger	   of	   the	   two	   stock	   markets	   to	   eventuate	   despite	   some	  
support	   for	   it	   (Mein	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   137).	   I	   wanted	   to	   explore	   this	   tension	   between	  
connection	  and	  separation	  in	  the	  world	  of	  border	  policy	  officials	  –	  an	  area	  of	  research	  notable	  by	  
its	  absence,	  aside	  from	  some	  investigation	  into	  immigration	  issues.11	  	  Related	  to	  this	  tension	  was	  
how	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   translated	   their	   respective	   governments’	   policy	   goals	  
into	   action	   –	   actions	   that	   from	   my	   experience	   did	   not	   always	   equate	   with	   politicians’	   stated	  
intentions,	  both	  domestically	  and	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Retrieved 27 March 2015 from http://jb-hdnp.org/Sarver/Maps/WC/wc23_ausnzpolphyt.jpg  
11 E.g. Dr Kate McMillan, Senior Lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington has focused on Australasian people 
movements. See http://www.victoria.ac.nz/hppi/about/staff/kate-mcmillan  
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To	  satisfy	  my	  curiosity	  about	  these	  tensions	  and	  mismatches,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  examine	  a	  period	  in	  
recent	   trans-­‐Tasman	   history	   that	   saw	   a	   burgeoning	   of	   activity	   between	   the	   border	   agencies	   in	  
each	  country	  over	  several	  years	  –	  activity	  that	  I	  was	  involved	  in	  for	  some	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  activity	  
was	  prompted	  by	  one	  of	  nine	  objectives	  in	  one	  of	  the	  ‘joint	  statements’	  that	  Australian	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  Prime	  Ministers	  customarily	  issue	  after	  their	  biannual	  meetings.	  The	  relevant	  parts	  of	  the	  
joint	  statement	  released	  on	  2	  March,	  2009	  read:	  
In	   the	   face	  of	   the	  global	  economic	  downturn	   they	   [the	  Prime	  Ministers]	  pledged	   renewed	  
ambition	  to	  achieve	  new	  levels	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  integration.	  These	  efforts	  will	  be	  
built	  on:	  
o the	  strong	  trade	  results	  delivered	  by	  26	  years	  of	  Closer	  Economic	  Relations,	  which	  have	  
set	  a	  global	  benchmark	  for	  free	  trade	  
o the	  vital	  role	  of	  the	  Single	  Economic	  Market	   initiative	   in	  aligning	  and	  strengthening	  the	  
two	  economies,	  stimulating	  business	  activity,	  competitiveness	  and	  job	  creation	  
o high	  quality,	  responsive	  domestic	  financial	  regulatory	  systems	  and	  institutions	  	  
o a	   determination	   to	   foster	   open	   markets,	   flows	   of	   capital	   and	   credit	   and	   to	   resist	  
protectionism	  in	  order	  to	  uphold	  confidence	  in	  the	  international	  economy;	  And	  
o the	  dynamism	  and	  strength	  of	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  companies,	  and	  the	  ideas	  and	  
energy	  of	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Australia	  New	  Zealand	  Leadership	  Forum.	  	  
The	  two	  Prime	  Ministers	  committed	  to:	  
.	   .	   .	   reduce	   remaining	   barriers	   at	   the	   borders	   to	   ensure	   that	   people	   and	   goods	   can	  move	  
more	  easily	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  (Key	  &	  Rudd,	  2009a).	  
The	  above	  statement	  associates	  the	  ‘reduce	  remaining	  barriers	  at	  the	  borders’	  objective	  with	  the	  
‘Single	  Economic	  Market	  initiative’.	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  am	  therefore	  equating	  delivering	  on	  the	  former	  
with	   contributing	   to	   the	   latter.	   The	   Single	   Economic	   Market	   (SEM)	   focus	   of	   border-­‐related	  
activities	  I	  was	  involved	  in	  over	  the	  period	  2004-­‐5	  supports	  this	  interpretation.	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  
this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  research	  question:	  	  
What	  role	  did	  narrative	  play	  in	  the	  way	  border	  policy	  officials	  translated	  the	  political	  goal	  of	  a	  
single	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  market	  into	  action	  after	  the	  Joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  of	  




Within	  this	  question	  is	  a	  mix	  of	  future	  focus,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  goals,	  and	  the	  ‘here	  and	  now’	  
in	  terms	  of	  the	  action	  officials	  took	  at	  the	  time.	  
1.3 Personal	  statement	  
This	  thesis	  has	  been	  a	  deeply	  personal	  quest,	   in	  that	  I	  have	  been	  working	  in	  and	  influencing	  this	  
particular	  environment	  on	  and	  off	  throughout	  the	  last	  15	  years.	  The	  communiqué	  of	  2	  March	  2009	  
was	  to	  re-­‐involve	  me	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  developments	  I	  will	  trace	  in	  this	  thesis	  –	  developments	  
that	  continued	  to	  follow	  an	  uneven	  path	  of	  ‘joint-­‐ness’.	  This	  thesis	  also	  has,	  of	  necessity,	  a	  focus	  
on	  the	  two	  Customs	  administrations,	  given	  my	  long	  employment	  in	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  and	  the	  
specialised	  knowledge	  and	  cultural	  mind-­‐set	  that	  brings.	  
This	  thesis	  is	  also	  grounded	  in	  practice	  –	  my	  own	  and	  others’	  –	  and	  in	  this	  respect	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  
the	  many	  officials	  in	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Europe	  who	  generously	  gave	  me	  their	  time,	  and	  
to	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  for	  access	  to	  the	  records	  of	  that	  practice.	  
1.4 The	  research	  arena	  
Australia	   has	   a	   federal	   parliamentary	   system,	   with	   a	   commonwealth	   of	   states	   and	   territories,	  	  
while	  New	   Zealand	   has	   a	  much	   simpler	   unitary	   parliamentary	   system	  which	   is	   also	   unicameral.	  
While	   each	   country	   is	   sovereign	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   both	   are	   still	   members	   of	   the	   British	  
Commonwealth,	  and	  while	  playing	  out	  differently	  in	  structure	  and	  practice,	  both	  political	  systems	  
derive	  from	  the	  British	  Westminster	  model	  (Rhodes,	  Wanna,	  &	  Weller,	  2009).	  	  
Even	   though	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   connections	   are	   primarily	   at	   the	   federal	   level,	   with	   no	  
involvement	   of	   the	   states	   and	   territories	   except	   for	   some	   food	   safety	   and	   biosecurity	  matters,	  
policy	   activity	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   context	   still	   involves	   a	   ‘spaghetti	   bowl’12	   of	   political,	  
official	   and	   industry	   players	   and	   relationships,	   both	   between	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   and	  
within	  each	  country,	  as	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  2	  below.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A term used to describe the effect of multiple trade agreements. See (Majluf, 2004, p. 9). My use is not the usual use of the 
term but the effect is the same – many intersecting and crossing connections at the organisational level. Not visible in this 
diagram are the many informal connections between different agencies and ministerial offices. 
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Represented	  in	  two	  places	  to	  
reflect	  different	  connections
Central	  agency	  relationship
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  Australian	  
Governments	  (COAG)
Australia-­‐New	  Zealand	  
Food	  Safety	  Ministerial	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What	  we	  see	  in	  this	  diagram	  is	  the	  messy,	  dispersed	  landscape	  depicted	  by	  political	  scientists	  of	  
the	  British	  ‘interpretive	  turn’.	  That	  work	  is	  built	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  government	  systems	  as	  
socially	  constructed,	  from	  the	  macro	  to	  the	  micro	  level	  (Bevir	  &	  Rhodes,	  2006a,	  2006b,	  2010;	  Bevir	  
&	   Richards,	   2009).	   The	   ‘spaghetti	   bowl’	   reflects	   different	   policy	   networks	   in	   the	   border	  
management	   domain,	   operating	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   governance	   (Bevir	   &	   Rhodes,	   2010;	  
Colebatch,	  2005;	  Rhodes,	  2007):	  	  
Policy	  networks	  are	  sets	  of	  formal	   institutional	  and	   informal	   linkages	  between	  government	  
and	   other	   actors	   structured	   around	   shared	   if	   endlessly	   negotiated	   beliefs	   and	   interests	   in	  
public	  policy	  making	  and	  implementation	  (Rhodes	  in	  Moran	  et	  al.	  2006,	  p.	  426).	  
Policy	  practice	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  context	   forms	   some	  of	   those	  networks,	   involving	  a	   range	  of	  
institutional	   arrangements	   in	   different	   policy	   areas,	   ranging	   from	   joint	   agencies	   to	   non-­‐binding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




cooperation	   (Australian	  Government	  Department	  of	  Finance	  and	  Administration	  &	  New	  Zealand	  
Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Development,	  2007).	  
Policy	   practice	   in	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   management14	   is	   framed	   by	   the	   Australia-­‐New	   Zealand	  
Closer	  Economic	  Relationship	  Trade	  Agreement	  (CER).	  This	  free	  trade	  agreement,	  signed	  in	  1983,	  
‘has	  been	  recognised	  by	   the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  as	  a	  model’.15	   It	  not	  only	  opened	  up	   the	  
two	  economies	  but	  also	  created	  a	  continuing	  environment	  of	  ongoing	  government	  cooperation	  as	  
the	  agreement	  progressively	  developed	  and	  deepened.16	  	  	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  arrangements	  involve	  non-­‐binding	  cooperation	  across	  the	  three	  key	  areas	  of	  
customs,	   biosecurity	   and	   immigration.	   In	   the	   area	  of	   customs,	   the	  policy	   issues	   yielding	   the	  big	  
gains	   have	   been	   dealt	   with,	   and	   what	   is	   left	   are	   more	   operational	   policy	   matters;	   biosecurity	  
cooperation	   likewise;	   immigration	   policy	   such	   as	   visa	   conditions	   and	   quotas	   and	   refugee	  
settlement	   affects	   border	   arrangements	   but	   is	   generally	   handled	   separately.	   Together,	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  border	  matters	  are	  classed	  as	  ‘trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  management’,	  which	  is	  the	  arena	  of	  
policy	  practice	  addressed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
As	  foreshadowed	  by	  the	  discussion	  above,	  this	  thesis	  comprises	  two	  interwoven	  strands.	  The	  first	  
is	   the	   search	   for	   the	   relationship	  between	  policy	  narrative	  and	  action;	   the	   second	   is	   the	   setting	  
within	  which	  that	  search	  occurs	  –	  that	  of	  border	  management	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
regional	   economic	   integration.	   The	   spaghetti	   bowl	   of	   border-­‐related	   interactions	   represents	  
where	  that	   interweaving	  takes	  place	  but	   it	  doesn’t	   tell	  us	  much	  about	  how	  policy	   is	  practised	   in	  
the	  domain	  of	  border	  management.	  For	  example,	  the	  diagram	  does	  not	  depict	  the	  many	  informal	  
contacts	  and	   interactions	  of	  officials	  and	  politicians;	   it	  does	  not	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  happens	   in	  
the	  formal	  contacts	  or	  what	  prompts	  changes	  in	  policies	  or	  processes;	  and	  it	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Border management involves managing the flows of people, goods and craft across borders. Discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
15 See Austrade’s website for an overview:  http://www.austrade.gov.au/Export/About-Exporting/Trade-
Agreements/ANZCERTA  
16 Discussed further in 5.4.2. 
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stories	  accompany	  the	  activities	  of	  officials	  and	  politicians	  or	  what	  influence	  those	  stories	  have	  on	  
those	  activities.	  
In	   the	  next	  Chapter,	   I	   establish	   the	   gaps	  of	   knowledge	   that	   are	   addressed	   in	   this	   thesis	   in	  both	  
these	   areas	   –	   border	   management	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   economic	   integration	   and	   the	  
relationship	  of	  narrative	  to	  action	   in	  policy	  practice	  –	   	  and	   introduce	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	  as	  a	  
way	  of	  addressing	  those	  gaps.	  I	  then	  describe	  in	  Chapter	  3	  how	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	  provides	  a	  
powerful	  theoretical	  frame	  for	  exploring	  both	  regional	  economic	  integration	  and	  policy	  narrative,	  
and	  how	  aspects	  of	  narrative	  theory	  could	  add	  additional	  insights	  to	  this	  frame.	  	  
	  In	   Chapter	   4,	   I	   describe	   the	   ontology,	   epistemology	   and	  method	   for	   conducting	   this	   research,	  
followed	  by	  the	  argument	  that	  border	  management	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  global	  marketization	  as	  
established	  by	  Çalışkan	  and	  Callon	  (2010),	  and	  thus	  of	  regional	  integration.	  Also	  in	  Chapter	  5	  is	  an	  
exploration	  of	  regional	  economic	   integration	   in	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  as	  a	  point	  of	  reference	  
for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   economic	   integration,	   with	   a	   particular	   focus	   on	   border	   management.	   This	  
material	  provides	  the	  necessary	  background	  for	  the	  narrative	  analysis	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8.	  	  	  
Chapter	  6	  delves	  more	  deeply	  into	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  management	  through	  five	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
border	  stories	  centred	  on	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  of	  2	  March	  2009,	  and	  provides	  an	  
analysis	  of	  each	  one	  along	  with	  overall	  reflections,	  using	  the	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	  frame.	  This	  is	  
followed	   by	   the	   research	   findings	   in	   Chapter	   7,	   wherein	   I	   answer	   the	   research	   question.	   This	  
Chapter	   identifies	  the	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  action	  in	  the	  five	  trans-­‐Tasman	  stories	  
and	   connects	   them	  back	   to	   two	  deeper	  narrative	   strands	  –	   trans-­‐Tasman	  historical	   and	   cultural	  
connections	   and	   connections	   to	   the	   global	   trading	   system	   that	   has	   spawned	   the	   regional	  
integration	   framework.	   	   The	   final	   Chapter	   develops	   the	   argument	   for	   broader	   connections,	  
providing	   a	   more	   in-­‐depth	   discussion	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   findings	   in	   Chapter	   7.	   This	  
discussion	  makes	   explicit	   the	   contribution	   to	   knowledge	   provided	   by	   this	   thesis	   in	   the	   areas	   of	  
border	   management	   in	   regional	   economic	   integration,	   policy	   practice,	   narrative,	   and	   Actor-­‐
Network	  Theory	  and	  also	  identifies	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	  	  




Chapter 2  
Border Management in Regional Economic Integration and Narrative 
in Public Policy – The Current State of Knowledge  
2.1 Introduction	  
This	  Chapter	  sets	  out	  the	  current	  state	  of	  knowledge	  about	  border	  management	  policy	  in	  regional	  
economic	  integration	  and	  about	  narrative	  in	  public	  policy,	  and	  identifies	  gaps	  in	  knowledge	  in	  both	  
areas.	  It	  situates	  border	  management	  policy	  in	  regional	  economic	  integration,	  which	  is	  revealed	  to	  
be	   a	   contested	   concept,	   and	   identifies	   a	   gap	   in	   the	   consideration	   of	   border	   management	   in	   a	  
deeply	   integrated	   region	  other	   than	   the	   EU.	   It	   also	   situates	  policy	  narrative	   in	   the	  Westminster	  
system,	  traverses	  the	  main	  themes	  of	  existing	  work	  on	  policy	  narrative	  and	  establishes	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  
relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  action,	  specifically	  how	  officials	  translate	  narrative	  into	  action.	  	  
2.2 The	  current	  state	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  contribution	  of	  border	  management	  
to	  regional	  economic	  integration	  
Regional	   economic	   integration,	   also	   known	   as	   economic	   integration	   or	   market	   integration,	  
involves	   a	   particular	   economic	   relationship	   between	   two	   or	   more	   markets.	   Jacks	   provides	   a	  
relatively	   simple	   definition:	   ‘.	   .	   .	   market	   integration	  may	   simply	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   opening	   and	  
development	  of	  trade	  between	  heretofore	  autonomous	  markets	  and	  their	  integration	  into	  a	  single	  
operative	  entity’	  (Jacks,	  2000).	  
Both	   understanding	   and	   applying	   theories	   of	   regional	   economic	   integration	   appear	   to	   be	  
somewhat	  problematic	  for	  the	  global	  trading	  system.	  First,	  regional	  economic	  integration	  could	  be	  
seen	  as	  either	  in	  competition	  with	  or	  part	  of	  global	  economic	  integration.	  A	  regionally	  integrated	  
market	  increases	  economic	  performance	  between	  participating	  countries	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  third	  
countries,	  which	  has	  been	  argued	  as	  being	  against	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  
and	   Trade	   (GATT),	   the	   first	  multilateral	   trading	   agreement,	   	   and	   thus	   against	   the	   global	   trading	  
system	   (Rom,	   1964).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   with	   the	   slowing	   of	   progress	   on	   further	   multilateral	  
agreements	   via	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization,	   economic	   integration	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   a	  
substitute	   for	   the	   global	   trading	   system,	   for	   example,	   the	   aspirations	   of	   the	   Association	   of	  




Pelkmans,	   in	   his	   1980	   article	   revisiting	   theories	   of	   economic	   integration,	   assesses	   integration	  
theory	  as	  lacking	  practicality.	  ‘A	  short	  and	  general	  verdict	  is	  that	  integration	  theory	  has	  too	  often	  
traded	  practical	  relevance	  for	  theoretical	  elegance’	  (Pelkmans,	  1980,	  p.	  333).	  He	  critiques	  Balassa’s	  
‘classic’	  work	  (Balassa,	  1961)	  in	  which	  Balassa	  sets	  out	  the	  stages	  of	  integration,	  and	  in	  particular	  
argues	  that	  customs	  union	  theory	  is	  alienated	  from	  reality	  (except	  for	  ‘at	  the	  border’	  for	  tariffs)	  by	  
its	  assumptions	  that	  remove	  change,	  uncertainty,	  complexity	  and	  government	  interference	  in	  the	  
economy	  from	  the	  model.	  
Table	   1	   sets	   out	   a	   version	   of	   Balassa’s	   stages	   of	   integration	   used	   by	   De	   Lombaerde,	   Dorrucci,	  
Genna,	  &	  Mongelli	  (2008)	  that	  shows	  five	  stages	  of	  integration	  and	  their	  particular	  characteristics.	  
This	  version	  also	  provides	  examples	  of	  each	  level	  of	  integration.	  Note	  that	  CER	  does	  not	  feature.	  
 Stages	  of	  Economic	  Integration	  Table	  1.
Stages	   of	  
integration	  
Description	   Characteristics	   Examples	  
1	   Free	  trade	  area	  (FTA)	  	  
	  
Tariffs	  and	  quotas	  abolished	  between	  area	  members	  
Tariffs	  and	  quotas	  retained	  against	  3rd	  countries	  
NAFTA	  
2	   Customs	  union	  (CU)	   Common	   tariffs	   and	   quotas	   for	   trade	   with	   non-­‐
members	  
European	   Economic	   Community	  
before	  1968	  
3	   Common	  market	  (CM)	  
	  
A	  CU	  promoting	  	  
-­‐integration	  of	  product	  and	  service	  markets	  (through	  
abolition	  of	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  to	  trade),	  and	  
-­‐integration	   of	   capital	   and	   labour	  markets	   (through	  
abolition	  of	  restrictions	  on	  factor	  movement)	  




4	   Economic	  union	  (EUN)	   A	   CM	   with	   a	   significant	   degree	   of	   coordination	   of	  
national	   economic	  policies	   and/or	  harmonisation	  of	  
relevant	  domestic	  laws	  
	  European	  Union	  
5	   Total	   economic	  
integration	  (TEI)	  
An	   EUN	   with	   all	   relevant	   economic	   policies	  
conducted	  at	  the	  supranational	  level	  
Supranational	  authorities	  and	  laws	  needed	  
The	  Eurozone	   is	  partway	  between	  
an	  EUN	  and	  a	  TEI	  
Taken	  from	  UNU-­‐CRIS	  working	  paper	  W-­‐2008/9,	   	   in	  which	  the	   information	   is	  presented	  as	   ‘a	  conceptual	   framework	  
inspired	  by	  Balassa	  (1961)	  and	  the	  European	  experience’	  (De	  Lombaerde,	  Dorrucci,	  Genna	  &	  Mongelli,	  2008,	  pp.	  3-­‐4)	  	  
Some	  terms	  used	   in	  Table	  1	  (tariff,	  market,	  customs	  union,	  non-­‐tariff	  barriers	  to	  trade)	  affect	  or	  




are	   ‘non-­‐tariff	  barriers’?17)	  and	  some	   looks	  clear	  but	   in	  practice	   is	   interpreted	  and	  played	  out	   in	  
different	   ways	   in	   different	   countries	   or	   groups	   of	   countries	   (e.g.	   customs	   union18).	   	   Crowley	  
suggests	   that	   the	   customs	   union	   step	   can	   be	   omitted	   altogether	   	   (Crowley,	   2002),	   which	   is	  
certainly	  the	  case	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  integration.	  
Government’s	  role	  is	  overtly	  present	  in	  regional	  economic	  integration	  theory.	  According	  to	  Mattli	  
(2005),	   integration	   is	   not	   integration	   until	   promises	   made	   in	   integration	   treaties	   have	   been	  
implemented.	  He	  describes	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  implementation:	  	  
.	  .	  .	  a	  lengthy	  process	  of	  establishing	  common	  rules,	  regulations,	  and	  policies.	  It	  is	  these	  rules,	  
regulations,	  and	  policies,	  based	  either	  on	  specific	  treaty	  provisions	  or	  derived	  over	  time	  from	  
the	   general	   principles	   and	   objectives	  written	   into	   integration	   treaties,	  which	   translate	   the	  
aspiration	  for	  regional	  prosperity	  into	  reality.	  Treaty	  implementation,	  however,	  is	  a	  slow	  and	  
arduous	  process	  laden	  with	  conflict	  (Mattli,	  2005,	  pp.	  328–9).	  
These	   treaties	   and	   ‘rules,	   regulations	   and	   policies’	   are	   made	   between	   governments.19	  
Governments	   thus	   set	   the	   conditions	   to	   facilitate	   trading	   across	   borders	   in	   regional	   economic	  
integration	   in	   a	   similar	   way	   to	   global	   forums	   like	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   (WTO).	   And	  
according	  to	  Pelkmans,	  these	  conditions	  are	  very	  political	  (Pelkmans,	  1980,	  p.	  350).	  	  
The	  EU	   is	   the	  most	  developed	  and	  most	   researched	  example	  of	  a	   single	  market	   (Leslie	  &	  Elijah,	  
2012).	   It	   also	   resulted	   in	   the	   most	   extensive	   example	   of	   and	   model	   for	   regional	   economic	  
integration	  in	  the	  world,	  even	  though	  no	  other	  regional	  grouping	  has	  achieved	  the	  same	  level	  of	  
integration	  (Cameron,	  2010).	  	  
One	  example	  that	  is	  not	  usually	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  comparator	  is	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  integration.	  
The	   stance	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	  of	   Leslie	  &	  Elijah,	  who	  provide	  a	  defensible	  argument	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The OECD’s definition indicates the way this term is applied in reality is not clear-cut: 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1837 
18 Pelkmans (1980) points to many problems with customs union theory, which is essentially about changes in efficiency, 
and therefore ignores movements within the market such as growth, labour and investment movements and new products. 
19 Grenville argues that these rules provide the framework for countries to go beyond economic interests and to introduce 
new ideas and insights (Chapter 2 in OECD & The Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Centre at the University of South 





treating	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   as	   a	   ‘region’,	   and	   therefore	   as	   an	   example	   of	   regional	  
economic	  integration	  (Leslie	  &	  Elijah,	  2012).	  	  
It	  is	  the	  ‘across	  borders’	  aspect	  that	  I	  now	  turn	  to.	  Regional	  economic	  integration	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  cross-­‐
border	  narrative	  –	  a	  narrative	  about	  the	  interplay	  between	  national	  and	  international	  borders.	  	  A	  
very	   useful	   concept	   for	   considering	   this	   narrative	   is	   that	   of	   ‘power	   containers’	   (Giddens,	   1985).	  
Peter	  Taylor	   (1994)	  developed	  this	   idea	   into	   four	  containers	   (power,	  wealth,	  cultural	  and	  social)	  
that	   represent	   the	   state’s	   basic	   tasks	   –	   of	   staging	   war,	   managing	   the	   economy,	   and	   providing	  
national	  identity	  and	  social	  services.	  	  	  
Paasi	  developed	  this	  further	  by	  articulating	  the	  tensions	  contained	  within	  these	  tasks	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	   state’s	   desire	   to	   extend	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   contain	   its	   territoriality.	   For	   example,	   to	  
maintain	   and	   develop	   economic	   wealth	   and	   cultural	   identity,	   a	   state	   will	   seek	   to	   extend	   its	  
territoriality;	   to	   control	   populations	   and	   to	   maintain	   culture	   and	   society,	   a	   state	   will	   seek	  
territoriality	   it	   can	  control	   (Paasi,	  1998,	  p.	  73).	  Paasi	  does	  not	  address	  Taylor’s	   ‘social	   container’	  
(the	   state’s	   moral	   obligation	   to	   look	   after	   its	   people)	   but	   his	   work	   does	   set	   the	   scene	   for	  
understanding	  borders	  as	  places	  of	  power:	  	  
Since	  boundaries	  are	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  power	  structures	  that	  exist	  between	  societies,	  a	  
major	  challenge	  for	  boundary	  research	  is	  to	  deconstruct	  such	  power	  relations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
boundary	   narratives.	   Boundaries	   may	   therefore	   be	   comprehended	   as	   flows	   of	   power	   in	  
which	  memories	  are	  transformed	  into	  things	  of	  the	  present	  and	  future	  (Paasi,	  1998,	  p.	  83).	  
If	   we	   accept	   his	   premise	   that	   the	   economic	   impetus	   is	   to	   expand	   a	   nation’s	   territory,	   and	   the	  
political	  impetus	  is	  to	  preserve	  existing	  boundaries,20	  borders	  are	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  connection	  
between	  these	  two	  drivers,	  where	  the	  integrating	  forces	  of	  the	  international	  trading	  system	  meet,	  
or	  pull	  against,	  the	  separating	  force	  of	  territorially-­‐bounded	  nation	  states	  (Walker,	  2010).21	  	  	  
These	  forces	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  distinction	  between	  political	  and	  economic	  communities.	  The	  
former	  is	  bound	  by	  state	  borders	  (democracy	  –	  voting	  for	  politicians,	  and	  what	  is	  publicly	  owned);	  
the	  latter	  is	  not	  so	  bound	  and	  can	  cross	  state	  boundaries	  with	  impunity:	  ‘what	  happens	  at	  borders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This thesis shows that his premise applies to Australia and New Zealand, at least. 




can	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  wider	  implications	  of	  their	  separate	  integration.	  .	  .	  Rather,	  it	  is	  formal	  state	  
sovereignty	  and	  representative	  democracy	  which	  “stop”	  at	  borders’	   (Anderson	  &	  O’Dowd,	  1999,	  
pp.	  8–9).	  The	  implication	  we	  can	  take	  from	  Anderson	  and	  O’Dowd	  is	  that	  studying	  what	  happens	  
at	  borders	  can	  help	  us	  understand	  an	  aspect	  of	  regional	  economic	  integration	  that	  has	  been	  little	  
studied	  –	  that	  of	  the	  way	  these	  forces	  play	  out	  at	  the	  borders	  of	  a	  single	  economic	  market.	  
The	  nature	  of	  policy	  in	  border	  management	  is	  two-­‐fold.	  The	  first	  area	  relates	  to	  particular	  policy	  
domains	  such	  as	  immigration,	  quarantine	  and	  customs;	  the	  second	  relates	  to	  the	  policy	  about	  the	  
mechanisms	   for	   managing	   flows	   across	   borders.	   Hills	   defines	   border	   management	   as	   ‘usually	  
concern[ing]	  the	  rules,	   techniques	  and	  procedures	  regulating	  activities	  and	  traffic	  across	  defined	  
border	  areas	  or	  zones’	  (Hills,	  2006).	  This	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  this	  latter	  type	  of	  policy,	  which	  I	  have	  
called	   ‘border	  management	   policy’.	   Border	  management	   policy	   provides	   governments	   with	   the	  
ability	  to	  enact	  their	  sovereign	  interests	  at	  the	  border.	  In	  other	  words,	  border	  management	  is	  an	  
instrument	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   border	   management	   policy	   defines	   and	   delineates	   this	  
instrument.22	  While	   there	   is	   extensive	   literature	   on	   borders	   and	   territorialisation,23	   there	   is	   not	  
much	  on	  this	  particular	  aspect	  of	  border	  management	  policy.24	  
 The gaps in knowledge 2.2.1
This	  review	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  literature	  in	  standard	  economic	  theory	  is	  under-­‐developed	  on	  the	  
border	  aspects	  of	  the	  ‘common	  market’	  stage	  of	  integration,	  given	  that	  ‘.	  .	  .	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  
as	  a	  “theory	  of	  the	  common	  market’’	  ’	  (Pelkmans,	  1980,	  p.	  341).	  The	  implication	  from	  Pelkmans’	  
comment	   is	   that	  there	   is	  not	  a	  single	  type	  of	   ‘single	  market’,	  and	  therefore,	  not	  a	  single	  type	  of	  
border	  management	   arrangement.	  While	   the	   concept	   and	   role	   of	   borders	   has	   been	   researched	  
extensively,	   including	   policy	   practices	   of	   border	   management	   beyond	   ‘customs	   union’	   in	   the	  
European	   Union,	   border	   management	   has	   not	   been	   examined	   in	   the	   deeply	   integrated	   trans-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Explained in Nicklin, 2002. 
23 For example, the work of Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999; Newman, 2006; Paasi, 1998; Walters, 2002. 
24 An exception is Ladley and White, 2006, commissioned by New Zealand Customs.  There is also significant material on 
border management in international organisations such as the WCO and the World Bank that includes policy-related 
matters developed for practitioners but does not focus on the policy implications of practice in a theoretical way. 
Recognising the general lack of research on customs matters, the WCO has developed a partnership with academia (the 





Tasman	   regional	   economic	   market.	   Neither	   has	   there	   been	   academic	   attention	   paid	   to	   border	  
management	  as	  a	  particular	  field	  of	  policy.	  
 The contribution to knowledge 2.2.2
This	  thesis	  provides	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  knowledge	  on	  regional	  economic	  integration	  in	  several	  
areas.	  First,	  it	  explicitly	  situates	  border	  management	  beyond	  customs	  union	  in	  regional	  economic	  
integration	  and	   creates	  new	   insights	  by	  extending	  Michel	  Callon’s	   approach	   to	  marketization	   to	  
border	  management	   (Çalışkan	  &	  Callon,	  2010;	  Callon,	  2007;	  Callon	  &	  Muniesa,	  2005).	  Second,	   it	  
explores	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   narratives	   of	   border	   management	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   economic	  
integration	  arrangements.	  There	  has	  been	  no	  attention	  given	  to	  narrative	  in	  this	  domain.	  Third,	  it	  
creates	  new	  knowledge	  about	   the	  particular	  dynamics	  of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   integration	  and	  
the	   implications	   for	  other	  regions.	  Fourth,	   there	   is	  only	  a	  small	  amount	  of	   research	  using	  Actor-­‐
Network	   Theory	   (ANT)	   to	   examine	   aspects	   of	   border	   management,	   primarily	   focused	   on	  
technology	  and	  security	  at	  the	  border	  (e.g.	  Naber,	  Hofman,	  Enserink,	  &	  Kotterink,	  2013;	  Tolerton,	  
2009).	  This	  thesis	  therefore	  adds	  to	  the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  applying	  ANT	  to	  the	  management	  of	  
borders,	   through	   an	   examination	   of	   border	   management	   policy	   practice	   in	   the	   formation	   and	  
operation	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  SEM.	  
2.3 The	  current	  state	  of	  knowledge	  about	  policy	  narrative	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  elements	  of	  policy,	  narrative25,	  border	  management	  and	  regional	  integration	  are	  
brought	  together	  through	  the	  field	  of	  policy	  narrative.	  According	  to	  Jones	  and	  McBeth,	  ‘narrative	  
remains	   a	   mysterious	   and	   elusive	   concept	   in	   policy	   theory’	   (Jones	   &	   McBeth,	   2010,	   p.	   330).	   I	  
therefore	  review	  key	  literature	  on	  policy	  narrative	  and	  what	  the	  current	  state	  of	  knowledge	  tells	  
us	  policy	  narratives	  might	  be,	  and	  the	  extent	   to	  which	   that	   literature	  addresses	   the	  relationship	  
with	  action.	  	  
Given	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman-­‐British	  Commonwealth	  connection	  referred	  to	   in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  British	   ‘interpretive	  turn’	  of	  political	  science	  provides	  a	   logical	  starting	  point.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  
proponents	   of	   the	   British	   interpretive	   turn	   is	   Rod	   Rhodes.	   Rhodes’	   long	   and	   varied	   career	   has	  
taken	  him	  on	  a	  progressive	  journey	  of	  exploration	  that	  has	  led	  him	  from	  public	  administration	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Although some narrative theorists distinguish between the two, ‘narrative’ and ‘stories’ are commonly used 




governance	   to	   policy	   networks	   and	   more	   recently	   to	   the	   role	   of	   narratives	   in	   policy	   practice,	  
particularly	   in	  policy	   implementation.	  The	  relationship	  of	  narrative	  and	  action	  has	  been	  a	  strand	  
throughout	  his	  work.	  For	  example,	   in	  their	  2003	  article	  on	  tradition	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  Rhodes,	  
Bevir	  and	  Weller	  describe	  narrative	  as	  a	  form	  of	  explanation	  ‘.	  .	  .	  that	  works	  by	  relating	  actions	  to	  
the	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  that	  produce	  them’	  (Bevir,	  Rhodes,	  &	  Weller,	  2003,	  p.	  13).	  
More	  recently,	  drawing	  on	  the	  rich	  and	  considerable	  literature	  on	  narrative	  in	  the	  human	  sciences,	  
Rhodes	  selects	  the	  metaphor	  as	  a	  central	  element	  to	  policy	  narratives,	  ‘.	  .	  .	  making	  the	  unfamiliar	  
analogous	  to	  familiar	  situations’	  	  (Rhodes,	  2011,	  p.	  204).	  His	  focus	  is	  on	  recovering	  from	  every-­‐day	  
policy	   makers	   ‘their	   beliefs	   and	   practices	   about	   “how	   things	   work	   around	   here’’’,	   as	   the	   main	  
vehicle	  for	  policy	  analysis	  (Ibid.).	  He	  is	  particularly	  interested	  in	  whether	  policy	  narratives	  can	  help	  
explain	   the	   failures	   of	   policy	   implementation.	   There	   is	   therefore	   a	   link	   in	   his	   work	   between	  
narrative	  and	  action	  in	  policy	  practice,	  and	  the	  struggles	  that	  entails,	  which	  is	  very	  relevant	  to	  the	  
enquiry	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Rhodes’	  frequent	  collaborator,	  Mark	  Bevir,	  provides	  a	  related	  link	  between	  
meaning	  and	  action:	  ‘An	  interpretive	  approach	  suggests	  that	  the	  state,	  like	  all	  political	  life,	  consists	  
of	  meaning	  in	  action’	  (Bevir,	  2011,	  p.	  192).	  
Similar	   to	   Rhodes	   and	   Bevir,	   Hajer,26	   including	   with	   his	   colleague	   David	   Laws,	   connects	   policy	  
practice	  with	   constructing	   narrative,	   including	  metaphors,	   as	   a	  means	   of	   generating	   action.	   For	  
them,	  policy	  practice,	   as	   the	   site	  at	  which	   interpretive	   schemata	  are	  produced	  and	   reproduced,	  
‘builds	   on	   the	   linguistic	   account	   of	   policy	  making	   that	   employs	   narratives	   –	   stories,	  metaphors,	  
myths	  –	  to	  create	  an	  image	  of	  the	  world	  that	  is	  acted	  upon	  and	  that	  constitutes	  the	  world	  at	  the	  
same	  time’	  (Hajer	  &	  Laws,	  2006,	  p.	  264).	  
The	   contributions	   of	   Rhodes,	   and	   Hajer	   and	   Laws,	   are	   part	   of	   the	   growing	   body	   of	   academic	  
literature	  on	  policy	  narrative	  that	  has	  emerged	  since	  the	  1990s.27	  	  Rhodes	  asserts	  that	  ‘narratives	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Hajer is an interpretive political scientist who argues that dispersed governance requires deliberative analysis, which in 
turn requires many different inputs and analytical methods, of which discourse analysis is one (Hajer, 2003). His work most 
relevant to this thesis is in two chapters co-authored with David Laws in the Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Moran, 
Rein, & Goodin, 2006).   





are	   the	   form	  theories	   take	   in	   the	  social	   sciences’28	   (Rhodes,	  2011,	  p.	  204)	  and	  cites	  Ricoeur	  and	  
Czarniawksa	  as	  examples	  of	  ‘the	  extensive	  literature	  on	  narratives	  in	  the	  human	  sciences’	  (Ibid.).	  	  
While	  story-­‐telling	  has	  a	  long	  genealogy,	  including	  grand	  narratives	  passed	  down	  from	  generation	  
to	   generation	   as	   part	   of	   tribal	   culture	   and	   history	   (White,	   1999),	   the	   development	   of	   narrative	  
theory	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  came	  about	  from	  the	  interpretivist	  and	  post-­‐modernist	  thinkers	  of	  
the	   1970s-­‐1990s,	   who	   gave	   weight	   to	   human	   meaning-­‐making	   (Czarniawska,	   2004a).	   It	   was	   a	  
natural	  progression,	  then,	  for	  academics	  to	  start	  to	  study	  narrative	  and	  stories	  as	  key	  vehicles	  for	  
meaning-­‐making	  (Hyvärinen,	  2010).	  This	  awakening	  of	  interest	  encompassed	  a	  movement	  that	  has	  
a	  polyphony	  of	  approaches	  and	  interpretations	  that	  continue	  to	  grow	  and	  develop.	  ‘The	  study	  of	  
narrative	  does	  not	  fit	  neatly	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  any	  single	  scholarly	  field’	  (Reissman,	  1993,	  p.	  
1).	  This	  movement	  is	  commonly	  called	  the	  ‘narrative	  turn’.	  	  
According	   to	   Czarniawska	   (2004a),	   who	   has	   written	   extensively	   on	   narrative	   in	   social	   science	  
research,	  Polkinghorne	  attributes	  the	  contemporary	  literary	  study	  of	  narrative	  to	  the	  five	  schools	  
of	   thought	   –	   comparative	   linguistics,	   Russian	   formalism,	   United	   States	   new	   criticism,	   German	  
hermeneutics	  and	  French	  structuralism,	  with	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	  in	  particular,	  spawning	  a	  range	  
of	   different	   narrative	   approaches.	   The	   table	   below	   illustrates	   the	   developments	   of	   narrative	  
thought.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This is a very broad statement that is not altogether clear. Does he mean social science theories are told by way of 




 Brief	  Genealogy	  of	  Narrative	  Methods	  Table	  2.
	  
	  
Adapted	  from	  Rosile,	  Boje,	  Carlon,	  Downs,	  &	  Saylors,	  (2013,	  p.	  577),	  drawing	  on	  Czarniawska	  (2004a)	  and	  (Hyvärinen,	  
2006)
29	  
Even	   given	   these	   developments,	   Hyvärinen’s	   study	   of	   the	   history	   of	   narrative	   has	   led	   him	   to	  
conclude	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  narrative	  ‘has	  remained	  un-­‐theorized	  and	  under-­‐theorized	  for	  a	  long	  
time’,	  in	  that	  the	  narrative	  turn	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  narrative	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  
concept	  (Hyvärinen,	  2006,	  p.	  32).	  This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  partly	  address	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  area	  of	  policy	  
narrative.	  
Because	  policy	  narrative	  theory	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  recognised	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  narrative	  turn	  by	  
Hyvärinen	   or	   Czarniawska,30	   I	   have	   created	   a	   category	   ‘Policy	   Narrative	   Methods’.31	   A	  
characteristic	   of	   the	   approaches	   in	   this	   new	   category	   is	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   actors	   in	   the	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  I have significantly expanded on the original table, and added in new categories, which I explain in this Chapter and in 
Chapter 3.5. 
30 For example, Hyvärinen covers the development of all the main strands of narrative but does not mention policy narrative 
at all. 
31 Hyvärinen notes an absence of fields of ‘narrative sociology’ and ‘narrative philosophy, but does not mention political 
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process,	   with	   authors	   contributing	   a	   different	   structural	   aspect	   to	   assist	   policy	   practitioners,	   in	  
particular,	   to	  understand	  and	  carry	  out	   their	  work.	   Implicit	   in	  most	   is	  a	   relationship	  with	  action.	  
Hyvärinen	  notes	   the	   ‘explosion	  of	  narrative	   inquiry’	   (Hyvärinen,	  2004,	  p.	  4),	   into	  which	  category	  
Catherine	  Reissman	  falls.	  Other	  policy	  narrative	  theorists	  included	  in	  this	  new	  category	  are	  Dvora	  
Yanow,	   Emery	   Roe,	   Jay	   White	   and	   Shanahan,	   Jones,	   McBeth	   and	   Lane,	   all	   of	   whose	   work	  
originated	   in	   or	   is	   currently	   based	   in	   the	   United	   States	   (US)	   public	   administration	   research	  
tradition.32	  	  
Reissman’s	  fields	  of	  research	  are	  social	  work	  and	  qualitative	  research	  methods.	  	  While	  not	  strictly	  
‘policy’,	  her	  approach	  has	  been	  used	  in	  research	  areas	  relevant	  to	  public	  policy	  such	  as	  education,	  
social	  wellbeing	  and	   illness.33	  Her	   approach	  builds	  on	   the	   ‘Life	   as	  Narrative’	   category	   in	   Table	  2	  
above,	  whose	  proponents	  argue	  that	  people’s	  lives	  are	  experienced	  as	  narratives.34	  Of	  interest	  to	  
this	   thesis	   is	   her	   method	   of	   narrative	   analysis,	   which	   she	   describes	   as	   having	   to	   do	   with	   how	  
people	   interpret	   things	   for	   themselves	   and	   how	   others	   interpret	   those	   interpretations.	   The	  
individual’s	   story	   is	   her	   particular	   area	   of	   interest.	   For	   her,	   the	   value	   of	   narrative	   analysis	   over	  
other	   social	   science	  methods	   is	   the	   insights	   it	   gives	   to	   social	   life	   ‘through	   an	   individual’s	   story’	  
(Reissman,	  1993,	  p.	  5).	  	  She	  relates	  action	  to	  narrative,	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  To	  her,	  
narrative	   gives	   meaning	   to	   actions.	   ‘Events	   become	   meaningful	   because	   of	   their	   placement	   in	  
narrative’	   (Reissman,	  1993,	  p.	  18).	   She	  also	  notes	   the	   lack	  of	  agreement	  about	   the	  definition	  of	  
narrative	   by	   narrative	   theorists.	   To	   summarise,	   while	   Reissman’s	   work	   provides	   guidance	   for	  
narrative	  analysis,	  it	  doesn’t	  help	  reveal	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  narrative.	  	  
Another	  academic	  whose	  work	  on	  narrative	  falls	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  policy	  narrative	  but	  without	  
the	   ‘policy	   narrative’	   label	   is	   Dvora	   Yanow.	   Her	   focus	   is	   on	   interpretive	   policy	   analysis	   and	  
meaning-­‐making	   in	   which	   ‘the	   interpretive	   policy	   analyst	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   translator,	   bringing	  
other	   interpretive	   communities’	   stories	   to	   her	   employing	   policymaker,	   agency,	   or	   community	  
group,	   helping	   each	   to	   understand	   the	   stories	   of	   the	   others’	   (Yanow,	   2000,	   p.	   90).	   For	   Yanow,	  
stories	  are	  therefore	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  analyst’s	  activity	  of	   interpreting	  and	  translating.	   	  Yanow’s	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33 For example, ‘Involving the public through participatory visual research methods’. Health Expectations, 12(3), 262-274; 
Phoenix, C., Smith, B., & Sparkes, A. C. (2010); Narrative analysis in aging studies: A typology for consideration. Journal of 
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work	  provides	  only	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  I	  aim	  to	  build	   in	  this	  thesis.	  Her	  focus	   is	  on	  guiding	  policy	  
practice	  rather	  than	  revealing	  it.	  An	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  her	  work	  is	  her	  recognition	  of	  the	  power	  
of	  ‘things’	  to	  tell	  policy	  stories	  by	  way	  of	  metaphor	  (Yanow,	  1995).	  A	  feature	  of	  ANT	  is	  its	  inclusion	  
of	  non-­‐humans	  as	  actors.35	  The	  role	  of	  ‘things’	  in	  narrative	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  Chapters	  6	  to	  8.	  
Arguably	  the	  most	  influential	  writer	  on	  the	  policy	  and	  practice	  of	  policy	  narrative	  is	  Emery	  Roe,	  a	  
practising	   policy	   analyst	   and	   academic	   researcher.	   He	   created	   a	   narrative	   model	   for	   policy	  
reconciliation	  that	  involves	  identifying	  the	  dominant	  and	  counter-­‐narratives	  underpinning	  a	  policy	  
controversy	   and	   finding	   the	   metanarrative	   to	   frame	   policy	   discussion	   that	   can	   break	   through	  
entrenched	  positions	  (Roe,	  1994).	  	  His	  book	  on	  policy	  narrative	  analysis	  provides	  a	  procedure	  for	  
carrying	  this	  out,	   in	  which	  he	  states:	   ‘Since	  stories	  are	  a	  fact	  of	   life	  for	  practicing	  policy	  analysts,	  
some	  form	  of	  rigorous	  narrative	  analysis	  should	  be	  available	  for	  them’	  (Roe,	  1994,	  p.	  55).	  His	  work	  
is	   insightful	   and	   implicitly	   contains	   an	   element	   of	   action	   (via	   breakthrough	   metanarrative)	   but	  
does	  not	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  action.	  
Jay	  White,	   and	   Shanahan,	   Jones	   and	  McBeth	   aim	   to	   bring	   a	  more	   scientific	   approach	   to	   policy	  
narrative	   analysis.	   Professor	   White’s	   extensive	   examination	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   knowledge	   as	  
storytelling	  in	  public	  administration	  makes	  an	  important	  contribution	  in	  this	  domain.	  In	  making	  the	  
argument	   for	   the	   importance	   of	   narrative	   in	   policy,	   he	   refers	   to	   action	   research,	   in	   which	   the	  
actors	   participate	   in	   their	   own	   understanding.	   He	   builds	   the	   case	   out	   of	   the	   scientific	  method,	  
arguing	   that	  even	   ‘basic	   science’	   involves	  making	  value	   judgments,	  and	   is	   therefore	   interpretive	  
(White,	   1999).	  White	   also	   asserts	   that	   public	   administration,	   as	   a	  minor	   discipline,	   needs	  more	  
local	  narratives.	  	  This	  thesis	  provides	  some	  of	  those.	  
More	  recently,	  Jones,	  McBeth	  and	  colleagues	  (Jones	  &	  McBeth,	  2010;	  Shanahan,	  Jones,	  McBeth,	  &	  
Lane,	  2013)	  have	  developed	  and	  applied	   their	   ‘Narrative	  Policy	  Framework’	   (NPF)	   that	   straddles	  
the	  divide	  between	   ‘scientific	  and	  repeatable’	  and	  post-­‐positive	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  policy	  
narrative	   to	   enable	   testable	   hypotheses.	   Their	   work	   is	   important	   in	   that	   it	   addresses	   the	  
relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  outcomes.	  The	  NPF	  operates	  at	  three	  levels	  –	  micro,	  meso	  and	  
macro.	  The	  micro	  level	  involves	  the	  interaction	  with	  and	  shaping	  of	  public	  opinion	  through	  policy	  
narrative;	  the	  meso	  level	  is	  strategic,	  where	  narratives	  are	  about	  winning	  and	  losing	  and	  are	  built	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




out	   of	   coalitions.	   Narrative	   analysis	   at	   the	  meso	   level	   involves	   ‘specifying	   causal	   links	   between	  
policy	   narratives	   and	   policy	   outcomes’	   (Shanahan	   et	   al.,	   2013,	   p.	   461);	   policy	   narratives	   at	   the	  
macro	  level	  are	  those	  of	  	  institutions	  and	  cultures.	  	  The	  authors	  claim	  their	  work	  provides	  greater	  
understanding	  about	  the	  properties	  of	  narratives	  and	  how	  they	  are	  used,	  although	  they	  consider	  
the	   importance	   of	   narrative	   in	   policy	   processes	   is	   still	   to	   be	   proven	   (Ibid.).	   Similarly	   to	   Roe,	  
Shanahan,	   Jones,	  McBeth	   and	   Lane	   examine	   narratives	   in	   public-­‐facing	   policy	   (Shanahan	   et	   al.,	  
2013).	   Their	   approach	   assumes	   a	   problem	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   certain	   types	   of	   tropes	   such	   as	  
villains	   and	   heroes.	   It	   currently	   does	   not	   address	   future-­‐focused	   ideas	   but	   could	   perhaps	   be	  
adapted	  by	  defining	  the	  future	  as	  the	  problem	  of	  what	  could	  happen.	  	  
For	   all	   their	   value	   in	   other	   respects,	   none	  of	   these	   approaches	   help	   us	   understand	   the	  ways	   in	  
which	  officials	  translate	  politicians’	  policy	  directives	  into	  action,	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  strategic	  
in	   nature	   and	   the	   form	   of	   the	   expected	   outcome	   is	   uncertain,	   as	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	  
situation.	  	  
Despite	   different	   approaches	   being	   used,	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   narrative	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   have	  
generated	  the	  many	  theoretical	  debates	  of	  other	  social	  sciences.	  Those	  debates	  cover	  such	  topics	  
as	   the	   relationship	   between	   narrative	   in	   literature	   and	   other	   fields,	   whether	   narrative	   is	  
representational	  or	  ‘lived’,36	  whether	  a	  narrative	  is	  only	  a	  narrative	  if	   it	  has	  the	  form	  ‘beginning-­‐
middle-­‐end’37	  	  or	  whether	  narrative	  can	  be	  narrative	  without	  a	  sequence	  or	  where	  the	  sequence	  is	  
mixed	  up;	  whether	  a	  narrative	  has	  to	  be	  complete	  and	  	  finished	  or	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  partial	  and	  
lived;	   and	   whether	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘grand	   narrative’	   is	   still	   useful	   or	   not	   (Czarniawska,	   2004a;	  
Hyvärinen,	   2006,	   2010;	   Klein,	   1995).	   There	   is	   also	   a	   separation	   between	   ‘narrative	   turn’	   and	  
‘narratology’	   literature,	   with	   the	   ‘narrative	   turn’	   exploring	   stories	   as	   meaning-­‐making,	   often	  
focusing	  on	  the	  ‘lived	  experience’	  of	  personal	  and	  collective	  narratives,	  and	  narratology	  having	  a	  
more	  technical	  focus	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  form	  of	  narrative:	  	  
Even	   the	   distinction	   between	   narrative	   and	   story	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   divides	   the	   two	   main	  
stories.	   While	   narratologists	   usually	   insist	   on	   its	   relevance,	   narrative	   turn	   scholars	   often	  
understand	  the	  terms	  simply	  as	  synonyms,	  and	  then	  prefer	  the	  shorter	  and	  more	  colloquial	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term	  of	  story	  	  (Hyvärinen,	  2004,	  p.	  2).	  
Hyvärinen	  offers	  an	  additional	  challenge	  to	  the	  field	  by	  calling	  for	  more	  theorising	  about	  the	  term	  
‘narrativity’.38	  	  
When	   we	   consider	   the	   debates	   in	   the	   field	   of	   policy	   narrative,	   academic	   writing	   tends	   to	   be	  
exploratory,	   and	   discussions	   more	   about	   how	   to	   apply	   policy	   narrative	   analysis	   to	   help	   policy	  
analysts	   to	  make	  sense	  of	  complex	  and	  unstable	  situations	   than	  about	  narrative	   theory	   (Moran,	  
Rein,	  &	  Goodin,	  2006,	  Chapters	  12	  and	  19).	  Jones	  and	  McBeth	  are	  an	  exception,	  arguing	  against	  
the	  tenet	  that	  scientific	  standards	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  policy	  narrative	  simply	  because	  it	  is	  socially	  
constructed	  (Jones	  &	  McBeth,	  2010).	  	  	  
This	  review	  of	  approaches	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  policy	  narrative	  is	  applied	  differently	  by	  
different	  academics,	  where	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  two	  different	  streams	  –	  the	  performative39	  stream	  
coming	  out	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK)	  and	  Europe,	  and	  the	  analytical	  methods	  of	  the	  US.	  Policy	  
narrative	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   involve	   stories,	   interpretation	   and	  meaning-­‐making,	   and	   the	   form	  and	  
shape	  of	  content,	  such	  as	  metaphors,	  controversies	  and	  plots.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  recognition	  of	  some	  
sort	   of	   relationship	   between	   narrative	   and	   action,	   though	   this	   has	   not	   been	   a	   focus	   of	   policy	  
narrative	  academic	  work	  to	  date.	  	  
 The gaps in knowledge 2.3.1
As	  outlined	  above,	  the	  use	  of	  narrative	  in	  policy	  practice	  is	  primarily	  focused	  on	  understanding	  the	  
form	  and	  content	  of	   the	  meaning-­‐making	   for	  use	   in	  policy	  analysis.	  Even	  when	   it	  does	   relate	   to	  
action,	  such	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  Rod	  Rhodes	  on	  implementation	  failures,	  the	  study	  of	  policy	  narrative	  
does	  not	  appear	  to	  lead	  us	  any	  closer	  to	  understanding	  how	  policy	  narrative,	  and	  future-­‐focused	  
policy	  narrative	  in	  particular,	  is	  translated	  into	  action	  by	  officials.	  
Hajer	  and	  Laws	  call	   for	  the	  use	  of	  narrative	  and	  discourse	  tools	  to	  help	  policy	  analysts	  deal	  with	  
controversies,	  and	  to	  help	  them	  innovate,	  and	  signal	  the	  need	  for	  research,	  stating:	  ‘to	  understand	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how	   policy	  makers	  make	   sense	   of	   a	   complex	  world	   and	   design	   actions,	   we	   need	   to	   look	  more	  
carefully	  at	  concrete	  interaction’	  (Hajer	  &	  Laws,	  2006,	  p.	  264).	  	  
This	  thesis	  looks	  specifically	  at	  the	  concrete	  interactions	  of	  officials	  in	  the	  policy	  practice	  of	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  border	  management.	  
 The contribution to knowledge  2.3.2
This	  thesis	  fills	  gaps	  in	  policy	  narrative	  theory	  through	  using	  ANT	  as	  a	  theoretical	  base	  and	  as	  a	  tool	  
for	   analysis,	   supported	   by	   links	   with	   related	   aspects	   of	   narrative	   theory.	   Rather	   than	   just	  
describing	  the	  narratives	  within	  a	  policy	  situation,	  ANT	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  trace	  the	  action	  and	  link	  
it	  to	  the	  narratives	  in	  play.	  Combining	  ANT	  with	  narrative	  theory	  enables	  narrative	  meanings	  to	  be	  
drawn	   out	   from	   what	   is	   revealed.	   Hajer	   and	   Laws	   provide	   a	   doorway	   into	   the	   use	   of	   ANT	   in	  
narrative	   policy	   by	   specifically	   mentioning	   the	   insights	   that	   Latour’s	   practice-­‐based	   approach	  
provides	  to	  policy	  practice	  (Moran	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Chapters	  12	  and	  19).	  	  They	  also	  describe	  narrative	  
in	   an	   ANT-­‐like	   way.40	   For	   them,	   narrative	   is	   relational	   and	   active	   –	   ‘stories	   emerge	   in	   an	  
interaction’,	   which	   they	   expand	   on	   further	   by	   saying	   ‘[n]arratives	   are	   like	   a	   ball	   that	   bounces	  
backwards	  and	  forwards	  and	  constantly	  adapts	  to	  new	  challenges	  that	  are	  raised’	  (Hajer	  &	  Laws,	  
2006,	   p.	   260).	   The	  next	  Chapter	  demonstrates	   that	  what	   they	   are	   referring	   to	   is	   the	  process	  of	  
translation.	  
Rhodes’	  work	  also	  provides	  a	  doorway	  into	  ANT	  through	  his	  linking	  of	  narrative	  and	  networks:	  
.	   .	   .	   by	   following	   a	   policy	   process	   through	   the	   ”webs	   and	   relations	   between	   actors,	  
institutions	   and	   discourses	   across	   time	   and	   space”	   (Shore	   and	  Wright	   1997,	   p.	   14)	   –	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  identify	  the	  several	  ways	  in	  which	  policies	  are	  framed	  in	  networks	  (Rhodes,	  2011,	  
p.	  206).	  
Nevertheless,	  ANT	  has	  neither	  been	  extensively	   connected	  with	  narrative	   in	  policy	  practice,	  nor	  
with	   narrative	   theory	   in	   general.41	   ANT	   has	   also	   been	   used	   to	   analyse	   different	   fields	   of	   public	  
policy	  and	  public	  administration,	  including	  border	  controls,	  but	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  narrative.42	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 ANT is described in Chapter 3. 
41 Czarniawska has linked ANT with narrative and applied ANT to her work on organisations. This will be discussed in 
Chapter 3. ANT and narrative have been linked in some theses on sociology and organisations (Peters, 2004; Wagner, 2003), 




Using	  ANT	  and	  narrative	  theory	  together	  adds	  to	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  policy	  narrative.	  
This	   knowledge	   is	   a	   new	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   narrative	   and	   action,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  area	  of	  ‘fact-­‐making’,	  and	  what	  is	  happening	  when	  actions	  fail	  or	  succeed	  within	  
their	  environment	  through	  tracing	  connections,	  associations	  and	  translations.	  These	  terms	  and	  my	  
approach	  to	  these	  matters	  is	  described	  in	  the	  next	  Chapter.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 E.g. using ANT to analyse policy innovation (Young, Borland, & Coghill, 2010); examining customs controls in the EU 








Chapter 3  
The Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Introduction	  
In	   this	  Chapter,	   I	   introduce	  ANT	  and	  use	   it	   to	   frame	  border	  management	  as	  a	   function	  and	  as	  a	  
part	  of	  global	  markets,	  and	   to	   frame	  narrative.	   I	   reveal	  connections	  between	  ANT	  and	  narrative	  
theory,	   including	  policy	  narrative,	  and	  draw	  out	  key	  areas	   that	  establish	  the	  theoretical	   focus	  of	  
this	  thesis.	  	  
3.2 An	  introduction	  to	  ANT	  
 ANT’s credentials and some key concepts 3.2.1
ANT	  emerged	  between	  1978	  and	  1982,	  and	  by	  1982	  it	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  new	  way	  of	  studying	  the	  
social	   impact	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  (Law,	  2009).	  Michel	  Callon,	  who	  coined	  the	  term	  ‘Actor-­‐
Network	  Theory’,	  developed	  the	  approach	  with	  Bruno	  Latour	  and	  others	  when	  teaching	  sociology	  
to	   engineers	   at	   the	   School	   of	  Mines	   in	   Paris.	   It	   has	   evolved	   steadily	   since	   1982,	   with	   Law	   and	  
Hassard’s	   1999	   book	   Actor-­‐Network	   Theory	   and	   After	   being	   seen	   as	   a	   transition	   to	   a	   broader	  
application	  known	  as	  ‘after	  ANT’	  (Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	  &	  Hernes,	  2005;	  Vikkelsø,	  2007).	  	  
ANT,	   which	   is	   sometimes	   called	   the	   sociology	   of	   translation,43	   and	   which	   Law	   argues	   is	   better	  
termed	  ‘material	  semiotics’	  (Law,	  2009),	  studies	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  social	  groupings	  are	  formed	  out	  
of	   connections	   between	   actors,	   human	   and	   non-­‐human.	   Rather	   than	   the	   usual	   sociological	  
approach	  of	   starting	  with	   the	  entity	   called	   ‘society’	  out	  of	  which	   the	   sociologist	   identifies	   social	  
groupings,	  ANT	  starts	  by	  revealing	  the	  connections	  from	  which	  social	  groupings	  are	  formed,	  and	  it	  
is	  these	  revealed	  groupings,	  not	  the	  sociologist’s	  classifications,	  that	   in	  turn	  define	  what	  is	  social	  
(Latour,	   2007).	   Through	   including	   non-­‐humans	   and	   non-­‐individuals44	   as	   actors,	   ANT	   reveals	  
insights	  about	  change	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  humans	  and	  non-­‐humans	  in	  change.	  
ANT	  draws	  on	  a	  mix	  of	  academic	  traditions,	   the	  key	   influences	  being	  the	  sociology	  of	  science	  of	  
Thomas	  Kuhn,	  the	  semiotics45	  of	  A.J.	  Greimas,	  the	  philosophies	  of	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Brown and Capdevila say this is the ‘proper’ name for ANT (In Law & Hassard, 1999). 
44 Technology has been a dominant non-human actor in ANT research.  
45 Semiotics is the study of the production of meaning in communication and language through signs and symbols. 




and	  Michel	   Serres,	   and	   the	   sociology	   of	  Gabriel	   Tarde	   (Latour,	   1996;	   Law,	   2009).	   In	   addition	   to	  
Callon	   and	   Latour,	   key	   contributors	   to	   the	   development	   of	   ANT	   as	   an	   academic	   discipline	   are	  
sociologists	   John	   Law	   and	  Vicky	   Singleton,	   anthropologist	   Annemarie	  Mol,	   the	   cross-­‐disciplinary	  
Donna	   Haraway	   whose	   field	   spans	   science	   and	   technology	   studies,	   anthropology	   and	   animal	  
studies	  and	  Barbara	  Czarniawska	  in	  the	  field	  of	  organisational	  studies.	  ANT	  is	  an	  evolving	  field	  that	  
‘is	  a	  diaspora	  that	  overlaps	  with	  other	  intellectual	  traditions’	  (Law,	  2009,	  p.	  142).	  	  
The	  core	  concept	  of	  ANT	  is	  the	  actor-­‐network	  which	  has	  three	  inextricably	  linked	  key	  elements	  –	  
actors,	  action	  and	  networks:	  
.	  .	  .	  actors	  associate	  with	  other	  actors,	  thus	  forming	  a	  network	  in	  which	  they	  are	  all	  made	  into	  
"actors"	   as	   the	   associations	   allow	   each	   of	   them	   to	   act.	   Actors	   are	   enacted,	   enabled,	   and	  
adapted	  by	  their	  associates	  while	  in	  their	  turn	  enacting,	  enabling,	  and	  adapting	  these	  (Mol,	  
2010,	  p.	  260).	  	  	  
Thus	  actors	  act	  upon	  the	  network	  and	  the	  network	  acts	  upon	  the	  actors;	  hence	  the	  hyphen	  in	  the	  
term	  ‘actor-­‐network’	  that	  couples	  the	  actor	  and	  the	  network	  together.	  	  
Actor-­‐networks	   are	   different	   from	   other	   sorts	   of	   networks	   (including	   policy	   networks46)	   in	   a	  
number	  of	   respects.	   The	   first	  difference	   is	   that	  by	   including	  non-­‐humans	  and	  non-­‐individuals	   as	  
actors,	  ANT	  gives	  them	  equal	  status	  with	  humans.	  This	  adds	  a	  dimension	  to	  the	  connections	  within	  
the	  network	  and	  thus	  on	  the	  way	  networks	  are	  studied.	  	  ANT	  reveals	  that	  non-­‐human	  actors	  can	  
speak,	  through	  humans,	  and	  can	  have	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  humans’	  behaviour.	  	  
The	  second	  is	  that	  power	  in	  ANT	  is	  relational	  –	   it	  comes	  from	  the	  associations	  rather	  than	  being	  
inherent	  in	  a	  position	  or	  a	  person,	  and	  is	  not	  centred	  on	  particular	  people	  but	  in	  the	  effects	  of	  	  the	  
associations	   and	   interactions	   between	   them:	   ‘It	   is	   the	   relations	   that	   matter,	   not	   the	   actors	   in	  
themselves’	  (Barry,	  2013,	  p.	  414).	  The	  more	  associations	  an	  actor-­‐network	  has,	  the	  more	  powerful	  
its	  effect	  on	  other	  actor-­‐networks.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The topic of policy networks is widely contested, but a defining difference from ANT is that policy networks are about 
human actors only. Nevertheless, there are links with ANT in some areas. Rhodes’ extensive work on governance places 
him as part of the group of academics who support ethnographic methods to reveal the role of individuals’ meaning- 
making in policy practice. This decentred approach creates links between ‘changing policy networks, new ideas and setting 




The	  third	  is	  that	  the	  terms	  macro-­‐,	  meso-­‐	  and	  micro-­‐	  as	  representations	  of	  gradations	  in	  size	  have	  
no	   meaning	   in	   ANT.	   The	   term	   ‘macro-­‐actor’	   used	   in	   ANT	   is	   short-­‐hand	   for	   many	   assemblages	  
associating	  together	  and	  using	  the	  same	  voice,	  such	  as	  in	  an	  organisation.	  The	  word	  ‘macro’	  refers	  
not	   to	   size	   but	   to	   ‘voice’.	   Actor-­‐networks	   operate	   in	   a	   conceptually	   flat	   landscape	   that	   is	  
determined	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  associations.	  In	  this	  flat	  landscape,	  time	  and	  distance	  become	  
irrelevant,	   except	   insofar	   as	   they	   are	   effects	   on	   the	   actor-­‐network.	   The	   focus	   is	   on	   the	  
associations;	   time	   and	   distance	   are	   ‘folded’	   into	   the	   local,	  where	   they	   are	   experienced	   as	   local	  
effects	  (Latour,	  1996).	  	  	  
The	   fourth	   is	   that	   the	   acting	   and	   enabling	   that	   Annemarie	   Mol	   talks	   about	   above	   are	   traced	  
through	   the	   translations	   that	   occur	   between	   actors.	   Translations	   are	   both	   making	   one	   thing	  
equivalent	   to	   another	   (in	   the	   sense	  we	   understand	   translating	   one	   language	   into	   another)	   and	  
about	   shifting	   and	   changing.	   This	   latter	   meaning	   of	   translation	   in	   ANT	   has	   a	   sense	   of	   picking	  
something	  up	  from	  someone	  or	  something	  else	  and	  making	  it	  one’s	  own	  so	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  same	  
as	   it	   was	   at	   the	   beginning.	   Translation	   is	   a	   term	   that	   is	   often	   used	   in	   narrative,	   and	   there	   is	   a	  
similarity	   in	   use.	  However,	   in	  ANT,	   translation	  has	   to	  occur	   for	   an	   action	   to	  be	   traced.	  Without	  
translation,	  there	  is	  no	  action.	  	  
Fifth,	   ANT	   does	   not	   involve	   any	   investigation	   by	   the	   researcher	   of	   intentionality	   in	   the	  
performance	   of	   the	   actor-­‐network;	   instead,	   it	   provides	   a	   way	   of	   describing	   what	   has	   occurred	  
leaving	  the	  actors	  to	  attribute	  meaning	  such	  as	  intentionality.	  	  
Sixth,	  ANT	   recognises	   the	   inherent	   instability	   in	   the	  associations	  of	  groups	   that	  are	   forming	  and	  
the	  need	  for	  constant	  effort	  to	  maintain	  and	  strengthen	  them:	  ‘Relating	  to	  one	  group	  or	  another	  is	  
an	  ongoing	  process	  made	  up	  of	  uncertain,	   fragile,	   controversial	   ,	   and	  ever-­‐shifting	   ties’	   (Latour,	  
2007,	   p.	   28).	   Law	   refers	   to	   this	   as	   the	   ‘performative’	   nature	  of	   actor-­‐networks	   (Law	  &	  Hassard,	  
1999).	  	  The	  concept	  of	  performativity	  features	  in	  Chapters	  6,	  7	  and	  8.	  	  
John	  Law	  summarises	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  ANT	  approach	  as:	  
.	   .	   .	   a	   theory	   of	   agency,	   a	   theory	   of	   knowledge,	   and	   a	   theory	   of	   machines.	   And	   more	  
importantly,	  it	  says	  that	  we	  should	  be	  exploring	  social	  effects,	  whatever	  their	  material	  form,	  




For	  Law,	  narrative	  and	  discourse	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  is	  framed	  (Law	  &	  
Williams,	  2014).	  
While	   Latour’s	   criticism	   of	   the	   words	   ‘actor’,	   ‘network’,	   ‘theory’	   and	   the	   hyphen	   in	   Law	   and	  
Hassard’s	   Actor-­‐Network	   Theory	   and	   After	   is	   tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek,	   his	   discussion	   highlights	   the	  
problems	  that	  have	  arisen	  from	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘Actor-­‐Network	  Theory’.	  The	  meaning	  of	  
other	   terms	   used	  within	   ANT	   have	   also	   been	   contested,	   as	   discussed	   by	  Annemarie	  Mol	   in	   her	  
article	   ‘Actor-­‐Network	   Theory:	   Sensitive	   Terms	   and	   Enduring	   Tensions’	   (Mol,	   2010).	   	   Some	  
explanation	  of	   the	  ANT	   terms	  as	  used	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   therefore	   required.	   Table	   3	  below	  briefly	  
describes	   each	   one.	   Their	   meaning	   will	   become	   clearer	   as	   the	   reader	   encounters	   them	   in	   my	  
narrative.	  
 Description	  of	  ANT	  terms	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  Table	  3.
Term	   Meaning	  
Actor/actant	   ‘something	  that	  acts	  or	  to	  which	  activity	  is	  granted	  by	  others’	  (Latour,	  1996,	  p.	  373).	  An	  
actor	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  an	  action	  however	  –	  ‘an	  actor	  is	  made	  to	  act	  by	  many	  others.’	  
(Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  46).	  An	  actant	  is	  a	  non-­‐human	  actor.	  	  
Macro-­‐actor	  
 ‘[M]acro-­‐actors	  are	  micro-­‐actors	  seated	  on	  top	  of	  many	  (leaky)	  black	  boxes.	  They	  are	  
neither	   larger	   nor	  more	   complex	   than	  micro-­‐actors;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   they	   are	   of	   the	  
same	  size	  and	  .	  .	  .	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  simpler	  than	  micro-­‐actors’	  (Callon	  &	  Latour,	  1981,	  p.	  
286).	  	  
	  ‘[A]	   super-­‐actor	   that	   seems	   to	  be	  much	   larger	   than	  any	   individuals	   that	   constitute	   it,	  
and	   yet	   it	   is	   but	   an	   association	   –	   a	   network	   –	   of	   these	   individuals,	   equipped	   with	   a	  
“voice”	  ’	  (Czarniawska,	  2004a,	  p.	  7).	  
Network	   The	   network	   is	   the	   action,	   and	   integrates	   signs	   and	   symbols	   in	   language	   and	  
communication	  (semiotics)	  and	  material	  connections.	  
Action	   Action	   is	   what	   is	   done.	   Action	   is	   only	   traceable	   through	   the	   process	   of	   translation.	  
Tracing	  does	  not	  involve	  intentionality.	  
Assemblage	   Social	  groupings	  are	  assembled	  through	  the	  connections,	  actors	  and	  actions	  that	  are	  an	  
actor-­‐network.	  An	  assemblage	   is	  an	  actor-­‐network.	  The	  word	  brings	   to	  mind	  how	  the	  





	  ‘To	  translate	  is	  to	  make	  two	  things	  equivalent	  .	  .	  .	  and	  about	  shifting.	  It	  is	  about	  moving	  
terms	   around,	   about	   linking	   and	   changing	   them’	   (Law,	   2009,	   p.	   144).	   Latour’s	  
description	  of	  the	  ‘shifting’	  aspect	  is	  ‘moving	  from	  one	  place	  to	  another’	  (Latour,	  1987,	  
p.	  117).	  	  








The	   traces	   actors/actants	   leave	   reveal	   connections	   (or	   associations	   –	   the	   terms	   are	  
used	  interchangeably).	  Connections	  form	  rhizomic-­‐like	  shapes.47	  	  
Drawing	   on	   Deleuze,	   Latour	   described	   the	   ‘fibrous,	   thread-­‐like,	  
wiry,	  stringy,	  ropy,	  capillary	  character’	  of	  modern	  societies	  (Latour,	  




Continuous	   processes	   of	   translation	   that	   have	   effects	   on	   the	   matter/s	   of	   concern.	  
‘Performances	   are	   material	   processes,	   practices,	   which	   take	   place	   day	   by	   day	   and	  





Matters	  of	  concern	  are	  different	  for	  different	  actors,	  are	  disputable	  and	  are	   ‘a	  way	  of	  
insisting	  that	  facts	  and	  values	  cannot	  be	  disentangled:	  that	  each	  implies	  the	  other’	  (Law	  
&	  Williams,	  2014,	  p.	  22);	  matters	  of	  fact	  have	  been	  created	  out	  of	  a	  collective	  process	  
of	  agreement	  (involving	  translation).	  All	  matters	  of	  fact	  ‘depend	  on	  holding	  the	  practice	  
together’	   and	   contain	   matters	   of	   concern	   ‘that	   are	   embedded	   in	   or	   motivate	   the	  
practice	  question’	  (Ibid.).	  
Stability	   and	  
instability	  
Actor-­‐networks	  are	  in	  a	  continual	  state	  of	  becoming,	  and	  as	  such,	  the	  connections	  are	  
unstable.	   Connections	   can	   be	   stabilised	   but	   are	   contingent	   and	   inherently	   uncertain.	  
Even	   seemingly	   stable	   connections	   will	   eventually	   break	   down	   and	   have	   to	   be	   re-­‐
established.	  
Power	   Neither	   positive	   nor	   negative,	   power	   is	   relational	   –	   it	   results	   from	   the	   density	   of	  
associations,	  and	  arises	  from	  translation,	  and	  others	  speaking	  on	  one’s	  behalf.	  ‘”Power	  
to”	  do	  things	  grows	  out	  of	  lots	  and	  lots	  of	  interwoven	  practices	  .	  .	  .	  so	  the	  power	  to	  do	  
things	  is	  always	  a	  bit	  uncertain’	  (Law	  &	  Singleton,	  2013,	  p.	  494).	  
Black	  box	  
The	   term	   is	   used	  where	   something	   is	   complex	   but	   stabilised,	   and	   you	   don't	   need	   to	  
know	  the	  ‘programme’	  –	  only	  the	  input	  and	  the	  output.	  It	  is,	  however,	  not	  inert	  –	  it	  has	  
to	  be	  maintained,	  or	  else	  it	  will	  become	  unstable.	  	  
Inscriptions	  
Visual	   representations	   that	   translate	   concepts	   or	   activity	   into	   an	   accessible	   and	  
understandable	  form	  e.g.	   in	  science,	  the	  printouts	  that	  show	  the	  results	  of	  a	  chemical	  
analysis	  make	  accessible	  the	  computations	  of	  the	  machine	  that	  did	  the	  analysis.	  
Fluidity	  and	  
flows	  
Actor-­‐networks	  that	  operate	  in	  an	  adaptable	  context	  can	  behave	  in	  a	  fluid	  way.	  Latour	  
describes	   actors	   as	   flows:	   ‘actors	   are	   not	   conceived	   as	   fixed	   entities	   but	   as	   flows,	   as	  
circulating	  objects’	  (Latour,	  1996,	  p.	  374).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Image from http://www.iaacblog.com/maa2013-2014-advanced-architecture-concepts/2013/11/rhizome-deleuze-




Term	   Meaning	  
Multiplicity	  
‘Different	  realities	  are	  enacted	  in	  different	  practices’	  (Law,	  2011,	  p.	  5)	  and	  ‘.	  .	  .	  the	  ways	  
in	   which	   coexisting	   and	   partly	   connected	   versions	   of	   reality	   are	   enacted’	   (Vikkelsø,	  
2007,	   p.	   301).	   In	   other	  words,	   different	   realities	   can	  occur	   alongside	  one	   another,	   or	  
intersect	  with	  one	  another,	  or	  be	  included	  in	  one	  another.	  
Obligatory	  
points	   of	  
passage	  
(OPP)	  
A	  ‘single	  locus	  that	  could	  shape	  and	  mobilize	  the	  local	  network’	  and	  ‘have	  control	  over	  
all	  transactions	  between	  the	  local	  and	  the	  global	  networks’	  (Bijker	  &	  Law,	  1992,	  p.	  31).	  
An	   OPP	   is	   a	   point	   of	   power	   but	   it	   only	   exists	   as	   long	   as	   actors	   and	   network	   remain	  
stable	  (Michael,	  1996).	  
	  
	  
3.3 The	  performativity	  of	  border	  management	  
In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  described	  how	  borders	  are	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  international	  and	  
sovereign	  interests.	  As	  the	  first	  part	  of	  establishing	  the	  overall	  theoretical	  frame	  of	  this	  thesis,	  this	  
section	   frames	  border	  management	  using	  ANT	  concepts,	  establishing	   the	   suitability	  of	  ANT	  as	  a	  
theoretical	  frame	  for	  this	  field.	  	  
The	   border	   of	   a	   nation	   state	   is	   a	   socially	   constructed	   concept.	   There	   might	   be	   a	   physical	  
manifestation	  through	  a	  natural	   feature,	  such	  as	  a	  mountain	  range,	  a	  river	  or	  an	  ocean	  or	  there	  
might	  be	  a	   line	  on	  a	  map	  that	  represents	  the	  border.	  The	  mechanisms	  governments	  establish	  to	  
control	  their	  borders	  include	  policies	  and	  practices	  that	  affect	  the	  behaviours	  of	  people	  wanting	  to	  
cross	  those	  borders	  for	  both	  legal	  and	  illegal	  purposes	  (Marenin,	  2010).	  	  This	  of	  course	  also	  applies	  
to	  illegal	  movement	  of	  goods,	  and	  avoidance	  of	  customs	  duties.	  	  
One	  area	  in	  which	  borders	  are	  visibly	  constructed	  is	  that	  of	  airports.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  air	  travel,	  
leaving	   and	   arriving	   occurs	  within	   two	   different	   territories,	   rendering	   airports	   as	   quasi-­‐borders,	  
even	  though	  they	  might	  be	  situated	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  their	  respective	  territories	  and	  nowhere	  near	  
a	   physical	   border.	   This	   introduces	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   non-­‐spatiality	   of	   borders.	   A	   networked	  
(non)border	   is	   a	   geostrategy	   identified	   by	  William	  Walters	   –	   an	   analytic	   inspired	   by	   Foucher,	   a	  
French	   theorist	  of	  geopolitics:	   ‘One	   last	  point	  about	   the	  networked	   (non)border	   is	   that	   it	  points	  
away	   from	  the	   idea	  of	   the	  border	  as	  a	  contiguous	  space,	  a	  skin	  or	  enclosure	  of	   the	  state.	  But	   it	  
does	  not	  dispense	  with	  material	  sites	  of	  control	  or	  gateways’	  (Walters,	  2004,	  p.	  683).	  	  
There	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	   the	  border,	  whatever	   its	   form,	   involves	  an	  agglomeration	  of	   interactions	  




border	   is	   performative.	   It	   involves	   a	   web	   of	   information	   being	   translated	   from	   one	   place	   to	  
another	   –	   information	   that	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   mass	   of	   goods	   and	   people	   moving	   from	   one	  
country	   to	   another	   in	   ships	   and	   aircraft	   (in	   various	   configurations,	   for	   example,	   goods	   in	  
containers	  on	  container	  ships,	  oil	  tankers,	  small	  pleasure	  craft,	  passenger	  liners	  carrying	  cargo	  as	  
well	   as	  passengers	  and	   their	  baggage,	   cargo	  aircraft	   for	   fast	   freight	   services).	  These	  movements	  
involve	   combinations	   of	   computer	   systems,	   surveillance	   technology,	   border	   signage,	   and	  
legislation	   (e.g.	   the	   requirement	   to	   submit	   information	   electronically;	   the	   requirement	   to	   send	  
information	  of	  imported	  or	  exported	  goods	  in	  advance	  of	  them	  leaving	  the	  country	  of	  departure).	  	  
At	   physical	   control	   points,	   there	   are	   government	   agencies	   (uniformed	   officers),	   airport	   staff,	  
seaport	  workers,	  airline	  and	  ship	  crews,	  shopkeepers,	  maintenance	  crew.	  Behind	  the	  scenes	  there	  
is	   a	   vast	   array	   of	   officials	   dealing	   with	   intelligence	   and	   surveillance,	   policy,	   finance,	   planning,	  
management	  and	  other	  support	  activities.	  While	  this	  assemblage	  of	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  actors	  
is	  replicated	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  particularised	  in	  each	  country,	  and	  at	  each	  control	  point.	  	  
The	  principle	   underlying	   control	   is	   that	   the	   government	  of	   a	   country	   has	   the	   sovereign	   right	   to	  
know	  who	   or	  what	   is	   entering	   or	   exiting	   that	   country,	   and	   to	   set	   the	   conditions	   by	  which	   that	  
happens.48	   The	   reality	   of	   border	   controls	   is	   one	   of	   regulation,	   where	   the	   focus	   is	   preventing	  
unwanted,	   but	   not	   necessarily	   criminal,	   goods,	   organisms	   and	   people	   leaving	   or	   entering	   the	  
country.	  This	  world	  of	  regulation	  has	  as	  many	  actors	  as	  there	  are	  things	  to	  be	  stopped.	  	  It	  involves	  
preventive	  measures	   such	  as	  presence,	   for	  example	   through	   signage	  or	  uniforms,	  and	  providing	  
information	  about	  what	  actions	  governments	  require.	  
Border	   management	   is	   a	   stabilised	   concept,	   with	   Customs	   and	   other	   border	   administrations	  
having	  a	  dual	   role	  of	   facilitating	  and	  controlling	  the	   flows	  of	  people	  and	  goods	  across	  a	  nation’s	  
border.49	  However,	  practices	  are	  always	  changing.50	  Facilitation	  means	  ‘making	  it	  easy’	  for	  traders	  
and	  travellers	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  border	  controls.51	  The	  aim	  of	  facilitation	   is	  to	  keep	  the	  border	  
flows	  moving	  fast	  to	  reduce	  the	  economic	  impact	  of	  border	  controls.	  The	  underlying	  assumption	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49 For example, see Ladley & Simmonds, 2007. 
50 Interviewees commented on this.  
51 It also has a technical meaning in the context of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement signed in 2013. This meaning is 





of	   facilitation	   is	   that	   most	   traders	   and	   travellers	   want	   to,	   and	   do,	   comply	   with	   government	  
requirements,	   such	   as	   honestly	   declaring	   what	   goods	   are	   being	   sent	   to	   or	   from	   a	   country,	   or	  
having	  a	  genuine	  passport	  in	  order	  to	  enter	  a	  foreign	  country.	  Compliance,	  as	  shown	  by	  Karen	  Boll	  
(Boll,	   2011),	   is	   a	   performance	   with	   many	   components.	   Moving	   through	   border	   requirements	  
involves	  knowledge	  of	  them	  and	  interaction	  with	  government	  either	  electronically	  or	  physically	  to	  
fulfil	  them.	  	  
Because	   the	   performativity	   of	   ‘bordering’	   needs	   the	   cooperation	   of	   all	   the	   elements	   of	   the	  
network	  but	  doesn’t	  always	  get	  it	  (Murdoch,	  1998),	  border	  controls	  also	  need	  to	  address	  criminal	  
activities.	  Those	  not	  cooperating	  in	  the	  network	  operate	  in	  a	  parallel	  world	  of	  illicit	  supply	  chains,	  
as	  well	  as	  opportunistic	  offending.	  One	  way	  Customs	  administrations	  characterise	  ‘the	  border’	   is	  
as	  the	  mouth	  of	  a	  funnel	  –	  a	  choke	  point,	  or,	  in	  ANT	  terms,	  an	  obligatory	  point	  of	  passage.	  This	  is	  
where	   border	   controls	   have	   been	   traditionally	   carried	   out.	   Today,	   though,	   the	   locations	   of	   the	  
practices	   of	  managing	   the	   border	   are	   fuzzier,52	   even	   though	   they	   are	   defined	   by	   the	   legislation	  
which	  creates	  border	  agencies	  and	  gives	   them	  their	  powers.	  Surveillance,	   information	  gathering	  
and	   exchange,	   risk	   assessment	   are	   all	   done	   visibly	   and	   invisibly:	   ‘networks	   of	   control	   come	   to	  
substitute	  for	  the	  functions	  that	  were	  previously	  physically	  concentrated	  at	  the	  border’	  (Walters,	  
2004,	  p.	  680).	  Marenin	  assesses	  these	  network	  controls	   to	  be	  more	   important	   than	  the	  physical	  
border:	  ‘The	  border	  is	  encountered	  in	  two	  forms,	  as	  a	  virtual	  and	  a	  physical	  self.	  The	  virtual	  self	  is	  
more	  important,	  in	  the	  end,	  for	  legal	  border	  control	  and	  management	  than	  the	  real,	  the	  physical	  
self’	  (Marenin,	  2010,	  p.	  51).	  From	  an	  ANT	  worldview,	  one	  is	  not	  more	  important	  than	  the	  other	  –	  
both	  virtual	  and	  physical	  forms	  of	  control	  are	  needed.	   	   It	   is	  the	  connections	  and	  the	  translations	  
that	  matter.	  	  
ANT	   concepts	   of	   ‘connections’,	   ‘flows’	   and	   ‘flatness’	   of	   landscape	   resonate	   strongly	   with	   the	  
border	  context.	  	  In	  Latour’s	  social	  world,	  there	  are	  only	  the	  rhizomic	  shapes	  of	  actor-­‐networks	  and	  
the	  spaces	   in	  between	   (Latour,	  1996).	  Space-­‐time	  becomes	  a	   flat	  but	   folded	   landscape,	  as	  what	  
may	  be	  geographically	  far	  or	  from	  the	  distant	  past	  is	  folded	  into	  the	  here	  and	  now	  of	  ‘local’,	  such	  
that	   ‘contexts.	   .	   .	   flow	   locally	   through	   networks,	   be	   these	   geography,	   medicine,	   statistics,	  
economics	  or	  even	  sociology’	  (Latour,	  1999,	  p.	  18).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




‘Flows’	  are	  part	  of	  the	  everyday	   language	  of	  managing	  the	  border;	  distance	   is	  collapsed	  through	  
‘virtual	   borders’,	   where	   border	   processes	   are	   conducted	   before	   goods	   and	   people	   have	   even	  
reached	   their	   destination.	   Information	   flows	   circulate	   through	   the	   border	   system,	   sometimes	  
undergoing	  transformation	  into	  intelligence	  reports	  or	  border	  ‘alerts’.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  what	  
Latour	  calls	  ‘chains	  of	  reference’	  in	  which	  ‘the	  network	  .	  .	  .	  never	  stops	  erecting	  bridges	  between	  
one	   inscription	  and	  the	  next’	   (Latour,	  2013,	  p.	  80).	  He	   is	   referring	  to	  the	   leaps	  of	  understanding	  
that	   occur	   when	   actors	   translate	   and	   transform	   real	   situations	   into	   representations	   of	   those	  
situations,	   such	   as	   translating	   a	   physical	   environment	   into	   signs	   on	   a	   map	   or,	   in	   the	   border	  
context,	  translating	  information	  about	  border	  movements	  into	  risk	  items	  located	  in	  containers	  or	  
risk	  persons	  crossing	  the	  border.	  	  	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  range	  of	  inherent	  instabilities	  in	  the	  border	  environment.	  Official	  documents	  from	  
both	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   administrations	   have	   talked	   about	   ‘a	   dynamic	  
environment’	   for	   over	   a	   decade.53	   There	   is	   a	   constant	   renewal,	   or	   cat	   and	  mouse	   game,	  where	  
criminals	   adapt	   their	   smuggling	   methods	   as	   fast	   as	   border	   officials	   uncover	   them.	   The	  
unpredictable	   effects	   of	   rapidly	   changing	   technologies,	   for	   example,	   the	   way	   mobile	  
communication	  technology	  converged	  with	  computing,	  has	  resulted	  in	  different	  social	  networking	  
and	  consumer	  behaviours	   that	  have	  affected	   revenue	  collection.	   Latour’s	  observation	  about	   the	  
prevalence	   of	   uncertainty	   over	   facts	   in	   the	   world	   could	   usefully	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   border	  
management	  policy	  environment:	   ‘The	  world	   is	  not	  a	  solid	  continent	  of	   facts	  sprinkled	  by	  a	   few	  
lakes	  of	  uncertainties,	  but	  a	  vast	  ocean	  of	  uncertainties	  speckled	  by	  a	  few	  islands	  of	  calibrated	  and	  
stabilized	   forms’	   (Latour,	   2007,	   p.	   245).	   Tracing	   the	   networks	   provides	   a	   way	   to	   map	   this	   oft-­‐
shifting	  territory.	  
3.4 Border	  management	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  global	  markets	  
	  The	  performance	  of	  border	  management	  has	  long	  and	  intense	  connections	  into	  the	  global	  trading	  
system,	   some	   of	   which	   were	   touched	   on	   in	   Chapter	   2.	   This	   section	   demonstrates	   how	   that	  
performance	   can	   be	   nested	   within	   Callon’s	   concept	   of	   ‘marketization’.	   Framing	   border	  
management	   with	   ‘marketization’	   provides	   access	   into	   regional	   economic	   integration	   via	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




different	  narrative	  from	  the	  economic	  narrative	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  2	  –	  one	  that	   is	  more	  akin	  to	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  border	  officials	  describe	  their	  work	  in	  practice.	  	  
Standard	   economic	   views	   of	   markets	   compartmentalise	   activities,	   based	   on	   theoretical	  
calculations.	  Social	  scientists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  treat	  any	  calculations,	  to	  the	  
extent	  they	  are	  present,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  association	  of	  related	  activities.	  Economic	  sociology	  
views	   market	   activity	   as	   ‘embedded	   in	   society’	   and	   ‘as	   social	   in	   character’,	   and	   looks	   at	   how	  
markets	  come	  about	  and	  how	  they	  operate:	  ‘[m]arkets	  are	  based	  on	  institutions,	  laws,	  rules,	  and	  
the	  social	   interactions	   that	   structure	   the	   relationships	  between	  market	  participants’	   (Fligstein	   in	  
Favell	   &	   Guiraudon,	   2011,	   p.	   102).	   In	   this	   view,	  markets	   are	   quite	   structured,	   and	   part	   of	   that	  
structure	   is	   social	   interaction	   –	   a	   concept	   that	   is	   missing	   from	   standard	   economic	   views	   of	  
markets,	  which	  focus	  on	  transactions.	  
From	  an	  ANT	  approach,	  a	  market	  is	  a	  ‘macro-­‐actor’	  -­‐	  a	  dense	  network	  of	  associations	  constructed	  
by	   both	   humans	   and	   non-­‐humans	   through	   their	   actions	   and	   practices,	   including	   economists,	  
whose	  theories	  shape	  the	  behaviours	  of	  the	  market	  participants	  through	  changing	  relations	  that	  
were	  ‘.	   .	   .	  previously	  organized	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  and	  equal	  partnerships	  .	  .	   .	  
into	  market-­‐type	  configurations,	  governed	  by	  references	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  markets’	  (Tikkanen	  &	  
Peltonen,	  2005,	  p.	  268).	  	  
Redefining	   the	   relations	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   a	  market	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   prising	   apart	   one	   set	   of	  
associations	   and	   replacing	   them	   with	   another,	   for	   example,	   a	   salad	   vegetable	   can	   have	   many	  
different	  names	  and	   those	  names	  will	  mean	  different	   things,	   both	   trans-­‐nationally	   and	  within	   a	  
single	  country.	  Some	  names	  will	  have	  cultural	  connections	  and	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  rituals	  or	  
seasonal	   practices;	   others	   will	   have	   regional	   connections	   with	   different	   varieties	   growing	   in	  
different	  parts	  of	  a	  country.	  A	  market	  requires	  that	  this	  salad	  vegetable	  is	  defined	  and	  named	  in	  a	  
predictable	  way	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  valued.	  	  As	  this	  is	  done,	  its	  other	  connections	  get	  replaced	  by	  the	  
market	  definition.	  Callon	  and	  Muniesa	  define	  a	  market	  as	  ‘a	  collective	  device	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  
goods.’	   (Callon	  &	  Muniesa,	   2005,	   p.	   1245).	   	   They	   say	   that	   three	   things	   happen	   that	   enable	   this	  
evaluation	   to	   occur:	   ‘Isolating	   objects	   from	   their	   context,	   grouping	   them	   in	   the	   same	   frame,	  
establishing	  original	   relations	  between	   them,	   classifying	   them	  and	   summing	   them	  up’	   (Callon	  &	  




classification	   mechanism	   that	   enables	   the	   value	   of	   those	   goods	   to	   be	   predictably	   and	   reliably	  
calculated	  and	  given	  a	  price.	  	  
Çalışkan	   and	   Callon	   have	   framed	   this	   separation	   as	   the	   ‘pacification’	   of	   goods,	  which	   is	   part	   of	  
producing	  a	  market	  (which	  they	  call	  ‘marketization’),	  thus	  identifying	  goods	  as	  non-­‐human	  actors	  
in	  the	  network	  that	   is	   the	  market	   (Çalışkan	  &	  Callon,	  2010,	  p.	  5).54	   	  What	  this	   term	  ‘pacification’	  
touches	  on	  is	  that	  until	  there	  is	  an	  agreed	  classification	  and	  evaluation	  mechanism	  for	  goods,	  they	  
are	   in	  a	   sense	  wild	  and	  unpredictable,	  as	   they	  are	  actants	   that	  can	  have	  different	  effects	   in	   the	  
network,	  providing	  no	  dependable	  base	   for	  any	   trading	  activities.	   	  Çalışkan	  &	  Callon	  equate	   this	  
view	  of	  goods	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  scientific	  facts:	  
Scientific	   investigations	   involve	   controversy	   because	   objects	   participate	   in	   producing	  
conflicting	  data	  about	  themselves.	  For	  a	  scientific	  fact	  to	  emerge,	  scientists	  must	  successfully	  
pacify	   natural	   objects,	   reducing	   them	   from	   wild	   unknowns	   to	   things	   with	   fixed	   qualities	  
(Çalışkan	  &	  Callon,	  2010,	  p.	  6).	  
Çalışkan	  &	  Callon	  name	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  defining	  and	  valuing	  goods	  in	  markets,	  but	  do	  
not	  mention	  border	  agencies.	  However,	  the	  stabilising	  nature	  of	  Customs	  practices	  as	  defined	  by	  
the	   World	   Customs	   Organization	   (WCO)	   and	   the	   WTO	   fits	   very	   well	   with	   the	   concept	   of	  
‘pacification’:	  
[I]t	   is	  the	  passivity	  of	  things	  that	  transforms	  them	  into	  goods,	  and	  that	  enables	  agencies	  to	  
form	   expectations,	   make	   plans,	   stabilize	   their	   preferences	   and	   undertake	   calculations.	   By	  
ensuring	  that	  their	  qualities	  evolve	  predictably,	  passive	  goods	  create	  an	  environment	  whose	  
stability	  favours	  organized	  action	  and	  establishes	  the	  possibility	  of	  entering	  into	  cooperative	  
or	  competitive	  relationships	  of	  exchange’	  (Çalışkan	  &	  Callon,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  
An	   example	   is	   the	  WCO	   coding	   system,	  which	   transforms	   goods	   into	   a	   set	   of	   numbers	   against	  
which	  a	  tariff	  rate	  can	  be	  applied.55	  That	  rate	  can	  be	  preferential	  for	  selected	  countries	  with	  which	  
agreements	  have	  been	  negotiated.	  	  The	  WTO	  makes	  publicly	  available	  the	  tariff	  rates	  imposed	  by	  
members,	  thus	  providing	  global	  predictability.	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Thus,	  from	  an	  ANT	  perspective,	  ‘goods’	  are	  created	  out	  of	  the	  process	  of	  pacification.	  This	  process	  
creates	   stability,	   enabling	   predictable,	   organised	   action.	   However,	   this	   stability	   is	   nevertheless	  
somewhat	   fictional	   in	   that	   there	   are	   many	   failures.	   Callon	   refers	   to	   failures	   in	   the	   stability	   of	  
pacified	  goods	  as	  ‘overflowings’:	  
Overflowings	  occur	  when	  goods	  act	  unpredictably,	  transgressing	  the	  frames	  set	  for	  them	  and	  
the	   passivity	   imposed	   on	   them.	   The	   notion	   of	   overflowing,	   like	   that	   of	   externality,	   is	   not	  
restricted	   to	   negative	   consequences;	   it	   might	   include	   positive	   effects	   (scientific	   research	  
outputs	   are	   a	   classic	   illustration	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   positive	   overflowing-­‐externalities)	  
(Callon,	  2007,	  p.	  144).	  
The	   performance	   of	   pacification	   and	   overflowings	   in	   markets	   sounds	   very	   much	   like	   the	  
‘facilitation	   and	   control’	   activities	   undertaken	   by	   border	   agencies,	   particularly	   Customs	  
administrations.	   	   The	   performative	   role	   of	   border	   regimes	   in	   global	   markets	   is	   supported	   by	  
Berndt	  and	  Boeckler:	  
Our	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   global	   movements	   of	   capital,	   goods,	   people,	   and	   ideas	   always	  
involve	   an	   ambivalent	   double	   play	   of	   debordering	   (overflowing)	   and	   bordering	   (framing)	  
processes.	  These	  ambivalent	  border	  regimes	  are	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  construction	  
of	   global	   markets	   and	   trade	   systems.	   Yet,	   in	   order	   for	   these	   markets	   to	   work,	   these	  
ambivalences	  have	  to	  be	  hidden	  and	  veiled	  (Berndt	  &	  Boeckler,	  2011,	  p.	  1062).	  
This	   thesis	  uses	  Callon’s	  concepts	  of	  pacification	  and	  overflowing	  to	  help	  unveil	   the	  connections	  
and	  narratives	  of	  border	  management	  policy	  practices	  within	  the	  global	  trading	  system,	  regional	  
economic	   integration	  as	   a	   subset,	   and	   sovereign	   interests.	   The	  next	   two	   sub-­‐sections	  explain	   in	  
more	  detail	  how	  I	  have	  applied	  these	  concepts	  to	  flows	  across	  borders.	  
 The pacification and overflowing of flows of goods across borders 3.4.1
The	  pacification	  of	  goods	  is	  as	  essential	  for	  a	  country’s	  ability	  to	  control	  flows	  of	  goods	  across	  its	  
border	  as	  for	  market	  transactions.	  Customs	  work	  relies	  on	  being	  able	  to	  classify	  and	  identify	  goods	  
so	   the	   goods	   can	   be	   valued	   and	   assessed	   for	   revenue,	   as	  well	   as	  well	   as	   having	   the	   necessary	  
phytosanitary,	   food	   safety	   and	   trade	   security	   certificates,	   and	   for	   providing	   the	   core	   data	   for	  
national	  statistics.	  The	  WCO’s	  Harmonized	  Commodity	  Description	  and	  Coding	  System	  (commonly	  




classify,	   identify,	   value	   and	   assess	   goods	   necessitates	   the	   gathering,	   storing	   and	   accessing	   of	  
particular	  information	  from	  the	  people	  or	  organisations	  moving	  the	  goods.	  	  
As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.3,	  border	  officials	  are	  also	  concerned	  with	  anticipating,	  identifying	  and	  
preventing	  the	  overflow	  effects	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  across	  borders.	  These	  take	  the	  form	  of	  
risks,	   such	   as	   smuggled	   illegal	   drugs	   or	   firearms	   or	   endangered	   species.	   For	   Customs	   officials,	  
overflowing	   is	   almost	  always	  associated	  with	  a	  human	  agent	   (Customs	  officers	   say	   ‘goods	  don’t	  
cause	   the	   risk,	  people	  do’56)	  and	  where	  organised	  crime	   is	   concerned,	   the	  value	  of	   the	  goods	   is	  
also	   associated	  with	   illegal	  markets,	   rather	   than	   legal	   ones.57	   Information	   gathered	   to	   facilitate	  
goods	   flows	   thus	  becomes	  equally	   valuable	   for	  managing	   the	  overflow	  effects.	   Information	  also	  
becomes	   the	   bridge,	   or	   a	   ‘compromise	   between	   presence	   and	   absence’	   (Latour,	   1987,	   p.	   243),	  
which	  returns	  us	  to	  William	  Walters’	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘networked	  (non)border’:	  ‘This	  term	  is	  meant	  to	  
convey	   the	   sense	   in	  which	   networks	   of	   control	   come	   to	   substitute	   for	   the	   functions	   that	  were	  
previously	  physically	  concentrated	  at	  the	  border’	  (Walters,	  2004,	  p.	  680).	  
There	  are	  also	  positive	  overflow	  effects	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  of	  Customs	  administrations	  to	  add	  to	  
the	  productivity	  of	  supply	  chains	  through	  Single	  Window	  technology.58	  
 The commodification of flows of people across borders 3.4.2
While	  Çalışkan	  and	  Callon	  stop	  short	  of	  saying	  that	  people	  are	  commodified	  in	  markets,	  tourism	  is	  
a	  market	  within	  global	  trade	  flows	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  nation	  states	  
(Blanke	  &	   Chiesa,	   2009;	   Ladley	   &	  White,	   2006).	   In	   the	   tourism	  market,	   people	   are	   turned	   into	  
volumes	  of	  tourists,	  and	  are	  valued	  according	  to	  their	  purchasing	  power	  in	  the	  locations	  they	  are	  
visiting.	  However,	  people	  are	  more	  unpredictable	   than	  goods,	   and	   their	  behaviour	   is	  difficult	   to	  
stabilise.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  national	  passport	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  (McKeown,	  2008)	  gave	  nation	  
states	  the	  means	  to	  control	  some	  of	  that	  unpredictability	  through	  identifying	  who	  is	  moving	  in	  and	  
out	  of	  their	  country.	  Additional	  means	  such	  as	  arrival	  cards	  provide	  governments	  with	  information	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Personal knowledge. This comment is an instinctive recognition by customs officers of the connections between humans 
and non-humans.  
57 Interview and personal knowledge. 
58 E.g. New Zealand Customs has built an electronic Trade Single Window as part of its computer redevelopment that will 
enable the system to integrate processes with other administrations. This integration is potentially a positive overflowing 




on	  why	  and	  for	  how	  long.	  In	  addition,	  to	  facilitate	  the	  global	  movement	  of	  people	  across	  borders,	  
the	  International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  sets	  standards	  for	  the	  inter-­‐operability	  of	  passports.59	  	  
We	  can	   therefore	  apply	   the	  pacification	  concept	   to	  people.	  Callon	  and	  Muniesa’s	  description	  of	  
the	  marketization	  of	  goods	  is	  equally	  applicable	  to	  people:	  	  
The	   good	   [substitute	   ‘person’]	   leaves	   the	   world	   of	   supply,	   breaks	   away	   from	   it	   [which	   is	  
possible	   since	   it	   has	   been	   objectified]	   and	   slots	   into	   another	   world,	   that	   of	   the	   buyer	  
[substitute	  ‘tourist	  destination’],	  which	  has	  been	  configured	  to	  receive	  it	  (Callon	  &	  Muniesa,	  
2005,	  p.	  1234).	  
Salter	  calls	  the	  movement	  from	  one	  country	  to	  another	  a	  ‘rite	  of	  passage’	  where	  border	  processes	  
create	   a	   	   transition	   point	   between	   the	   old	   world	   to	   the	   new	   (Zureik	   &	   Salter,	   2005).	   At	   this	  
transition	   point,	   border	   officials	   do	   with	   people	   what	   they	   do	   with	   goods	   –	   they	   classify	   and	  
identify	   them,	   for	   example	   into	   visa-­‐required,	   non-­‐visa	   required	   or	   refugees,	   so	   they	   can	   be	  
valued,	   such	  as	   tourists	  who	  provide	  high	  economic	  value	   to	   the	   state.	   The	  assessment	  process	  
involving	  areas	  such	  as	  health,	  education,	  employment	  and	  financial	  status	  occurs	  when	  or	  if	  they	  
have	   to	   apply	   for	   a	   visa.	   Biometric	   technologies	   are	   used	   to	   increase	   assurance	   over	   individual	  
identities.	  A	  person’s	  passport,	  which	   is	  the	  property	  of	  the	  state	  that	   issued	  it,	  and	   information	  
about	   their	   travel	   via	   the	   arrival	   card	   enables	   them	   to	   be	   identified	   and	   classified.60	   If	   a	   visa	   is	  
required,	  they	  have	  to	  surrender	  their	  privacy	  to	  enable	  certain	  checks	  to	  be	  conducted	  to	  ensure	  
they	  fit	  the	  criteria	  for	  entry,	  for	  example,	  a	  criminal	  check.	  	  
As	  for	  goods,	  border	  officials	  are	  also	  concerned	  with	  anticipating,	  identifying	  and	  preventing	  the	  
overflow	  effects	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  people	  across	  borders.	  These	  risks	  often	  incorporate	  goods	  
risks	   such	   as	   smuggling	  drugs	   on	   their	   person,	   tobacco	   in	   their	   luggage	  or	   smuggling	  people,	   in	  
which	  illegal	  market	  people	  are	  also	  treated	  as	  if	  they	  were	  goods.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that:	  
[i]n	  many	  ways,	  the	  personal	  belongings	  of	  crossers	  are	  more	  important	  for	  border	  checks	  at	  
the	  physical	  border	   than	  the	  persons	  themselves.	  Persons	  have	  already	  been	  checked,	  but	  
their	  luggage	  has	  not	  (Marenin,	  2010,	  p.	  43).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This work is carried out by the Technical Advisory Group on Machine-Readable Travel Documents. See 
http://www.icao.int/Security/mrtd/Pages/TAGMRTD.aspx  
60 A passport describes a person’s physical characteristics, and shows their nationality. Apart from marital status, it doesn’t 




	  Another	   risk	   can	   be	   to	   the	   receiving	   state	   such	   as	   the	   likelihood	   of	   criminal	   activity	   once	   the	  
person	  enters	  that	  state.	  	  
This	  discussion	  has	  identified	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  marketization,	  pacification	  and	  overflowings	  can	  
be	  applied	  usefully	   to	  both	  goods	  and	  people	  moving	  across	  borders,	  and	   that	   they	  can	  equally	  
apply	  to	  legal	  and	  illegal	  markets.	  Though	  this	  aspect	  of	  illegal	  marketization	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  focus	  
of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  has	  only	  been	  touched	  on	  here,	  it	  is	  worthy	  of	  further	  research.	  
The	  concepts	  of	  pacification	  and	  overflowing	  provide	  an	  analytical	  backdrop	  to	  the	  performativity	  
of	  border	  management	  policy	  practices	   in	  a	   regional	   integration	   situation,	   and	  are	  used	   to	  help	  
uncover	  that	  performativity	  and	  the	  narratives	  that	  emerge	  from	  and	  through	   it.	  As	   indicated	   in	  
Chapter	   2,	   the	   narratives	   of	   nation	   state	   borders	   are	   interconnected	   with	   the	   domestic	   and	  
international	  narratives	  with	  which	  they	  interact.	  Changing	  geopolitical	  landscapes	  play	  out	  at	  the	  
border	  through	  new	  international	  agreements,	  trading	  partners,	  source	  countries	  for	  tourists,	  and	  
through	  significant	  events	  like	  terrorist	  attacks.	  Border	  narratives	  therefore	  change	  as	  geopolitics	  
and	   internal	  conditions	  change.	  We	  would	  expect	  these	  changing	  narratives	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  
translations	   of	   performativity	   –	   translations	   that	   in	   the	   trans-­‐national	   environment	   of	   borders	  
resonate	   strongly	   with	   ‘the	   translation	   zone’	   concept:	   ‘the	   translation	   zone	   is	   a	   space	   where	  
“transmission	  failure	  is	  marked”	  (Apter,	  p.	  5),	  not	  in	  a	  space	  within	  which	  all	  translations	  are	  either	  
easy	  or	  possible.	  The	  translation	  zone	  is	  a	  politicized	  zone	  .	  .	  .	  ’	  (Barry,	  2013,	  p.	  416).	  
3.5 ANT	  and	  narrative	  
In	  this	  sub-­‐section,	   I	  explore	  narrative	  aspects	  of	  ANT.	  Some	  of	  the	  key	  proponents	  of	  ANT	  have	  
long	  argued	  that	  it	  derives	  from	  and	  is	  grounded	  in	  language	  (Latour,	  1996;	  Law,	  2009;	  Mol,	  2010).	  
This	   is	   not	   surprising	   given	   its	   semiotic	   roots.	   Semiotics	   is	   broader	   than	   ‘semantics’	   in	   that	   it	  
involves	   not	   only	   the	   meaning	   of	   language	   but	   also	   signs,	   which	   may	   be	   gestures	   or	   symbols.	  
Latour	  describes	  ANT	  as	  a	  semiotics	  of	  things,	  and	  in	  the	  following	  quotation,	  the	  implications	  of	  
that	  description:	  	  
[W]hen	  semiotics	  is	  turned	  to	  nature,	  however,	  and	  that	  unhuman	  entities	  are	  entered	  into	  
the	   picture,	   it	   soon	   appears	   that	   the	   word	   ‘discourse’,	   or	   ‘meaning’	   may	   be	   dropped	  
altogether	  without	   any	  danger	  of	   going	  back	   to	  naïve	   realism	  or	  naïve	  naturalism	   (Latour,	  




Mol	  explains	  that	  the	  relational	  nature	  of	  semiotics	  ‘has	  been	  shifted	  on	  from	  language	  to	  the	  rest	  
of	  reality’(Mol,	  2010,	  p.	  257).	  	  
One	  could	   infer	   from	  these	  comments	   that	  ANT	  has	  removed	   itself	   from	   language.	  And	   in	  some	  
ways	   it	   has.	   While	   it	   uses	   semiotic	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘actor’,	   ‘actant’	   and	   ‘trace’,	   	   and	   while	   ANT	  
examines	  the	  effects	  of	  signs	  and	  words	  as	  they	  are	  associated	  with	  other	  things	  and	  people,	  an	  
ANT	   approach	   does	   not	   involve	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   structure	   or	   form	   of	   language.	   It	   does	   not	  
exclude	   language,	   however,	   and	   as	   the	   stories	   arising	   from	   the	   use	   of	   ANT	   are	   created	   out	   of	  
language,	  it	  cannot.	  	  
John	  Law	  asserts	   that	   in	   the	  world	  of	   techno-­‐science	   ‘there	   is	  no	   important	  difference	  between	  
stories	  and	  materials.	  Or,	  to	  put	  it	  a	  little	  differently:	  stories,	  effective	  stories,	  perform	  themselves	  
into	   the	   material	   world’	   (Law,	   2000,	   p.	   2).	   He	   also	   argues	   that	   ANT	   is	   two	   stories	   that	   work	  
together.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  story	  of	  its	  relational	  nature,	  where	  entities	  have	  ‘no	  inherent	  qualities’,	  
no	   dualisms.	   Instead,	   distinctions	   emerge	   as	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   relations	   between	   entities	   (Law,	  
1999,	   p.	   3).	   	   The	   second	   is	   one	   of	  making	   the	   relations	   ‘stick’	   through	   performativity,	   in	  which	  
‘everything	  is	  uncertain	  and	  reversible’	  (Ibid,	  p.	  4)	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  continuing	  circulation	  of	  
translations	  that	  are	  required	  to	  maintain	  the	  connections	  create	  another	  story.	  	  
The	   implications	   of	   the	   working	   together	   of	   these	   two	   elements	   are	   worth	   examining.	   One	  
implication	   is	   that	   the	  scope	  of	   the	   relational	  effects	  of	  ANT	   (applying	   to	  everything	  and	   lacking	  
duality)	   is	  potentially	  huge,	  and	  that	  the	  researcher’s	  choice	  about	  what	  to	   include,	  what	  not	  to	  
include	  and	  what	  distinctions	  or	  groupings	  they	  identify	  play	  a	  significant	  part	  in	  how	  these	  effects	  
are	  narrated;	   another	   is	   that	   there	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  multiple	  actor-­‐networks	   in	  play	  at	   any	  given	  
time.	  An	   implication	  of	  Law’s	  second	   ‘story’	   is	   that	   tracing	   the	  relations	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  messy,	  as	  
multiple	  realities	  rub	  up	  against	  one	  another,	  are	  contained	  within	  one	  another,	  and	  slide	  past	  one	  
another.	  	  
We	  can	  get	  some	  sense	  from	  this	  discussion	  of	  what	  Law	  means	  when	  he	  asserts	  that	  these	  two	  
stories	  are	   ‘not	   simply	  narrations	   in	   the	  standard	   linguistic	   sense	  of	   the	   term’	   (Law,	  2000,	  p.	  2).	  
This	   thesis	   explores	   this	   assertion	   in	   the	   non-­‐techno-­‐science	   setting	   of	   policy	   practice	   and	   by	  
tracing	   the	   connections	   to	   uncover	   different	   types	   of	   narratives	   contained	   within	   the	   trans-­‐




 Connections between ANT and narrative theory 3.5.1
In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  suggested	  that	  the	  work	  of	  Rhodes	  and	  Hajer	  and	  Laws	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  an	  ANT	  
approach	  to	  narrative.	  I	  also	  included	  a	  category	  in	  Table	  2	  called	  ‘enacted	  narrative’,	  suggesting	  
that	  the	  work	  of	  Gabriel	  Tarde,	  Bruno	  Latour,	  John	  Law	  and	  Barbara	  Czarniawska	  fit	  within	  it.	  	  This	  
category	  came	  from	  Czarniawksa.	  In	  ‘Narratives	  in	  Social	  Science	  Research’,	  Czarniawska	  suggests	  
the	   concept	   of	   enacted	   narrative	   as	   a	   useful	   way	   to	   provide	   insights	   about	   social	   life.	   In	   the	  
Chapter	   ‘Structural	   Analysis’,	   she	   explicitly	   locates	   Latour	   in	   this	   type	   of	   narrative,	   through	  
Greimas.	  She	   implies	   that	  his	  use	  of	  parts	  of	  Greimas’	   theory	  such	  as	   the	  role	  of	   the	  actant	  and	  
‘narrative	  trajectories’	  is	  almost	  cavalier:	  	  
He	  does	  not	  seem	  interested	  in	  demonstrating	  his	  knowledge	  or	  skill	  in	  using	  the	  model:	  he	  is	  
using	   it	  because	  the	  model	  permits	  him	  to	  say	  things	  about	  his	  chosen	  topic	  —	  innovation	  
and	  power	  —	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	   to	  say	  otherwise	   (Czarniawska,	  2004a,	  p.	  
82).	  
I	  consider	  her	  analysis	  in	  this	  Chapter	  to	  be	  a	  limited	  reading	  of	  Latour	  and	  other	  	  ‘ANT	  academics’,	  
such	  as	  Law	  and	  Mol	  who	  have	  made	  clear	  that	  ANT	  is	  a	  flexible	  and	  evolving	  field	  of	  knowledge	  
that	   draws	   on	   many	   sources,	   as	   described	   earlier	   in	   this	   Chapter.	   Nevertheless,	   Czarniawska’s	  
explicit	   linking	   of	   ANT	   and	   narrative	   through	   situating	   them	   as	   ‘enacted	   narrative’	   is	   of	   great	  
relevance	  to	  this	  thesis.	  Later	  in	  the	  same	  book,	  in	  the	  Chapter	  on	  writing	  social	  science,	  there	  is	  
another	   link	   to	   ANT	   where	   she	   describes	   how	   separate	   episodes	   are	   transformed	   into	   a	   plot	  
through	   connections	   between	   actions	   and	   events	   such	   that	   ‘[t]heory	   is	   the	   plot	   of	   a	   thesis’	  
(Czarniawska,	  2004a,	  p.	  125).	  	  	  
Given	   the	  broad	   social	   science	   roots	  of	  ANT,	  different	   aspects	  of	  ANT	   can	  be	   found	   in	  different	  
approaches	  to	  narrative	  theory.	  Three	  strands	  of	  narrative	  theory	  resonate	  with	  ANT	  –	  aspects	  of	  
policy	  narrative,	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  concept	  of	  action	  in	  political	  life	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  narrative	  
and	  Paul	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	  of	  temporality	  in	  narrative.	  	  
The	   seminal	   article	   of	   Bevir,	   Rhodes	   and	  Weller	   on	   tradition	   in	   public	   policy	   (Bevir	   et	   al.,	   2003)	  
contains	   a	   number	   of	   strong	  ANT-­‐like	   signals.	   Already	  mentioned	   in	   Chapter	   2	   is	   their	   focus	   on	  
using	   actors’	   own	   words.	   In	   addition,	   their	   description	   of	   the	   need	   for	   people	   to	   change	   their	  




similar	   to	   the	  ANT	  way	  of	  describing	   translation	  and	   transformation	   in	   an	  unstable	  assemblage.	  
Their	  focus	  on	  connections	  relates	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  networks	  and	  could	  even	  imply	  that	  actors	  
are	   not	   necessarily	   human:	   ‘Narratives	   depend	   on	   conditional	   connections.	   .	   .	   conditional	  
connections	   exist	  when	   the	   nature	   of	   one	   object	   draws	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   another’	   (Bevir	   et	   al.,	  
2003,	  p.	  13).	  Hajer	  talks	  about	  ‘performativity’	  and	  similarly	  argues	  that	  settings	  and	  practices	  act	  
on	  people:	  
Here	   one	   may	   argue	   that	   the	   setting	   in	   which	   utterances	   are	   made	   has	   a	   performative	  
dimension:	   practices	   of	   participation	   construct	   their	   participants	   and	   some	  may	   construct	  
people	  as	  protestors,	  whereas	  other	  practices	  may	  create	  collaborators	  (Hajer,	  2005,	  p.	  626).	  	  
And	  
Although	   the	   literature	   manifests	   a	   strong	   awareness	   that	   people	   do	   things	   with	   words	  
(Austin,	  1955),	  we	  sometimes	  forget	  that	  settings	  do	  things	  with	  people	  too.	  A	  discussion	  is	  
not	  merely	  talk,	  it	  is	  an	  act	  as	  well	  (Ibid,	  p.	  628).	  
Bridgman	  and	  Barry	  make	  several	  ANT-­‐like	   references.	  They	  argue	   that	  metaphors	  are	  powerful	  
carriers	  of	  action,	  which	  is	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  ANT	  approach	  to	  power	  where	  power	  is	  an	  effect	  
of	  the	  connections	  created	  by	  actors	  (and	  actants)	  ‘speaking	  on	  behalf’:	  	  
.	   .	   .	  metaphor-­‐guided	  thematic	  analysis	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  trace	  power	  dynamics	  within	  a	  
given	  policy	  discourse.	  As	  Monin	  and	  Monin	  (1997:p.57)	  state,	  “those	  who	  will	  control	   the	  
metaphors	   will	   ultimately	   control	   the	   action:	   and	   those	   who	   change	   the	   metaphors	   will	  
ultimately	  change	  the	  action”	  (Bridgman	  &	  Barry,	  2002).	  	  
In	   their	   articulation	  of	   the	   resistance	  of	   policy	  narratives	   to	   change	   they	  bring	   to	  mind	   Latour’s	  
description	  of	  how	  facts	  are	  made	  in	  the	  scientific	  community	  (Latour,	  1987):	  	  	  
Policy	  narratives	  often	  resist	  change	  or	  modification	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  contradictory,	  
empirical	  data	  because	  their	  tightly	  storied	  characterisations,	  metaphors,	  and	  emplotments	  
continue	   to	   underwrite	   and	   stabilise	   assumptions	   for	   decision-­‐making	   (Bridgman	  &	   Barry,	  
2002,	  p.	  142).	  
Bridgman	  and	  Barry	  also	  suggest	  that	  metanarratives	  are	  ‘foundational	  frameworks,	  archetypally	  




are	  suggesting	  that	  policy	  narratives	  are	  given	  weight	  by	  being	  connected	  back	  to	  frameworks	  that	  
have	  already	  been	  accepted	  as	  ‘the	  way	  things	  are’.	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  ANT	  concept	  of	  how	  
matters	  of	  fact	  are	  created,	  which	  is	  an	  idea	  that	  I	  will	  be	  exploring	  further	  in	  Chapters	  6	  to	  8.	  	  
An	  ANT	   framing	  provides	   for	  all	  of	   these	  elements	   to	  be	   revealed	  –	   the	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  
actors,	  the	  performativity,	  the	  uncertainties	  and	  instabilities,	  the	  translations	  and	  transformations,	  
the	   ‘speaking	  on	  behalf’	  and	  performance	  of	  power	  and	   the	  creation	  of	  matters	  of	   fact	  and	   the	  
subsequent	  revealing	  of	  narratives.	  
There	  are	  also	   two	  non-­‐policy	   theorists	  whose	  work	  connects	  especially	  well	  with	  ANT	  and	  with	  	  
the	  role	  of	  narrative	  in	  action,	  and,	  as	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  provides	  additional	  insights	  
to	  the	  ANT	  approach.	  	  The	  first	  is	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  a	  political	  and	  social	  theorist	  who	  predated	  but	  
is	  one	  of	  the	  earlier	  thinkers	  picked	  up	  by	  and	  influencing	  the	  narrative	  turn	  (Hyvärinen,	  2010);	  the	  
second	  is	  Paul	  Ricoeur.	  There	  is	  a	  linkage	  between	  Ricoeur	  and	  Arendt,	  through	  Ricoeur’s	  analysis	  
of	   Arendt’s	   arguments	   on	   narrative	   in	  The	  Human	   Condition.	  Arendt’s	   contribution	   to	   narrative	  
theory	  lies	  primarily	   in	  that	  book,	  through	  an	  in-­‐depth	  examination	  of	  action	  in	  political	   life,	  and	  
the	  role	  of	  storytelling	  in	  capturing	  and,	  in	  effect,	  translating	  action.	  	  
 Hannah Arendt and ANT 3.5.1.1
The	  context	  of	  narrative	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  is	  Arendt’s	  exploration	  of	  political	  and	  social	  life.	  
Arendt	   has	   been	   criticised	   for	   her	   focus	   on	   ‘great	  words	   and	   deeds’	   as	   the	   pinnacle	   of	   human	  
endeavour	  (Thiele,	  2009,	  p.	  1).	  Thiele,	   in	  his	   insightful	  article	  on	  the	  role	  of	  narrative	   in	  Arendt’s	  
work,	  argues	  that	  rather	  than	  dismissing	  her	  work	  because	  of	  her	   idealisation	  of	  political	  speech	  
and	  action,	  there	  is	  much	  to	  be	  gained	  by	  paying	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  narrative	  aspects	  of	  her	  
work.	   	   He	   provides	   a	   clue	   about	   the	   possible	   connection	   of	   Arendt’s	   work	   with	   ANT	   when	   he	  
describes	   her	   political	   realm	   as	   ‘a	   place	   of	   performances’	   (Thiele,	   2009,	   p.	   1).	   For	   Arendt	   the	  
political	   realm,	   and	   the	   action	   that	   arises	   from	   it,	   differs	   from	   the	   biological	   and	   social	   realms	  
which	  give	   rise	   to	   labour	  and	  work,	  both	  of	  which	  are	   seen	   to	  be	   less	   important	   than	   (political)	  
words	  and	   the	  actions	   that	  derive	   from	  them.	    According	   to	  Arendt,	  action	   is	  political,	   and	  only	  
action	   involves	   the	   plurality	   of	   men	   as	   opposed	   to	   labour	   or	   work,	   which	   can	   be	   carried	   out	  
without	  the	  presence	  of	  others.	  	  Her	  narrative	  argument	  relates	  to	  the	  relational	  nature	  of	  action	  




Drawing	  on	   the	  different	  words	   for	   ‘to	  act’	   in	  Greek	  and	   Latin,61	  Arendt	  depicts	   action	  as	  being	  
begun	  by	  an	   individual	  and	  completed	  or	  brought	  to	  completion	  by	  many.	  Arendt’s	  definition	  of	  
action	  is	  different	  from	  ANT	  in	  that	  she	  excludes	  the	  ‘intermediaries	  of	  things	  or	  matter’	  i.e.	  action	  
is	  ‘directly	  between	  men’	  (Arendt,	  1998,	  p.	  7).	  This	  is	  the	  plurality	  she	  asserts	  is	  ‘the	  condition.	  .	  .	  
of	  all	  political	  life’	  (Ibid.).	  	  She	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  beginning	  and	  ending	  as	  an	  unpredictable	  
chain	   of	   action	   and	   reaction	   ‘and	  where	   every	   process	   is	   the	   cause	   of	   new	   processes’	   (Arendt,	  
1998,	  p.	  190).	  This	  concept	  of	  a	  chain	  of	  action	  and	  reaction	  is	  similar	  to	  Latour’s	  articulation	  of	  the	  
impact	  of	  users	  on	  the	  intended	  use	  and	  functioning	  of	  machines	  in	  his	  book	  Science	  in	  Action.	  He	  
concludes:	   ’The	   fate	   of	   facts	   and	   machines	   is	   in	   later	   users'	   hands;	   their	   qualities	   are	   thus	   a	  
consequence,	  not	  a	  cause,	  of	  a	  collective	  action’	  (Latour,	  1987,	  p.	  259).	  	  
He	  means	  that	  once	  facts	  and	  machines	  have	  been	  constructed,	  the	  more	  users	  of	  the	  machines	  
there	   are,	   the	   more	   the	   connections	   multiply.	   	   These	   users	   reinforce	   the	   ‘facts’	   about	   the	  
machines’	  creation,	  and	  define	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  machines,	  which	  may	  be	  different	  (translated)	  
from	  what	  was	   intended	   by	   the	   originators.	   For	   example,	   the	   electric-­‐powered	   car	   has	   not	   yet	  
supplanted	   the	   petrol-­‐powered	   car,	   even	   though	   it	   has	   been	   invented	   and	   has	   been	   shown	   to	  
work	  well.	  The	  small	  proportion	  of	  people	  who	  use	  electric	  cars	  currently	  define	  what	  an	  electric	  
car	   is	   good	   for.	   As	   demand	   changes,	   and	   the	   technology	   continues	   to	   develop,	   the	   number	   of	  
users	  will	   grow	  and	   the	   types	  of	  users	  will	   change.	  So	  will	   the	  narrative	  associated	  with	  electric	  
cars.	  Whereas	   they	  may	  be	  considered	  expensive	  and	  not	  powerful	  enough	  now,	   in	  a	   few	  years	  
they	  may	  be	  considered	  economical	  and	  ‘cool’.	  The	  inventors/designers	  of	  the	  electric	  car	  of	  today	  
have	  no	  control	  over	  how	  their	  machine	  is	  marketed	  	  and	  used	  now	  or	  in	  ten	  years,	  	  nor	  over	  what	  
values	  are,	  or	  will	  be,	  associated	  with	  them.	  	  
Arendt	  argues	  that	  a	  story’s	  	  
full	  meaning	  can	  reveal	  itself	  only	  when	  it	  has	  ended	  .	  .	  .	  Action	  reveals	  itself	  fully	  only	  to	  the	  
storyteller,	  that	  is,	  to	  	  the	  backward	  glance	  of	  the	  historian,	  who	  indeed	  always	  knows	  better	  
what	  it	  was	  all	  about	  than	  the	  participants	  (Arendt,	  1998,	  p.	  192).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 She identifies the parallel distinctions in Greek and Latin language that saw different words for ‘to begin, to lead/to set in 
motion and ‘to achieve, to finish/to bear. ‘Here it seems as though each action were divided into two parts, the beginning 
made by a single person and the achievement in which many join by “bearing” and “finishing” the enterprise, by seeing it 




This	  is	  both	  different	  and	  similar	  from	  Latour	  –	  	  different	  in	  that	  Latour	  says	  to	  follow	  the	  actors,	  	  
who	  will	  describe	  the	  meaning	  of	  what	  is	  happening;62	  similar	  in	  that	  both	  argue	  that	  actors	  never	  
act	   alone.	   Latour	   describes	   actions	   as	   the	   result	   of	   connections	   with	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   actors,	  
making	  it	  impossible	  to	  determine	  exactly	  who	  or	  what	  is	  acting	  at	  any	  given	  time	  (Latour,	  2007).	  
Latour	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  an	  actor	  on	  a	  theatre	  stage,	  supported	  by	  any	  number	  of	  people	  and	  
objects	   –	   the	   playwright,	   the	   director,	   the	   stage	   designer,	   the	   scenery	   to	   name	   a	   few.	   These	  
people	   and	   objects	   act	   on	   the	   actor	   so	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   distinguish	   between	   their	  
performance	  and	  the	  associations	  connected	  to	  that	  performance.	  	  
This	  discussion	  highlights	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  action	  come	  from	  many	  actors,	  and	  are	  multiple	  and	  
unpredictable.	   The	   relationship	   of	   these	   multiplicities	   to	   narrative	   is	   something	   I	   will	   explore	  
further	  in	  Chapters	  6	  to	  8.	  
Action	  for	  Arendt	  also	  contains	  temporality	  –	  it	  both	  exists	  for	  a	  very	  short	  time	  and	  is	  made	  visible	  
by	   looking	   backward.	   Arendt	   argues	   that	   while	   human	   affairs	   are	   transitory,	   the	   political	  
constitution	  of	  the	  State	  is	  enduring	  (Arendt,	  1998).	  Ricoeur	  picked	  up	  on	  this	  in	  his	  1983	  article	  on	  
The	   Human	   Condition,	   in	   which	   he	   highlighted	   the	   temporal	   differences	   between	   action	  
(transitory)	  and	  work	  (enduring);	  power	  (transitory)	  and	  strength	  (enduring)	  (Ricoeur,	  1983).	  Time	  
in	  ANT	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  actor	  –	  a	  part	  of	  the	  network	  –	  than	  a	  narrative	  condition.	  On	  the	  
face	  of	  it,	  Arendt’s	  supposition	  about	  action	  as	  transitory	  becomes	  irrelevant	  using	  an	  ANT	  frame.	  
In	  ANT,	  if	  action	  is	  transitory	  and	  has	  no	  effect,	  its	  trace	  will	  disappear	  quickly;	  if	  not,	  its	  trace	  will	  
last	   longer.	   	  However,	  Ricouer	  was	  right	  to	  point	  out	  the	  temporal	  differences	   in	  Arendt’s	  work,	  
which	   go	   beyond	   the	   simple	   temporary-­‐enduring	   distinction,	   for	   Arendt’s	   temporality	   also	  
contains	  an	  interesting	  and	  ANT-­‐like	  development	  that	  suggests	  a	  progression	  from	  the	  transitory	  
to	  the	  permanent	  through	  the	  web	  of	  relations.	  Arendt’s	  worldview	  of	  the	  web	  of	  relations,	  which,	  
although	  human-­‐centred,	  references	  the	  tangible	  recording	  of	  stories	  as	  a	  production	  of	  that	  web:	  	  
It	   is	   because	   of	   this	   already	   existing	   web	   of	   human	   relationships,	   with	   its	   innumerable,	  
conflicting	  wills	  and	  intentions,	  that	  action	  almost	  never	  achieves	   its	  purpose;	  but	   it	   is	  also	  
because	   of	   this	   medium,	   in	   which	   action	   alone	   is	   real,	   that	   it	   "produces"	   stories	   with	   or	  
without	  intention	  as	  naturally	  as	  fabrication	  produces	  tangible	  things.	  These	  stories	  may	  then	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be	  recorded	  in	  documents	  and	  monuments,	  they	  may	  be	  visible	  in	  use	  objects	  or	  art	  works,	  
they	  may	  be	  told	  and	  retold	  and	  worked	  into	  all	  kinds	  of	  material.	  	  They	  themselves,	  in	  their	  
living	  reality,	  are	  of	  an	  altogether	  different	  nature	  than	  these	  reifications	  .	  .	  .	  nobody	  is	  the	  
author	  or	  producer	  of	  his	  own	  life	  story	  (Arendt,	  1998,	  p.	  184).	  
Arendt	  goes	  further	  by	  asserting	  that	  action	  can	  be	  captured,	  or	  in	  ANT	  terms,	  ‘stabilised’,	  through	  
the	  medium	  of	  these	  recorded	  documents,	  but	  with	  provisos:	  ‘action	  can	  result	  in	  an	  end	  product	  
only	   on	   condition	   that	   its	   own	   authentic,	   non-­‐tangible,	   and	   always	   utterly	   fragile	   meaning	   is	  
destroyed’	  (Ibid.,	  p.196).	  	  
The	  destruction	  of	  the	  original	  meaning	  of	  action	  through	  capturing	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  but	  slightly	  
different	   from	   translation	   in	   ANT.	   The	   question	   it	   raises	   about	   translation	   in	   ANT	   is	   ‘does	   the	  
original	  action	  disappear	  through	  translation,	  or	  is	  it	  incorporated	  within	  it?’	  A	  possible	  answer	  to	  
this	  question	  is	  given	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
A	  relational	  approach	  to	  power	  appears	   in	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  work.	  Arendt’s	  description	  of	  action	  
and	  power	  is	  about	  political	  power,	  and	  is	  therefore	  relevant	  to	  public	  policy.	  To	  Arendt,	  action	  is	  a	  
social	  activity,	  involving	  as	  it	  does	  ‘the	  intercourse	  of	  men’	  through	  which	  their	  ‘specific,	  objective,	  
worldly	   interests’	   bind	   them	   (Arendt,	   1998,	   p.	   182).	   Like	   Latour,	   Arendt	   sees	   power	   as	   active,	  
emerging	  out	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  men	  and	  their	  interests:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  power	  springs	  up	  between	  
men	  when	   they	  act	   together’	   (Ibid.,	   p.	   200).	   But	   a	   key	   difference	   is	   that	   Arendt	   sees	   power	   as	  
fleeting,	   whereas	   ANT	   shows	   power	   can	   be	   made	   enduring	   when	   translations	   reach	   the	   point	  
where	  a	  single	  voice	  or	  story	  emerges	  as	  the	  ‘winner’,	  and	  becomes	  stabilised	  into	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  
(Latour,	  2007).	  	  	  
In	   the	   political	   realm,	   Arendt	   sees	   isolation	   as	   leading	   to	   impotence:	   ‘[W]hoever,	   for	   whatever	  
reasons,	  isolates	  himself	  and	  does	  not	  partake	  in	  such	  being	  together,	  forfeits	  power	  and	  becomes	  
impotent,	  no	  matter	  how	  great	  his	  strength	  and	  how	  valid	  his	  reasons’	  (Arendt,	  1998,	  p.	  201).	  This	  
is	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  Latour’s	  description	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  scientist	  who	  was	  the	  only	  one	  in	  
their	  field	  in	  Science	  in	  Action	  (1987).	  By	  being	  isolated,	  he	  had	  no	  one	  to	  bounce	  ideas	  off	  or	  to	  
challenge	  him,	  and	  he	  started	  to	  disappear,	  even	  to	  himself:	  
.	  .	  .	  an	  isolated	  specialist	  is	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms.	  Either	  you	  are	  isolated	  and	  very	  quickly	  




who	  are	  as	  specialised	  as	  you,	  are	  trying	  out	  your	  material	  so	  fiercely	  that	  they	  may	  push	  the	  
proof	   race	   to	   a	   point	   where	   all	   your	   resources	   are	   barely	   enough	   to	   win	   the	   encounter	  
(Latour,	  1987,	  p.	  152).	  
Because	   of	   its	   importance	   to	   action,	   how	   relational	   power	   manifests	   through	   narrative	   is	   an	  
important	  research	  strand	  that	  is	  revealed	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  and	  explored	  further	  in	  Chapter	  8.	  
 Paul Ricoeur and ANT 3.5.1.2
Ricoeur	  comes	  from	  the	  ‘narrative	  of	  life’	  group	  of	  theorists,	  and	  is	  renowned	  for	  his	  deep	  enquiry	  
into	  narrative	  and	  time.63	  Time	  is	  a	  common	  element	  in	  definitions	  of	  narrative,	  particularly	  those	  
in	  the	  ‘beginning,	  middle	  and	  end’	  school.64	  	  Ricoeur’s	  work	  explores	  not	  only	  sequential	  time	  but	  
other	   sorts	   of	   time	   in	   narrative,	   such	   as	   ‘social	   time’	   which	   for	   him	   is	   a	   social	   phenomenon	  
(Ricoeur,	  1973).	  As	  with	  Arendt,	  Ricoeur	  could	  almost	  have	  anticipated	  ANT	  when	  he	  asserted	  that	  
documents	   give	   us	   archives,	   which	   enable	   us	   to	   trace	   history	   through	   the	   interplay	   of	   action	  
between	  players.65	  	  This	  tracing	  of	  history	  is	  an	  example	  of	  his	  ‘social	  time’:	  
.	  .	  .	  not	  only	  because	  it	  is	  done	  by	  several	  agents	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  role	  of	  each	  of	  them	  
cannot	  be	  distinguished	  from	  the	  role	  of	  the	  others,	  but	  also	  because	  our	  deeds	  escape	  us	  
and	  have	  effects	  which	  we	  did	  not	  intend	  (Ricoeur,	  1973,	  p.	  101).	  
Ricoeur	   calls	   social	   time	   the	   place	   of	   durable	   effects,	   of	   persisting	   patterns.	   An	   action	   leaves	   a	  
‘trace’,	   it	  makes	  its	  ‘mark’	  when	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  such	  patterns	  which	  become	  
the	  documents	  of	  human	  action	  (Ibid.).	  	  
Another	   aspect	   of	   time	   in	   narrative	   that	   Ricoeur	   explores	   involves	   the	   way	   in	   which	   repeated	  
narratives	  can	  shift	  the	  future	  to	  the	  present.	  This	   is	  relevant	  because	  of	  the	  future	  focus	  of	  the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  policy	   stories	   in	  Chapter	   6.	   	   Ricoeur	   concludes	   that	   an	  effect	   of	   hearing	   repeated	  
retellings	  of	  stories	  such	  as	  folk-­‐tales	  is	  the	  anticipation	  of	  the	  ending	  before	  the	  story	  starts.	  For	  
example,	  imagine	  people	  sitting	  around	  a	  campfire	  listening	  to	  a	  retelling	  of	  their	  tribe’s	  creation	  
myth	  story.	  Everyone	  knows	  how	   it	  ends,	   right	   from	  the	  start,	  and	  when	  the	  storyteller	   reaches	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 His seminal work on narrative is Time and Narrative (1990), and he has also written numerous articles on the topic.  
64 As in the work of Louis Mink, Hayden White and David Carr (Hyvärinen, 2006). 




the	  end	  of	  the	  story,	  they	  hear	  what	  they	  have	  been	  waiting	  for	  since	  the	  beginning,	  thus	  getting	  
resolution	  and	  satisfaction.	  In	  this	  sense	  they	  have	  shifted	  the	  future	  back	  to	  the	  present	  and	  are	  
carrying	  it	  with	  them	  until	  the	  end	  appears	  in	  the	  story	  (Ricoeur,	  1980).	  	  
Given	  that	  much	  application	  of	  ANT	  has	  to	  date	  been	  in	  the	  form	  of	  case	  studies,	  the	  narration	  of	  
those	  case	  studies	  has	  inevitably	  involved	  some	  element	  of	  temporality.	  However,	  as	  indicated	  in	  
relation	   to	  Arendt,	   the	  effects	  of	   temporality	   in	  ANT	  are	   likely	   to	  emerge	   from	  time	  as	  an	  actor	  
rather	  than	  as	  an	  element	  of	  narrative	  such	  as	  ‘beginning,	  middle,	  end’.	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  8,	  I	  discuss	  my	  
findings	  on	  Ricoeur’s	   concepts	  of	   social	   time	  and	   temporal	   shifting	  when	  brought	   together	  with	  
ANT,	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  policy	  practice.	  	  
By	  suggesting	  that	  recorded	  actions	  such	  as	  those	  contained	  in	  archives	  are	  able	  to	  be	  ‘explained	  
in	  different	  ways’	  depending	  on	   the	  way	   they	  are	   interpreted,	  Ricoeur	   recognises	   that	   reality	   is	  
subjective	   (Ricoeur,	   1973,	   p.	   109).	   An	   ANT	   interpretation	   is	   that	   Ricoeur	   is	   talking	   about	   the	  
existence	   of	   multiple	   realities	   where	   each	   different	   interpretation	   is	   associated	   with	   different	  
actors	  and	  networks	  that	  frame	  reality	  differently:	  ‘Every	  network	  surround	  [sic]	  itself	  with	  its	  own	  
frame	  of	  reference,	  its	  own	  definition	  of	  growth,	  of	  refering	  [sic],	  of	  framing,	  of	  explaining’	  (Latour,	  
1996,	  p.	  377).	  	  
Vikkelsø	  argues	  that	  knowledge	  of	  multiple	  realities	  provides	  value	  to	  policy	  practice	  not	   just	  by	  
surfacing	   the	   trade-­‐offs	   and	   political	   choices,	   but	   also	   ‘	   the	   concrete	   ways	   in	   which	   different	  
practices	   can	   be	   enacted	   	   simultaneously’	   (Vikkelsø,	   2007,	   pp.	   302–3).	   This	   simultaneous	  
enactment	  implies	  multiple	  practices	  –	  an	  idea	  Law	  explores	  explicitly	  in	  his	  article	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  
with	   a	   One-­‐World	   World’	   (Law,	   2011).	   If	   multiple	   actor-­‐networks	   intersect	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
performing	   their	   different	   practices,	  we	   can	   expect	   interesting	   things	   to	   happen,	   as	   Annemarie	  
Mol	  describes:	  ‘What	  ”multiplicity”	  entails	  instead	  is	  that,	  while	  realities	  may	  clash	  at	  some	  points,	  
elsewhere	   the	   various	   performances	   of	   an	   object	   may	   collaborate	   and	   even	   depend	   on	   one	  
another’	  (Mol,	  1999,	  p.	  83).	  
Mol	  differentiates	  multiplicity	  from	  plurality,	  the	  difference	  being	  that	  unlike	  plurality,	  multiplicity	  
allows	   for	   interconnections	   between	   the	   different	   realities.	   Ricoeur’s	   ideas	   don’t	   catch	   at	   the	  
interconnectedness	  of	  different	   realities	   that	   is	   revealed	  by	  Mol.	  However,	  by	  applying	  Mol	  and	  




relationships	  between	  narratives	  and	  the	  effect	  they	  have	  on	  one	  another,	  depending	  on	  whether	  
they	   are	   collaborative,	   cooperative,	   co-­‐dependent	   or	   opposing.	   	   This	   element,	   missing	   from	  
current	  approaches	  to	  policy	  narrative,	  is	  explored	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  an	  ANT	  approach	  to	  narrative	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  analyse	  people’s	  
motivations	  or	  beliefs.	  If	  they	  come	  out	  in	  the	  course	  of	  tracing	  the	  actor-­‐networks,	  we	  can	  expect	  
them	   to	   add	   to	   the	   narrative,	   but	   the	   narrative	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   them	   as	   it	   does	   in	   other	  
approaches	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Rhodes	  and	  Shanahan,	   Jones,	  McBeth	  and	  Lane.	   	  We	  would	  expect	  
not	   having	   to	   address	   beliefs	   to	   enable	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   different	   matters	   of	   concern	   being	  
presented	  in	  any	  given	  situation,	  and	  who	  or	  what	  those	  matters	  of	  concern	  are	  connected	  to.	  This	  
would	   in	   turn	  enable	  multiplicities	   to	  be	   identified	  and	  worked	  with,	   as	  well	   as	  where	  and	  how	  
different	  assemblages	  and	  connections	  interact	  –	  whether	  they	  overlap,	  intersect,	  are	  embedded	  
in	  or	  have	  no	  connection	  at	  all.	  	  
3.6 Combining	  ANT	  and	  narrative	  theory	  
Using	  ANT	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  identifying	  policy	  narrative	  together	  with	  theoretical	  contributions	  from	  
the	  work	   of	   Arendt	   and	   Ricoeur	   points	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   new	   insights	   about	   the	   interplay	   of	  
narrative	  and	  action	  in	  a	  policy	  environment.	  	  
The	   work	   of	   Barbara	   Czarniawska	   provides	   possible	   signposts	   to	   this	   interplay	   through	   her	  
research	   on	   organisations	   using	   ANT,	   and	   her	   writings	   on	   narrative	   inquiry	   in	   organisations	  
(Czarniawska,	   2004a,	   2007;	   Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	   &	   Hernes,	   2005).	   While	   the	   study	   of	   policy	  
practice	   is	   not	   primarily	   about	   organisations,	   research	   on	   the	   operation	   of	   organisations	   can	  
nevertheless	  provide	  insights	  into	  policy	  practice.	  Hogwood	  noted	  the	  connection	  between	  policy	  
and	   organisational	   change	   in	   his	   article	   on	   public	   policy	   	   (Hogwood,	   1995).	   In	   this	   sense,	  
Czarniawska’s	  work	  provides	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
First,	   Czarniawska’s	   exploration	   of	   the	   operation	   of	   non-­‐chronological	   time	   in	   organisational	  
studies	  echoes	  both	  Ricoeur	  and	  Arendt.	   In	  her	  examination	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   time	  and	  space	   in	  
organisations,	   she	   argues	   that	   people	   in	   organisations	   experience	   ‘kairotic’	   time,	   in	  which	   time	  
speeds	   up,	   slows	   down	   and	   some	  periods	   can	   be	   left	   out	   altogether	   (Czarniawska,	   2004b).	   Her	  
enquiry	  also	  echoes	  Arendt,	  in	  claiming	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  event	  is	  ‘made’:	  




cases	  people	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  time	  of	  day	  and	  the	  day	  of	  the	  month.	  Events	  must	  be	  made	  
important	  or	  unimportant	  (Czarniawska,	  2004b,	  p.	  776).	  	  
Implicit	  in	  this	  statement	  is	  that	  the	  importance	  occurs	  through	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  events	  are	  told	  
and	  to	  whom	  they	  are	  told.	  	  
Second,	   her	   introductory	   chapter	   with	   Tor	   Hernes	   in	   their	   book	   Actor-­‐Network	   Theory	   and	  
Organizing	   explores	   ANT	   and	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘macro-­‐actor’	   in	   the	   playing	   out	   of	   power.	   	   She	  
references	  Greimas’	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘actant’	  as	  ‘highlighting	  the	  process	  of	  actants	  changing	  roles	  
through	   narrative’	   (Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	   &	   Hernes,	   2005,	   p.	   8).	   	   A	   key	   question	   posed	   in	   this	  
chapter	   is:	   ‘How	   is	   it	   possible	   for	   many	   to	   become	   one?	   It	   is	   possible	   thanks	   to	   translation,	   a	  
phenomon	   which	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   constructions	   of	   macro-­‐actors	   but	   necessary	   to	   their	  
construction’	  (Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	  &	  Hernes,	  2005,	  p.	  9).	  	  
In	  the	  same	  book,	  Feldman	  and	  Pentland	  explore	  organisational	  routines	  from	  an	  ANT	  perspective	  
and	  conclude	  that	  narratives	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  routines:	  
The	  performances	  exist	  in	  a	  reciprocal	  relation	  with	  the	  narrative.	  The	  narrative	  cannot	  exist	  
without	  performances	  and	  it	  endows	  performances	  with	  particular	  meaning	  that	  they	  would	  
not	  otherwise	  have	  (Chapter	  6	  in	  Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	  &	  Hernes,	  2005,	  p.	  110).	  
The	   discussion	   in	   this	   Chapter	   has	   therefore	   shown	   that	  when	  we	   look	   at	   ANT,	  we	   see	   that	   an	  
actor-­‐network	  both	  is	  the	  action	  through	  performativity	  and	  reveals	  the	  action	  through	  tracing	  the	  
connections.	   As	   I	   see	   it,	   these	   are	   John	   Law’s	   two	   stories,	   from	  which,	   if	   he	   is	   correct,	  we	   can	  
expect	   a	   third	   story	   –	   the	  narratives	  of	   the	   interaction.	   Law	  has	   also	   identified	   that	  narrative	   is	  
itself	  performative.	  	  I	  explore	  these	  matters	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8.	  
In	  this	  Chapter,	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  ANT	  provides	  a	  common	  analytical	  frame	  for	  borders,	  markets	  
and	   policy	   narrative,	   and	   have	   identified	   several	   particular	   areas	   of	   enquiry	   I	   will	   be	   testing	  
throughout	   my	   thesis.	   In	   establishing	   the	   performativity	   of	   borders	   and	   the	   relationship	   with	  
marketization,	   I	   have	   identified	   that	   borders	   are	   places	   where	   the	   effects	   of	   markets	   play	   out	  
through	  nation	  states	  managing	  the	  pacification	  and	  overflowings	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  
people.	   Thus	   the	   narratives	   of	   national	   borders	   are	   connected	   into	   domestic	   and	   international	  
narratives,	   and	   as	   these	   change,	  we	   can	   expect	   border	   narratives	   to	   change,	  making	   borders	   a	  




I	  have	  established	  ANT	  links	  with	  policy	  narrative	  and	  identified	  the	  value	  of	  using	  ANT	  to	  identify	  
the	   effects	   of	   connections	   and	   the	   stickiness	   of	   translation.	   This	   then	   enables	   enquiry	   into	   the	  
performativity	   of	   narrative	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   ANT	   to	   reveal	   the	   matters	   of	   concern	   in	   policy	  
narrative.	   In	   examining	   the	   work	   of	   Hannah	   Arendt	   and	   Paul	   Ricoeur	   alongside	   ANT,	   I	   have	  
revealed	  the	  value	  of	  enquiry	  into	  the	  role	  of	  time	  and	  temporality	  in	  ANT,	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  
temporality	  in	  narrative	  with	  the	  temporality	  of	  ANT,66	  the	  fragility	  of	  action	  and	  the	  role	  of	  State	  
narratives	   in	  capturing	  action,	   the	  visibility	  of	  action	  through	  the	  performativity	  of	  ANT,	  and	  the	  
interplay	  between	  multiple	  narratives.	  	  
The	  next	  Chapter	  explains	  the	  methodology	  for	  these	  enquiries.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








Chapter 4  
 Methodology and Method 
4.1 Introduction	  	  
As	  well	   as	  providing	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   this	   thesis,	  ANT	   forms	   the	   foundation	  of	  my	  
methodology,	  both	  ontologically	  and	  epistemologically.	  	  
4.2 Ontology	  
Where	  ANT	  sits	  ontologically	  has	  not	  been	  widely	  discussed	  academically	  but	   leading	  proponent	  
John	   Law	   describes	   ANT	   as	   ‘an	   empirical	   version	   of	   poststructuralism’	   (Law,	   2009,	   p.	   145).	  
According	   to	  Law,	   this	  view	  owes	  much	  to	  Foucault,	  whose	   focus	  on	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  breaking	  
down	   and	   reassembling	   of	   connections	   both	   human	   and	   non-­‐human	   underpin	   his	   relational	  
approach	  to	  knowledge:	  
Despite	   the	   cracks	   and	   the	   strains	   .	   .	   .	   most	   of	   the	   space	   –	   the	   space	  made	   by	   .	   .	   .	   the	  
episteme	   for	   Foucault	  –	  most	  of	   the	   space	  we	  have	   for	   knowing	  and	  being,	  narrating	  and	  
performing,	  living	  and	  building,	  most	  of	  that	  space	  is	  structured	  by	  a	  single	  set	  of	  ontological	  
strategies	  or	  distributions	  (Law,	  2000,	  p.	  17).	  
While	  some	  proponents	  of	  ANT	  state	  that	  ANT	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  (Callon	  in	  Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999;	  Mol,	  
2010),	  Latour’s	  view	  is	  that	  ANT	  is	  a	  theory,	  but	  not	  of	  ‘the	  social’.	  For	  him	  it	  is	  about	  ‘how	  to	  let	  
the	  actors	  have	  some	  room	  to	  express	  themselves’	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  142).	  	  This	  view	  comes	  out	  of	  
ethnomethodology	  about	  which	  Latour	  says:	  	  
Actors	   know	   what	   they	   do	   and	   why	   they	   do	   it.	   It	   is	   us,	   the	   social	   scientists,	   who	   lack	  
knowledge	  of	  what	  they	  do,	  and	  not	  they	  who	  are	  missing	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  they	  are	  
unwittingly	  manipulated	  by	  forces	  exterior	  to	  themselves	  and	  know	  to	  the	  social	  scientist’s	  
powerful	  gaze	  and	  methods	  	  (Latour,	  1999,	  p.	  19).	  
Ontologically,	   I	  wanted	  a	  method	  that	  did	  not	  separate	  structure	  and	  agency.	  ANT	  is	  one	  of	  two	  
key	  approaches	  that	  do	  this.	  The	  other	  is	  Giddens’	  structuration	  theory.	  While	  both	  are	  designed	  
to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  social	  structures	  (structure)	  and	  individual	  action	  (agency)	  being	  treated	  
as	  separate	  and	  opposing	  ontological	  perspectives	  by	  treating	  them	  as	  interrelated,	  ANT	  has	  been	  




more	  complete	  picture.	  A	  criticism	  of	  Giddens	  is	  that	  he	  focuses	  on	  social	   interaction,	  side-­‐lining	  
the	  physical	  world	  (Murdoch,	  1997).	  
Cordella	  and	  Shaikh	  argue	  that	  ANT’s	  view	  of	  emergent	  reality	  is	  a	  distinguishing	  feature.	  In	  letting	  
the	  actors	  speak,	  the	  researcher	  reveals	  the	  relations	  between	  actors	  ‘.	  .	  .	  and	  it	  is	  only	  from	  this	  
interaction	  that	  reality	  can	  emerge’	  (Cordella	  &	  Shaikh,	  2006,	  p.	  17).	  In	  arguing	  for	  the	  ontology	  of	  
ANT,	  Cordella	  and	  Shaikh	  propose	  that	  this	  emergent	  property	  of	  agency	  within	  a	  heterogeneous	  
network	  in	  ANT	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  other	  approaches:	  ‘The	  ontology	  of	  ANT	  is	  that	  reality	  
emerges	  through	  the	  interplay	  of	  various	  actors	  [both	  technology	  and	  people],	  so	  in	  a	  sense	  reality	  
becomes	  ‘real’	  when	  actors	  interact’	  (Cordella	  &	  Shaikh,	  2006,	  p.	  18).	  
ANT	   also	   addresses	   the	   problem	   of	   dualistic	   thinking	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   the	   gap	   created	   by	   the	  
local/global	   dichotomy	   and	   the	   separation	   of	   social	   and	   material	   worlds	   (Murdoch,	   1997).	  
Dichotomies	  separate;	  separation	  creates	  gaps	  and	  the	  need	  to	  make	  choices.	  ANT	  removes	  the	  
gap	  created	  by	  separating	  the	  local/global	  dichotomy	  by	  ‘flattening’	  the	  landscape	  so	  that	  the	  two	  
are	   interlinked	   non-­‐hierarchically	   and	   there	   is	   no	   dualism;	   it	   removes	   the	   gap	   created	   by	  
separating	  humans	  and	  non-­‐humans	  by	  recognising	  that	  material	  objects	  are	  actors,	   rather	  than	  
inert	  carriers	  –	  they	  create	  effects,	  albeit	  in	  a	  different	  way	  from	  human	  actors;	  it	  removes	  the	  gap	  
between	  actor,	  action	  and	  network	  by	  defining	  the	  actor	  as	  creating	  the	  network	  through	  action	  –	  
the	  actor-­‐network.	  	  
4.3 Epistemology	  	  
 Introduction 4.3.1
ANT’s	  post-­‐structural	   ontology	  points	   to	   an	   interpretivist	   	   epistemology.	   	   The	   term	   ‘interpretive	  
turn’	   is	   more	   commonly	   used,	   which	   encapsulates	   the	   ideas	   of	   turning	   away	   from	   pseudo-­‐
scientific	  objective	  methods	  and	  turning	  toward	  more	  humanised	  approaches	  (Yanow	  &	  Schwartz-­‐
Shea,	  2006).	  	  	  
Interpretivist	  epistemology	  starts	  with	  the	  proposition	  that	  reality	  is	  socially	  constructed	  and	  that	  
individuals	  construct	  and	   interpret	  the	  world	  around	  them	  in	  different	  ways,	  depending	  on	  their	  
experiences	  and	  beliefs,	   and	   the	   social	   context	  within	  which	   they	  operate	   (Berger	  &	   Luckmann,	  
1967;	  Bevir	  &	  Rhodes,	  2006b);	   in	  short,	   that	   reality	   is	   ‘subjectively	  experienced	  and	   interpreted’	  




(Schram,	   n.d.,	   p.	   10),	   including	   ethnography,	   discourse	   analysis,	   semiotics,	   narrative	   analysis,	  
storytelling	  analysis	  and	  more.	   Influential	   contributors	   to	   the	   interpretivist	  epistemology	   include	  
Clifford	  Geertz	  (anthropology);	  Max	  Weber,	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  Peter	  Berger	  and	  Thomas	  Luckmann	  
(sociology);	  Michel	  Foucault	  (philosophy);	  William	  Labov	  (linguistics);	  Paul	  Ricoeur,	  Roland	  Barthes,	  
Hayden	   White	   (history),	   Frank	   Fischer	   (policy	   sciences).67	   	   Bevir	   and	   Rhodes	   (political	  
science/public	  administration)	  argue	  for	  an	  interpretive	  approach	  using	  narrative	  (Finlayson,	  Bevir,	  
Rhodes,	  Dowding,	  &	  Hay,	  2004).	  	  	  
While	   interpretivist	   social	   researchers	   interpret	   other	   people's	   interpretations	   of	   their	   reality	  
(Bevir	  &	  Rhodes,	   2006b;	  Bevir	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Finlayson	  et	   al.,	   2004;	  Giddens,	   1976;	   Schram,	  n.d.),	  
ANT,	  as	  already	  described,	  lets	  the	  explanation	  come	  from	  the	  actors.	  However,	  the	  writer	  still	  has	  
an	  interpretive	  role.	  ‘The	  social	  scientist	  must	  begin	  with	  data	  that	  are	  already	  partially	  interpreted	  
in	  the	  ordinary	  language	  of	  everyday	  life’(Outhwaite,	  1975,	  pp.	  16–17).	  	  This	  language	  of	  everyday	  
life	   is	   underpinned	   by	   ‘thick	   description’	   -­‐	   the	   background	   information	   that	   is	   not	   immediately	  
obvious	  but	  which	  drives	  people’s	  beliefs	  and	  behaviours	  (Geertz,	  1973).	  	  
The	  interpretivist	  approach	  places	  the	  social	  researcher	  within	  the	  research,	  so	  that	   in	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	   situation,	   the	   interaction	  between	   the	   interviewer	  and	   those	  being	   interviewed	   is	   creative,	  
‘requiring	   a	   dialogic	   relationship	   between	   the	   people	   doing	   the	   studying	   and	   the	   people	   being	  
studied’	   (Schram,	  2003	  on	  Bent	  Flyvbjerg).	   	  Geertz	  comments	  that	  a	  monologue	   is	  of	   little	  value	  
(Geertz,	  1973).	  
Narrative	  is	  a	  central	  part	  of	  an	  interpretive	  epistemology,	  and	  is	  characterised	  by	  events,	  players	  
in	  those	  events,	  and	  sequences.	   In	  addition,	   	   ‘[t]o	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  particular	  constituents	  of	  a	  
narrative,	  one	  needs	  to	  grasp	  its	  plot’	  (Tsoukas	  &	  Hatch,	  2001,	  p.	  997).	  	  When	  we	  are	  in	  the	  middle	  
of	  the	  plot,	  we	  use	  narrative	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world.	  All	  people	  do	  this	  from	  a	  very	  young	  age:	  
‘.	   .	   .	  narrative	  comprehension	  is	  among	  the	  earliest	  powers	  of	  mind	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  young	  child	  
and	   among	   the	   most	   widely	   used	   form	   of	   organizing	   human	   experience’	   (Bruner,	   1991,	   p.	   9).	  	  
Bruner	  argues	  that	  in	  this	  way,	  interpretation	  comes	  out	  of	  narrative.	  We	  can	  infer	  from	  Bruner’s	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explanation	  that	  by	  the	  time	  a	  child	  grows	  to	  adulthood,	  their	  interpretations	  are	  a	  complex	  mix	  of	  
understandings	  (stories)	  built	  up	  over	  time	  out	  of	  their	  different	  experiences.	  	  Social	  theories	  
.	  .	  .	  are,	  or	  at	  least	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as,	  various	  ways	  to	  account	  for	  how	  people	  come	  to	  
adopt	   stories	   that	   guide	   behaviour.	   In	   this,	   and	   in	   their	   ultimate	   nonpostivism,	   they	   are	  
related	  to	  the	  narrative	  paradigm,	  for	  it,	  too,	  seeks	  to	  account	  for	  how	  people	  come	  to	  adopt	  
stories	  that	  guide	  behaviour	  (Fisher,	  1987,	  pp.	  86–7).	  	  
Thus,	  narrative	  and	  interpretation	  are	  closely	  linked.	  Central	  to	  both	  is	  language	  –	  not	  only	  as	  the	  
medium	   through	   which	   stories	   are	   told,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   communication	   and	   influencing	   tool	  
(Bridgman	  &	  Barry,	  2002;	  Herman,	  2000).	  	  Language	  isn’t	  just	  a	  descriptive	  tool	  either	  –	  it	  is	  part	  of	  
the	  fabric	  of	  actions:	  ‘Language	  is	  a	  medium	  of	  social	  practice’	  (Giddens,	  1979,	  p.	  245).	  	  
The	  narrative	  mode	  reminds	  one	  there	  is	  a	  dialogue	  involving	  a	  narrator	  and	  a	  listener	  (or	  reader)	  
and	  that	  in	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  situation,	  there	  is	  an	  interchange	  between	  the	  two,	  even	  if	  no	  words	  are	  
exchanged	  (Tsoukas	  &	  Hatch,	  2001).	  	  The	  listener	  therefore	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  story,	  in	  a	  subtle	  
sense.	   Even	   when	   the	   social	   scientist	   is	   working	   off	   written	   records,	   they	   are	   changed	   by	   the	  
narrative	  they	  read	  or	  watch	  (in	  the	  latter	  case,	  in	  a	  movie).	  They	  are	  not	  the	  expert	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  a	  social	  scientist	  is	  in	  positivist	  research.	  This	  is	  what	  Giddens	  meant	  with	  his	  term	  the	  ‘double	  
hermeneutic’	  (Giddens,	  1976).	  	  	  	  
	  Narrative	  analysis	  involves	  drawing	  out	  themes	  and	  insights	  from	  actors’	  stories.	  The	  challenge	  for	  
social	   researchers	   is	   to	  do	   so	  without	  homogenising	   them.	  One	  way	  of	  mitigating	   this	   risk	   is	   by	  
acknowledging	  that	  different	  people	  have	  different	  narratives,	  as	  already	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  
Another	  is	  by	  depicting	  a	  rich	  picture	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  aggregation.	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  make	  a	  
distinction	  between	  much	  more	  diverse	  current	  narratives	  and	  historical	  metanarratives	  of	  earlier	  
times.	   	   In	  narrative	  analysis,	   the	  researcher	  draws	  out	  the	  narrative	  from	  their	  data	  by	  way	  of	  a	  
theory	  or	  a	  method	  (Jones	  &	  McBeth,	  2010,	  p.	  342).	  Narrative	  analysis	  that	   is	  not	  anchored	  to	  a	  
theoretical	  domain	  is	  not	  enough	  on	  its	  own.68	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 ANT as method 4.3.2
ANT	   is	   a	  method	   that	   traces	   and	   thus	   reveals	   the	   circulations	   and	   transformations	   that	   are	   the	  
actor-­‐network	  (Callon	  in	  Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999).	  The	  difference	  between	  ANT	  and	  other	  strands	  of	  
post-­‐modernist	   thinking	   (e.g.	   Foucault,	   Deleuze	   and	   Gattari,	   Lyotard)	   is	   that	   ANT	   provides	   a	  
coherent	  platform	  for	  applying	  these	  ideas	  and	  concepts	  to	  the	  real	  world	  (Law,	  2009),	  although	  
what	  the	  application	  of	  that	  platform	  reveals	  may	  not	  be	  coherent	  (Law,	  2004a;	  Mol,	  2010).	  
Since	   its	   emergence	   in	   the	   1980s,	   ANT	   has	   been	   applied	   in	   many	   different	   ways.	   It	   has	   been	  
challenged	  and	   championed;	   as	   a	   term,	   it	   has	  become	  a	  part	  of	   the	   academic	   lexicon,	  meaning	  
‘something’,	   although	  what	   that	   something	   ‘is’	   has	   varied	  with	   the	  way	   it	   has	   been	   used	   (Law,	  
1999).	  Latour	  has	  long	  intended	  the	  ANT	  approach	  to	  be	  applied	  broadly:	  
.	  .	  .	  it	  [bureaucracy]	  constitutes	  a	  mixture	  of	  other	  disciplines	  which	  have	  to	  be	  studied	  with	  
the	  same	  method	   I	   have	   presented	   in	   this	   book	   even	   though	   they	   are	   not	   considered	   as	  
pertaining	  to	  “science	  and	  technology”(Latour,	  1987).	  
Law	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  version	  of	  ANT	  used	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Society	  has	  
deliberately	  not	  addressed	  the	  institutional	  interactions	  in	  the	  policy	  context.	  However,	  he	  found	  
it	  useful	  to	  do	  so	  in	  his	  and	  Karel	  Williams’	  study	  of	  the	  UK	  government	  in	  which	  a	  key	  issue	  was	  
breaking	  open	  the	  simplicity	  and	  singularity	  of	  ‘the	  market’	  (Law	  &	  Williams,	  2014).	  	  	  
As	  ANT	   is	  used	   in	  new	  ways,	   so	   its	   reach	  and	  scope	  extends	   into	  new	   fields	  and	  disciplines.	  For	  
example,	   Callon	   has	   worked	   with	   others	   to	   apply	   an	   ANT	   approach	   to	   economic	   theory	   and	  
markets	  (Çalışkan	  &	  Callon,	  2010;	  Callon	  &	  Muniesa,	  2005).	  Others	  have	  helped	  expand	  the	  use	  of	  
ANT	   into	  other	  areas,	   such	  as	  organizational	   studies	   	   (Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	  &	  Hernes,	  2005)	  and	  
public	  policy	  (Dugdale	  in	  Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999;	  Young,	  Borland,	  &	  Coghill,	  2010).	  	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  an	  
example	  of	   itself.	   It	   is	  an	  actor-­‐network	  that	   is	  being	  translated	  and	  transformed	  every	  time	  it	   is	  
used:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  the	  ANT	  tradition	  rarely	  works	  by	  adding	  to	  what	  has	  already	  been	  established.	  Instead	  
it	   introduces	   variations,	   sets	   up	   contrasts,	   and	   time	   and	   again,	   proposes	   shifts’	   (Mol,	   2010,	   p.	  
256).	  	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	   contribute	   to	  extending	   the	   reach	  and	  scope	  of	   the	  application	  of	  ANT	   in	   several	  
ways.	  First,	   I	  apply	  ANT	  in	  two	  new	  ways	  to	  the	  field	  of	  border	  management	  –	  by	  extending	  the	  




regional	  economic	  integration.	  Second,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  narrative	  aspects	  of	  ANT	  and	  apply	  them	  to	  
policy	  narrative	  in	  this	  setting.	  	  	  	  
4.4 How	  ANT	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  this	  thesis	  
In	  Reassembling	  the	  Social	  (2007),	  Latour	  provides	  guidance	  on	  conducting	  an	  ANT	  enquiry.	  While	  
much	  of	   that	  guidance	   is	  open	  to	   interpretation,	   	   such	  as	  what	  exactly	  constitutes	  a	   translation,	  
the	  necessity	  to	  ‘follow	  the	  actors’	  through	  an	  ethnographic	  enquiry	  is	  clear	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  12).	  	  
Ethnographic	  inquiry	  is	  where	  the	  social	  researcher	  reads	  ‘practices,	  actions,	  texts,	  interviews	  and	  
speeches	   to	   recover	   other	   people's	   stories’	   (Finlayson	   et	   al.,	   2004,	   p.	   135).	   Law	   (1999,	   2000,	  
2004b)	  and	  Boll	  (2011)	  show	  in	  their	  work	  how	  they	  use	  ANT	  as	  an	  approach	  to	  inform	  their	  work,	  
indicating	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  or	  right	  way	  to	  go	  about	  recovering	  those	  stories.	  
My	  ethnographic	  approach	  has	  been	  to	  open	  up	  the	  black	  box	  of	  events	  that	  had	  already	  occurred	  
and	  to	  retrace	  the	  actor-­‐networks	  in	  play.	  For	  the	  events	  that	  occurred	  during	  my	  research,	  I	  kept	  
notes	  on	  those	  events	  I	  was	  involved	  with,	  but	  as	  the	  work	  was	  fragmented	  across	  different	  areas	  
of	  work	  and	  different	  agencies,	  and	  occurred	  intermittently,	  my	  reach	  was	  limited.	  I	  have	  followed	  
the	  actors	  through	  written	  records,	  through	   interviews	  with	  those	   involved	  with	  the	  events,	  and	  
through	  recalling	  my	  own	  experiences	  of	  those	  events. The	  writing	  of	  this	  thesis	  also	  contributed	  
to	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  border	  story	  (see	  Figure	  3	  below).	  The	  performance	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  
policy	   practice	   continued	   sporadically	   throughout	   the	   course	   of	   the	   data	   gathering	   period.	   The	  
material	   I	  gathered	  not	  only	   informed	  my	  thesis,	  but	  by	  way	  of	   seminars	  and	  workshops,	   I	   took	  
back	   into	   the	  workplace	   the	   analysis	   of	   it,	   thus,	   in	   a	   small	  way,	   influencing	   the	   discussions	   and	  
debates	  about	  ‘where	  to	  from	  here?’	  This	  circulating	  debate	  was	  its	  own	  actor-­‐network	  within	  the	  
larger	  story.	   	  For	  example,	  below	  are	  my	  notes	  written	  the	  day	  after	  a	  workshop	  I	  held	  with	  the	  
Customs	  Policy	  Group69:	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Figure	  3. Notes	  from	  applying	  ANT	  in	  the	  workplace	  on	  1	  August	  2012	  
Experimenting	  –	  part	  of	  my	  research	  strategy/method?	  
On	   1	   August,	   I	   held	   a	   workshop	   to	   test	   out	   the	   usefulness	   of	   some	   aspects	   of	   ANT	   for	   policy	  
thinking.	  What	   I	   am	   wondering,	   then,	   for	   my	   research,	   is	   whether	   I	   can	   build	   on	   this	   initial	  
workshop	   for	   identifying	   TT	   [trans-­‐Tasman]	   connections,	   and	   incorporate	   the	   findings	   in	   my	  
thesis	  as	  part	  of	  my	  method.	  	  
I	  got	  the	  (15	  or	  so)	  staff	  who	  chose	  to	  attend	  the	  session	  (labelled	  ‘discussion	  of	  concepts’)	  
to	   identify	  TT	  connections	  relevant	  to	  Customs.	  They	  came	  up	  with	  a	  range	  of	  suggestions	  –	  not	  
full	  coverage	  but	  a	  good	  mix	  –	  which	  I	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  our	  discussion.	  We	  also	  discussed	  the	  
types	  of	  connections,	  and	  whether	  they	  were	  formal	  or	  informal	  and	  how	  they	  occurred.	  Some	  of	  
this	  is	  reflected	  on	  the	  whiteboard	  notes.70	  I	  noted	  the	  way	  in	  which	  discussing	  connections	  in	  this	  
way	  (and	  writing	  them	  on	  the	  board)	  built	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  living,	  moving	  web.	  	  	  	  
I	   then	   introduced	   the	   idea	   of	   connections	   creating	   groupings,	   the	   inherently	   unstable	  
nature	  of	  these	  connections,	  and	  what	  we	  do	  in	  the	  policy	  world	  to	  stabilise	  them	  –	   introducing	  
also	   the	   idea	   that	   these	   connections	   can	   be	   either	   human	   or	   non-­‐human.	   So	   I	   suggested	   that	  
paper,	  and	  pens,	  and	  emails,	  and	  the	  meetings	  we’d	  identified	  on	  the	  board	  were	  all	  technologies	  
that	  we	  use	  in	  the	  policy	  world	  to	  stabilise	  connections,	  and	  so	  are	  agreements	  and	  reports.	  	  
I	  had	  already	  introduced	  these	  ideas	  to	  at	  least	  three	  people	  in	  the	  room,	  and	  so	  they	  were	  
able	  to	  chip	  in	  early	  on	  with	  some	  thoughts	  about	  how	  this	  approach	  could	  help	  them	  think	  about	  
their	  work.	  A	  number	  of	  people	  commented	  on	  their	  own	  work	  situations,	  reflecting	  on	  what	  this	  
approach	  gave	  them.	  	  
This	  exposure	  alone	  won’t	  be	  enough	  to	  get	  people	  thinking	   in	  this	  way	   in	  their	  work	  –	   I	  
have	  been	  the	  most	  exposed	  and	  even	  I	  don’t	  apply	  this	  thinking	  across	  all	  my	  work.	  
I	   clustered	   the	  connections	   identified	   in	   the	  workshop	   into	   several	  groups	  –	  geopolitical/foreign	  
policy,	   formal,	   informal,	   day-­‐to-­‐day,	   the	   border	   operating	   environment,	   and	   sharing	   knowledge	  
and	  learning.	  The	  electronic	  version	  of	  the	  output	  from	  the	  workshop	  is	  depicted	  below	  in	  Figure	  
4:	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  









In	  ANT,	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  an	  enquiry	  is	  arbitrary	  because	  it	  can	  always	  be	  traced	  to	  more	  and	  
more	   connections,	   and,	   as	   suggested	  by	   Passoth	   and	  Rowland,	   there	   is	   no	  ultimate	   truth	  being	  
aimed	  for:	  
As	  long	  as	  we	  do	  not	  assume	  that	  a	  better	  picture	  of	  the	  network	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  adding	  
more	  and	  more	  perspectives,	  the	  problem	  of	  where	  to	  begin	  following	  actors	   is	  not	  so	  big	  
because	  following	  different	  actors	  will	  not	  bring	  us	  closer	  to	  some	  indelible	  truth	  (Passoth	  &	  
Rowland,	  2011,	  p.	  11).	  
By	  using	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  of	  2	  March	  2009	  as	  the	  starting	  point,	  I	  have	  been	  
able	   to	   localise	  events	   through	   the	   five	   trans-­‐Tasman	  border	   stories	   that	   feature	   in	  Chapter	  6.	   I	  
have	  done	  this	  by	  explaining	  the	  different	  assemblages	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  policy	  context.	  
I	  then	  connect	  them	  with	  the	  past	  and	  the	  geographically	  distant	  in	  a	  flat	  and	  folded	  landscape	  as	  
described	  by	  Latour:	  
So	  the	  right	  topography	  here	  is	  not	  to	  include	  the	  front	  line	  ‘into’	  some	  overarching	  power,	  
but	  to	   localize	  both	  and	  to	  connect	   through	  some	  sort	  of	  well-­‐fed	  cables	  what	   in	  French	   is	  
called	  connectique.	  This	  is	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  flattening	  the	  landscape	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  182).	  
Latour	  gives	  a	  clear	  description	  of	  a	  good	  ANT	  account:	  	  
A	  good	  ANT	  account	  is	  a	  narrative	  or	  a	  description	  or	  a	  proposition	  where	  all	  the	  actors	  do	  
something	  and	  don’t	  just	  sit	  there	  .	  .	  .	  A	  good	  text	  elicits	  networks	  of	  actors	  when	  it	  allows	  
the	  writer	  to	  trace	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  defined	  as	  so	  many	  translations	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  128).	  
This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  provide	  a	  good	  account.	  To	  frame	  that	  account,	  I	  focused	  on	  the	  actors,	  their	  
stories,	   associations	   and	   tensions,	   matters	   of	   concern	   versus	   matters	   of	   fact,	   translations,	  
multiplicities	  and	  surprises.	  	  
As	  evidenced	  by	  the	  quotes	  above,	  I	  have	  drawn	  heavily	  on	  Latour’s	  later	  writings,	  though	  I	  have	  
also	  found	  his	  book	  Science	  in	  Action	  (Latour,	  1987)	  to	  be	  very	  useful,	  particularly	  in	  unpacking	  the	  
concepts	  of	   ‘matters	  of	  fact’	  and	  ‘matters	  of	  concern’,	  which	  are	  central	  to	  my	  analysis.	   	  While	   I	  




the	  associated	  stages	  of	  translation	  to	  frame	  my	  analysis.71	  My	  retracings	  and	  interviews	  revealed	  
that	   there	   were	   no	   fundamental	   controversies	   in	   play	   for	   which	   this	   framing	  might	   have	   been	  
useful.	  I	  found	  instead	  that	  while	  translations	  emerged	  as	  critically	  important	  to	  this	  research,	  the	  
stages	  of	  translation	  were	  less	  so.	  The	  stages	  of	  translation	  could	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  Story	  2	  in	  
Chapter	  6	  but	  I	  found	  the	  elements	  of	  power	  emerged	  without	  them.	  	  What	  emerged	  instead	  were	  
what	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  more	  interesting	  and	  useful	  dynamics,	  such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  matters	  of	  fact	  
out	  of	  matters	  of	  concern	  in	  the	  policy	  context.	  In	  his	  exposition	  on	  ANT,	  Reassembling	  the	  Social,	  
Latour	   does	   not	   mention	   the	   stages	   of	   translation,	   which	   indicates	   they	   are	   not	   central	   to	   his	  
thinking	  about	  ANT	  (Latour,	  2007).	  
I	   have	   also	   chosen	   not	   to	   use	   some	   other	   ANT	   terms,	   particularly	   ‘immutable	   mobiles’,	  
‘intermediaries’	   and	   ‘mediators’	   as	   I	   consider	   they	   would	   have	   unnecessarily	   complicated	   the	  
understandability	  of	  my	  narrative.	  The	  dynamics	  sitting	  behind	  them	  do	  nevertheless	  appear	  in	  my	  
narration.72	   
4.5 Method	  
As	   signalled	   above,	   there	   is	   no	   absolute	   truth	   that	   arises	   from	   the	   ANT	   method	   (Passoth	   &	  
Rowland,	  2011)	  and	  ‘there	  is	  no	  final	  word,	  no	  line	  to	  draw	  under	  an	  analysis	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  a	  close,	  
no	   necessary	   compilation	   of	   accounts’	   (Lee	   and	   Stenner	   in	   Law	   &	   Hassard,	   1999,	   p.	   93).	   It	  
therefore	   follows	   there	   is	  no	   ideal	  number	  of	   interviews	  or	  documents	   to	  be	  examined	  and	   the	  
end	  point	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  judgment.	  
My	   research	   method	   was	   to	   trace	   translations	   and	   identify	   narratives	   from	   a	   combination	   of	  
primary	   documents,	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews,	   personal	   recollection,	   and	   observations	   and	  
interventions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Refer to Callon, M. (1986). Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the 
Fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay in J. Law (Ed.) Power, Action and Belief: a new Sociology of Knowledge? Sociological Review Monograph. 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 32: 196-233. 
72 The inscriptions discussed in Chapters 6-8 are examples of immutable mobiles – representations that move from one 
place to another and that can be used by actors to monopolise meaning. An intermediary is ‘anything passing between actors 
which defines the relationship between them’ and this can include ‘scientific articles, computer software, disciplined human 
bodies, technical artefacts, instruments, contracts and money’ (Michael, 1996, p. 134). An intermediary counts for ‘just 
one—or even for nothing at all because it can be easily forgotten’ (Latour, 2007, p. 39). A mediator, on the other hand, 
translates and transforms and ‘their input is never a good predictor of their output’ (Ibid.). Thus an intermediary doesn’t 





I	  began	  my	  research	  with	  a	  small	  pilot	  study	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  SmartGate,	  involving	  four	  interviews	  
and	   one	   meeting	   (see	   Appendix	   A	   for	   the	   interview	   guide).	   At	   this	   stage	   I	   had	   identified	   a	  
theoretical	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  action,	  but	  had	  not	  settled	  on	  a	  theoretical	  frame.	  
From	   the	  pilot,	   I	   found	   that	   exploring	  narrative	  without	   a	   theoretical	   frame	  was	  not	   enough	   to	  
trace	   its	   relationship	   to	   action	   even	  with	   the	   focus	  on	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  management.	   I	  
needed	  a	  theoretical	  base	  out	  of	  which	  the	  narrative	  could	  be	  revealed.	  	  
Therefore,	  while	  the	  pilot	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  article	  (Nicklin,	  2012),	   I	  ended	  up	  changing	  the	  
theoretical	  approach	  to	  my	  research	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  six-­‐month	  academic	  exchange	  to	  Sciences	  
Po,	   Paris	   in	   late	   2011-­‐mid-­‐2012.	   This	   institution	   is	   the	   academic	   home	   of	   Bruno	   Latour,	   where	  
access	  to	  his	  and	  other	  ANT	  materials	  were	  plentiful	  and	  close	  at	  hand.	  I	  am	  indebted	  also	  to	  Dr.	  
Karen	  Boll,	  whom	  I	  visited	   in	  Copenhagen,	   for	  showing	  me	  that	  ANT	  can	  be	  used	   in	  many	  ways,	  
including	  as	  an	  approach	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  strict	  ethnographic	  method.	  	  
While	   in	   Paris,	   I	   conducted	   exploratory	   research	   on	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   EU.	   I	   was	   particularly	  
interested	   in	   finding	   out	   if	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   UK,	   with	   its	   geographical	   separation	   by	   the	  
English	  Channel,	  to	  the	  European	  mainland	  was	  in	  any	  way	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  New	  Zealand	  to	  
Australia.	  I	  also	  wanted	  to	  find	  out	  more	  about	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  border	  management	  parts	  of	  
the	  EU	  as	  a	  major	  source	  of	  the	  global	  research	  on	  regional	  economic	  integration.	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  
my	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  colleague	  stationed	  in	  Brussels,	  and	  to	  the	  Brussels	  Embassy,	  for	  helping	  
set	  up	  the	  interviews	  for	  this	  research.	  
I	  then	  conducted	  the	  substantive	   interviews	  in	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia.	  This	  was	  the	  stage	  at	  
which	   I	   used	   ANT	   as	   my	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   frame.	   My	   aim	   was	   to	   elicit	   from	  
interviewees	   their	   recollections	   of	   events	   during	   the	   period	   of	   study.	   Czarniawska	   calls	   these	  
‘narrative	   interviews’	   which	   ‘come	   near	   to	   an	   everyday	   account,	   and	   therefore	   to	   direct	  
observation’	  (Czarniawska,	  2004b,	  p.	  787).	  	  My	  own	  knowledge	  proved	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  enabled	  me	  
to	  provide	  prompts	  and	  memory-­‐joggers	  to	  interviewees	  and	  to	  generate	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  two-­‐way	  
conversation.	   I	   found	   on	   one	   occasion	   that	   an	   interviewee	   did	   not	  want	   to	   focus	   on	  what	   had	  
happened,	  and	  kept	  reverting	  back	  to	  the	  future	  that	  would	   	   ‘give	  us	  that	  common	  ground,	  as	  a	  
way	  forward	  to	  move	  forward’	  (Official	  2,	  lines	  257-­‐258),	  which	  appeared	  to	  greatly	  energise	  this	  
person.	   	  While	  other	   interviewees	  did	  not	   talk	   about	   the	   future	   to	   the	   same	  extent,	   they	  often	  




for	   me	   that	   temporality	   in	   policy	   practice	   was	   worth	   noting.	   What	   was	   also	   evident	   from	  
interviewees	  were	  the	  things	  that	  animated	  them.	  I	  refer	  to	  some	  of	  these	  instances	  in	  my	  analysis	  
of	  the	  stories	  and	  in	  my	  conclusions.	  
I	   traced	   the	   translations	   and	   recorded	   them	   as	   chronological	   stories	   (explained	   below).	   I	   then	  
analysed	   the	   narratives	   by	   letting	   the	   actors	   speak.	   The	   interviews	   in	   particular	   provided	   rich	  
analytical	   material	   for	   identifying	   different	   types	   of	   narratives	   and	   the	   interplay	   of	   a	   range	   of	  
dynamics.	  	  
Interviews	  were	  subject	  to	  the	  Victoria	  University	  of	  Wellington	  ethics	  guidelines.	  Ethics	  approval	  
was	  sought	  and	  granted	  for	  three	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  research	  –	  first,	  for	  the	  pilot,	  second	  for	  
the	  exploratory	  research	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  third,	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  interviews.	  	  
 Data collection  4.5.1
In	  planning	  for	  data	  collection,	   I	  aimed	  for	  enough	  information	  to	  trace	  action	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
show	   that	   the	   activities	   in	   my	   stories	   are	   verifiable.	   However,	   the	   interpretation	   of	   what	   was	  
important	   in	  my	   stories	   and	  how	   they	   fit	   together,	   how	   they	   are	   emphasised	  or	   not,	   and	  what	  
sense	  I	  have	  subsequently	  made	  of	  them	  is	  my	  own.	  
 Data from New Zealand and Australia 4.5.1.1
As	   discussed	   earlier,	   the	   fragmented	   and	   intermittent	   nature	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   activities	   did	   not	  
lend	   itself	   to	   full	  on-­‐site	  ethnographic	  methods	   for	  gathering	  data	   for	   the	  stories	   in	  Chapter	  6.	   I	  
therefore	   used	   a	   combination	   of	   organisational	   and	   personal	   records	   and	   interviews	   to	   build	   a	  
picture	  of	  officials’	   activities,	   supplemented	  by	  my	  own	  memory	  of	  events.	   	   These	  activities	   are	  
from	  a	  New	  Zealand	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  embellished	  by	  interview	  material	  from	  both	  countries,	  by	  
jointly	  agreed	  documents	  and	  some	  documents	  from	  Australia.	  	  	  
Documents	  accessed	  were	  official	  and	  working	  records	  held	  by	  New	  Zealand	  Customs.	  They	  were	  
both	  paper-­‐based	  and	  electronic,	  and	  included	  some	  of	  my	  own	  work.	  I	  also	  accessed	  open	  source	  
information,	   for	   example,	   Cabinet	   papers	   made	   publicly	   available,	   media	   reports	   and	   Hansard	  
reports.	  	  
Interviews	  were	  structured	  around	  a	  set	  of	  guiding	  questions	  (Appendices	  A	  &	  B).	  This	  provided	  a	  




the	   interviewee	   scope	   to	  pursue	   their	  own	   line	  of	   thinking.	   	   The	  guiding	  questions	   for	   the	  pilot	  
were	   different	   from	   the	   substantive	   interviews,	   because	   of	   the	   change	   of	   approach	   described	  
above.	  
Thirty	   three	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   with	   past	   and	   current	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australian	  
government	   officials	   and	   one	  Minister.	   This	  Minister	   was	   the	   one	  most	   closely	   involved	   in	   the	  
goals	   and	   events	   covered	   by	  my	   research.	   Based	   on	   that	   interview,	   I	   decided	   not	   to	   interview	  
other	  politicians	  because	  of	  their	  peripheral	  involvement	  and	  the	  emerging	  focus	  of	  my	  research	  
on	   the	   activities	   of	   officials.	   The	   Interviewees	   were	   selected	   because	   of	   their	   knowledge	   and	  
involvement	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  activities	  relevant	  to	  border	  management.	  	  Most	  interviewees	  knew	  
me	  or	  knew	  of	  me	  through	  our	  work	  connections.	  While	  the	  accounts	  of	  these	  interviewees	  were	  
remarkably	  consistent	  with	  my	  own	  memory	  of	  the	  events	  I	  had	  been	  involved	  in,	  I	  observed	  two	  
effects.	   The	   first	  was	   that	   on	  occasions,	   they	   framed	   their	   comments	   carefully;	   the	   second	  was	  
they	  would	  refer	  to	  our	  common	  experience	  of	  a	  situation	  with	  ‘as	  you	  know,	  Germana’,	  indicating	  
a	  connection.	  Overall,	  I	  assessed	  that	  interviewees	  were	  open	  and	  genuinely	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  
experiences	  with	  me.	  	  
 Data from the EU 4.5.1.2
My	  investigation	  of	  the	  border	  arrangements	  of	  the	  EU	  consisted	  of	  an	  examination	  of	  academic	  
research	   and	   official	   EU	   documentation	   and	   interviews	   with	   member-­‐state	   Customs	   and	   EU	  
officials.	   This	   investigation	   provided	   this	   thesis	   with	   the	   reference	   point	   of	   the	  most	   advanced	  
regional	   economic	   integration	   in	   the	   world	   and	   a	   comparison	   between	   the	   UK’s	   physical	  
separation	  from	  the	  European	  continent	  with	  that	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  	  
I	  interviewed	  nine	  officials	  from	  member-­‐state	  Customs	  and	  EU	  administrations.	  I	  also	  held	  a	  focus	  
group	  with	  eight	  Customs	  officials	  from	  Europe,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	   Interview	  guidelines	  
are	   attached	   in	   Appendix	   C.	   Note	   that	   these	   guidelines	   were	   written	   before	   I	   changed	   my	  
theoretical	   approach.	   Documents	   accessed	   were	   direct	   from	   the	   EU	   (electronically),	   as	   well	   as	  
academic	  material	  about	  the	  EU.	  
 Telling the stories 4.5.2
I	  have	  represented	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis	  as	  a	  number	  of	  stories	  that	  are	  separate	  but	  related.	  




some	   of	   the	   events	  were	   happening	   in	   parallel.	   There	   are	   two	   reasons	   for	   telling	   these	   stories	  
separately.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  this	  format	  makes	  visible	  the	  different	  and	  overlapping	  worlds	  in	  which	  
officials	  were	  operating	  and	  thus,	  the	  ‘interferences	  between	  the	  stories’,	  and	  the	  discontinuities	  
(Law,	   2002,	   p.	   5).	   The	   second	   is	   that	   these	   are	  what	   Law	   calls	   ‘little	   narratives’	   in	  which	   larger	  
narratives	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  play	  out:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  these	  smaller	  narratives	  perform	  the	  same	  pattern.	  It	  is	  just	  
that	  they	  do	  so	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  magnification’	  (Law,	  2002,	  p.	  184).	  
The	   stories	   have	   been	   constructed	   from	   the	   primary-­‐sourced	   written	   and	   interview	   material	  
outlined	  above.	  The	  chronologies	  are	  by	  necessity	  selective.	  I	  have	  included	  what	  I	  considered	  to	  
be	  the	  most	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  the	  events,	  based	  on	  the	  actors	  and	  their	  translations.	  	  
 Voice  4.5.2.1
4.5.2.1.1 Actors’ voices 
In	  these	  stories,	   I	  have	  treated	  the	  organisations	   involved	  as	  macro-­‐actors,	  because	  they	  caused	  
officials	   to	   translate	   and	   transform	   communications	   and	   issues	   in	   particular	   ways.	   Treating	  
government	  organisations	  as	  macro-­‐actors	  has	  allowed	  me	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  dynamics	  that	  
occur	   between	   organisations	   in	   different	   situations.	   While	   interactions	   are	   always	   between	  
individual	  officials,	  in	  the	  stories	  outlined	  in	  this	  thesis	  the	  descriptions	  of	  events	  are	  more	  about	  
them	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  governmental	  and	  organisational	  objectives	  and	  priorities	  to	  which	  
they	   work	   than	   about	   their	   individual	   preferences	   and	   behaviours,	   even	   in	   their	   personal	  
reflections	  on	  what	  happened	  and	  what	  that	  meant	  to	  them.	  	  
I	  have	  retained	  the	  emphasis	  in	  actors’	  voices	  as	  italics	  in	  their	  quotes	  where	  it	  adds	  to	  what	  they	  
said.	  For	  officials	  from	  the	  Border	  Secretariat,	  which	  was	  a	  small	  unit,	   I	  have	  referred	  to	  them	  in	  
the	  collective,	  rather	  than	  their	  individual	  roles,	  to	  protect	  their	  identities.	  	  
4.5.2.1.2 Storyteller’s voice 
‘A	  story	  told	  presupposes	  a	  storyteller’	  (Tsoukas	  &	  Hatch,	  2001,	  p.	  999).	   	   	   I	  am	  transparently	  the	  
storyteller	   in	   this	   thesis.	  As	  such,	   I	  aim	  to	  represent	   the	  actors’	   intentionality	   through	  their	  own	  
voices	  rather	  than	  interpret	  it.	  	  However,	  my	  own	  authorial	  intentionality	  is	  covertly	  present	  in	  the	  
choices	   I	   have	  made	   about	   which	   actors	   and	   actions	   appear	   in	   the	   stories,	   and	   which	   of	   their	  
comments	  I	  use	  (Munslow,	  2007;	  Ricoeur,	  1990).	  This	  aspect	  of	  storyteller’s	  voice	  is	  a	  core	  feature	  




Because	   of	   my	   embeddedness	   in	   the	   environment,	   close	   relationship	   with	   the	   events	   I	   am	  
recounting	  and	  familiarity	  with	  the	  actors	  and	  actants,	   I	  have	  written	   in	  the	  first	  person	  when	   it	  
has	  made	  sense	  to	  do	  so.	  Thus	  I	  have	  made	  transparent	  my	  voice	  as	  storyteller.	  	  
 Analysis  4.5.3
Interpretive	  analysis	  is	  subjective	  and	  therefore	  not	  able	  to	  be	  replicated.	  However,	  Dodge,	  Ospina	  
and	  Foldy	  argue	  that	  narrative	  methods	  of	  analysis	  can	  be	  rigorous	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  results	  not	  able	  
to	  be	  scientifically	  replicated	  (Dodge,	  Ospina,	  &	  Foldy,	  2005).	  	  
Based	  on	  our	  assumptions	  and	  purposes,	  our	  products	  should	  resonate	  on	  some	  level,	  with	  
practitioners’	   experience,	   even	   if	   they	   reframe,	   abstract,	   or	   even	   challenge	   their	  
understanding	  (Dodge	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p.	  295).	  
Drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Dodge,	  Ospina	  &	  Foldy,	  and	  of	  Bruno	  Latour,	  I	  have	  established	  analytical	  
rigour	  in	  four	  ways:	  	  
• 	  The	  first	   is	  by	   letting	  the	  actors	  speak	  (Dodge	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p.	  290;	  Latour,	  2007).	  As	  described	  
above	   under	   ‘Voice’,	   I	   have	   used	   the	   words	   of	   interviewees	   as	   much	   as	   possible	   to	   tell	   the	  
thematic	  stories	  and	  have	   included	  substantial	  excerpts	  from	  a	  range	  of	  actors	  to	  enable	  their	  
voices	  to	  truly	  be	  heard,	  although,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  my	  judgment	  about	  which	  excerpts	  to	  
use	  and	  how	  I	  use	  them	  means	  that	  the	  actors	  speak	  through	  me.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  non-­‐human	  
actors,	   some	  human	  actors	  have	  spoken	   for	   them,	  as	   for	  SmartGate	  and	  some	  of	   the	  notable	  
inscriptions.	  I	  have	  given	  others	  voice	  through	  my	  analysis	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Chapter	  6.	  
• The	  second	   is	  by	  establishing	  credibility	  through	  thick	  descriptions	  and	  triangulation	  (Dodge	  et	  
al.,	  2005;	  Geertz,	  1973).	  I	  have	  triangulated	  the	  interviews	  by	  drawing	  on	  official	  written	  material	  
and	  my	  own	  experience,	  including	  applying	  the	  ANT	  method	  in	  my	  work,	  to	  provide	  insights	  into	  
aspects	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	  performativity	   of	   border-­‐related	  policy	  practice.	   This	   includes	   getting	  
permission	   from	   the	   Australian	   Customs	   and	   Border	   Protection	   Service	   (ACBPS)	   and	   New	  
Zealand	   border	   agencies	   for	   use	   of	   their	   material.	   As	   far	   as	   possible,	   I	   have	   checked	   with	  
interviewees	  that	  my	  use	  of	  their	  quotes	  does	  not	  distort	  their	   intended	  meaning	  and	  that	  my	  
account	  of	  events	  does	  not	  misrepresent	  their	  involvement.	  In	  addition,	  I	  have	  embellished	  ANT	  
analysis	  with	  narrative	  analysis	  to	  enrich	  my	  findings.	  
• The	  third	  is	  by	  establishing	  dependability.	  I	  have	  done	  this	  through	  making	  my	  position	  clear	  as	  




present	  the	  material	  (Dodge	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  
• The	  fourth	  is	  by	  ensuring	  my	  analysis	  has	  an	  internal	  logic	  (Dodge	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  For	  this,	  I	  used	  
the	  elements	  of	  ANT	  to	  draw	  out	  insights	  about	  performativity	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  narrative	  
rather	   than	  adopt	   a	  narrative	   framework	   such	   as	   that	   developed	  by	  Reissman	   (1993),	  Dodge,	  
Ospina	   and	   Foldy	   (2005)	   or	   Shanahan,	   Jones,	   McBeth	   and	   Lane	   (2013).	   My	   approach	   is	  
preferable	  because	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  narratives	  emerges	  out	  of	  the	  performativity	  rather	  than	  
being	  predetermined,	  with	  the	  attendant	  risk	  of	  making	  the	  data	  fit	  the	  model.	  
My	  analysis	  is	  not	  normative;	  there	  are	  no	  judgments	  of	  right	  or	  wrong,	  and	  I	  have	  drawn	  out	  ‘not	  
one	  but	  many	  narratives’	  (Czarniawska,	  2004a,	  p.	  62).	  For	  example,	  the	  section	  on	  the	  High	  Level	  
Steering	   Group	   (Chapter	   5.4)	   contains	   a	   chronological	   story,	   a	   purpose	   narrative,	   an	   action	  
narrative,	  and	  a	  hidden	  SEM	  narrative.	  	  Neither	  have	  I	  tried	  to	  turn	  these	  different	  narratives	  into	  
a	  single	  narrative,	  but	  have	  instead	  shown	  where	  they	  intersect	  and	  overlap.	  
4.6 Research	  limitations	  and	  challenges	  
Because	  I	  did	  not	  physically	  follow	  the	  actors	  and	  note	  down	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  minute	  detail,	  
I	   have	   not	   been	   able	   to	   paint	   a	   detailed	   picture	   of	   the	   performativity	   of	   the	   policy	   practice	   of	  
individuals	   at	   specific	   locations.	   This	   is	   a	   limitation	   in	   that	   I	   have	  not	  been	  able	   to	  observe	   and	  
record	  the	  nuances	  of	  engagement,	  such	  as	  passions	  felt,	  what	  the	  particular	  points	  of	  contention	  
were	   and	  how	   long	   it	   took	   for	   the	   circulating	  meanings	   to	   resolve	   into	   a	   decision	  or	   an	   agreed	  
point	  of	  view.	  However,	  I	  consider	  this	  limitation	  not	  to	  be	  material.	  My	  interest	  has	  been	  in	  the	  
translations	   at	   the	   group	   level	  more	   than	  at	   the	   individual	   level.	   The	  events	   I	   have	   traced	  have	  
involved	   groups	   of	   people	   involved	   in	   collective	   endeavours,	   which	   I	   have	   been	   able	   to	   trace	  
through	  written	   records	  and	   through	   the	   recollections	  of	   interviewees.	   I	  have	  also	  been	  able	   to	  
draw	  out	  remembered	  passions	  and	  points	  of	  contention	  from	  the	  interviews.	  	  
I	   did	   not	   interview	   all	   the	   participants	   involved	   in	   the	   five	   border	   stories.	   As	   explained	   in	   the	  
previous	  subsection,	  I	  selected	  officials	  who	  had	  enough	  knowledge	  of	  events	  and	  processes	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  help	  me	  unpack	  the	  black	  boxes	  containing	  the	  matters	  of	  concern,	  the	  debates	  and	  other	  
connections.	  This	  has	  enabled	  me	  to	  construct	  a	  credible	  story.	  
Far	  more	  data	  is	  gathered	  than	  can	  be	  included	  in	  the	  writing	  up	  of	  any	  research.	  Choices	  have	  to	  




Singleton	  in	  Law	  &	  Singleton,	  2013,	  p.	  495).	  Thus,	  even	  ANT	  stories	  are	  interpretive.	  I	  acknowledge	  
that	  I	  may	  therefore	  have	  missed	  some	  important	  insights.	  	  Such	  potential	  omissions	  	  are	  related	  
to	  the	  risks	  for	  researchers	  from	  ‘rendering	  somebody	  else’s	  story	  in	  one’s	  own	  idiom’,	  such	  that	  
‘such	  a	  translation	  is	  a	  political	  act	  of	  totalizing’	  (Czarniawska,	  2004a,	  p.	  61).	  
 Responses to criticisms of ANT  4.6.1
The	  use	  of	  some	  terms	  and	  the	  flexibility	  of	  ANT	  as	  an	  academic	  theory	  and	  method	  has	  resulted	  
in	  no	  shortage	  of	  critics	  (discussed	  in	  Baiocchi,	  Graizbord,	  &	  Rodríguez-­‐Muñiz,	  2013;	  Czarniawska-­‐
Joerges	   &	   Hernes,	   2005;	   Passoth	   &	   Rowland,	   2010;	   Peters,	   2004),	   the	   challenges	   from	   whom	  
proponents	  of	  ANT	  acknowledge	  and	  readily	   respond	  to	   (Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999).	  Below,	  some	  of	  
the	  key	  challenges	  are	  explained.	  
 Network 4.6.1.1
The	   ubiquity	   of	   the	   term	   ‘network’	   in	   society,	   for	   example,	   the	   road	   and	   rail	   networks,	   the	  
telecommunications	  network,	  social	  networks	  –	  brings	  with	  it	  certain	  mental	  images	  for	  the	  reader	  
such	  as	  railway	  lines	  and	  stations,	  and	  which	  therefore	  defines	  the	  reader’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  term	  
when	  used	  in	  ANT.	  ‘What	  metaphorical	  bag	  and	  baggage	  does	  [‘network’	  vocabulary]	  carry?’	  (Law,	  
1999,	   p.	   6).	  Of	   course,	   train	  drivers	   and	   telecommunication	   technicians	   know	   that	   these	   linking	  
mechanisms	   are	   difficult	   to	   control.	   They	  wear	   out,	   they	   get	   damaged	   by	  weather	   or	   someone	  
digging	   a	   hole	   in	   the	  wrong	   place.	   	   They	   don’t,	   in	   other	  words,	   operate	   on	   their	   own,	   but	   are	  
connected	  with	  other	  things.	  In	  ANT,	  networks	  are	  active	  –	  performative	  –	  and	  operate	  in	  a	  non-­‐
topographical	   spatiality,	  where	   space	   and	   time	   fold	   to	   create	   a	   flat	   landscape	  of	   ‘local’	   (Latour,	  
2007;	  Law,	  1999).	  	  	  
 Labelling 4.6.1.2
Law	   argues	   that	   the	   naming	   of	   ANT	   has	   created	   a	   label	   that	   un-­‐usefully	   simplifies	  what	   ANT	   is	  
about.	   For	   Law,	   an	   important	   theoretical	   question	   is	   how	   to	   label	   ANT	  without	   limiting	   it	   to	   a	  
singularity,	  particularly	  given	  ANT	  throws	  up	  ‘the	  complexities	  of	  tension’	  (Law,	  1999,	  p.	  12).	  In	  this	  
thesis,	   I	  have	  used	   the	   term,	   like	  Andrew	  Barry,	  as	  a	   shorthand	   for	   the	   richness	  and	  complexity	  




 Description not explanation 4.6.1.3
Latour	  himself	  answers	  criticisms	  that	  ANT	  doesn’t	  explain	  performativities,	  that	  it	  (only)	  describes	  
them	   (Latour,	   1996).	   	   An	   incorrect	   implication	   is	   that	   ANT	   is	   devoid	   of	   meaning.	   First,	   the	  
describing	   in	   ANT	   is	   not	   inert,	   in	   that	   it	   is	   following	   the	   actors	   whose	   translations	   create	   the	  
network.	  Second,	  meaning	  is	  provided	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  actors	  themselves	  provide	  the	  meanings.	  
The	   researcher	   not	   then	   interpreting	   those	   meanings	   enables	   the	   reader	   to	   become	   an	   active	  
participant	   through	   their	   own	   process	   of	   translation	   and	   connection-­‐making.	   Second,	   the	  
researcher	   describing	   a	   particular	   performativity	   is	   an	   action	   that	   brings	   to	   light	   other	   realities,	  
other	  worlds	  (Law,	  2009).	  Each	  description	  expands	  not	  only	  the	  subject	  being	  described	  but	  also	  
the	  body	  of	  knowledge	   that	   is	  ANT.	   ‘Academic	  work	   is	  performative’	   (Law	  &	  Singleton,	  2013,	  p.	  
486).	  	  
Callon	  addresses	  the	  charge	  of	  	  ‘the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  analysis	  which	  [ANT]	  offers	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  
actor’	  (Callon	  in	  Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999,	  p.	  181).	  He	  argues	  that	  one	  of	  its	  strengths	  is	  that	  because	  
of	   the	   absence	   of	   motivations	   and	   psychology	   as	   drivers	   of	   analysis,	   these	   aspects	   are	   not	  
predetermined	  but	  rather	  may	  emerge.	  I	  have	  already	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  3	  the	  benefit	  from	  letting	  
motivation	   emerge	   out	   of	   the	   analysis	   for	   policy	   narrative.	   My	   key	   response	   to	   the	   lack	   of	  
attention	  to	  motivation,	  though,	  is	  that	  the	  point	  of	  ANT	  is	  not	  to	  analyse	  the	  actor,	  but	  to	  analyse	  
the	  performance	  of	  the	  actor-­‐networks.	  	  	  
 Power and symmetry 4.6.1.4
Another	   criticism	   is	   that	   ANT	   doesn’t	   address	   ‘interests’	   or	   power.	   I	   disagree.	   Interests	   have	  
emerged	  as	  central	  to	  this	  thesis	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘matters	  of	  concern’	  and	  ANT	  explicitly	  addresses	  
power.	  The	  ANT	  approach	   to	  power	  also	  has	   the	  ability	   to	   ‘debunk	   the	  hero	  myth’	  of	  power	  by	  
attributing	  it	  to	  the	  connections	  a	  person	  makes	  rather	  than	  their	  own	  inherent	  qualities	  (Passoth	  
&	  Rowland,	  2011,	  p.	  834).	  
A	  related	  criticism	  is	  the	  symmetry	  of	  ANT	  –	  that	  ANT	  treats	  people	  and	  things	  too	  even-­‐handedly,	  
without	   discrimination	   (Passoth	   &	   Rowland,	   2011).	   The	   implication	   is	   that	   people	   should	   be	  
favoured	  over	  things,	  because	  if	  things	  are	  extensions	  of	  people,	  they	  should	  not	  be	  in	  opposition	  




power	   and	   stems,	   I	   believe,	   from	   too	  narrow	  a	   view	  of	   non-­‐human	   actors	   and	   the	   effects	   they	  
have	  on	  humans.	  Munro	  (2009)	  mounts	  a	  related	  argument	  for	  allowing	  asymmetry:	  
Whatever	   bodies	   its	   vocabulary	   of	   domination,	   be	   this	   heterogeneous	  materials	   or	   elites,	  
research	  in	  sociology	  and	  ANT	  has	  to	  open	  up	  to	  asymmetries	  of	  power	  that	  not	  only	  nurture	  
the	  ephemeral,	  but	  rely	  on	  the	  intermittency	  of	  such	  links	  (Munro,	  2009,	  p.	  135).	  
Munro	  interprets	  ANT	  as	  focusing	  on	  durable	  translations,	  and	  that	  this	  undermines	  the	  invisible	  
and	   non-­‐durable	   interactions	   between	   humans	   relating	   to	   identity.	   	   Strathern’s	   and	   Munro’s	  
arguments	  imply	  that	  humans	  will	  somehow	  be	  disadvantaged	  if	  the	  action	  of	  things	  is	  equivalent	  
to	   the	   action	   of	   people.	   Even	   though	  Munro	   calls	   for	   nurturing	   the	   ephemeral,	   neither	   he	   nor	  
Stathern	  appear	  to	  see	  that	  ephemeral	  and	  non-­‐tangible	  things,	  such	  as	   ideas,	  visions,	  concepts,	  
principles,	  morals	  and	  ethics	  and	  behaviours	  can	  all	  be	  actants	  that	  can	  have	  immense	  effects	  on	  
the	   behaviours	   of	   humans	   and	   their	   social	   groupings.	   Neither	   do	   these	   arguments	   take	   into	  
account	  that	  humans	  oppose	  humans	  not	  only	  physically	  but	  by	  using	  these	  non-­‐tangible	  ‘things’	  
against	  one	  another.	  	  The	  answer,	  I	  believe,	  is	  in	  the	  underlying	  premise	  of	  ANT	  –	  the	  associations	  
and	  the	  translations	  and	  their	   inherent	   instability.	  My	  view	  is	  that	   inherent	   instability	  allows	  the	  
possibility	  of	  intermittency,	  and	  in	  this	  thesis,	  my	  research	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  what	  is	  happening	  
(refer	   to	  Stories	  1	  and	  4	   in	  Chapter	  6).	   	   Latour	  explains	  how	  people	  and	   things	  can	   be	  of	  equal	  
status	  in	  respect	  of	  ‘speaking	  on	  behalf’:	  
So	   in	   practice,	   there	   is	   not	  much	   difference	   between	   people	   and	   things:	   they	   both	   need	  
someone	  to	  talk	  for	  them.	  From	  the	  spokesperson’s	  point	  of	  view	  there	  is	  thus	  no	  distinction	  
to	  be	  made	  between	  representing	  people	  and	  representing	  things	  (Latour,	  1987,	  p.	  72).	  
Nevertheless,	   in	   using	   ANT,	   I	   found	   assigning	   equal	   status	   took	   practice;	   it	   does	   not	   come	  
naturally,	  so	  ingrained	  is	  the	  invisibility	  of	  things.	  I	  am	  still	  learning	  how	  to	  see	  non-­‐actors	  to	  grant	  
them	  equivalence.	  	  	  	  
Another	  accusation	  related	  to	  power	  is	  that	  ANT	  is	  ‘managerial’,	  that	  is,	  ‘that	  ANT	  analysis	  tends	  to	  
explore	  strong	  networks	  and	  disregard	  marginal	  or	   loosely	  coupled	  networks’	   (Vikkelsø,	  2007,	  p.	  
303).	  It	  is	  possible,	  in	  ANT,	  so	  see	  where	  and	  how	  weak	  associations	  fall	  away	  as	  well	  as	  those	  that	  




 My response to potential criticisms  4.6.2
While	   all	   research	   has	   limitations,	   sometimes	   particular	   problems	   are	   more	   a	   matter	   of	  
perspective	   than	   reality.	   In	  addition	   to	   the	  criticisms	  outlined	  above,	   there	  are	  several	  potential	  
criticisms	  specific	  to	  my	  use	  of	  ANT	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
The	   first	   could	   be	   the	   question	   ‘how	   can	   I	   be	   sure	   I	   have	   captured	   the	   full	   complexity	   of	   the	  
research	  subject?’	   I	  cannot,	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  claim	  to.	  One	  obvious	  omission	   if	   fullness	  was	  
the	  objective	  would	   be	   the	   inclusion	  of	   data	   from	   industry	   stakeholders,	   traders	   and	   travellers.	  
This	  data	  is	  deliberately	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	  although	  would	  be	  worth	  investigation	  as	  
a	  separate	  research	  project.	  	  
The	   second	   could	   be	   that	   my	   analysis	   oversimplifies	   the	   research	   arena	   and	   findings.	   I	   have	  
simplified	  but	  have	  attempted	  not	  to	  oversimplify.	  One	  of	  the	  challenges	  of	  a	  research	  topic	  such	  
as	   this	   is	   holding	   all	   the	   threads	   together	   as	   a	   conceptual	   whole.	   Given	   the	   non-­‐coherence	   of	  
actor-­‐networks	   as	   discussed	   in	   subsection	   4.3.2,	   this	   challenge	   is	   no	   surprise.	   One	   way	   I	   have	  
addressed	   this	   is	   to	   conceptualise	   the	   structure	   of	   my	   thesis	   as	   ‘flare/focus/flare/focus/flare’,	  
where,	  after	  setting	  the	  scene,	  I	  flare	  out	  to	  describe	  the	  state	  of	  knowledge,	  focus	  in	  on	  the	  gaps,	  
flare	  out	  to	  examine	  the	  historical	  and	  geographical	  connections,	   focus	   in	  on	  the	  specific	  border	  
stories	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman,	  then	  further	  in	  on	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question,	  and	  then	  flare	  
out	  to	  the	  wider	  implications	  for	  policy	  practice	  and	  narrative	  theory.	  	  While	  the	  research	  has	  been	  
Customs-­‐centred,	   I	  have	  also	  identified	  connections	  in	  the	  immigration	  and	  biosecurity	  functions	  
that	   fall	  outside	   the	   focus	  of	   study.	   I	  have	  also	  conceptualised	  what	   I	  have	   seen	  happening	  and	  
translated	   those	   concepts	   into	   diagrams	   that	   depict	   the	   main	   threads	   and	   how	   they	   interact.	  
These	   are	   of	   necessity	   simplified,	   as	   to	   represent	   every	   element	  would	  make	   the	   diagram	   very	  
difficult	   to	   understand.	   My	   overall	   thesis	   narrative	   is	   another	   device	   for	   holding	   the	   threads	  
together,	   in	  building	  up	  a	  picture	  of	  the	   long	  connections	  and	  how	  they	  are	   interwoven	  into	  the	  
policy	  practices	  of	  officials.	  	  
The	   third,	   not	   unique	   to	   ANT,	   could	   be	   that	   I	   am	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   the	   research	   domain.	   I	  
consider	  this	  to	  have	  had	  two	  effects.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  I	  cannot	  be	  objective.	  My	  reply	  to	  criticism	  of	  
that	  is	  that	  no	  researcher	  is	  objective.	  We	  all	  bring	  our	  own	  histories	  to	  our	  research.	  Our	  choices	  




personal.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   unconscious	   bias	   that	   masquerades	   as	  
objectivity	  and	  conscious	  bias	  that	  is	  accompanied	  by	  rigorous	  research	  method.	  I	  have	  attempted	  
to	   achieve	   the	   latter.	   One	  way	   in	   which	   I	   do	   this	   is	   by	   being	   quite	   transparent	   about	  my	   own	  
involvement;	  another	  comes	  from	  the	  clear	  concepts	  with	  which	  the	  ANT	  approach	  has	  guided	  my	  
analysis;	  and	  a	  third,	  very	  important	  way	  is	  through	  peer	  review,	  getting	  feedback	  on	  my	  material	  
from	  seminars	  and	  conferences	  throughout	  the	  process,	  and	  of	  course	  from	  my	  supervisors.	  
The	  second	  effect	  of	  being	  embedded	  is	  that	  I	  am	  both	  more	  informed	  about	  how	  things	  work	  and	  
have	  better	  access	   to	   information	   than	   someone	   from	  outside	   the	  border	  management	   system,	  
and	  am	  at	  the	  same	  time	  blinded	  to	  things	  that	  would	  be	  clear	  to	  someone	  not	  embedded.	  	  
As	  a	  final	  comment,	  because	  it	   is	   interpretive,	  this	  thesis	  is	  unique,	  which	  in	  turn	  means	  it	   is	  not	  
scientifically	  replicable.	  However,	  as	  with	  any	  good	  social	  science	  thesis,	  I	  have	  established	  in	  this	  
Chapter	  the	  credibility	  of	  my	  methodology	  and	  the	  rigour	  of	  my	  method.	  	  









Chapter 5  
The performance of border management in regional integration 
5.1 Introduction	  
This	  Chapter	  provides	  an	  ANT	  lens	  to	  the	  role	  of	  border	  management	  in	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  
and	   regional	   market	   integration,	   and	   provides	   a	   short	   historical	   narrative	   of	   key	   border	  
developments	   in	   the	   EU	   and	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   market	   integration	   environments.	   I	   will	  
demonstrate	   in	  Chapters	  6	   and	  7	  how	   these	  different	  narratives	   connect	   into	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
border	  stories.	  	  
5.2 How	  border	  management	  became	  part	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  
As	  indicated	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  border	  practices	  are	  intimately	  connected	  with	  markets	  and	  trade	  flows.	  
Brunet-­‐Jailly’s	  non-­‐ANT	  view	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  border	  practices	  focuses	  not	  just	  on	  border	  flows	  
but	  also	  on	  incentives	  (2005).	  Incentives	  were	  part	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  that	  emerged	  out	  
of	  the	  first	  GATT	  in	  1948	  and	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  what	   is	  now	  the	  European	  Union.	  Up	  to	  then,	  
world	   trade	  was	  unstable,	   as	  nation	   states	   vied	  not	  only	   for	   their	   share	  of	  what	  was	   seen	  as	   ‘a	  
definite	  volume	  of	  commerce’	  (Bunting,	  1996,	  p.	  508)	  but	  also	  for	  political	  power.	  	  In	  this	  system,	  
nation	  states	  could	  place	  tariffs	  on	  any	  goods	  at	  any	  rate	  unilaterally,	   resulting	   in	  an	  absence	  of	  
certainty	  about	   the	  basis	  of	  any	   trading	  activities.	  To	  achieve	   the	   ‘nirvana’	  of	  efficiency,	  a	  more	  
systematic	   approach	   was	   required.	   Thus	   the	   global	   trading	   system	   was	   built	   on	   the	   theory	   of	  
comparative	  advantage	  -­‐	  the	  argument	  that	  liberalising	  trade	  enables	  countries	  to	  concentrate	  on	  
producing	  what	  they	  can	  do	  most	  efficiently,	  thus	  leaving	  to	  other	  countries	  those	  products	  they	  
can’t	   compete	   with.73	   Applied	   globally,	   comparative	   advantage	   makes	   the	   whole	   system	  more	  
efficient,	  but	  to	  achieve	  it,	  standard	  tools	  and	  policies	  are	  required:	  ‘Although	  conceived	  in	  1947,	  
GATT	   took	   so	   long	   because	   reconstruction	   of	   industrial	   bases	   and	   infrastructure	   required,	   in	  
addition	   to	   global	  monetary	   stability,	   carefully	   tailored	   investment	   and	   tariff	   policies’	   (Bunting,	  
1996,	  p.	  518).	  
Customs	   practices	   formally	   became	   part	   of	   the	   global	   trading	   system	   in	   1948,	   when	   the	   23	  
signatories	   to	   GATT	   agreed	   to	   45,000	   tariff	   concessions	   affecting	   $10	   billion	   in	   trade.	   In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The World Trade Organization refers to this theory, which was developed by 19th century political economist David 




anticipation	  of	  this	  event,	  thirteen	  European	  Governments	  had	  set	  up	  a	  study	  group	  a	  year	  earlier	  
to	  look	  at	  ‘the	  possibility	  of	  establishing	  one	  or	  more	  inter-­‐European	  Customs	  Unions	  based	  on	  the	  
principles	   of	   the	   General	   Agreement	   on	   Tariffs	   and	   Trade	   ‘(World	   Customs	   Organization,	   n.d.).	  
Those	  principles	  included	  rules	  for	  the	  valuation	  of	  customs,	  and	  rules	  of	  origin.	  Both	  sets	  of	  rules	  
aimed	  to	  provide	  transparency	  and	  predictability	  to	  customs	  practices	  in	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  
that	  began	  with	  the	  GATT.74	  	  	  
In	   1948,	   the	   European	   Study	   Group	   set	   up	   two	   committees	   –	   one	  was	   the	   predecessor	   of	   the	  
OECD;	   the	   other	   evolved	   into	   the	   Customs	   Co-­‐operation	   Council	   (CCC)	   (World	   Customs	  
Organization,	  n.d.).	   	   In	  1994,	   the	  CCC	  adopted	   the	  name	  World	  Customs	  Organization	   to	  better	  
reflect	  its	  membership.	  The	  WCO	  now	  has	  179	  members75	  and	  processes	  over	  98%	  of	  international	  
trade	  (World	  Customs	  Organization,	  n.d.).	  
As	  well	  as	  technically	  supporting	  the	  WTO’s	  rules	  system,	  the	  WCO	  was	  responsible	  for	  developing	  
the	  aforementioned	  Harmonized	  System	  (the	  ‘HS’)	  –	  an	  instrument	  that	  now	  underpins	  the	  global	  
trading	  system.76	  Before	  the	  HS	  was	   introduced,	  each	  country	  had	   its	  own	  system	  for	  classifying	  
goods,	  which	  they	  used	  for	  imposing	  tariffs,	  valuing	  goods	  and	  other	  trade	  measures.	  Since	  the	  HS,	  
classification	   and	   valuation	   of	   goods	   have	   become	   core	   activities	   of	   Customs	   administrations.	  
Customs	  administrations	  globally	  require	  declarations	  on	  information	  about	  imports	  and	  exports,	  
for	  which	  a	  narrative	  description	  of	  what	  is	  being	  imported	  or	  exported	  must	  also	  be	  accompanied	  
by	   a	   classification	   from	   the	   HS.	   The	   HS	   clusters	   goods	   into	   different	   categories,	   against	   which	  
tariffs	   can	  be	   listed,	   and	   from	  which	   valuation	  of	   customs	  duty	   can	   then	  be	  assessed.	   	   Figure	  5	  
depicts	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  HS	  coding	  system.	  The	  first	  six	  numbers	  represent	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Equivalent harmonisation was introduced in the area of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary measures covering the application of 
food safety and animal and plant health regulations, which are administered in Australia and New Zealand by the respective 
agencies responsible for biosecurity. ‘The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the “SPS 
Agreement”) entered into force with the establishment of the World Trade Organization on 1 January 1995 as an outcome 
of the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations under the auspices of the then GATT (the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)’ (World Trade Organization, 2010, pp. 2-3). 
75 174 sovereign states, 4 customs territories (Hong Kong, Macao, Netherlands Antilles and Bermuda), and 1 customs union 
(EU), retrieved from the WCO website at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/wco-members/membership.aspx c.f. the 
World Trade Organization’s 160 members: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  
76 This 1988 convention is not compulsory for WCO members, but it is a quasi-standard for international trade, given the 






description	   internationally.77	   Further	   detail	   is	   added	   by	   additional	   pairs	   of	   numbers.	   These	   are	  
determined	  at	  a	  national	  or	  regional	  level.	  
Figure	  5. The	  HS	  Coding	  System	  Structure	  
	  
The	  drive	  for	  harmonisation	  came	  from	  border	  requirements	  such	  as	  customs	  and	  phytosanitary	  
procedures	   historically	   being	   seen	   as	   a	   drain	   on	  market	   efficiency,	   and	   therefore	   an	   area	   that	  
needs	   to	   be	  minimised.78	   They	  were	   seen	   to	   interfere	  with	   the	   flow	   of	   goods	   from	   supplier	   to	  
buyer,	  taking	  time,	  effort	  and	  skill	  to	  comply	  with	  (Bjelić	  &	  Petović,	  2009).	  	  
In	  the	  21st	  century,	  the	  narrative	  about	  barriers	  from	  border	  requirements	  has	  been	  modified	  to	  
one	  about	  trade	  facilitation.	  The	  economic	  benefits	  of	  trade	  flows	  are	  debated	  and	  promoted	   in	  
many	   different	   forums	   (e.g.	   OECD,	   World	   Economic	   Forum,	   World	   Trade	   Organization)79,	   and	  
Customs	  administration	  is	  widely	  accepted	  as	  important	  in	  either	  enabling	  or	  inhibiting	  trade.80	  In	  
the	   2012	   World	   Economic	   Forum	   ‘Enabling	   Trade’	   report,	   an	   article	   by	   the	   World	   Customs	  
Organization	   Secretary-­‐General	   highlights	   the	   value	   from	  Customs	   administrations	  working	  with	  
business,	  not	  just	  to	  remove	  barriers,	  but	  to	  facilitate	  global	  supply	  chains	  (Chapter	  1.7	  in	  World	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77  ‘For example the four-digit code or “heading” 0403 is a group of products derived from milk. At six digits, 0403.10 is 
the “sub-heading” for yoghurt; at the eight-digit level, 0403.10.11 could be low-fat yoghurt “tariff line’. Retrieved from 
‘Customs codes and standardisation’, WTO: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariff_data_e.htm  
78 The World Bank annually ranks countries against ten ‘ease of doing business’ criteria, one of which is ‘trading across 
borders’.  The World Economic Forum’s 2012 “Global Enabling Trade Report: Reducing Supply Chain Barriers” is even 
more explicit in its view of “burdensome customs procedures as the second most important impediment to trade“ for 
imports (World Economic Forum, 2012, p. 5)., 
79 See http://www.oecd.org/trade/benefitlib/ ; https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm   




Economic	  Forum,	  2012).	  This	  view	  of	  Customs	  as	  part	  of	  global	  supply	  chains	  was	  made	  explicit	  in	  
2005	  with	   the	  WCO’s	   introduction	  of	   the	   SAFE	  Framework	  of	   Standards	   to	   secure	  and	   facilitate	  
global	  trade.81	  Implicit	  in	  the	  acceptance	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  governments	  have	  a	  legitimate	  role	  in	  
trade	  and	  travel	  supply	  chains,	  and	  are	  not	  necessarily	  a	  dead-­‐weight	  cost,	  especially	  when	  they	  
work	  with	  business.82	  	  	  
This	   short	   history	   shows	   how	   border	   management	   became	   part	   of	   global	   markets	   and	   thus	  
marketization,	  with	  the	  WCO	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ‘macro-­‐actors’83	  that	  helps	  ensure	  that	  it	  continues	  to	  
be	  so.	  It	  creates	  not	  only	  tools	  and	  guidelines,	  but	  is	  a	  gathering	  point	  for	  Customs	  administrations	  
to	   connect	   and	   share	   their	   experiences,	   knowledge	   and	   information	   about	   the	   movement	   of	  
(pacified)	  goods	  and,	  to	  a	  limited	  extent	  people,	  and	  managing	  their	  overflowing	  effects.	  The	  WCO	  
is	  a	  network	  of	  people	  and	  technologies	  for	  managing	  borders.	  One	  interviewee	  said:	  ‘I	  think	  it’s	  
internationally	  –	  every	  Customs	  administration	  deals	  with	  similar	  issues	  –	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  work	  
in	  terms	  of	  cross-­‐border	  activity’	  (EU	  Customs	  focus	  group).	  
The	  concept	  of	  pacification	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3	  is	  functionally	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  
that	   even	   if	   they	   add	   costs	   to	   trading,	   border	   regulations	   have	   also	   been	   a	   part	   of	   and	   even	  
complicit	   in	   the	   pacification	   of	   the	   movement	   of	   goods	   across	   borders	   since	   the	   GATT	   and	  
continue	  to	  be	  so	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  where	  customs	  processes	  are	  being	  treated	  as	  part	  of	  trade	  
supply	  chains.84	  	  
As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.4,	  pacification	  is	  accompanied	  by	  overflowing.	  A	  non-­‐ANT	  view	  of	  these	  
two	  dynamics	  is	  that	  they	  present	  a	  contradiction	  for	  the	  global	  trading	  system:	  
The	  variable	  permeability	  of	  borders	  culminates	  in	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  major	  contradiction	  
of	   the	   contemporary	  world	   system	  –	   the	   fact	   that	   capital	   and	   commodities	   can	   now	   flow	  
much	   more	   freely	   across	   borders	   but	   labour	   cannot	   (Anderson	   et	   al.,	   2003,	   p.	   9).	   [My	  
emphasis].	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Available from the WCO (http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-
tools/tools/~/media/55F00628A9F94827B58ECA90C0F84F7F.ashx)   
82 There is also recognition that the classic view of trade liberalisation and global markets is partial, e.g., it does not take into 
account the viewpoints of workers and consumers (Aldonas, 2009).  
83 Defined in Table 3.  
84 Customs officials understand this. They talked about border processes being part of the trade value chain long before 




Anderson,	  Dowd	  and	  Wilson	  are	  highlighting	  that	  freeing	  up	  border	  flows	  excludes	  the	  movement	  
of	  people	  where	  restrictions	   limit	  their	  ability	  to	  participate	   in	   labour	  markets	  outside	  their	  own	  
countries.	  This	  contradiction	  plays	  out	  differently	   in	   regional	  economic	   integration.	   If	   the	   labour	  
market	   has	   been	   freed	   up	   for	   parties	   to	   the	   integration,	   as	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman,	   there	   is	   no	  
contradiction.	   	   However,	   for	   non-­‐parties	   to	   the	   integration,	   restrictions	   beyond	   the	   border	   can	  
result	  in	  overflowings	  at	  the	  border	  as	  people	  try	  to	  evade	  the	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  in	  
that	   labour	  market.	  The	  marketization	  point	  of	  view	   is	  helpful	  because	   it	  enables	  us	   to	  see	   that	  
rather	   than	   a	   contradiction,	   there	   is	   an	   effect.	   	   People	   who	   are	   parties	   to	   the	   integration	   are	  
pacified	  as	  commodities	  and	  can	  cross	  the	  borders	  freely.	  The	  actions	  of	  people	  who	  are	  not	  able	  
to	   be	   pacified	   are	   overflowings	   to	   be	   managed.	   These	   play	   out	   in	   the	   EU	   as	   two	   different	  
narratives	  that	  Van	  Houtum	  characterises	  as	  ‘liberal	  economics’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  
internal	  borders	  of	  Europe,	  and	  ‘protectionism’	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  its	  external	  borders:	  	  
Neoliberal	  arguments	  about	  the	  benefits	  of	  free	  trade	  underpin	  the	  economic	  rhetoric	  about	  
the	   EU’s	   internal	   borders,	   whereas	   classical	   protectionist	   arguments	   are	   applied	   at	   its	  
external	  borders	  (Van	  Houtum	  in	  Anderson	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  46).	  	  
These	  narratives	  reflect	  two	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  which	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  differently,	  
pointing	  to	  regional	  market	  integration	  being	  made	  up	  of	  a	  number	  of	  actor-­‐networks: 
So	  .	  .	  .	  we	  may	  imagine	  actor-­‐network	  theory	  as	  a	  machine	  for	  waging	  war	  on	  Euclideanism:	  
as	  a	  way	  of	  showing,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  regions	  are	  constituted	  by	  networks.	  That,	  for	  instance,	  
nation	   states	   are	  made	   by	   telephone	   systems,	   paperwork,	   and	   geographical	   triangulation	  
points	  (Law,	  1999,	  p.	  7).	  
The	   following	   discussion	   examines	   the	   policy	   settings	   of	   the	   EU	   and	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	  
market	  integration	  in	  light	  of	  the	  discussion	  above.	  	  
5.3 The	  EU	  single	  market	  and	  ‘bordering’	  
The	  concept	  of	  the	  Single	  Market85	  is	  the	  European	  Union’s	  ‘core	  business’	  (Pelkmans,	  2011,	  p.	  2)	  
and	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  extensive	  macro-­‐actor.	  The	  institution-­‐building	  in	  the	  EU	  
is	   unique	   in	   the	   world	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   size	   and	   extent	   of	   political	   integration,	   and	   reflects	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




political	  drive	  for	   long-­‐term	  European	   integration.	   	  Fligstein	  argues	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  EU	  
markets	   reflect	   this	   goal	   rather	   than	   being	   born	   out	   of	   global	   trade	   (Fligstein	   in	   Favell	   &	  
Guiraudon,	   2011,	   p.	   101).	   	   The	   1950	   Schuman	   Declaration	   stated	   the	   aspiration	   for	   a	   united	  
Europe	  and	  in	  1951	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Paris	  formally	  established	  the	  first	  step	  –	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  
Steel	  Community	  (ECSC).	  With	   its	  strong	  institutional	  base,	   it	  was	  seen	  as	  successful	  and	  ‘helped	  
pave	  the	  way	  for	  further	  integration’	  (Nugent,	  2010,	  p.	  20).	  	  	  
The	   creation	   of	   an	   open	   European	  market	   based	   on	   free	   and	   fair	   competition	   has	   been	   at	   the	  
heart	  of	  the	  policy	  goals	  of	  the	  EU	  since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  integration	  process	  and	  has	  remained	  
largely	  unchanged	  (Nugent,	  2010,	  p.	  323).	  O’Dowd	  indicates	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  internal	  competition	  
has	  since	  been	  extended	  to	  include	  competitiveness	  with	  external	  markets	  in	  other	  countries:	  	  
The	   theory	   behind	   the	   Single	  Market	  was	   that	   EU	  member	   states	   suffered	   from	  a	   lack	   of	  
competitiveness.	  Creating	  a	   ‘borderless’	   single	  market	  would	   reduce	   transaction	   costs	  and	  
increase	  competitiveness	  by	  creating	  an	  EC86-­‐wide	  division	  of	  labour	  that	  would	  benefit	  from	  
economies	  of	  scale	  in	  competition	  with	  North	  America	  and	  Japan	  (O’Dowd	  in	  Anderson	  et	  al.,	  
2003,	  p.	  20).	  
Since	   1993,	   the	   EU’s	   objective	   for	   its	   Single	  Market	   has	   been	   clear:	   ‘The	   internal	   market	   shall	  
comprise	   an	   area	   without	   internal	   frontiers	   in	   which	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods,	   persons,	  
services	  and	  capital	  is	  ensured	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaties’	  (European	  Union,	  
2010,	   p.	   59).	   This	   delineation	   of	   the	   free	  movement	   for	   goods,	   persons,	   services	   and	   capital	   is	  
commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  four	  freedoms’.87	  	  
The	  development	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  was	  slow	  until	  the	  early	  1980s.	  Drivers	  that	  accelerated	  
the	  process	  were	  the	  continuing	  slow	  economic	  growth	  since	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1970s,	  with	  
the	   EU	   falling	   behind	   the	   US	   and	   Japan,	   and	   the	   realisation	   by	   EU	   member	   states	   that	  
fragmentation	  of	  markets	  in	  Europe	  was	  affecting	  their	  economic	  performance.	  A	  white	  paper	  by	  
Lord	   Cockfield	   listed	   300	   recommended	   actions	   that	   covered	   the	   removal	   of	   three	   types	   of	  
barriers:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This could mean European Community in this context. Another common meaning of EC is European Commission, 
which doesn’t make sense here. 
87 The New Zealand and Australian Productivity Commissions adopted the term ‘the four freedoms’ in their 2012 




• The	   removal	   of	   physical	   barriers	   including	   the	   total	   abolition	   of	   frontier	   controls	   by	   1992	  
covering	  ‘all	  restrictions	  on	  goods	  and	  individual	  travellers’	  (Leonard,	  2002,	  p.	  112)	  
• The	  removal	  of	  technical	  barriers	  arising	  from	  different	  standards	  and	  regulations,	  for	  example,	  
by	   introducing	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   national	   standards,	   pending	   adoption	   of	   European	  
standards	  	  
• The	  removal	  of	  fiscal	  barriers	  by	  establishing	  an	  approximate	  harmonization	  of	  VAT	  and	  excise-­‐
duty	  rates	  +/-­‐2.5%	  of	  the	  target	  rate	  or	  norm	  (Ibid.).88	  
The	   European	   Council	   accepted	   the	   White	   Paper	   and	   agreed	   that	   the	   1992	   deadline	   and	   the	  
internal	  market	  objective	  be	  included	  in	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  1986	  (Nugent,	  2010).	  Integration	  
measures	  continue	  to	  this	  day.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  EU	  Single	  Market	  is	  a	  work	  in	  progress	  (ibid.).	  
For	  example,	  in	  2010,	  the	  EU	  adopted	  a	  new	  strategy	  that	  recommended	  three	  sets	  of	  initiatives	  
to	  strengthen	  the	  Single	  Market,	  as	  the	  words	  used	  in	  the	  strategy	  indicate:	  
o Build	  (a	  stronger	  single	  market)	  
o Build	  consensus	  (on	  a	  stronger	  single	  market)	  
o Deliver	  (a	  stronger	  single	  market)	  (Monti,	  2010).	  	  
 EU bordering  5.3.1
Like	   the	   Single	   Market	   itself,	   the	   border	   component	   of	   the	   EU	   Single	   Market	   has	   not	   been	  
theorised	   into	   a	   single	   theory.	   ‘On	   the	   contrary,	   many	   different	   strands	   of	   thought	   are	  
contributing	   to	   the	   EU’s	   policy-­‐driven	   approach	   to	   borders	   that	   has	   emerged	   since	   1989’	   (Van	  
Houtum	  &	  Scott,	   2005,	   p.	   3).	  How	   this	   juxtaposition	  of	   different	   realities	   plays	   out	  was	   evident	  
from	  my	   interviews	  on	  EU	  border	  arrangements,	  not	  only	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  different	  geographical	  
borders	   for	  managing	   the	   flows	   of	   goods	   and	   people,	   but	   also	   the	  member-­‐state	   interests	   and	  
interactions	  outside	  the	  EU.	  
As	  previously	  noted,	  Fligstein’s	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  EU	  economy	  is	  not	  globalised.	  By	  this	  
he	  means	  that	  most	  trade	  convergence	  and	  trade	  growth	  has	  occurred	  within	  the	  EU	  (Fligstein	  in	  
Favell	  &	  Guiraudon,	   2011).	   This	   has	  been	  assisted	  by	  border	  practices	   that	  delineate	   travel	   and	  
trade	  within	  the	  EU	  as	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  trade	  and	  travel	  into	  and	  out	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




A	   key	   focus	   for	   EU	   border	   agencies	   is	   therefore	   on	   integration	  within	   the	   Single	  Market.	   	   This	  
manifests	   in	   a	   number	   of	   unique	   policies	   for	   the	   movement	   of	   people	   and	   the	   movement	   of	  
goods.	  Each	  are	  treated	  separately.	  While	  the	  Customs	  Union	  was	  created	  by	  the	  1957	  Treaty	  of	  
Rome	  and	  came	   into	   force	   in	  1968,	  policies	  on	   immigration	  and	  people	  movements	  were	  not	  a	  
core	  policy	  competency	  of	  the	  EU	  from	  the	  start,	  and	  even	  now	  are	  only	  partially	  so.	  The	  Terms	  of	  
Reference	  for	  the	  European	  Community	  in	  1957	  set	  the	  objective	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  workers	  as	  
part	   of	   the	   economic	   agenda	   but	   didn’t	   deal	   with	   border	   crossings,	   immigration	   or	   visa	   policy	  
(Leonard,	  2002).	  
In	  1967,	  the	  Naples	  convention	  formalized	  cooperation	  and	  mutual	  assistance	  between	  Customs	  
administrations	  as	   ‘the	   first	   framework	   for	  dialogue	  between	  member	  states’	   (Leonard,	  2002,	  p.	  
219).	  By	  the	  1970s,	  member	  states	  wanted	  freedom	  of	  movement	  for	  all	  people,	  and	  also	  to	  work	  
together	  more	  to	  combat	  smuggling	  of	  drugs,	  organized	  crime,	   illegal	   immigration	  and	  terrorism	  
as	  problems	  with	  these	  increased	  (Ibid.).	  From	  1975,	  informal	  cooperation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  meetings	  
and	   networks	   for	   sharing	   information	   developed	   outside	   the	   formal	   Community	   institutional	  
arrangements.	   1984	   saw:	   ‘.	   .	   .	   the	   first	   informal	  meetings	  of	   justice	   and	  home	  affairs	  ministers,	  
every	  six	  months,	  to	  discuss	  issues	  such	  as	  police,	  judicial	  and	  customs	  co-­‐operation,	  and	  the	  free	  
movement	   of	   people’	   (Leonard,	   2002,	   p.	   219).	   By	   the	   late	   1980s,	   policy	   topics	   included	  
immigration,	  visas,	  public	  order	  and	  customs	  controls	  (Nugent,	  2010).	  	  
The	  Single	  European	  Act	  of	  1986	  established	  that	  the	  four	  fundamental	  freedoms	  didn’t	  establish	  
freedom	   for	   non-­‐European	   nationals.	   Removing	   internal	   border	   controls	   didn’t	   meet	   with	   all	  
member	   states’	   approval	   until	  measures	  were	   proposed	   ‘to	   strengthen	   external	   borders	   and	   to	  
draft	   European	   asylum	   and	   immigration	   policies’	   (Leonard,	   2002,	   p.	   219).	   Failure	   to	   move	   to	  
formal	  arrangements	  led	  to	  five	  states	  (Belgium,	  Luxembourg,	  Netherlands,	  Germany	  and	  France)	  
signing	   the	   Schengen	  Agreement	   in	   June	   1990,	  which	   came	   into	   force	   in	   1994.	   This	   Agreement	  
abolished	  internal	  borders	  between	  the	  five	  states,	  while	  strengthening	  their	  external	  borders	  by	  
harmonizing	   visa	   requirements	   and	   issuing	   visas	   valid	   for	   all	   Schengen	   countries,	   creating	   a	  
common	  watchlist	  and	  aligning	  political	  asylum	  procedures.	  The	  Schengen	  Aquis	  contains	  a	  set	  of	  
rules	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  Schengen	  signatories.	  It	  includes:	  	  
[the]	  removal	  of	  checks	  on	  persons	  at	  the	  internal	  borders;	  a	  common	  set	  of	  rules	  applying	  to	  




conditions	  of	   entry	   and	  of	   the	   rules	  on	   visas	   for	   short	   stays;	   enhanced	  police	   cooperation	  
(including	  rights	  of	  cross-­‐border	  surveillance	  and	  hot	  pursuit);	  stronger	   judicial	  cooperation	  
through	   a	   faster	   extradition	   system	   and	   transfer	   of	   enforcement	   of	   criminal	   judgments;	  
establishment	  and	  development	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Information	  System	  (SIS).89	  
In	  practice,	  these	  rules	  mean	  that	  citizens	  of	  signatory	  states	  can	  cross	  from	  one	  member	  state	  to	  
another	  as	  if	  they	  are	  travelling	  within	  their	  own	  country.	  They	  can	  stay	  in	  any	  signatory	  state	  for	  
as	  long	  as	  they	  like	  without	  a	  visa	  or	  passport.	  All	  visitors	  to	  Schengen	  signatory	  states	  are	  subject	  
to	  the	  same	  short-­‐term	  visa	  rules.90	  
Three	  years	   after	  1994,	  13	  of	   the	  15	  member	   states	  plus	  Norway	  and	   Iceland	   (non-­‐EU	  member	  
states)	  had	  agreed	   to	   join	   the	  Agreement	   (Leonard,	  2002,	  p.	  114).	  The	  Maastricht	  Treaty	   (1992)	  
provided	  the	  framework	  for	  cooperation,	  including	  a	  permanent	  secretariat	  (Leonard,	  2002).	  The	  
UK	  was	  the	  outlier,	  keeping	   its	  own	  border	  controls	  over	  people	  movements.	   Ireland	  stayed	  out	  
also	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  free	  movement	  between	  Ireland	  and	  the	  UK.	  By	  2014,	  of	  the	  additional	  
13	  members,	  Bulgaria,	  Romania	  and	  Croatia	  were	  still	  to	  join.	  
Part	  of	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  external	  borders	  appeared	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Frontex91	  –	  an	  agency	  
established	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   European	   Union	   on	   26	   October	   2004.	   The	   main	   reasons	   for	  
establishing	  the	  agency	  were	  to	  ensure	  integrated	  control	  and	  surveillance	  through	  common	  rules	  
on	  standards	  and	  procedures,	  and	  increased	  coordination	  of	  operational	  cooperation	  between	  the	  
Member	  States	  (Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2004).	  	  Since	  2007,	  Frontex	  has	  also	  had	  a	  rapid	  
response	  role	  in	  relation	  to	  border	  risks.	  	  Neal	  calls	  Frontex:	  	  
.	  .	  .	  a	  textbook	  interpretation	  of	  European	  integration	  as	  regulating	  traditional	  sovereign	  rule	  
by	   nation-­‐states	   so	   that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   common	   procedures	   come	   to	   replace	   state	  
judgements	  based	  on	  self-­‐interest	  or	  populism	  (Neal,	  2009,	  p.	  348).	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For	  the	  movement	  of	  goods,	  similar	  conditions	  apply.	  Trade	  between	  members	  of	  the	  EU	  Customs	  
Union	   is	   in	  effect	  domestic.	  There	  are	  no	  processes	  for	  clearing	  goods	  (and	  all	   the	  requirements	  
that	   involves),	   no	   tariffs	   and	  no	  need	   to	  prove	   rules	   of	   origin.	   There	   is	   also	  one	   set	   of	   external	  
trade	  data	  for	  the	  whole	  EU	  (equivalent	  to	  national	  data).	  For	  trade	  with	  countries	  outside	  the	  EU	  
Customs	  Union,	  all	  signatory	  states	  apply	  the	  same	  external	  tariff	  rules.	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Customs	  part	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  ongoing.	  There	  are	  
constant	  improvements	  underway,	  led	  and	  funded	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  (EC),	  which	  is	  the	  
policy	   and	   administrative	   arm	   of	   the	   EU.	   For	   example,	   the	   objectives	   in	   the	   EC	   Customs	  
Programme	  for	  2013	  for	  ‘functioning	  of	  the	  Internal	  Market	  in	  the	  Customs	  Field’	  covered:	  
• ‘protecting	  the	  financial	  and	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  EU’	  
• ‘Facilitating	  trade	  and	  improving	  competitiveness’	  
• ‘Helping	   national	   customs	   administrations	   to	   perform	   their	   duties	   as	   though	   they	   were	   one	  
administration’	  
• ‘strengthening	  safety	  and	  security	  for	  citizens	  and	  trade’	  (The	  Evaluation	  Partnership,	  2011).	  
 Networks, pacification and overflowing in the EU border context 5.3.2
I	   now	   return	   to	   earlier	   assertions	   that	   the	   ANT,	   pacification	   and	   overflowing	   themes	   provide	   a	  
more	  nuanced	  theoretical	  framework	  than	  economic	  approaches	  on	  their	  own.	  When	  we	  look	  at	  
how	   borders	   are	   being	   managed	   in	   the	   EU,	   and	   the	   linkages	   involved	   in	   enacting	   the	   Single	  
Market,	  we	  see	  a	  complex	  maze	  of	  structures,	  directed	  by	  the	  EC.	  	  The	  EC	  is	  the	  hub	  for	  policy	  and	  
legislation	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   i.e.	   Customs	   Union	   policy	   for	   the	   movement	   of	   goods	   and	   border	  
management	  policy	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  people.	  The	  EC	  maintains	  a	  dense	  network	  of	  relations	  
with	  Customs	  administrations	  in	  member	  states	  and	  manages	  the	  complex	  relationships	  with	  the	  
joint	  decision-­‐making	  bodies	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  	  One	  official	  
described	  the	  intense	  effort	  required	  to	  participate	  in	  this	  system:	  
But	   that	   is	  only	   the	  policy,	  and	   the	   legal	  work,	  but	   implementation	   is	  always	  a	   task	  of	   the	  
member	  states,	  and	  of	  course	  what	  you	  say	  there	  is	  very	  close	  cooperation,	  especially	  in	  the	  
customs	   area,	   there	   is	   a	   Director	   General	   of	   TAXUD	   –	   that	   is	   a	   unit	   within	   the	   European	  
Commission	  –	  very,	  very	  close	  cooperation.	  There	  are	  always	  every	  day	  meetings	  in	  Brussels	  




how	   many	   working	   groups	   in	   the	   customs	   area	   of	   the	   Commission	   –	   around	   30,	   40,	   50	  
groups	   	  doing	  this	   for	  special	  customs	  matters.	  So	  we	  are	  always	   in	  Brussels	  at	  every	   level	  
(Official	  E4,	  lines	  141-­‐147).	  
In	  examining	  the	  EU	  from	  an	  ANT	  perspective,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  despite	  the	  integration	  rhetoric,	  
there	  are	  multiplicities	  within	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  EU.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  whole,	  but	  
it	  is	  not	  homogeneous.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  reporting	  of	  the	  Eurocrisis	  of	  2010-­‐2012	  was	  a	  narrative	  
of	  an	  EU	  in	  crisis,92	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  continued	  smooth	  operation	  of	  the	  flows	  of	  trade	  
in	   and	   out	   of	   the	   EU	   external	   border	   spoke	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   a	   successful,	   integrated	   EU.	  
These	   different	   narratives	   –	   failure	   and	   success	   –	   operated	   at	   the	   same	   time	   within	   the	   same	  
infrastructure.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  multiplicities	  are	  graphically	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  6	  below.	  This	  diagram	  depicts	  
the	  different	  overlapping	  and	  intersecting	  memberships	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  
Figure	  6. Multiplicities	  in	  EU	  membership	  
	  
Source:	  Odessa	  Talk,	  12	  June,	  201193	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 For example, this 2010 Spiegel article accessed on 27 January 2015 presents a range of views on what was happening: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-world-from-berlin-the-eu-could-be-facing-a-double-dip-recession-a-
694789.html. 





Anderson	  and	  Dowd	  eloquently	  describe	   some	  of	   the	  border	  effects	  of	   this	   sort	  of	  overlapping.	  
Borders	  	  
.	   .	   .	  are	  at	  once	  gateways	  and	  barriers	   to	   the	  “outside	  world”,	  protective	  and	   imprisoning,	  
areas	   of	   opportunity	   and/or	   insecurity,	   zones	   of	   contact	   and/or	   conflict,	   of	   co-­‐operation,	  
and/or	  competition,	  of	  ambivalent	   identities	  and/or	   the	  aggressive	  assertion	  of	  difference.	  
These	  apparent	  dichotomies	  may	  alternate	  with	  time	  and	  place,	  but	  –	  more	  interestingly	  –	  
they	  can	  co-­‐exist	  simultaneously	  in	  the	  same	  people,	  some	  of	  whom	  have	  to	  regularly	  deal	  
not	  with	  one	  state	  but	  two.	  Borders	  are	  filters	  with	  highly	  variable	  degrees	  of	  permeability	  or	  
porosity	   .	   .	   .	   borders	   look	   inwards	   and	   outwards:	   they	   simultaneously	   unify	   and	   divide,	  
include	  and	  exclude	  (Anderson	  &	  O’Dowd,	  1999,	  pp.	  595–6).	  
I	   revealed	  above	   the	  very	   clear	   linkage	  between	  managing	   the	  border	  and	  benefiting	   the	  Single	  
Market.	  The	  EC’s	  border	  programmes	  do	  have	  an	  outward-­‐facing	  ‘third	  country’	  component,	  but	  
the	  primary	  focus	  appears	  to	  be	  on	  the	  internally-­‐facing	  component.	  The	  individual	  member	  states	  
are	  tasked	  with	  carrying	  out	  the	   ‘border	  managing’	  at	   the	  external	  border	   for	  the	  benefit	  of	   the	  
internal	  market.	  	  
One	   European	   official	   referred	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   this	   border	   configuration	   when	   there	   were	  
‘overflow’	   situations	  at	   the	  border	  –	   for	  example,	   large	   flows	  of	   illegal	   immigrants	   that	   try,	   and	  
sometimes	  manage,	  to	  enter	  the	  EU.	  When	  the	  flows	  became	  very	  high	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  of	  
2011,	   small	   countries	   like	  Malta	   and	  Greece	  were	  overwhelmed,	   and	   illegal	   immigrants	   flooded	  
into	   the	  EU.94	  Once	   there,	  of	  course,	   they	  could	   then	  move	  to	  any	  country	  within	   the	  Schengen	  
zone,	  much	  to	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  immigrants’	  destination	  states	  such	  as	  France.	  
European	   Customs	   officials	   also	   consider	   the	   lack	   of	   internal	   borders	   makes	   the	   EU’s	   Customs	  
Union	  into	  more	  than	  a	  ‘regular’	  customs	  union.	  They	  gave,	  as	  an	  example,	  security,	  which	  is	  part	  
of	  the	  EU	  Customs	  Union	  but	  not	  part	  of	  a	  customs	  union	  (as	  broadly	  defined	  in	  the	  GATT95).	  They	  
differentiated	   the	   customs	   union	   with	   Turkey	   from	   the	   EU	   Customs	   Union	   and	   noted	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 See the Executive Summary  (Frontex, 2012) for a description of illegal entry points, numbers and source countries. 
Retrieved from http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachment_Featured/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2012.pdf  
95 See WTO “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994” 




Norway/EFTA96	  is	  in	  a	  free	  trade/economic	  area	  with	  Europe	  (the	  EEA)	  but	  there	  is	  still	  a	  customs	  
border	  with	  EFTA	  countries.	  
The	   EU	   is	   also	   a	   member	   of	   the	   WCO	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   so	   that	   the	   EU	   is	   represented	   by	   the	  
individual	  member	  countries	  and	  the	  EC.	  One	  official	  spoke	  of	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  
the	  WCO,	  and	  how	  the	  EU	  aims	  to	  influence	  the	  WCO:	  
.	   .	   .	  we	  can	  have	  a	  look	  at	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  EU	  –	  what	  are	  they	  doing	  in	  the	  WCO?	  
They	  have	  been	  members	  now	  for	  a	  few	  years.	  They	  use	  the	  WCO	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  standard	  –	  
setting	   the	   standards.	  And	   the	   standards	   they	  adopt	   immediately	   in	   the	  EU	  –	   I	   think	   they	  
want	   to	   influence	   a	   lot	   on	   the	   work	   being	   done	   –	   and	   the	  WCO	   –	   their	   models	   of	   their	  
thoughts	  being	  global.	  So	  the	  influence	  the	  EU	  have	  on	  the	  standard	  setting	  in	  the	  WCO	  –	  I	  
think	  it’s	  more	  and	  more	  important	  (EU	  focus	  group,	  lines	  487-­‐492).	  
The	  narratives	  of	  EU	  border	  officials	  tell	  of	  the	  two-­‐way	  effects	  of	  the	  EU	  Single	  Market	  policies,	  
and	  the	  tensions	  it	  brings	  to	  their	  activities.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  pacification	  activities	  draw	  officials	  
together	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   further	   development	   of	   the	   Customs	   Union	   and	   the	  
Schengen	  Agreement;	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  responses	  to	  overflowing,	  while	  supported	  by	  the	  EU,	  are	  
dealt	   with	   primarily	   on	   a	   member	   state	   to	   member	   state	   basis,	   as	   well	   as	   drawing	   on	   their	  
international	  associations.	  
 EU border stories 5.3.3
To	  provide	   a	   ‘behind	   the	   looking	   glass’	   view	  of	   the	   stories	   in	  Chapter	   6,	   this	   section	  uses	   three	  
interlinked	  UK	  border	  stories	  as	  a	  jumping	  off	  point	  for	  looking	  at	  wider	  border	  integration	  issues,	  
and	  illuminates	  them	  with	  an	  ANT	  lens.	  These	  stories	  are	  deeply	  interesting,	  because	  they	  reflect	  
some	  of	  the	  dilemmas	  and	  judgements	  I	  have	  seen	  and	  experienced	  in	  my	  own	  working	  life	  in	  New	  
Zealand	  Customs,	  particularly	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  context.	  	  The	  UK	  is	  a	  useful	  point	  of	  reference	  
for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   arrangements	   because	   of	   its	   island	   geography	   (albeit	   there	   is	   now	   a	  
quasi-­‐land	  border	   via	   the	  Channel	   Tunnel	   (‘Chunnel’))	   and	   its	   different	  memberships	   of	   the	   EU.	  
The	  UK	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  but	  is	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement,	  nor	  
the	   Eurozone,	   so	   the	   UK	   is	   both	   in	   and	   out	   of	   the	   EU.	   	   The	   implication	   for	   UK	   government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




relationships	  is	  that	  it	   is,	  as	  one	  official	  put	  it,	  ‘a	  bit	  of	  a	  part-­‐time,	  sort	  of	  half-­‐hearted	  member’	  
which,	   in	   this	  person’s	  opinion,	  made	   it	   ‘a	  kind	  of	  pragmatic,	  practical	  partner’	   (Official	  E2,	   lines	  
268,	  271).	  In	  practice,	  this	  means	  the	  UK	  fully	  participates	  in	  the	  EU	  Customs	  Union	  but	  has	  an	  opt-­‐
in	   arrangement	   for	   customs	   law	   enforcement	  matters,	   where	   it	   can	   choose	  whether	   or	   not	   to	  
come	   under	   EU	   competence	   on	   an	   issue	   by	   issue	   basis;	   and	  while	   the	   UK	   is	   not	   a	  member	   of	  
Schengen,	  it	  seeks	  a	  seat	  on	  Schengen	  working	  groups	  so	  it	  can	  influence	  policies	  that	  might	  affect	  
it.	  	  This	  is	  not	  unlike	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  practices	  in	  some	  respects,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  later	  in	  this	  
Chapter.	  	  
There	  are	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  you	  can	  read	  these	  three	  stories.	  One	  is	  to	  look	  for	  human	  and	  
non-­‐human	   connections.	   Two	   ‘star’	   non-­‐human	   performers	  were	   the	   Chunnel,	   which	   physically	  
transformed	   the	   UK	   from	   an	   island	   completely	   separated	   from	   Europe	   to	   an	   island	   partly	  
connected	   to	  mainland	   Europe,	   and	   the	   rail	   link	   between	   Europe	   and	   the	  UK	   that	   the	   Chunnel	  
made	  possible,	  transforming	  public	  transport	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  France.	  Another	  is	  to	  see	  how	  
and	  where	  power	  plays	  out,	  such	  as	  who	  or	  what	  is	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  whom,	  or	  what.	  	  
My	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  UK’s	  non-­‐membership	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement.	  As	  already	  described,	  
the	   Schengen	   Agreement	   removed	   internal	   borders	   for	   the	   movement	   of	   people	   within	   the	  
Schengen	  zone	  i.e.	  in	  2012,	  all	  EU	  members	  except	  Romania,	  Bulgaria,	  UK	  and	  Ireland,	  plus	  non-­‐EU	  
members	  Switzerland	  and	  Norway.	  	  Because	  the	  UK	  isn’t	  at	  the	  EU	  table	  as	  of	  right	  for	  policy	  work	  
affecting	   Schengen	   policy,	   it	   can	   only	   seek	   to	   sit	   in	   as	   a	   non-­‐voting	   participant.	   This	   is	   an	  
interesting	  position	  for	  a	  country	  that	  has	  a	  full	  vote	  in	  the	  political	  arena.	  	  	  
The	   first	   story	   depicts	   UK	   officials	   on	   the	   edges	   of	   the	   Schengen	   network.	   The	   UK’s	   political	  
membership	  of	  the	  EU	  gives	  it	  some	  permanent	  connections	  (e.g.	  with	  a	  mission	  in	  Brussels	  and	  as	  
a	   fully	   participating	   member	   of	   the	   EU	   Customs	   Union),	   but	   officials	   have	   to	   actively	   and	  
continuously	  build	  their	  connections	   in	  the	  Schengen	  group	  where	  the	  political	  masters	  they	  are	  
speaking	   for	   are	   not	   directly	   connected	   with	   those	   developing	   the	   policy,	   and	   where	   the	   UK’s	  
position	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  different	  from	  the	  other	  member	  states	  and	  to	  the	  EC.	  	  Here,	  the	  outcomes	  
of	  the	  UK’s	   influence	  are	  clearly	  uncertain,	  and	  take	  a	   lot	  of	  effort	   for	  policy	  officials	  to	  monitor	  
and	  manage:	  
.	  .	  .	  you	  see	  that	  now	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  sort	  of	  slightly	  caveated	  relationships,	  so	  Schengen	  is	  a	  




working	  groups	  and	  a	   lot	  of	  Schengen-­‐based	   initiatives	  that	  the	  UK	  wants	  to	  comment	  on,	  
and	  influence	  as	  they	  develop,	  but	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  Schengen	  working	  groups	  want	  to	  exclude	  the	  
UK	  because	  the	  UK’s	  not	  part	  of	  Schengen.	  	  So	  we	  have	  observer	  status	  on	  Schengen	  working	  
groups,	  and	  on	  a	  range	  of	  other	  measures	  where	  we’re	  not	  really	  part	  of	  it	  but	  we’d	  still	  like	  
to	  be	  at	  the	  table.	  Frontex	   is	  another	  example	  –	  so	  again,	  we	  go	  to	  Frontex	  meetings,	  and	  
where	  we	   can,	  we	   –	   a	   new	  word	   I’ve	   come	   across	   recently	   –	  we	   “ventriloquise”	   through	  
those	  who	  have	  a	  voice	  –	  using	  diplomatic	  channels,	  and	  other	  means	  of	  lobbying	  where	  we	  
need	  to,	  to	  try	  and	  achieve	  the	  sorts	  of	  objectives	  we	  would	  like	  to	  see	  achieved,	  and	  it’s	  all	  
about	  allegiances	  isn’t	  it,	  so	  you	  can	  see	  how	  the	  politicking	  happens,	  and	  we	  often	  are	  in	  an	  
interestingly	  half-­‐hearted	  position.	  We’re	  not	  entirely	  part	  of	  whatever	   the	   structures	  are,	  
but	  we	  really	  want	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  influencing	  body,	  so,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  that	  playing	  
out	  (Official	  E2,	  lines	  275-­‐288).	  
Because	   it	   isn’t	  a	  Schengen	  signatory,	   the	  UK	  still	  has	  border	  controls	   for	  people	  moving	   to	  and	  
from	  mainland	  Europe.	  Since	  the	  building	  of	  the	  Chunnel,	  the	  UK	  has	  juxtaposed	  border	  controls	  
with	   France	   and	   Belgium	   for	   checking	   people	  movements	   to	   the	  UK	   from	   these	   two	   countries.	  
How	   this	   works	   for	   Eurostar	   train	   passengers	   is	   that	   UK	   border	   officials	   are	   stationed	   at	   Paris,	  
Brussels	  and	  Lille	  where	  they	  pre-­‐clear	  passengers	  headed	  for	  the	  UK.	  When	  passengers	  arrive	  in	  
the	  UK,	   they	  can	   leave	   the	   train	  without	  any	   further	  border	  checks.	  As	  a	   result,	  UK	  officials	   feel	  
they	   have	   to	   actively	   manage	   the	   relationship	   and	   give	   something	   back	   to	   France:	   ‘.	   .	   .	   the	  
juxtaposed	  controls	  are	  viewed	  as	  a	  huge	  favour	  to	  us,	  ‘cause	  basically	  we’ve	  exported	  our	  border	  
.	   .	   .	  we’re	  more	  kind	  of	  generally	  grateful	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   juxtaposed	  controls	  are	   in	  place’	  
(Official	   E2,	   lines	   323-­‐4,	   347-­‐8).	   The	   language	   of	   this	   official	   points	   to	   an	   area	   of	   inherent	  
instability.	  	  
If	  we	  unpack	   this	   story	  a	   little,	  we	  see	   that	  several	  different	   realities	   (or	   ‘narratives’)	  have	  been	  
‘black	   boxed’	   into	   the	   process	   of	   juxtaposed	   controls.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   created	   by	   legitimate	  
passengers	   whose	   objective	   is	   to	   get	   from	   Europe	   to	   the	   UK	   with	   as	   little	   bother	   as	   possible.	  
Juxtaposed	  controls	  are	  a	  benefit,	  a	  service	  because	  they	  create	  easier	  travel.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  of	  
would-­‐be	   illegal	   immigrants	   and	   other	   ‘undesirables’	   who	   want	   to	   get	   from	   Europe	   to	   the	   UK	  




officials.	  For	  them,	  the	  border	  controls	  are	  a	  barrier	  that	  has	  to	  be	  overcome	  if	  they	  are	  to	  get	  to	  
the	  UK.	  Getting	  around	  those	  controls	  is	  not	  easy,	  as	  explained:	  	  
If	  you	  want	  to	  claim	  asylum	  in	  the	  UK	  .	  .	  .	  you	  can’t	  do	  it	  at	  Paris,	  Belgium	  and	  Lille.	  It’s	  not	  
going	   to	   work,	   ‘cause	   if	   you	   try	   to	   claim	   asylum,	   British	   border	   officials	   send	   you	   to	   the	  
French	  border	  officials	  next	  door.	  You’ve	  got	  to	  claim	  asylum	  in	  France	  (Official	  E2,	  lines	  324-­‐
327).	  
The	  third	  is	  that	  of	  French	  and	  UK	  government	  officials	  –	  their	  reality	  involves	  meeting	  the	  needs	  
of	   their	   respective	   governments,	   managing	   the	   tensions	   between	   the	   pacification	   and	  
overflowings	  of	  border	  flows.	  The	   juxtaposed	  controls	  also	  bring	  together	  French	  and	  UK	  border	  
worlds.	  In	  developing	  these	  joint	  controls,	  the	  UK	  and	  France	  had	  to	  negotiate	  an	  agreement	  –	  to	  
translate	   two	   border	   processes	   into	   one.	   The	   difficulties	   and	   barriers,	   the	   controversies	   and	  
debates	  disappeared	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  agreement,	  as	  they	  were	  no	  longer	  needed.	  
There	  is	  an	  exception,	  however	  –	  the	  UK	  officials	  ‘on	  the	  ground’	  maintain	  the	  matter	  of	  concern	  
wherein	  success	  of	  the	  venture	  depends	  on	  France’s	  continuing	  goodwill.	  	  
The	  fourth	  is	  that	  of	  politicians	  –	  the	  historical	  political	  associations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  UK	  not	  signing	  
up	   to	   the	  Schengen	  Agreement,	  which	   in	   turn	   led	   to	   the	  need	   for	   the	  border	   controls	  between	  
France	   and	   the	   UK	   to	   be	   maintained,	   and	   the	   associations	   with	   the	   Single	   Market,	   and	   its	  
economic	  benefits,	  that	  led	  to	  a	  desire	  for	  facilitated	  travel	  by	  both	  countries.	  	  	  
Each	  EU	  member	  state	  has	  a	  mini-­‐embassy	   in	  Brussels	   for	  negotiating	  and	   lobbying	   its	  country’s	  
position	  in	  the	  EU	  policy	  process.	  It	  keeps	  track	  of	  dossiers	  and	  informs	  relevant	  people	  back	  in	  the	  
member	   state	   about	   issues	   that	   affect	   it.	   The	   mini-­‐embassy	   is	   responsible	   for	   ensuring	   the	  
member	   state	   is	   represented	   correctly	   and	   effectively	   in	   the	   EU.	   As	   a	   result,	   there	   are	   lots	   of	  
information	  flows	  between	  the	  member	  state	  ‘back	  home’,	  the	  mini-­‐Embassy	  in	  Brussels,	  and	  the	  
member	  state’s	  embassies	  in	  other	  locations	  in	  Europe.	  	  There	  is	  a	  constant	  process	  of	  translation	  
as	  member	  states	  debate	  their	  positions,	  and	  policies	  get	  negotiated	  and	  finalised.	  This	  process	  is	  
complicated	   but	   it	   is	  well	   established	   and	   public	   servants	   in	  member	   states	   can	   explain	   how	   it	  
works.97	  This	   is	  a	  picture	  of	  a	   largely	  stable	  macro-­‐actor	  (the	  EU)	  that	   is	  maintained	  through	  the	  
performance	  of	  routines	  (Feldman	  and	  Pentland	  in	  Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	  &	  Hernes,	  2005,	  p.	  110).	  





The	   second	   story	   involves	   a	   proposed	   EU	   policy	   change.	   As	   indicated	   earlier,	   EU	   policy	  
development	  affecting	  the	  Schengen	  agreement	  can	  have	  flow-­‐on	  effects	  for	  the	  UK,	  which	  is	  why	  
the	  UK	  wants	  to	  be	  at	  the	  table	  to	  influence	  it.	  	  	  Such	  an	  area	  is	  rail	  liberalisation.	  Liberalising	  rail	  
services	   is	   about	   enabling	   them	   to	   be	   better	   connected	   from	   one	   side	   of	   Europe	   to	   the	   other.	  
Liberalised	  rail	  services	  to	  the	  UK	  could	  mean	  the	  Eurostar	  starting	  at	  Verona,	  or	  Copenhagen	  or	  
Berlin	  or	  Budapest,	  or	  anywhere	  else.98	  	  
At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interview,	  this	  policy	  work	  was	  well	  advanced,	  having	  been	  under	  negotiation	  
for	  18	  months	  and	  for	  which	  legislation	  had	  already	  been	  drafted.	  The	  UK	  representatives	  based	  in	  
Brussels	  had	  been	  at	  the	  table	  throughout:	  	  
.	   .	   .	   it’s	  reached	  a	  sort	  of	  a	  head	  of	  steam.	  It’s	  happening	   .	   .	   .	   the	  point	  at	  which	  we	  might	  
have	  been	  able	  to	  veto	  it,	  or	  to	  influence	  it	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  couldn’t	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  
border,	  for	  instance,	  that	  moment	  has	  passed	  .	  .	  .	  and	  it’s	  only	  now	  	  that	  the	  full	  implications	  
for	  border	  control	  have	  become	  quite	  clear	  .	  .	  .	  (Official	  E2,	  lines	  92-­‐96).	  	  
Those	   implications?	   	  The	   juxtaposed	  controls	  model	  doesn’t	  work	   in	  an	  era	  of	   rail	   liberalisation,	  
because	  the	  UK	  would	  have	  to	  have	  dozens	  of	  such	  controls	  all	  over	  Europe	  –	  at	  every	  stop	  from	  
every	  destination	  –	  unless	  they	  all	  hubbed	  through	  the	  existing	  control	  points.	  And	  somehow,	  UK	  
officials	   did	   not	   realize	   this	   particular	   implication	   until	   too	   late.	   	   In	   the	  moment	   of	   realization,	  
managing	   the	   border	   shifted	   ‘.	   .	   .	   from	   certainty	   about	   action	   to	   an	   uncertainty	   about	   action’	  
(Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  60).	  	  For	  over	  a	  year,	  EU	  officials	  had	  been	  working	  on	  the	  policy,	  and	  UK	  officials	  
at	  the	  table	  had	  been	  feeding	  it	  back	  to	  the	  UK,	  where	  nothing	  was	  done.	  There	  appeared	  to	  be	  no	  
translation,	  no	  interpretation.	  Officials	  in	  England	  weren’t	  picking	  up	  the	  information	  and	  making	  
it	  their	  own.	  The	  Brussels	  mini-­‐embassy	  was	  not	  a	  power	  node	  for	  this	  issue	  and	  the	  information	  
wasn’t	  a	  significant	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  officials	  located	  in	  the	  UK.	  
The	  triggering	  event	  came	  from	  Paris,	  where	  the	  UK	  officials	   there	  saw	  what	  this	  meant	  to	  UK’s	  
juxtaposed	  controls	  with	  France.	  They	  were	  worried	  about	  not	  upsetting	  that	  French	  relationship.	  
So	  here	  you	  have	   the	   juxtaposed	  controls,	   the	  basis	  of	  which	  had	  been	   ‘black	  boxed’	   in	   the	  UK,	  
being	  destabilised	  by	  this	  new	  policy	  –	  	  a	  risk	  which	  officials	  and	  politicians	  in	  the	  UK	  couldn’t	  see	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 At the time of writing, border control points were at the termination points in Brussels and Paris and interim points at 
Lyons and Lille in mainland Europe. These hubs enable passengers from connecting trains to process through immigration 




until	  someone	  in	  Paris,	  for	  whom	  the	  black	  box	  was	  still	  open,	  showed	  how	  those	  old	  connections	  
collided	  with	  the	  new.	  As	  the	  Official	  E2	  said:	  ‘now	  eventually	  there’s	  a	  cross-­‐government	  working	  
group	  that’s	  been	  set	  up’	  (lines	  117-­‐8)	  and	  ‘now	  it’s	  being	  gripped	  in	  a	  really	  quite	  heavy-­‐handed	  
fashion,	  but	  you	  know	  the	  Government	  understands	  it’s	  an	  issue	  that	  they	  need	  to	  deal	  with	  and	  
they	  are	  dealing	  with	  it’	  (lines	  122-­‐4).	  In	  this	  story,	  the	  UK’s	  embassy	  in	  Paris	  was	  a	  power	  node	  for	  
this	  issue.	  
The	   third	   story	   is	   another	  example	  of	   change	  disrupting	  existing	   connections	  and	   requiring	  new	  
groupings	  to	  be	  established.	  To	  recap,	  the	  UK	  and	  France’s	  juxtaposed	  border	  controls	  apply	  to	  the	  
Paris-­‐London	   rail	   service	   and	   to	   that	   from	  Belgium	   to	   London,	  which	   stops	   at	   Lille	   on	   the	  way.	  
However,	  the	  latter	  process	  contained	  a	  loophole	  in	  which	  people	  could	  buy	  tickets	  from	  Brussels	  
in	  Belgium	  to	  Lille	   in	  France,	  board	  at	  Brussels	  without	  having	  to	  show	  a	  passport	  (because	  they	  
were	  staying	  within	  the	  Schengen	  area),	  but	  with	  no	  one	  checking	  that	  they	  disembarked	  at	  Lille.	  
So	   they	   could	   carry	   on	   and	   disembark	   at	   London	  with	   no	   trouble.	   A	   similar	   loophole	   had	   been	  
identified	  in	  2001	  at	  Calais	  and	  subsequently	  closed.	  With	  the	  Lille	  loophole,	  officials	  knew	  about	  
but	  didn’t	  act	  on	   it.	   In	  our	  story,	  this	   instability	  was	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  as	   long	  as	   it	  wasn’t	  
widely	  known	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  where	  the	  problem	  didn’t	  connect	  to	  a	  power	  node.	  
However,	   the	   BBC	   found	   out	   about	   it	   and	   broadcast	   and	   published	   an	   item	   about	   it,99	  making	  
visible	  the	  sleeping	  problem	  which	  suddenly	  became	  a	  matter	  of	  concern,	  ‘because	  it	  advertised	  to	  
would-­‐be	   clandestine	   migrants	   a	   way	   in’	   (Official	   E2,	   lines	   140-­‐1).	   The	   intense	   media	   interest	  
prompted	  officials	  to	  look	  for	  ways	  to	  plug	  the	  Lille	  Loophole,	  ‘bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  wider	  context	  
of	   rail	   liberalisation	  services	  across	  the	  EU’	   (Official	  E2,	   lines	  142-­‐3).	  The	   liberalisation	  of	   the	  rail	  
network	  as	  described	  above	  would	  mean	  there	  would	  be	  many	   ‘Lille	   loopholes’	   to	  close	  –	  many	  
‘internal	  Schengen	  trips’	  that	  wouldn’t	  need	  passport	  controls	  but	  that	  could	  enable	  on-­‐travel	  to	  
London	  if	  not	  stopped	  somehow.	  In	  describing	  how	  the	  issue	  became	  translated	  from	  one	  thing	  to	  
another	  and	  how	  the	  EU	   liberalisation	  policy	  was	  operating	  at	   the	  same	  conceptual	   level	  as	   the	  
operational	   issue,	   Official	   E2	   demonstrated	   a	   mind-­‐shift	   –	   a	   translation	   that	   bridged	   the	   gap	  
between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  issue:	  
.	  .	  .	  it	  goes	  from	  being	  a	  really	  operational-­‐focused	  issue	  looking	  at	  people	  getting	  on	  and	  off	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





trains,	   and	   how	   we	   do	   border	   controls,	   to	   you	   know,	   the	   strategic	   approach	   of	   the	   EU	  
towards	  liberalizing	  services	  and	  encouraging	  free	  movement	  (Official	  E2,	  lines	  143-­‐145).	  
If	  we	  look	  at	  the	   intersection	  of	  the	  story	  about	   juxtaposed	  controls	  with	  this	  story,	  we	  see	  that	  
the	   Lille	   loophole	  wasn’t	   a	   problem	   for	   legitimate	   passengers	   –	   they	  wouldn’t	   even	   have	   been	  
aware	   of	   it.	   For	   criminals	   and	  would-­‐be	   illegal	   immigrants,	   however,	   it	   provided	   the	  means	   for	  
them	  to	  evade	  the	  border	  controls.	  For	  the	  politicians,	  it	  was	  a	  known	  issue.	  According	  to	  the	  BBC	  
report	  that	  sparked	  off	  all	  the	  publicity,	  officials	  had	  advised	  politicians	  some	  months	  before,	  but	  
they	  didn’t	  act	  on	  it	  until	  this	  operational	  matter	  was	  made	  visible	  by	  the	  media.	  And	  we	  can	  see	  
how	  the	  problem	  was	  compounded	  when	  proposed	  changes	  to	  EU	  policy	  came	  into	  the	  picture.	  	  
These	  are	  local	  stories	  that	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  constant	  movement	  –	  of	  policy	  being	  constructed,	  of	  
borders	  being	  managed.	  Similarly	  to	  Bevir	  and	  Rhodes	  (2006a),	  this	  view,	  I	  believe,	  challenges	  the	  
idea	  of	  the	  public	  service	  as	  a	  solid	  and	  static	  entity.	  Looking	  with	  ANT	  eyes,	  ‘the	  public	  service’	  is	  a	  
honeycomb	   of	   connections	   through	   which	   officials	   and	   politicians	   are	   serving	   the	   public.	   As	  
illustrated	   in	  the	  telling	  of	   these	  tales,	  macro-­‐actors	  such	  as	   the	  EU	  and	  the	  UK	  government	  are	  
ever	  present	  hubs	  of	  influence	  and	  power.	  Our	  three	  stories	  were	  local	  in	  nature,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  part	  of	  the	  governance	  stories	  of	  the	  EU.	  Political	  power	  in	  ANT	  depends	  on	  an	  agglomeration	  
of	  connections	  that	  lead	  out	  to	  and	  feedback	  from	  many	  local	  sites,	  where	  every	  site	  is	  local	  in	  the	  
way	   officials	   are	   translating	   their	   government’s	   wishes	   into	   action	   and	   where	   connections	  
between	  sites	  become	  important.	  
These	  stories	  have	  provided	  insights	  into	  the	  performativity	  of	  EU	  and	  UK	  border	  policy	  and	  some	  
of	  the	  tensions	  and	  contradictions	  involved	  in	  stabilizing	  actor-­‐networks	  involving	  an	  island	  and	  a	  
continent.	   They	   provide	   an	   introduction	   into	   what	   might	   be	   meant	   by	   ‘performativity’	   in	   the	  
domain	  of	  policy	  practice,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  connections,	  translation,	  matters	  of	  concern	  and	  
hubs	  of	  power.	  	  
 UK border narratives 5.3.3.1
Within	   these	   stories	   are	   contained	   some	   specific	   narratives.	   The	   first	   is	   about	   the	   UK’s	  
membership	  of	  the	  EU.	  The	  ‘part-­‐time’	  nature	  of	  the	  UK’s	  membership	  of	  the	  EU	  creates	  a	  tension	  
for	  border	  officials:	  




exclusive	  EU	  competence,	  where	  all	  	  the	  27	  member	  states	  have	  got	  to	  act	  as	  one,	  and	  we	  
can’t	   unilaterally	   decide	   to	   do	   something	   different	   from	   everybody	   else,	   contrasting	   that	  
with	   the	   immigration	   situation,	   where	   the	   UK	   is	   not	   in	   Schengen	   and	   in	   the	   EU-­‐wide	  
arrangements,	   so	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  we’ve	   got	   national	   discretion	   and	   autonomy	   to	   do	  
things	  differently	  varies	  quite	  a	  lot	  from	  customs	  and	  immigration.	  And	  that’s	  something	  that	  
I	  think	  can	  be	  in	  tension	  a	  little	  bit	  (Official	  E1,	  lines	  189-­‐95).	  
UK	  border	  officials	  interviewed	  for	  this	  thesis	  also	  highlighted	  that	  the	  UK’s	  geographical	  position	  
in	   relation	   to	  continental	  Europe	   is	  a	  part	  of	   the	  UK	  psyche	  and	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  policy	  and	  the	  
behaviour	  of	  officials:	  
You’ll	  still	  hear	  people	  here	  refer	  to	  the	  Continent	  as	  ‘Europe’	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  us	  not	  being	  part	  
of	   Europe,	   which	   is	   something	   that	   colleagues	   in	   the	   EU	   would	   always	   pick	   up	   on,	   if	  
somebody	   said	   “well,	   in	   Europe	   .	   .	   .”,	   as	   the	  UK	  delegate,	  which	   is	  quite	   interesting.	  But	   I	  
think	  again,	  that’s	  just	  part	  of	  island	  mentality,	  I	  suppose,	  that	  we’re	  not	  used	  to	  the	  same,	  
yeah,	   if	   you	   have	   the	   experience	   of	   being	   on	   a	   train,	   going	   across	  mainland	   Europe,	   you	  
realize	  just	  how	  much	  integration	  can	  make	  sense,	  because	  it’s	  just	  so	  seamless	  moving	  from	  
one	   country	   into	   another.	   I	   think	   because	  we’ve	   got	   some	   form	  of	   barrier,	  even	  with	   the	  
train,	   that	   still	   feels	   like	   it’s	   there,	   that	   probably	   influences	   our	   kind	   of	   psychology	   and	  
approach	  to	  those	  kind	  of	  things	  (Official	  E1,	  lines	  69-­‐77).	  
	  
.	   .	   .	   many	   commentators	   in	   general	   in	   the	   UK	   often	   talk	   about	   us	   being	   separated	   from	  
Europe	  by	  the	  English	  Channel	  –	  there’s	  been	  headlines	  in	  papers	  recently	  saying	  “fog	  in	  the	  
Channel	  cuts	  us	  off	  from	  Europe”.	  So	  there’s	  this	  really	  strong	  sense	  that	  Britain	  is	  separate	  
and	  different	  .	  .	  .	  (Official	  E2,	  lines	  166-­‐9).	  	  
Other	   comments	   included	   the	   fixed-­‐ness	   of	   its	   borders	   (as	   compared	  with	  Alsace-­‐Lorraine),	   the	  
‘strength	  of	  feeling	  around	  British	  identity’	  and	  ‘of	  not	  wanting	  to	  let	  foreigners	  in’	  (Official	  E2).	  
But	   the	   Chunnel	   is	   playing	   a	   role	   in	   lessening	   that	   separation	   through	   making	   possible	   new	  
everyday	  connections	  with	  Europe:	  	  
I	  suppose	  it	  makes	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  people	  easier	  and	  quicker,	  so	  in	  that	  sense,	  it’s	  




quicker	  connection,	  rather	  than	  having	  to	  take	  a	  flight,	  or	  take	  the	  ferry	  across	  the	  Channel.	  
You	  know,	  it	  means	  you	  can	  do	  Paris	  or	  Brussels	  in	  a	  day,	  which	  previously	  would	  have	  been	  
a	  more	  difficult	  thing	  to	  do”	  (Official	  E1,	  lines	  60-­‐64).	  
Associated	  with	  these	  narratives	  is	  that	  the	  UK’s	  matters	  of	  concern	  have	  historically	  had	  a	  wider	  
focus	  than	  Europe:	  
Now,	  clearly,	  all	  EU	  member	  states	  have	  got	  their	  histories	  and	  their	  historical	  connections	  
which	  remain	  important,	  but	  I	  guess	  there’s	  something	  about	  the	  UK	  perspective	  that	  we’ve	  
always	  had	  both	  EU	  but	  also	  wider	  relationships	  that	  have	  been	  a	  critical	  part	  of	  our	  foreign	  
policy	  and	   the	  way	  we’ve	  operated	  –	  you	  can	   look	  back	   in	  history	   for	   that	   .	   .	   .	   the	  sort	  of	  
British	   Empire	   days	  when	  we’ve	   had	   a	  much	   sort	   of	  bigger	  world	   picture	   and	   influence	   –	  
that’s	  changed	  hugely	  obviously	  over	  the	  last	  hundred	  years,	  but	  there’s	  always	  been	  a	  wider	  
world	  view,	  a	  lot	  of	  it	  based	  around	  trade	  .	  .	  .	  (Official	  E1,	  lines	  386-­‐89,	  394-­‐397).	  
All	   these	  narratives	  affected	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  officials	  engaged	   in	  and	  with	  the	  EU	  and	  start	  to	  
provide	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  multiplicities	  within	  a	  regional	  integration	  environment.	  
5.4 Trans-­‐Tasman	  ‘bordering’	  	  
This	   section	   sets	  out	   the	  historical	   connections	  between	   the	   two	  members	  of	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
economic	  region,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  trans-­‐Tasman	  ‘bordering’.	  
In	  the	  beginning,	   trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  management	  was	  all	  about	  revenue.	  Both	  Australia’s	  and	  
New	   Zealand’s	   Customs	   administrations	   have	   their	   roots	   in	   the	   British	   Customs	   and	   Excise	  
department	  that	  began	  with	  the	  Winchester	  Assize	  of	  1203-­‐4	  under	  King	  John	  of	  England	  (Asakura,	  
2003).	  Customs	  controls	  for	  New	  Zealand	  were	  managed	  out	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  under	  direction	  
from	  London	  until,	  in	  1840,	  George	  Cooper,	  New	  Zealand’s	  first	  Collector	  of	  Customs,	  set	  up	  New	  
Zealand’s	  first	  Customhouse	  in	  Russell.	   In	  1841,	  when	  Governor	  Hobson	  declared	  New	  Zealand	  a	  
colony,	  the	  Customs	  Regulation	  Ordinance	  was	  the	  third	  law	  created	  in	  the	  colony,100	  providing	  for	  
New	  Zealand’s	  own	  tariff	  (McGill,	  1991).	  Its	  early	  creation	  highlights	  the	  importance	  the	  Customs	  
revenue-­‐gathering	  role	  had	  for	  the	  young	  colony.	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In	   the	   early	   19th	   century,	   trade	   between	   the	   Australian	   and	  New	   Zealand	   colonies	  was	   prolific	  
(Patman,	  2001),	   but	   from	   the	   late	  19th	   century	   to	   the	  1960s,	  Britain	   replaced	  Australia	   as	  New	  
Zealand’s	  main	  bilateral	  partner.	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  economic	  ties	  weakened	  during	  this	  
period	  because	  developments	  in	  technology	  and	  transportation101	  made	  Britain	  a	  more	  attractive	  
market	  than	  Australia	  for	  New	  Zealand	  (Patman,	  2001).	  However,	  while	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  
also	  tried	  to	  develop	  reciprocal	  customs	  duties	  during	  this	  period,	  attempts	  were	  thwarted	  first	  by	  
Britain	   and	   then	   by	   the	   federation	   of	   Australia	   in	   1901.	   Federation	  meant	  New	   Zealand	   traded	  
with	  one	   large	   entity,	   rather	   than	  with	   each	  of	   the	  previous	   colonies,	   creating	   an	   asymmetrical	  
trading	  environment	  (Mein	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
 From Federation to World War II 5.4.1
There	   are	   differing	   views	   about	   the	   reasons	   for	   Australia’s	   move	   to	   federation	   with	   the	  
predominant	  view	  changing	  over	  time	  from	  economic	  to	  cultural.	  Mein	  Smith	  concludes	  the	  most	  
compelling	   reason	   for	   federation	   as	   creating	   a	   ‘grander,	   nobler	   future’	   and	   a	   stronger	   identity	  
(Mein	  Smith,	  2003,	  p.	  309).	  ‘God	  wanted	  Australia	  to	  be	  a	  nation’	  (Hirst,	  2000,	  p.	  4)	  and	  Australia	  
wanted	  to	  raise	  its	  status	  with	  Britain	  from	  ‘mere	  colonists’	  to	  an	  equal	  nation	  (Hirst,	  2000,	  p.	  30;	  
Joseph	   &	   Kirby,	   1995;	   Mein	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Dispute	   between	   Australian	   states	   was	   also	   a	  
fraught	  issue	  for	  the	  Australians,	  and	  one	  in	  which	  border	  controls	  played	  a	  part:	  	  
Ultimately	   the	   irritations,	   delays	   and	   the	   cost	   of	  maintaining	   inland	  Customs	  border	   posts	  
between	  the	  colonies	  became	  a	  crucial	  element	  in	  the	  Federation	  debate.	  It	  was	  also	  argued	  
that	  border	  duties	  between	  the	  colonies	  interfered	  with	  trade	  and	  disrupted	  travellers	  (Lee,	  
2000).	  	  
In	   practical	   terms,	   one	  of	   the	   things	   federation	   created	  was	   a	   common	  external	   border	   for	   the	  
whole	   Australian	   continent,	   although	   a	   customs	   union	   could	   have	   been	   achieved	   without	  
federation	  (Hirst,	  2000).	  
When	   Australia	   invited	   New	   Zealand	   to	   join	   the	   Federation,	   New	   Zealand	   could	   have	   become	  
another	  state	  within	  this	  system.	  However,	  New	  Zealand	  decided	  not	  to	   join.	  A	   favoured	  reason	  
cited	  is:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Nature	  has	  made	  1,200	  impediments	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  New	  Zealand	  in	  any	  such	  federation	  
in	  the	  1,200	  miles	  of	  stormy	  ocean	  which	  lie	  between	  us	  and	  our	  brethren	  in	  Australia	  (Sir	  
John	  Hall,	  quoted	  in	  Mein	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  19).	  	  
His	   next	   sentence,	   which	   is	   relevant	   to	   this	   thesis,	   expresses	   New	   Zealand’s	   wish	   to	   stay	  
connected:	  	  ‘That	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  community	  of	  interests	  between	  us’	  (Ibid.)	  	  
That	  Australia	  has	  kept	  Clause	  6	   	   in	   its	  constitution	  allowing	   ‘the	  Colony	  of	  New	  Zealand’	  to	   join	  
the	  Australian	  Commonwealth,	  has,	  while	   legally	  debated,	  kept	  alive	  the	  popular	  story	  that	  New	  
Zealand	  could	  still	  do	  that	  if	  it	  wished	  (Eichbaum,	  1992).	  
Even	  after	  New	  Zealand’s	  refusal	  of	   federation,	  the	  drive	  to	  reciprocity	  continued.	   ‘New	  Zealand	  
customs	  officials	  sought	  tariff	  reciprocity	  with	  Australia	  right	  up	  to	  the	  Second	  World	  War’	  (Mein	  
Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   100).	   Preferential	   trade	   arrangements	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   were	  
signed	  in	  1907,	  1922,	  and	  1933	  (Easton,	  1991)	  ‘.	  .	  .	  although	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  markedly	  
affected	   actual	   trade’	   (Easton,	   1991,	   para.	   11).	   	   Rather,	   New	   Zealand	   trade	   with	   Australia	   was	  
disadvantaged	   by	   Australian	   protectionism	   until	   1938,	  when	  New	   Zealand	   reciprocated	  with	   its	  
own.	   And	   tit-­‐for-­‐tat	   quarantine	   disputes	   about	   fruit	   and	   vegetables	   and	   dairy	   foods	   erupted	  
between	  the	  World	  Wars.102	  
 The road to Closer Economic Relations 5.4.2
Today’s	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   arrangements	   came	   out	   of	   three	   geopolitical	   changes	   created	   by	  
World	   War	   Two,	   resulting	   in	   ‘greater	   regional	   consciousness’	   (Holmes,	   2002,	   p.	   2).	   First,	   the	  
‘superpower	  mantle’	   shifted	   from	   Britain	   to	   the	   US,	   creating	   ‘a	   new	   international	   order’	   (Mein	  
Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  104).	  Second,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  signed	  the	  Canberra	  Pact	  in	  1944,	  
not	  telling	  Britain	  or	  the	  US	  until	  afterwards:	  ‘Above	  all,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  wanted	  their	  
collective	  voices	  heard	  by	   their	  American	  ally	   .	   .	   .	   They	  did	  not	  want	   the	  US	   to	   set	   the	   terms	   in	  
what	  they	  perceived	  as	  their	  realm,	  south	  of	  the	  equator’	  (Mein	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  p.	  105).	  Third,	  
Britain	  joined	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community,	  removing	  from	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  their	  
privileged	   trade	   status.	   As	   a	   result,	   ‘[f]orewarned	   of	   Britain’s	   intentions,	   Australia	   and	   New	  
Zealand	  started	  to	  coordinate	  economic	  policy’	  (Patman,	  2005,	  p.	  51).	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The	  subsequent	  freeing	  up	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  started	  in	  1966	  following	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  New	  
Zealand-­‐Australia	   Free	   Trade	   Agreement	   in	   1965.	   It	   was	   a	   rather	   limited	   vision	   of	   free	   trade,	  
however,	  because	   it	   kept	   ‘a	  high	  wall	  of	  protection	  against	   trans-­‐Tasman	  competition’	   (Holmes,	  
2002,	  p.	  3).	  In	  1980,	  New	  Zealand’s	  special	  arrangement	  with	  Britain	  ended,	  and	  in	  1983,	  CER	  was	  
signed:	  ‘It	  was	  this	  deprivation	  [that	  is,	  not	  having	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  provided	  by	  
states	  in	  the	  Australian	  federation]	  that	  CER	  set	  out	  to	  mollify.	  It	  was	  more	  than	  just	  a	  free	  trade	  
agreement’	  (Kirby,	  2002,	  p.	  1085).	  	  
The	   idea	  of	   reciprocity,	  evident	   from	  the	   late	  1800s,	  was	  present	  during	  the	  negotiation	  of	  CER.	  
The	   Lusaka	   Agreement	   of	   1979	   set	   out	   a	   range	   of	   options	   for	   wider	   economic	   cooperation,	  
including	  customs	  union	  and	  economic	  community	  (Australian	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  
Trade	   &	   New	   Zealand	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Trade,	   2003).	   That	   1979	   agreement	  
envisaged	  a	  wider	  scope	  even	  still,	   including	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  people:	  ‘The	  enduring	  thread	  is	  the	  
hope	  of	  achieving	  reciprocity	  in	  the	  relationship,	  and	  of	  creating	  a	  “community	  of	  interests”	  or	  a	  
“community	   of	   purpose”’	   (Mein	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   120).	   The	   political	   ambition	   for	   CER	  was,	  
from	   the	   beginning,	   for	   a	   broad	   agenda	   (Australian	  Department	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs	   and	   Trade	  &	  
New	   Zealand	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Trade,	   2003).103	   The	   resulting	   components	   of	   CER	  
covered	   free	   trade	   in	   goods,	   services,	  mutual	   recognition	   of	   occupations	   and	   goods	   and	   a	   free	  
labour	  market,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  of	  the	  two	  economies	  went	  far	  beyond	  the	  type	  of	  Free	  
Trade	  Agreement	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  Balassa	  hierarchy104.	  	  
In	   1983,	   CER	   committed	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   to	   ‘harmonization	   of	   business	   laws,	   trade	  
practices,	   tariffs,	   competition	   and	   commercial	   laws,	   taxation,	   customs	   and	   quarantine	  
arrangements’	   (Kirby,	   2002,	   p.	   1085).	   At	   the	   operational	   level,	   in	   1985,	   the	   two	   Ministers	  
responsible	  for	  customs	  matters	  signed	  a	  Customs	  Cooperative	  Arrangement	  that	  supported	  the	  
implementation	  of	  CER.	  
CER	   has	   been	   progressively	   implemented	   and	   extended	   since	   its	   signing	   in	   1983,	   although	   not	  
without	   some	  back-­‐tracking	   at	   times.	   Further	   liberalisation	  occurred	   in	   1988	  with	   the	   review	  of	  
CER,	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   geopolitical	   considerations	   were	   still	   driving	   CER	   developments.	   ’Joint	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ministerial	   statements	   from	   1988	   identify	   the	   importance	   of	   CER	   as	   a	   springboard	   into	   Asia’	  
(Joseph	   &	   Kirby,	   1995,	   p.	   154).	   This	   review	   widened	   CER	   to	   include	   trade	   in	   services	   and	  
competition	  law,	  customs	  and	  quarantine	  procedures,	  standards	  and	  industry	  assistance	  (Pearce,	  
1995).	  	  
Another	   review	   of	   CER	   in	   1992	   gave	   consideration	   to	   further	   extension	   to	   include	   taxation,	  
passenger	  facilitation	  and	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  standards	  and	  occupational	  registration	  (Pearce,	  
1995).	  On	   1	   Aug	   1992,	   the	   phased	   integration	   of	   Australian	   and	  New	   Zealand	   aviation	  markets	  
began	  but	  in	  1994,	  just	  before	  the	  final	  stage,	  Australia	  announced	  its	  intention	  to	  withdraw.	  The	  
New	  Zealand	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  recalled	  this	  moment,	  while	  recognising	  that	  in	  the	  2010s,	  the	  
relationship	  was	  on	  a	  much	  better	  footing:	  
I	  have	  to	  tell	  you	  back	  in	  the	  old	  round	  of	  Ministers	  in	  the	  ‘90s,	  I	  was	  absolutely	  gobsmacked	  
that	  they	  pulled	  out	  of	  the	  single	  aviation	  market,	  given	  that	  they	  had	  initiated	  it,	  they	  had	  
asked	  for	  it,	  Keating	  had	  asked	  New	  Zealand	  to	  consider	  it,	  Bolger	  sent	  me	  packing	  over	  there	  
as	   the	  Minister	   of	   Transport.	  We	   got	   ourselves	   a	   negotiated	   arrangement	   for	   the	  within,	  
beyond	  and	  between	   rights,	   for	   it	  all	   to	  come	   into	  effect	  on	   the	  1st	  of	  November	   in	  1994.	  
Bolger	  then	  went	  off	  to	  a	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  in	  Australia	   in	  July	  and	  they	  ratified	  it.	  
Keating	  and	  Bolger	  ratified	  the	  whole	  deal,	  and	  we	  just	  thought	  “this	  is	  brilliant”.	  Everyone	  
was	  as	  happy	  as	  hell,	  and	  so	  was	  I.	  And	  to	  receive	  a	  fax	  from	  my	  counterpart	  six	  days	  before,	  
on	  the	  25th	  of	  October,	  saying	  “We	  are	  unilaterally	  withdrawing	  from	  the	  bilateral	  agreement	  
that	  was	  ratified	  by	  our	  Prime	  Ministers.	  Get	  stuffed”,	  I’ve	  never	  seen	  anything	  quite	  –	  and	  
I’m	   told	   by	   a	   number	   of	   the	   officials	   that	   I’ve	   talked	   to	   since,	   there	   was	   just	   huge	  
consternation	  (lines	  232-­‐242).	  
Unsurprisingly,	  from	  1994-­‐6	  there	  was	  ‘.	  .	  .	  a	  stiffening	  in	  the	  Australian	  approach	  to	  New	  Zealand	  
on	  CER	  matters.’	  (Holmes,	  1996,	  p.	  29).	  Holmes	  reports	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  reasons,	  stemming	  
partly	  from	  a	  perception	  that	  New	  Zealand	  was	  pushing	  Australia	  faster	  than	  it	  wanted	  to	  go.	  
 Trans-Tasman travel 5.4.3
Much	  of	   the	   academic	  writing	   about	   trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  movements	  has	  been	  about	   trade.	  A	  
key	   reason	  appears	   to	  be	   the	  predominant	   story	  of	   the	   role	  of	   international	   trade	   in	  promoting	  




needed	  little	  attention,	  as	   it	  has	  been	  largely	  free-­‐flowing	  since	  the	  colonies’	  creation,	  and	  apart	  
from	   the	   short	   period	   from	   1915-­‐1920,	   only	   since	   the	   1970s	   have	   there	   been	   any	   real	   barriers	  
(Henry,	  2008;	  Patman,	  2001).	  Holmes	  observes	  that	  ‘[n]o	  aspect	  of	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  better	  
epitomises	  the	  shared	  heritage	  than	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  arrangements’	  (Holmes,	  1996,	  p.	  41).	  
That	  history	  has	  centred	  on	  a	  shared	  view	  that	  the	  Australasian	  colonies	  were	  and	  should	  remain	  
’white’	  (‘New	  Zealand’	  in	  Irving,	  1999,	  p.	  400).	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   data	   has	   been	   collected	   since	   1858,	   though	   patchily	   at	   times	   (Carmichael,	  
1993).	  From	  1915-­‐1920,	  a	  passport	  and	  exit	  permit	  system	  developed	  during	  World	  War	  I	  was	  in	  
place,	   impacting	  on	   the	   freedom	  of	   travel	   for	   British	   subjects	   (that	   is,	   including	  Australians	   and	  
New	  Zealanders)	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  This	  was	  abolished	  in	  1920	  and	  ‘all	  ”natural	  
born	   British	   subjects”	   (including	  Maori,	   as	   “honorary	  whites”)	  would	   be	   able	   to	   travel	   between	  
New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  without	  travel	  documents’	  (Henry,	  2008,	  p.	  198).	  	  
This	  arrangement	  existed	  until	  1981,	  when	  Australia	  became	  alarmed	  by	  an	   imbalance	   in	   travel,	  
with	   many	   more	   New	   Zealanders	   travelling	   to	   Australia	   than	   vice	   versa.	   In	   1981,	   all	   New	  
Zealanders	  were	   given	   a	   visa	  on	   arrival	   in	  Australia,	   in	   effect	   requiring	   them	   to	  have	  passports.	  
New	  Zealand	  reciprocated	   in	  1987	  by	  requiring	  Australians	  to	  have	  passports	  for	  entry	   into	  New	  
Zealand	  (Mein	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  These	  arrangements	  still	  exist.	  However,	  despite	  now	  having	  to	  
travel	   with	   passports,	   travel	   is	   easy	   and	   frequent,	   and	   since	   commercial	   flights	   were	   provided	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   by	   jet	   airplanes	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1960s,	   travel	   and	   tourism	   between	   the	   two	   countries	  
have	  grown	  significantly	  (McLintock,	  1966).	  For	  example,	  between	  December	  1983	  and	  December	  
2007,	   visitors	   from	   Australia	   to	   New	   Zealand	   more	   than	   quadrupled	   (Statistics	   New	   Zealand,	  
2007).	  Pearce	  comments:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  identify	  any	  pre-­‐existing	  barriers	  to	  the	  free	  and	  full	  
development	  of	  tourism	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  civil	  aviation	  excepted,	  which	  needs	  
to	   be	   eliminated’	   (1995,	   p.	   114).	   He	   also	   notes	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   tourism	  
industry	   and	   the	   close	   cooperation	   between	   the	   two	   industry	   associations	   and	   that	   CER	   has	  




driver	   of	   economic	   growth,	   and	   tourism	   is	   included	   in	   economic	   development	   planning.	   Today,	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  is	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  tourism	  and	  airline	  businesses	  in	  New	  Zealand.105	  	  
However,	   while	   tourism	   might	   have	   been	   made	   easier,	   labour	   market	   movements	   from	   New	  
Zealand	   to	   Australia	   were	   affected	   by	   Australian-­‐initiated	   changes	   to	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   social	  
security	   arrangement	   in	   2001.	   It	   was	   the	   fourth	   change	   since	   1986,	   each	   change	   progressively	  
eroding	  the	  immediate	  access	  to	  social	  security	  benefits	  New	  Zealanders	  had	  enjoyed	  up	  to	  1986.	  
These	  changes	  arose	  from	  Australia’s	  concern	  about	  increased	  migration	  flows	  from	  New	  Zealand	  
to	   Australia	   (Mein	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008).106	   While	   understandable	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   fiscal	  
pressures	  for	  Australia,	  it	  did	  constrain	  the	  traditional	  free	  flow	  of	  labour.	  
Until	   the	   mid-­‐2000s,	   there	   had	   been	   very	   little	   visible	   change	   to	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	  
arrangements	   for	   travellers.	   The	   only	   observable	   changes	   were	   Australia’s	   introduction	   of	   an	  
‘Australians	   and	   New	   Zealanders’	   arrivals	   line	   in	   2005107	   and	   their	   inclusion	   of	   New	   Zealand	  
passport	   holders	   as	   eligible	   to	   use	   the	   automated	   passenger	   processing	   system	   SmartGate,	  
launched	  in	  2007.	  As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  a	  passport	  lane	  for	  New	  Zealanders	  and	  Australians	  had	  
been	  established	  in	  New	  Zealand	  a	  decade	  earlier,	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  are	  
keenly	   aware	   that	   it	   took	   10	   years	   for	   Australia	   to	   reciprocate	   this	   visible	   sign	   of	   the	   special	  
relationship	  between	  New	  Zealanders	  and	  Australians.108	  	  
 Towards a single economic market 5.4.4
The	  economic	  asymmetry	  that	  prevailed	  from	  1901	  persists	  to	  this	  day.	  Even	  after	  the	  expansion	  
of	  CER,	  there	  were	  still	   significant	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  differences	  not	  experienced	  by	  states	  
within	  the	  Federation	  and	  a	  need	  to	  consider	  further	  integration	  such	  as	  a	  single	  economic	  market	  
or	   economic	   union	   (Kirby,	   2002).	   By	   1999,	   the	   CER	   agenda	   shifted	   from	   ‘at	   the	   border’	   trade	  
matters	   to	   services	   and	   ‘behind	   the	   border’	   competition,	   and	   the	  matters	   of	   concern	  were	   the	  
hard	  ones	  to	  resolve:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See Trans-Tasman references in the information on the tourism industry, Statistics New Zealand website. Retrieved from 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/Tourism/tourism-satellite-account-
2014/Summary_results.aspx  
106 That concern was not so much about the flows themselves as the attendant costs associated with the right of New 
Zealanders residing in Australia to access social security entitlements, including transfer payments and health care. 
107 I was present at the 2005 Ministerial meeting when the Australian Minister said that he wanted this put in place.  




There	  was	  some	  truth	  to	  the	  claim	  made	  by	  some	  officials,	  mostly	  in	  Canberra,	  that	  it	  was	  a	  
lemon	  squeezed	  dry.	   It	  was	  getting	  harder	  and	  harder	   to	  make	  progress	  with	   services	  and	  
back-­‐from-­‐the-­‐border	  issues	   like	   regulatory	   harmonisation.	   The	   only	   issues	   that	   were	  
animating	  the	  business	  community	  on	  the	  New	  Zealand	  side	  were	  very	  difficult	   issues,	   like	  
the	   imputation	   credits	   and	   so	  on.	   They	  were	  what	   I	   called	   ‘high	  hanging	   fruit’.	   You	  know,	  
they	  weren’t	  easy	  things	  to	  pick	  off	  and	  do	  because	  the	  balance	  of	  direct,	  easily	  quantifiable,	  
up-­‐front	  benefits	  was	  at	  the	  margins	  (Official	  14,	  lines	  167-­‐171).	  
At	  this	  time,	  therefore,	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  attention	  was	  more	  focused	  on	  the	  growing	  
opportunities	  in	  Asia:	  
.	   .	   .	   here	   were	   the	   two	   of	   us	   who	   were	   bilaterally	   partners	   in	   a	   trade	   and	   economic	  
integration	  strategy,	  and	  also	  (pluri-­‐laterally)	  APEC	  members	  tracking	  towards	  Asia	  in	  a	  new	  
set	  of	  economic	  relations	  with	  Asia.	  Were	  we	  talking	  to	  each	  other	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
AFTA-­‐CER109	  was	  going	  to	  carry	  us	  into	  South	  East	  Asia,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  was	  APEC	  going	  
to	  carry	  us	   into	  North	  Asia?	  What	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand's	  common	  
interests	  in	  all	  of	  that?	  It	  was	  a	  difficult	  issue	  –	  we	  were,	  as	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  things,	  at	  a	  
certain	  point,	  chasing	  the	  same	  goals,	  and	  wanting	  to	  arrive	  there	  ahead	  of	  each	  other.	  Like,	  
the	  Australians	  did	  their	  US	  FTA	  ahead	  of	  us.	  We	  arrived	  at	  the	  gate	  to	  find	   it	  closed	  and	  I	  
think	  to	  some	  extent,	  our	  China	  FTA	  was	  the	  obverse	  of	  that	  (Official	  14,	  lines	  242-­‐250).	  
The	   two	   countries’	   solution	   was	   to	   refresh	   CER	   as	   the	   SEM.	   The	   New	   Zealand	   Government	  
announcement	  in	  2004	  that	  the	  two	  countries	  would	  move	  toward	  a	  single	  economic	  market was	  
clearly	  part	  of	  a	  steady	  development	  of	   reciprocity	  since	  the	  1960s.	  This	  was	  the	  point	  at	  which	  
the	   concept	   of	   the	   single	   economic	   market	   shifted	   to	   the	  more	   symbolic	   objective	   of	   a	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  SEM.	  Official	  14	  summarised	  the	  situation	  thus:	  
So	   SEM	   came	   along	   to	   succeed	   ANZCERTA	   as	   a	   “brand”	   	   at	   a	   point	   in	   time	   when	   this	  
argument	   about	   the	   lemon	   squeezed	   dry	   and	   the	   high	   hanging	   fruit	   had	   the	  more	   force,	  
because	   these	   other	   	   regional	   agendas,	   and	  other	   third	   country	   bilateral	   objectives	   	  were	  	  
much	  more	  in	  play.	  And	  the	  CER	  Trade	  Ministers'	  meetings	  were	  becoming	  pretty	  desultory,	  
really.	  There	  wasn't	  an	  awful	   lot	  of	  stuff	  that	  the	  two	  Trade	  Ministers	  –	  Australia	  and	  New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Zealand	  –	  could	  talk	  about	  bilaterally;	  really	  the	  back-­‐from-­‐the-­‐border,	  economic	  integration	  
agenda	   issues	   sat	   in	   other	   portfolios	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	   belonged	  more	   to	   other	  
Ministers.	  We	   needed	   a	   broader	   based	   negotiations	   architecture.	   That	   often	   left	   both	   of	  
them,	   I	   felt,	   sitting	   there	   thinking	   “I	  wonder	  how	   I'm	  going	   to	  deal	  with	  China	  or	   India	  or	  
Singapore	  or	  whatever,	  or	  APEC”.	  The	  DOHA	  round	  was	  in	  the	  frame	  too,	  and	  it,	  in	  its	  early	  
stages	   anyway,	   consumed	   lots	  of	   trade	  policy	   energy	   and	  attention	   (Official	   14,	   lines	  252-­‐
259).	  
A	   joint	   review	   of	   the	   CER	   agenda	   in	   2012-­‐13	   by	   the	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Productivity	  
Commissions	  involved	  an	  in-­‐depth	  look	  at	  developments	  and	  opportunities	  for	  further	  integration.	  
This	  review	  used	  the	  EU	  ‘four	  freedoms’	  as	  part	  of	  its	  framing.	  Here	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Issues	  
Paper:	  
Opportunities	  to	  strengthen	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  ties	  can	  be	  classified	  using	  a	  framework	  
based	  on	  what	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  termed	  the	   ‘four	   freedoms’	  —	  relating	  to	  trade	   in	  
goods	  and	  services,	  and	  the	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  labour.	  Knowledge	  transfers	  and	  the	  
integration	   or	   interaction	   of	   government	   functions	   are	   also	   considered	   (Australian	  
Productivity	  Commission	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Productivity	  Commission,	  2012a,	  p.	  8).	  
This	   short	   history	   shows	   geopolitical	   considerations	   have	   long	   affected	   Australia	   and	   New	  
Zealand’s	  responses	  to	  each	  other,	  drawing	  them	  close	  at	  times,	  and	  pulling	  them	  apart	  at	  others.	  	  
 Trans-Tasman bordering today 5.4.5
Anderson	  and	  Dowd	  note	  that	  land	  borders	  have	  been	  more	  contested	  than	  sea	  borders	  (1999,	  p.	  
596),	  but	   sea	  borders	  are	   still	   subject	   to	  geopolitical	   forces.	   The	  nation	   state	   that	   claims	  power	  
over	  sea	  borders	  has,	  more	  likely	  than	  not,	  gained	  that	  power	  through	  conflict	  and	  violence,	  just	  
as	   the	  nation	   states	  within	  a	   continent	   such	  as	  Europe	   (Anderson	  &	  O’Dowd,	  1999,	  pp.	  595–6).	  
That	   is	   certainly	   the	   case	   for	  Australia	   and	  New	  Zealand,	  whose	   territory	  was	  wrested,	   in	   some	  
cases	  violently,	  from	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  by	  the	  British.	  
This	  territoriality	  by	  violence	  is	  hidden	  in	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  ‘legitimate’	  nation	  state	  (Anderson	  &	  
O’Dowd,	  1999	  pp.	  595-­‐6;	  Walters,	  2002	  p.	  506).	  	  Sovereignty	  has	  become	  a	  sacrosanct	  concept,	  in	  




questions	  of	   sovereignty	  and	  high	  politics.	   It	   is	  a	   sacred,	  politically	  charged	   institution’	   (Walters,	  
2002,	  p.	  564).	  
The	   borders	   of	   countries	   surrounded	   by	   sea	   are	   therefore	   in	   some	   ways	   as	   imagined	   as	   land	  
borders.	  Australia	   and	  New	  Zealand’s	   common	  colonial	  history	  attests	   to	   that.	  Australia,	   from	  a	  
British	  perspective,	   started	  off,	   in	  1788,	  as	   the	   convict	  port	  of	   Sydney.	  New	  Zealand	  was	  briefly	  
annexed	  to	  the	  colony	  in	  1839	  until	  1841,	  when	  New	  Zealand	  became	  a	  separate	  colony.	  What	  are	  
now	  Australia’s	  states	  and	  territories	  were	  all	  separate	  colonies	  of	  Britain,	  such	  that	  they	  all	  had	  
their	  own	  Customs	  controls.	  If	  you	  wanted	  to	  travel	  from	  New	  South	  Wales	  to	  Victoria,	  you	  had	  to	  
go	   through	   Customs	   on	   one	   side	   of	   the	   border	   and	   again	   on	   the	   other	   side,	   both	   collecting	  
customs	  for	  the	  British	  government	  	  (Lee,	  2000).	  
Nevertheless,	   Australia’s	   and	   New	   Zealand’s	   approaches	   to	   their	   borders	   are	   characterised	   by	  
their	  geography.	  Both	  are	  surrounded	  by	  water;	  neither	  has	  a	  land	  border	  with	  any	  other	  country	  
and	  no	  country	  disputes	  their	  sovereignty.	  The	  two	  countries	  are	  separated	  by	  the	  Tasman	  Sea	  –	  
the	   ‘ditch’,	   in	  popular	  parlance.110	   Their	   legislated	  maritime	  boundaries	   comply	  with	   the	  United	  
Nations	  Convention	  on	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea.111	  Their	  wider	  Extended	  Economic	  Zones	  and	  Continental	  
Shelves	  intersect	  at	  only	  two	  points	  –	  around	  Norfolk	  Island	  in	  the	  north	  and	  Macquarie,	  Auckland	  
and	  Campbell	  Islands	  in	  the	  south.112	  New	  Zealand’s	  legal	  border	  is	  so	  aligned	  with	  its	  island	  status	  
and	  so	  internationally	  uncontested	  that	  it	  does	  not	  attract	  the	  same	  official	  attention	  as	  countries	  
with	  land	  borders.113	  For	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia,	  entry	  into	  and	  exit	  out	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 One of my interviewees used the term.  An internet search will reveal many references, e.g. the Encyclopaedia of Earth, 
para. 3:  http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/156417/. 
111 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II retrieved from United Nations website 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm   
112 ‘New Zealand and Australia agreed a treaty defining a maritime boundary over their overlapping areas of EEZ and 
continental shelf on 25 July 2004. The boundary has two parts: 
• in the north dividing New Zealand and Australia’s EEZs and continental shelf in the region extending from Lord 
Howe Rise, past Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands to Three Kings Ridge to the northwest of the North Island. 
• in the south dividing New Zealand and Australia’s EEZs and continental shelf in the area between Macquarie 
Island (Australia) and Auckland and Campbell Islands (New Zealand) off the south coast of the South Island.’ 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Maritime Boundaries’, retrieved from: http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-
International-Law/04-Law-of-the-Sea-and-Fisheries/NZ-Continental-Shelf-and-Maritime-Boundaries.php	  
113 Australia’s northern border is not quite settled: ‘all borders between Indonesia and Australia have been agreed upon 
bilaterally, but a 1997 treaty that would settle the last of their maritime and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundary has 
yet to be ratified by Indonesia's legislature; Indonesian groups challenge Australia's claim to Ashmore Reef; Australia closed 





can	  be	  more	  easily	  controlled	  than	  for	  countries	  separated	  by	  a	  land	  border.	  Two	  reasons	  are	  that	  
their	  huge	  coastlines	  have	  large	  parts	  that	  are	  inhospitable	  to	  craft,	  and	  vessels	  can	  only	  enter	  or	  
exit	  the	  two	  countries	  by	  air	  or	  sea,	  giving	  more	  time	  to	  find	  out	  if	  people,	  goods	  or	  craft	  moving	  
into	  the	  country	  are	  a	  threat	  or	  are	  of	  interest	  than	  with	  a	  land	  border.	  	  
Each	   country	   manages	   its	   border	   according	   to	   its	   own	   sovereign	   interests.	   In	   recent	   times,	  
Australia’s	  primary	  border	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  security	  and	  protection114;	  New	  Zealand’s	  has	  been	  
on	   contributing	   to	   the	   economy	   (New	   Zealand	   Customs	   Service,	   2010,	   p.	   7).	   Those	   interests	  
include	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border.	  The	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  is	  about	  the	  movement	  of	  
people,	  goods	  and	  craft	  across	  the	  Tasman	  Sea	  and	  it	  draws	  on	  the	  two	  countries’	  shared	  history	  
described	  above.	  This	  shared	  history	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  modern	  expectation	  that	  the	  movement	  of	  
people,	  goods	  and	  craft	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  should	  be	  as	  free	  as	  possible	  –	  a	  ‘networked	  
(non)border’.115	  As	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  5.4.3,	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  movement	  of	  people	  in	  particular	  
has	  been	  ‘.	   .	   .	   largely	  unrestricted	  as	  to	  right	  of	  entry	  and	  permitted	   length	  of	  stay’	   (Carmichael,	  
1993,	  p.	  820).	  	  
These	   stories	   of	   trade	   and	   people	  movements	   show	   us	   freedoms	   have	   varied	   over	   time.	   They	  
show	   that	   since	   CER,	   border	   regulation116	   and	   border	   mechanisms	   have	   become	   a	   part	   of	   the	  
discourse	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  As	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  sub-­‐section,	  they	  also	  show	  that	  
changes	  to	  border	  arrangements	  have	  been	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  geopolitical	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  
interests.	  
 Border practices 5.4.5.1
Border	   practices	   that	   delineate	   travel	   and	   trade	   between	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   are	  
structurally	   different	   from	   the	   EU,	   both	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   role	   and	   in	   integration.	   While	  
internationally	  many	  Customs	  administrations	  do	  not	  have	  responsibility	  for	  primary	  processing	  of	  
passengers,	  both	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  do,	  and	  have	  gained	  added	  value	  from	  managing	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Its name changed from Australian Customs Service to Australian Customs and Border Protection Service in December 
2008 to better reflect this role “About Customs and Border Protection”, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service. 
Retrieved from http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page4222.asp  
115 Refer to Chapter 3.3. 
116 Border regulation includes reporting requirements for movements of people, goods and craft, quarantine requirements, 




flows	  of	  both	  people	  and	  goods.117	  This	   is	  different	  from	  the	  EU,	  where	  border	  management	  for	  
goods	   is	   quite	   separate	   from	   border	   management	   for	   people.118	   In	   the	   20th	   century,	   both	  
governments	   created	   new	   functions	   to	   specifically	   manage	   immigration	   and	   biosecurity	   risks,	  
though	  the	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  administrations	  are	  most	  strongly	  equated	  with	  
‘border	  management’.119	  
There	   is	  no	   ‘internal	  border’,	  divided	  as	   the	   two	  countries	  are	  by	   the	  Tasman	  Sea,	   the	  width	  of	  
which	  precludes	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  ‘chunnel’	  or	  a	  bridge	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  The	  Tasman	  Sea	  
might	   be	   a	   symbol	   of	   the	   political	   separation	   of	   the	   two	   countries	   since	   Sir	   John	  Hall’s	   famous	  
statement	  in	  1890.	  However,	  Hall’s	  ‘community	  of	  interest’	  plays	  out	  through	  officials	  working	  to	  
create	   the	   ‘feel’	  of	  an	  EU-­‐type	   internal	  border.	  An	  example	   is	   the	   term	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	  used	   in	  a	  
2012	  paper	  from	  the	  border	  sector	  Ministers	  of	  Primary	   Industries,	  Customs	  and	   Immigration	  to	  
Cabinet:	  	  	  
Government	   expectations	   of	   improved	   service	   delivery	   are	   also	   reflected	   in	   its	   vision	  
statement	  for	  future	  trans-­‐Tasman	  passenger	  processing:	  	  
"The	  ideal	  future	  state	  for	  passenger	  processing	  would	  be	  designed	  to	  simplify	  the	  travel	  
experience	  for	  passengers	  without	  compromising	  security	  and	  border	  control.	  It	  would	  
require	  cooperation	  between	  governments	  and	  their	  agencies	  as	  well	  as	  travel	  industry	  
stakeholders	  in	  both	  countries."	  [CAB	  Min	  (09)	  16/2	  refers].	  	  
This	   vision	   was	   articulated	   by	   the	   Prime	   Ministers	   of	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australia	   as	   an	  
expectation	   that	   both	   countries	   will	   work	   towards	   a	   'domestic-­‐like’	   experience	   for	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   travellers	   (Office	   of	   the	  Minister	   for	   Primary	   Industries,	   Office	   of	   the	  Minister	   of	  
Immigration,	  &	  Office	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs,	  2012	  para.	  18)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Note also that both countries are among the few globally that operate separate and substantial biosecurity functions at the 
border. 
118 Since 11 Sept, 2001, US, Canada, UK and Singapore have created new authorities that combine customs and immigration 
functions as part of their core business. This is a different arrangement from the ‘working on behalf of’ arrangements in 
Australia and New Zealand (personal knowledge). 
119 Compare this with other countries e.g. UK’s immigration function was until recently a standalone department, into which 
the border control parts of customs has been absorbed; Singapore similarly. See UK Border Force, retrieved on 11 March 
2015 from https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/border-force  and Immigration and Checkpoints Authority of 




The	   focus	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   management	   is	   therefore	   facilitation,	   or	   in	   marketization	  
terms,	  ‘pacification’.	  	  The	  focus	  is	  both	  domestically	  inward-­‐looking	  and	  looking	  outward	  to	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  and	  other	  markets.	  Ideally,	  changes	  in	  one	  administration	  benefit	  both	  countries.120	  	  	  
For	   the	   movement	   of	   people,	   facilitated	   travel	   processes	   are	   in	   place	   for	   New	   Zealand	   and	  
Australian	  passport-­‐holders	   through	  a	  separate	  Australia/New	  Zealand	  passport	   lane	  at	  airports,	  
and	   automated	   passport	   clearance	   (SmartGate)	   at	   major	   international	   airports	   (Auckland,	  
Wellington	  and	  Christchurch	  in	  New	  Zealand).	  
For	  the	  movement	  of	  goods,	  facilitated	  trade	  processes	  are	  in	  place	  for	  goods	  bound	  for	  Australia	  
and	   for	   imports	   from	   Australia	   that	   fulfil	   the	   rules	   of	   origin	   test.	   Most	   goods	   are	   cleared	   for	  
customs	  and	  biosecurity	  purposes	  before	  the	  goods	  reach	  the	  other	  country	  (Australian	  Customs	  
and	  Border	  Protection	  Service	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Service,	  2010).	  
Official	  8	  explained	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  CER	  and	  related	  trade	  discussions	  play	  out	  in	  the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  customs	  world:	  	  
So	  the	  trade	  area	  is	  interesting	  for	  us	  because	  –	  well	  it's	  interesting	  –	  it's	  a	  slightly	  different	  
relationship	   because	   the	   role	   that	   Customs	   plays	   in	   Australia	   is	   different	   to	   the	   role	   that	  
Customs	  plays	  in	  New	  Zealand	  in	  that	  space.	  So	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  has	  a	  policy	  function	  
in	  relation	  to	  trade.	   It's	  built	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade's	  core	  overall	  
policy	   function	   for	   New	   Zealand,	   but	   we	   provide	   policy	   advice	   to	   our	  Minister	   and	   other	  
Ministers	  on	  those	  issues	  that	  we	  deal	  with	  in	  trade	  agreements,	  and	  those	  issues	  in	  relation	  
to	   border	   management.	   Australia	   Customs	   has	   a	   slightly	   different	   function.	   They	   are	   not	  
direct	   providers	   of	   policy	   advice	   in	   that	   space.	   They	   support	   the	   Department	   of	   Foreign	  
Affairs	  and	  Trade,	  so	   in	  a	  negotiation	  setting,	   the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  
leads	  the	  negotiations	  and	  Customs	  sits	  behind	  for	  Australia.	  	  
For	  New	  Zealand,	  Customs	  leads	  the	  negotiation,	  with	  support	  from	  MFAT121	  in	  legal	  areas,	  
and	   ensuring	   that	   it's	   within	   the	   border	   policy	   context.	   So	   a	   lot	   of	   our	   networking,	   and	  
especially	  over	  this	  period	  where	  we	  have	  supported,	   I	   think,	  two	  kind	  of	  core	   initiatives	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Or at worst, don’t impede. The SEM principles announced on 20 August 2009 included this element of mutual benefit 
‘Outcomes should seek to optimise net Trans-Tasman benefit’ (Key & Rudd, 2009b, Joint Statement of Intent: Single 
Economic Market Outcomes Framework, point 5. )  




one	   is	   ongoing	   review	   of	   CER	   Rules	   –	   quite	   technical	   –	   and	   also	   the	   implementation	   of	  
AANZFTA122	  and	  the	  start	  of	  TPP123	  over	  this	  period,	  and	  the	  negotiation	  of	  that	  –	  a	  lot	  of	  our	  
work	  has	  been	  with	  DFAT.	  	  And	  if	  I	  talk	  about	  the	  TPP	  negotiation,	  we've	  worked	  very,	  very	  
closely,	  actually,	  with	  the	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  as	  the	  lead	  negotiator	  on	  
customs	  issues.	  Australian	  Customs	  has	  played	  a	  role	  in	  that,	  but	  it	  actually	  has	  also	  been	  one	  
of	  the	  most	  notable	  absentees.	  There	  have	  been	  rounds	  when	  they	  are	  the	  only	  country	  that	  
has	  not	   sent	  a	  Customs	  person,	  and	   they	  are	   totally	   reliant	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade's	  
kind	  of	  leadership	  in	  broad	  issues.	  And	  if	  we're	  looking	  at	  trans-­‐Tasman	  barriers,	  you	  know,	  
those	  discussions	  –	  the	  most	  important	  one	  has	  been	  CER	  Rules	  of	  Origin	  –	  and	  cleaning	  up	  
any	   remaining	   technical	   issues	   that	   have	   prevented	  New	  Zealand	   access	   to	   the	  Australian	  
market.	  The	  most	  telling	  is	  men's	  suits,	  which	  has	  now	  been	  sorted,	  but	  was	  a	  pain	  for	  a	  long	  
time	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  27-­‐50).	  
Official	  8	  also	  explained	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  two	  Customs	  administrations	  use	  those	  connections	  
in	  regional	  trade	  negotiations:	  
But	  most	  of	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  discussions	  are	  about	  Australia	   	  and	  New	  Zealand	  outlook	   into	  
other	  markets	  such	  as	  ASEAN	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  how	  we	  can	  work	  jointly,	  and	  what	  
areas	  of	  common	  interest	  we	  have	  in	  the	  customs	  and	  origin	  space	  that	  we	  can,	  you	  know,	  
present	  a	  common	  front	  on,	  and,	  you	  know,	  use	  CER	  as	  the	  model	  –	  a	  model	  of	  how	  a	  free	  
trade	  agreement	  should	  actually	  work,	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  you	  get	  when	  you	  finalise	  a	  
deal,	  but	  longer	  term	  what	  it	  means	  for	  two	  economies,	  and	  that's	  been	  a	  very	  very	  core	  part	  
of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  story	  for	  TPP,	  and	  from	  a	  Customs	  perspective,	  that	  has	  
been	   very	   very	   important	   to	   us	   as	   well,	   	   to	   say	   “look,	   we've	   been	   able	   to	   break	   down	  
gradually	  over	  time	  the	  few	  remaining	  trade	  barriers	  that	  we	  have	  to	  goods,	  and	  I	  think	  the	  
Productivity	   Commission	   review,	   even	   though	   it	   came	   up	   with	   a	   slightly	   weird	  
recommendation	   around	   ROO,124	   supported	   that.	   You	   set	   an	   initial	   agreement,	   and	   over	  
time,	   it	   works	   to	   actually	   promote	   greater	   cooperation	   to	   remove	   any	   further	   remaining	  
barriers	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  51-­‐62).	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123 Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. See the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website 
http://mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php  




The	  linkage	  between	  border	  processes	  and	  the	  SEM	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  one.	  One	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  
official	  said	  	  
.	  .	  .	  there	  might	  be	  a	  wider	  high	  level	  issue	  of	  closer	  economic	  ties	  with	  Australia	  but	  that’s	  
not	  about	  border	  management	   .	   .	   .	   .	  That’s	  purely	  an	  economic	  strategic	  position	   for	  both	  
countries.	   .	   .	   .	   	   It’s	   a	   piece	   of	   keeping	   the	   relationship	   positive	   and	   coming	   together,	   as	  
distinct	  from	  the	  thing	  that	  will	  alter	  it	  (Official	  22,	  lines	  380-­‐384,	  389-­‐390).	  
And	  from	  another,	  referencing	  the	  ‘lowering	  and	  raising	  fences’	  concept	  in	  Ladley	  &	  White	  (2006):	  
.	  .	  .	  we	  could	  go	  back	  to	  the	  “Conceptualising	  the	  Border”	  and	  the	  sort	  of	  concept	  in	  there	  of	  
the	   border	   having	   fences	   and	  depending	   on	   the	   times,	   that	   fence	   gets	   raised	  or	   lowered.	  
Well	  I	  guess	  using	  that	  concept	  is	  that	  I	  would	  see	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  having	  a	  lower	  
fence,	   potentially,	   than	   the	   external	   border,	   but	   it	   doesn’t	   mean	   having	   no	   fence	   at	   all	  	  
(Official	  6,	  lines	  473-­‐478).	  
Even	   so,	   facilitating	   the	   movement	   of	   goods	   and	   people	   in	   general	   is	   the	   end-­‐game	   for	   both	  
Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   officials.	   The	   two	   Customs	   administrations	   have	   a	   long	   history	   of	  
working	  together	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  operational	  and	  policy	  matters	  –	  ‘there’s	  nothing	  new,	  if	  you	  
like’	  said	  Official	  3.	  Another	  official	  said	  of	  the	  relationship	  ‘Australian	  officials	  are	  genuinely	  keen	  
to	  know	  what	  we’re	  each	  trying	  to	  achieve	  individually	  and	  what	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  do	  together’	  
(Official	  21,	  lines	  571-­‐580).	  
The	  way	  in	  which	  that	  ‘working	  together’	  occurs	  is	  not	  by	  way	  of	  formal	  structure.	  There	  are	  semi-­‐
regular	  meetings	  by	  working	  and	  senior	   level	  officials,	  and	  by	  Ministers,	  and	  New	  Zealand	  has	  a	  
Counsellor	  in	  the	  High	  Commission	  in	  Canberra	  who	  provides	  an	  important	  link	  between	  the	  two	  
Customs	  administrations.	  Compared	  with	  the	  dense	  spider	  web	  of	  connections	  spun	  by	  the	  EC,	  the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   management	   linkages	   are	   well-­‐established	   but	   subject	   to	   the	   vagaries	   of	  
political	  priorities,	  organisational	  restructurings	  and	  operational	  needs.125	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Employment (immigration). These agencies are primarily interested in the overflow effects of trade and travel, although 




5.5 Narrative	  implications	  
The	  pacification	  and	  overflowing	  narratives	  are	  products	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  that	  play	  out	  
at	  nation-­‐state	  borders	  in	  two	  main	  ways.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  incorporation	  of	  international	  standards	  
in	  customs,	  quarantine	  and	  food	  safety	  into	  local	  legislation	  and	  border	  policy	  and	  practices.	  The	  
second	  is	  that	  overflowings	  create	  a	  tension	  that	  is	  largely	  left	  to	  nation-­‐states	  to	  manage.126	  	  One	  
official	  articulated	  this	  very	  point,	  implying	  that	  dealing	  with	  criminal	  matters	  (overflowings)	  was	  a	  
much	  more	  emotional	  matter	  than	  dealing	  with	  pacification:	  
.	   .	   .	   speaking	   from	   a	   personal	   perspective	   rather	   than	   knowing	  what	  was	   in	   the	  minds	   of	  
Ministers	   at	   the	   time,	   public	   perception	   and	  opinion	   here	  was	   such	   that	   that	  would	   have	  
been	  unacceptable,	   from	  a	   sort	   of	   public	   viewpoint	   to	   have	   closer	   integration	   on	  matters	  
that	  are	  seen	  as,	  as	  I	  said,	  fundamental	  to	  your	  national	  security	  and	  to	  nationhood,	  I	  guess,	  
in	  that	  sense,	  so	  we’ve	  got	  a	  situation	  for	  customs	  which	  is	  really	  interesting.	  The	  things	  that	  
are	  about	  the	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	  single	  market	  within	  Europe	  –	  customs	  procedures,	  
processes,	  the	  Tariff	  –	  all	  of	  that	   is	  very,	  very	  harmonized,	  but	  the	   law	  enforcement	  side	  –	  
prohibitions	   and	   restrictions,	   cooperation	   on	   criminal	   matters,	   as	   opposed	   to	   civil	   or	  
administrative	   stuff,	   is	   in	   quite	   a	   different	   space,	   and	   attitudes	   to	   that	   are	   quite	   different	  
(Official	  E1,	  lines	  223-­‐232).	  
When	  we	   look	   at	   regional	   integration	   narratives	   relating	   to	   the	   border,	  we	   see	   the	   integration	  
narrative	  playing	  out	  in	  different	  ways.	  In	  the	  EU,	  the	  narrative	  about	  no	  internal	  border	  and	  one	  
external	   border	   is	   very	   strong,	   driving	   policy	   action	   such	   as	   the	   Customs	   Strategy.	   In	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman,	   the	   border	   narratives	   are	   different	   in	   different	   domains.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   EU’s	  
framing	  of	  pacification	   for	   the	   Single	  Market	   (the	   four	  pillars)	   has	  been	  adopted	   into	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   lexicon	   in	   recent	  years	  and	   for	   the	   free	  movement	  of	   trade,	   the	  narrative	   is	   simple	  and	  
unproblematic;	  on	  the	  other,	  in	  Australia,	  the	  ‘free	  movement	  of	  people’	  has	  been	  challenged	  and	  
constrained,	  justified	  by	  a	  counter-­‐narrative	  related	  to	  sovereign	  matters	  of	  concern	  not	  matched	  
by	  New	  Zealand.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Despite	  the	  two	  regions’	  differences,	  the	  EU	  border	  narrative	  also	  plays	  a	  part	  in	  that	  of	  the	  trans-­‐
Tasman:	  
Well,	  Australia	   I	  would	  hope	   looks,	  you	  know,	  more	  and	  more	   like	  an	  ability	   to	  trial	   things	  
that	   you	   can’t	   do	   anywhere	   else,	   because	   if	   Europe	   can	   take	   –	  what	  was	   the	   number	   of	  
European	  –	  13,	  I	  think,	  started	  at	  the	  Union,	  and	  if	  you	  can	  have	  13	  countries	  who	  have	  been	  
at	  war	  with	  each	  other	  so	  many	  times	  –	  the	  Germans	  and	  the	  French,	  or	  the	  French	  and	  the	  
Spanish	   or	   the	   whatever,	   or	   the	   Italians	   and	   the	   Spanish,	   if	   you’ve	   had	   sort	   of	   countries	  
who’ve	   had	   hundreds	   of	   years	   of	   history	   of	   war,	   and	   hundreds	   of	   years	   of	   different	  
currencies,	  and	  hundreds	  of	  years	  of	  dislike,	  and	  all	  sorts	  that	  went	  on	   in	  Europe,	  and	   just	  
suddenly	   say	   “we’re	   all	   now	   one”	   and	   they	   don’t	   even	   need	   passports	   to	   cross	   borders	  
between	  these	  countries	  any	  more,	  if	  you’re	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  –	  if	  you’re	  a	  
member	  of	  a	  country,	  you’re	  a	  member	  of	  the	  whole	  lot,	  I	  can’t	  see	  why	  for	  the	  life	  of	  me	  
that	  can’t	  become	  even	  more	  so	  between	  us	  and	  Australia	  (Minister,	  lines	  189-­‐98).	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UK,	  geography	  explicitly	  affects	  narrative.	  It	  is	  also	  implicit	  in	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  trans-­‐Tasman	  bordering	  has	  evolved.	  	  
The	   above	   comments	   highlight	   that	   there	   are	   global	  market	   narratives	   and	   regional	   integration	  
narratives	   in	   the	  EU	  and	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  regional	  economic	   integrations,	   that	   these	  narratives	  
are	  multiple	  and	  that	  there	  are	  also	  connections	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  trans-­‐Tasman	  systems.	  The	  
historical	  narratives	  appear	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  integrations,	  and	  for	  the	  trans-­‐
Tasman,	   we	   can	   see	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘matters	   of	   concern’	   appearing.	   The	   tension	   between	  
integration	  and	  separation	  identified	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  border	  stories	  
and	  the	  description	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  practices.	  These	  two	  different	  border	  pictures	  provide	  
clues	  about	  how	  these	  narratives	  are	  likely	  to	  play	  out	  at	  a	  more	  detailed	  policy	  level	  in	  the	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  border	  environment	  and	  how	  they	  affect	  action.	  As	  I	  take	  you	  through	  the	  stories	  in	  the	  
next	  Chapter,	  I	  invite	  you	  to	  hold	  these	  different	  integration	  and	  separation	  narratives	  in	  the	  back	  
of	   your	   mind,	   to	   see	   where	   they	   surface	   and	   what	   effects	   they	   have	   on	   the	   different	   actor-­‐
networks.	  









Chapter 6  
 Trans-Tasman border stories: the performance of border 
management policy practice 
6.1 Introduction	  
This	   Chapter	   tells	   stories	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   policy	   practice	   over	   the	   period	   from	   2	  March	  
2009	   to	   early	   2012,	   and,	   using	   ANT	   analysis,	   draws	   out	   insights	   and	   conclusions	   about	  
performativity	  and	  narrative	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  management	  policy	  over	  this	  
period.	  
6.2 Customs,	  Biosecurity	  and	  Immigration	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connections	  	  
This	   section	   describes	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   the	   three	  main	   border	   agencies	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	  
Tasman	   are	   connected,	   first	   bilaterally	   and	   then	   more	   widely.	   The	   formal	   framing	   of	   those	  
connections	  in	  many	  cases	  arises	  from	  CER.	  Table	  4	  below	  outlines	  some	  of	  the	  key	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
CER	  instruments	  operating	  in	  the	  current	  border	  environment.	  
 Trans-­‐Tasman	  CER	  instruments	  operating	  at	  the	  border	  Table	  4.
Domain	   Instrument	   Description	  
Trade	   Rules	  of	  Origin	   The	   CER	   ‘rules	   of	   origin	   determine	   which	   products	  
count	   as	   “Australian”	   or	   “New	   Zealand”	   products.	  
They	  are	  then	  eligible	  to	  enter	  the	  markets	  in	  either	  
country	  at	  a	  zero	  tariff	  rate.	  The	  rules	  establish	  what	  
level	   of	   processing	   or	   manufacturing	   needs	   to	   be	  
achieved	  on	  a	  product	  by	  product	  basis’	  (para	  3.).	  
‘[F]or	   the	  majority	   of	   tariff	   lines,	   an	   exporter	   need	  
simply	   satisfy	   the	   condition	   that	   there	   has	   been	   a	  
specified	  change	   in	   tariff	   classification	  between	  any	  
imported	   materials	   from	   third	   countries,	   and	   the	  
completed	  good	  being	  exported	  to	  Australia	  or	  New	  
Zealand’	  (para.	  5).127	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  do	  not	  take	  anti-­‐dumping	  
cases	  against	  each	  other.	  
	   Food	   Standards	   	   Australia	   New	  
Zealand	  (FSANZ)	  1991.	  
This	   is	   a	   joint	   Australia-­‐New	   Zealand	   independent	  
agency	   that	   sets	   the	   food	   standards	   for	   both	  
countries.	  It	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  joint	  Board.128	  
Protocol	   on	   the	   Harmonisation	  
of	   Quarantine	   Administrative	  
Procedures,	  1988	  
	  
The	   Protocol	   aims	   to	   improve	   the	   efficiency	   and	  
speed	   of	   the	   flow	   of	   goods	   between	   the	   two	  
countries	   by	  harmonising	  quarantine	   administrative	  
procedures.	  It	  contains	  the	  principle	  that	  quarantine	  
requirements	   should	   not	   be	   deliberately	   used	   as	   a	  
means	  of	  creating	  a	  technical	  barrier	  to	  trade	  where	  
this	  is	  not	  scientifically	  justified.	  	  
The	  Protocol	  places	  some	  rules	  or	  disciplines	  around	  
harmonising	   technical	   measures	   with	   international	  
standards	  where	  they	  exist.129	  
High-­‐level	   dialogue	   on	  
biosecurity	  issues,	  known	  as	  the	  
Consultative	   Group	   on	  
Biosecurity	  Cooperation,	  1999	  
Provided	   for	   in	   the	   Protocol,	   this	   group	   aims	   to	  
strengthen	   trans-­‐Tasman	   relations	   through	  
increased	  dialogue	  on	  quarantine	  issues	  
Travel	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Travel	  
Arrangement	  (TTTA)	  	  
	  
The	  TTTA	  ‘allows	  New	  Zealanders	  and	  Australians	  to	  
live	   and	   work	   in	   each	   other’s	   countries	   with	   the	  
minimum	   of	   bureaucratic	   obstacles’	   (Australian	  
Government	   Department	   of	   Finance	   and	  
Administration	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  
Development,	  2007,	  p.	  9).	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   Open	  Skies	  Agreement,	  2002	   The	   Agreement	   allows	   Australian	   and	  New	   Zealand	  
airlines	   access	   ‘from	   and	   beyond	   the	   others'	  
territories,	   without	   prescribing	   where	   carriers	   fly,	  
the	   number	   of	   flights	   they	   operate	   and	   the	   prices	  
they	  charge’.130	  
Working	  
in	   each	  
other’s	  
country	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	   Mutual	  
Recognition	   Arrangement	  
(TTMRA),	  1998	  
The	  TTMRA	  helps	  facilitate	  trade	  in	  two	  areas:	  
1. By	  allowing	  any	  good	  legally	  able	  to	  be	  sold	  in	  
New	   Zealand	   to	   be	   legally	   sold	   in	   Australia,	  
and	  vice-­‐versa	  
2. By	  entitling	  any	  person	  registered	  in	  Australia	  
to	   practice	   an	   occupation	   to	   practice	   an	  
equivalent	   occupation	   in	   New	   Zealand,	   and	  
vice-­‐versa.131	  
	  
 Trans-Tasman Customs connections 6.2.1
As	  already	  explained,	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Customs	  connections	  are	  longstanding	  and	  multiple	  in	  nature.	  
However,	   knowing	   that	  doesn’t	   tell	  us	  much	  about	  how	   those	  connections	  are	  made,	  how	   they	  
work	  in	  practice	  and	  what	  they	  result	  in.	  The	  following	  section	  introduces	  some	  of	  the	  more	  stable	  
kinds	  of	  connections.	  
 Formalised cooperation 6.2.1.1
As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  5.4,	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  
administrations	  were	   formalised	   by	   a	   non-­‐binding	   Customs	   Cooperative	   Arrangement	   signed	   in	  
1985	   to	   support	   the	   implementation	   of	   CER.	   The	   Arrangement	   also	   provided	   a	   mandate	   for	  
cooperative	   activities	   such	   as	   sharing	   of	   information,	   cooperation	   on	   law	   enforcement	  matters	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and	  joint	  training.	  This	  mandate	  was	  renewed	  in	  1996,	  when	  the	  Arrangement	  was	  updated	  and	  
specific	  schedules	  have	  been	  added	  since.	  	  
There	   is	   a	   history	   of	   formal,	   generally	   at	   least	   annual,	   trans-­‐Tasman	   Customs	   meetings	   at	  
ministerial	   and	   senior	   officials	   levels.	   These	   meetings	   have	   provided	   an	   avenue	   for	   decision-­‐
making	   that	   has	   supported	   and	   enhanced	   the	   every-­‐day	   operational	   connections.	   This	   thesis	  
describes	   in	   section	  6.3	   the	   rise	  and	  decline	  of	  one	  of	   these	  meetings	  –	   the	  High	  Level	  Steering	  
Group	  (HLSG).	  
 Trans-Tasman Customs representatives 6.2.1.2
New	  Zealand	  Customs	  has	  had	  a	   full-­‐time	   representative	   in	  Australia	   since	  1969,	   located	  within	  
Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Trade	   (MFAT)	   premises.	   Originally	   operating	   out	   of	   the	   New	  
Zealand	  Consulate	  in	  Sydney	  to	  manage	  technical	  customs	  matters	  relating	  to	  goods,	  the	  removal	  
of	  this	  function	  in	  1989-­‐90	  led	  to	  a	  continued	  presence	  but	  a	  change	  of	  focus	  to	  law	  enforcement.	  
In	  early	  2008,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  moved	   its	   representative	   from	  Sydney	   to	   the	  New	  Zealand	  
High	   Commission	   in	   Canberra,	   signalling	   a	   commitment	   to	   greater	   strategic	   and	   policy	   level	  
engagement	   with	   the	   Australian	   Customs	   Service.132	   The	   move	   strengthened	   ‘head	   office’	  
connections	  between	  Canberra	  and	  Wellington.	  	  
 Differences in agency responsibilities 6.2.1.3
Connections	   between	   the	   two	   Customs	   administrations	   are	   not	   fully	   equivalent	   because	   of	  
differences	   in	   agency	   responsibilities.	   For	   example,	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   has	   responsibility	   for	  
collecting	  excise	  duty	  and	  for	  investigating	  border	  offences	  including	  those	  relating	  to	  illicit	  drugs;	  
in	  Australia,	  the	  Australian	  Tax	  Office	  is	  responsible	  for	  collecting	  excise	  and	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  
Police	  undertakes	  investigations	  of	  illegal	  importation	  of	  drugs.	  As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5.4,	  New	  
Zealand	   Customs	   leads	   the	   customs	   aspects	   of	   trade	   negotiations	   whereas	   in	   Australia,	   this	  
responsibility	   falls	   to	  their	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade.	  While	  these	  differences	  are	  
not	  major	  and	  do	  not	  detract	   from	   the	   core	   customs	  work	   in	   common,	  we	  will	   see	   later	   in	   this	  
Chapter	  some	  of	  how	  the	  focus	  of	  each	  agency’s	  work	  plays	  out	  differently.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	   connections	   between	   the	   two	   Customs	   administrations	   are	   about	   to	   be	   disrupted	   by	   the	  
implementation	   in	   July	   2015	   of	   the	   consolidation	   of	   customs	   and	   immigration	   policy	   and	  
operational	  functions	  into	  a	  single	  department.133	  	  While	  some	  of	  the	  senior	  staff	  in	  the	  ACBPS	  will	  
take	  up	  positions	  in	  the	  new	  department,	  a	  lot	  of	  changes	  at	  other	  levels	  are	  expected.	  One	  likely	  
effect	  is	  that	  some	  connections	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  officials	  have	  with	  individual	  ACBPS	  officials	  
will	  be	  severed;	  another	  is	  that	  work	  programmes	  could	  be	  disrupted	  and	  potentially	  changed;	  a	  
third	   is	   that	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  may	  have	   to	  create	  connections	  with	  Australian	   Immigration	  
officials,	  with	  whom	  there	  is	  no	  shared	  global	  culture.	  	  
As	   indicated	   in	   Chapter	   5.4,	   the	   two	   Customs	   administrations	   work	   closely	   together	   in	   other	  
regional	   forums,	   such	   as	   APEC	   and	   ASEAN.	   They	   also	   do	   so	  within	   the	  WCO,	   including	   a	   group	  
calling	  itself	  the	  Border	  Five.	  This	  group	  comprises	  the	  Heads	  of	  the	  Customs	  administrations	  from	  
New	  Zealand,	  Australia,	  Canada,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.	  
 Trans-Tasman Biosecurity and Quarantine connections 6.2.2
The	   history	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   quarantine	   cooperation	   since	   CER	   is	   well-­‐documented	   by	   MFAT:	  
‘Quarantine	   issues	  were	  carved	  out	  of	   the	  original	  CER	  Agreement,	  which	  allows	  for	  reasonable,	  
scientifically	   justified	  quarantine	  measures	  to	  be	  taken	  to	  protect	  human,	  animal	  or	  plant	   life	  or	  
health’	  (para	  1.).134	  	  
The	  Consultative	  Group	  on	  Biosecurity	  Cooperation	   (CGBC)	  ensures	   the	   intent	  of	   the	  Protocol	   is	  
followed.	  Key	  areas	  of	  focus	  for	  the	  CGBC	  are	  to:	  	  
• Streamline	  approaches	  in	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  risk	  analysis.	  	  
• Ensure	  that	  current	  biosecurity	  requirements	  are	  based	  on	  sound	  science.	  	  
• Review	  the	  mechanisms	   for	   information	  exchange	  and	  other	   interaction	  between	  the	  
two	  countries	  on	  biosecurity	  issues.	  
The	  CGBC	  meets	  annually	  (and	  can	  consider	  issues	  out	  of	  session),	  reporting	  to	  the	  Australian	  
and	  New	  Zealand	  Ministers	  of	  Agriculture	  (Ibid.,	  para.	  5)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See the ACBPS website: http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page4222.asp.  




Interviews	  revealed	  that	  the	  biosecurity	  relationship	  focusing	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  is	  new,	  
very	  loose	  and	  not	  formalised	  but	  also	  very	  close	  in	  some	  parts,	  and	  offers	  the	  potential	  for	  much	  
more.135	   	   New	   Zealand	   is	   looking	   to	   learn	   from	   Australia’s	   Department	   of	   Agriculture,	   which	   is	  
introducing	  new	  approaches	  to	  biosecurity	  at	  the	  border:	  
Parts	  of	  our	  relationship	  are	  much	  tighter	  and	  much	  more	  aligned	  and	  virtually	  like	  we	  work	  
in	  the	  same	  office	  in	  a	  sense,	  around	  food	  and	  things	  like	  that,	  and	  standards,	  whereas	  the	  
actual	  management	  of	  the	  border,	  we’re	  not	  connected	  that	  well,	  but	  we’re	  looking	  at	  each	  
other’s	   systems,	   and	   we	   talk	   about	   each	   other’s	   systems,	   and	   we	   work	   with	   industry	  
together	  (Official	  12,	  lines	  97-­‐101).	  
This	  alignment	  of	  the	  relationship	  was	  confirmed	  by	  an	  Australian	  official:	  
So	  there’s	  some	  areas	  where	  we	  could	  work	  closely	  together,	  but	  there’s	  very	  rarely	  areas	  of	  
disagreement,	  or	  argument.	  Those	  things	  tend	  to	  happen	  much	  more	  at	  a	  policy	  level,	  and	  
they’re	  generally	  trade-­‐driven	  (Official	  A3,	  lines	  284-­‐287).	  
The	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Biosecurity	  agencies	  is	  ‘.	  .	  .	  the	  nasty	  pests	  and	  diseases	  
that	  the	  other	  one’s	  got’	  (Official	  A3,	  lines	  314-­‐316).	  These	  risks	  are	  most	  significant	  for	  trade,	  but	  
less	   so	   for	   people,	   as	   described	   by	   a	   New	   Zealand	   official:	   ‘But,	   you	   know,	   in	   the	   end,	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   trade	   for	   us,	   while	   it's	   major,	   it's	   not	   our	   biggest	   biosecurity	   threat,	   particularly	   with	  
people’	   (Official	   12,	   lines	   252-­‐253).	   And	   it’s	   not	   the	   goods	   themselves	   that	   are	   the	   biosecurity	  
problem.	  ‘It’s	  the	  conveyance	  we’re	  interested	  in’	  (Official	  12,	  line	  351).	  	  
A	  trans-­‐Tasman	  operational	  cargo	  group	  involving	  senior	  officials	  from	  the	  Australian	  Department	  
of	   Agriculture	   and	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Ministry	   for	   Primary	   Industries	   (MPI)	   covers	   sharing	   of	  
experience	   and	   collaboration,	   such	   as	   mutual	   recognition.	   ‘MAF136	   did	   have	   people	   located	   in	  
Japan	  looking	  at	  used	  vehicles	  coming	  in	  from	  Japan	  so	  we	  accepted	  the	  New	  Zealand	  inspection	  .	  .	  
.	   for	   Australian	   purposes’	   (Official	   A3,	   lines	   29-­‐31).	   Also,	   five	   years	   ago,	   what	   was	   then	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Until early 2014, the two senior officials leading the administration of biosecurity at the border had previous connections 
through employment in the respective Customs administrations. 




Department	   of	   Agriculture,	   Fisheries	   and	   Forestry	   (DAFF,	   now	   the	   Department	   of	   Agriculture)	  
shared	  its	  Biosecurity	  Import	  Condition	  System	  with	  New	  Zealand.137	  	  	  
As	   two	   of	   only	   a	   few	   countries	   internationally	  with	   an	   interest	   in	   biosecurity	   controls,	   the	   two	  
Biosecurity	  agencies	  also	  work	   closely	   together	   in	   international	   standard	   setting.138	   	  One	  official	  
noted	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  work	  to	  New	  Zealand:	  
Biosecurity	  operates	  well	  beyond	  the	  border	  as	  well,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  work	  
done	  with	  other	  countries	  around	  import	  standards	  and	  export	  certification	  and	  so	  on	  and	  
the	  wider	  influence	  in	  international	  standard	  setting.	  New	  Zealand	  quite	  deliberately	  puts	  a	  
huge	   amount	   of	  work	   into	   as	   it	  was	   an	   area	  where	  New	   Zealand	   could	   get	   screwed	   very	  
quickly	  if	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  agreed	  on	  a	  set	  of	  protocols	  and	  standards	  which	  didn’t	  work	  
for	  us	  
	  (Official	  13,	  lines	  81-­‐86).	  
Australia	   and	  New	   Zealand	   also	  work	   together	   under	   the	  QUADS	   framework,	  which	   provides	   a	  
forum	  for	  quadrilateral	  scientific	  cooperation	  in	  plant	  biosecurity	  between	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  
Canada	  and	  US.139	  
Two	  trans-­‐Tasman	  matters	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  two	  agriculture	  ministries	  impact	  very	  little	  on	  the	  
administration	  of	  border	  processes	  and	  related	  policy	  practice.	  The	  first	  is	  food	  safety,	  addressed	  
through	   Food	   Standards	   Australia	   New	   Zealand	   (FSANZ).	   The	   second	   is	   the	   already-­‐mentioned	  
long-­‐standing	  dispute	  arising	  from	  Australia’s	  refusal	  to	  approve	  the	  importation	  of	  New	  Zealand	  
apples.140	   This	   has	   been	   an	   emotional	   and	   very	   political	  matter	   of	   policy	   concern	   that	   has	   now	  
been	   largely	   resolved	   through	   the	  WTO	   disputes	   process.	   However,	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   apple	  
dispute	   was	   still	   present	   for	   both	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Biosecurity	   officials	   who	   were	  
interviewed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Interview. 
138 Others are Hawaii (a state of US) and Galapagos Islands (province of Equador). 
139 See MPI. (2007). ‘Biosecurity Science Strategy’, p. 43. Retrieved from 
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/biosec/sys/strategy/2007-biosecurity-science-strategy.pdf  




 Trans-Tasman Immigration connections 6.2.3
The	  TTTA	  underpins	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  engagement	  between	  the	  two	  Immigration	  agencies	  –	  the	  
Australian	   Department	   of	   Immigration	   and	   Border	   Protection	   (DIBP)141	   and	   Immigration	   New	  
Zealand	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Business,	   Innovation	  and	  Employment	  (MBIE).	  Senior	   Immigration	  
leaders	   (agency	   Heads	   and	   General	   Managers)	   meet	   annually	   for	   the	   Australia-­‐New	   Zealand	  
Immigration	   Forum.	   This	   is	   a	   policy	   forum	   where	   leaders	   discuss	   matters	   of	   mutual	   interest.	  
However,	   the	   two	   countries	   are	   also	   in	   competition	   with	   each	   other	   for	   the	   same	   groups	   of	  
immigrants:	  
.	   .	   .	   it	   probably	   is	   unlike	   Customs	   –	   within	   Immigration,	   we're	   actually	   competitors	   with	  
Australia	   in	   a	   lot	   of	   space	  –	   attracting	   international	   students,	   business	  migrants,	   even	  our	  
temporary	  labour	  schemes,	  like	  what's	  called	  the	  RSE	  scheme	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  workers,	  like	  
mostly	   from	   the	   Pacific,	   but	   some	   South-­‐East	   Asian	   countries	   temp	   –	   in	   the	  
horticulture/viticulture	   seasonal	   worker	   programmes.	   That's	   actually	   competition,	   and	   in	  
that	   –	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   seasonal	  worker	   space,	   our	   programme	   is	  more	   advanced	   and	  
more	   supposedly	   successful,	   so	   they	   want	   to	   get	   our	   ideas	   and	   understand	   –	   and	   in	   the	  
student	   space,	   we're	   really	   vying	   for	   the	   same	   people,	   so	   it's	   all	   a	   bit	   problematic,	   the	  
engagement	  there,	  'cause	  we're	  not	  collaborators,	  we're	  competitors	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  475-­‐
482).	  
For	  ‘at	  the	  border’	  functions,	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  immigration	  border	  control	  tends	  to	  focus	  
on	  technologies	  for	  identifying	  risk.	  For	  example,	  both	  countries	  use	  the	  same	  technical	  system	  for	  
advance	   passenger	   processing	   (APP),142	   which	   requires	   the	   two	   Immigration	   agencies	   to	   work	  
together	  closely	  on	  the	  system	  itself	  and	  operationally:	  ‘because	  the	  system	  generates	  operational	  
“hits”	  on	  passengers	   that	   are	  of	   interest	   to	  both	   countries	   .	   .	   .	   .	   So	  we	   sort	   of	   have	   this	   partial	  
virtual	  common	  border,	  if	  you	  like,	  with	  APP’	  (Official	  11,	  lines	  237,	  242).	  In	  his	  2005	  lecture	  on	  the	  
relationship	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   public	   servants,	   New	   Zealand	   State	   Services	   Commissioner	   Mark	  
Prebble	   used	   this	   arrangement	   as	   an	   example	   of	   increasing	   cooperation	   between	  New	   Zealand	  
and	  Australian	  officials	  (Prebble,	  2007).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 As noted above, this will include customs functions from 1 July 2015.  




The	   main	   international	   forum	   for	   immigration-­‐related	   border	   collaboration	   is	   the	   Five	   Country	  
Conference,	  which	  also	  includes	  the	  UK,	  Canada	  and	  the	  US.143	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  are	  very	  
aligned	  in	  this	  forum:	  ‘We	  often	  find	  ourselves	  working	  really	  collaboratively	  to	  try	  and	  influence	  in	  
the	  multilateral	  space’	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  501-­‐2).	  
The	   two	   countries	   also	   work	   together	   in	   two	   significant	   regional	   forums	   -­‐	   the	   Bali	   Ministerial	  
Process,	   and	   APEC’s	   Business	  Mobility	   Group,	  which	   is	   chaired	   by	   Australia.	   One	   tool	   from	   this	  
latter	   group	   that	   is	   highly	   valued	   by	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand’s	   Immigration	   officials	   is	   the	  
Regional	   Movement	   Alert	   System	   (RMAS).	   This	   tool	   enables	   participating	   countries	   (US,	   New	  
Zealand,	  Australia,	  and	  soon,	  Philippines144)	  to	  check	  their	  records	  of	  people	  traveling	  there	  from	  
APEC	  member	  economies	  against	  a	  regional	  ‘lost	  and	  stolen	  passport’	  Alert	  List.	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	  work	  together	  to	  ensure	  travellers	  are	  not	  using	  any	  of	  the	  listed	  passports.145	  
 Wider trans-Tasman connections 6.2.4
In	  Australia,	  the	  ACBPS	  is	  a	  federal	  agency	  with	  no	  equivalent	  agencies	  in	  the	  Australian	  states	  and	  
territories	   of	   Australia.	   This	   means	   that	   ACBPS	   is	   not	   connected	   into	   any	   Australian	  
Commonwealth	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Australian	  Governments	  (COAG).	  And	  because	  
ACBPS	  is	  not	  connected	  to	  COAG,	  neither	  is	  New	  Zealand	  Customs.	  Likewise,	  the	  two	  Immigration	  
agencies	  are	  connected	  with	  each	  other	  but	  are	  not	  actively	  involved	  in	  COAG.	  However,	  since	  the	  
2013	   election	   in	   Australia,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   Ministerial	   connection	   between	   customs	   and	  
immigration,	   with	   the	   one	   Minister	   responsible	   for	   both	   portfolios.	   This	   has	   resulted	   in	   more	  
Customs-­‐Immigration	  connections,	  for	  example	  Operation	  Sovereign	  Borders	  (OSB),	  which	  is:	  	  
.	   .	   .	   a	   military-­‐led,	   border	   security	   operation	   supported	   and	   assisted	   by	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  
federal	  government	  agencies.	  The	  OSB	  Joint	  Agency	  Task	  Force	  (JATF)	  has	  been	  established	  
to	  ensure	  a	  whole-­‐of-­‐government	  effort	  to	  combat	  people	  smuggling	  and	  protect	  Australia’s	  
borders.	  The	  JATF	  is	  supported	  by	  three	  operational	  task	  groups:	  	  
• Disruption	  and	  Deterrence	  Task	  Group—led	  by	  the	  Australian	  Federal	  Police	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






• Detection,	   Interception	   and	   Transfer	   Task	   Group—led	   by	   the	   Australian	   Customs	   and	  
Border	  Protection	  Service	  (ACBPS),	  which	  includes	  Border	  Protection	  Command	  (BPC)	  	  
• Offshore	   Detention	   and	   Returns	   Task	   Group—led	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Immigration	  
and	  Border	  Protection	  (DIBP).146	  
Despite	   its	   disruptive	   effect	   on	   the	   Customs-­‐to-­‐Customs	   and	   Immigration-­‐to-­‐Immigration	  
connections,	  the	  new	  DIBP	  that	  will	  integrate	  customs	  and	  immigration	  functions	  will	  create	  new	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  connections	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  strengthen	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  New	  Zealand’s	  
customs	  and	  immigration	  functions.	  
The	  Biosecurity	  agencies	  are	  connected	  to	  COAG,	  involving	  greater	  effort	  and	  organisational	  focus	  
than	   biosecurity	   border	   connections.	   As	   indicated	   above,	   New	   Zealand’s	  MPI	   is	   responsible	   for	  
food	   safety,	   and	   as	   such	   is	   part	   of	   FSANZ	   -­‐	   a	   joint	   agency	  where,	   as	   one	  manager	   put	   it,	   New	  
Zealand	   officials	   are	   in	   Australia	   every	   week.	   In	   addition,	   a	   Commonwealth/New	   Zealand	  
Ministerial	   level	   body	   sets	   policy	   and	   guidelines	   on	   food	   regulation	   -­‐	   the	   Legislative	   and	  
Governance	  Forum	  on	  Food	  Regulation.	  This	  COAG	  body:	  	  
.	  .	  .	  comprises	  a	  Minister	  from	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  Health	  Ministers	  from	  Australian	  States	  
and	  Territories,	  the	  Australian	  Government	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Ministers	  from	  related	  portfolios	  
(Primary	   Industries,	   Consumer	   Affairs	   etc.)	   where	   these	   have	   been	   nominated	   by	   their	  
jurisdictions	  (para.	  2).147	  	  
For	   New	   Zealand,	   this	   gives	   multiple	  Ministers	   access	   to	   a	   range	   of	   Australian	   colleagues	   with	  
whom	  they	  otherwise	  wouldn’t	  connect.	  Not	  only	  are	  the	  connections	  highly	  stabilised	  (as	  in	  the	  
case	   of	   FSANZ)	   but	   also	   the	   matter	   of	   concern	   is	   more	   wide-­‐reaching.	   This	   gives	   MPI	   more	  
imperative	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  Australia	  on	  a	  sustained	  basis.	  	  	  	  
COAG	   covers	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   government	   business,	   but,	   as	   indicated	   earlier,	   not	   customs	   or	  
immigration.	  This	  absence	  from	  Commonwealth	  mechanisms	  is	  significant	  because	  these	  agencies	  
miss	  out	  on	  opportunities	  to	  connect.	  Interviewees	  from	  biosecurity	  agencies	  identified	  the	  many	  
opportunities	  it	  provides	  for	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  work	  together	  more	  closely,	  or	  to	  integrate	  an	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aspect	   of	   governmental	   business.	   These	   opportunities	   occur	   serendipitously	   at	   COAG	  meetings	  
where	  New	  Zealand	  Government	  Ministers	  and	  officials	  are	  present:	  	  
New	   Zealand	   has,	   I	   think,	   an	   astonishing	   advantage	   and	   the	   Australians	   have	   been	  
astonishingly	  generous	  in	  opening	  the	  COAG	  processes	  to	  us.	  Helen	  Clark	  was	  very	  good	  at	  
encouraging	  Ministers	   and	  also	   chief	   executives	   to	  participate.	   I	   think	   it	  would	  be	  a	   grave	  
mistake	   on	   New	   Zealand’s	   part	   to	   let	   that	   opportunity	   for	   engagement	  slip.	  COAG	  
meetings	  can	  be	  tedious,	  boring,	  time-­‐consuming	  and	  all	  the	  rest	  of	   it.	  But	  being	  there	  has	  
provided	  smart	  officials	  and	  ministers,	  often	  quite	  serendipitously,	   to	  spot	  opportunities	  to	  
say	   “ah,	   why	   don’t	   we	   include	   New	   Zealand	   in	   that?”	   Others	   can	   recount	   more	  
authoritatively	   than	   me	   which	   initiatives	   have	   emerged	   from	   simply	   being	   there	   on	   the	  
spot	  and	   being	   able	   to	   make	   the	   case	   for	   New	   Zealand's	   inclusion	   in	   new	   initiatives.	   I	  
understand	  the	  SEM	  initiative	  came	  on	  the	  back	  of	  an	  Australian	  discussion	  around	  how	  to	  
create	   greater	   integration	   between	   the	   states.	  So,	   it’s	   having	   New	   Zealand	   Ministers	  
and	  officials	   sitting	   there,	   alongside	   their	   Australian	   counterparts,	  participating	   in	   the	  
dialogue,	  watching	  the	  states	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  get	  together	  and	  decide	  they	  want	  
to	  do	  something	  jointly,	  and	  saying	  “Why	  not?	  Why	  not	  put	  New	  Zealand	  in	  there?”	  (Official	  
13,	  lines	  330-­‐341).	  
So	  in	  terms	  of	  broader	  institutional	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connections,	  Customs	  and	  Immigration	  agencies	  
are	  comparatively	   isolated,	  though	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  connect	  with	  each	  other	  more	  strongly.	  
ACBPS	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  WCO	  ‘family’,	  as	  already	  described,	  and	  the	  
‘five	   country’	   relationship	  with	   the	   UK,	   Canada,	   and	   the	   US	   is	   important	   for	   both	   customs	   and	  
immigration	  functions.	  	  
The	   following	   stories	   describe	   how	   the	   three	   main	   border	   agencies	   carrying	   out	   customs,	  
immigration	  and	  biosecurity	   functions	  have	  worked	  to	  forge	  new	  connections	  and	  to	  strengthen	  
existing	  ones	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  SEM.	  




6.3 Story	  1:	  Customs-­‐to-­‐Customs	  High	  Level	  Steering	  Group	  	  
This	   story	   outlines	   the	   birth	   and	   decline	   over	   a	   period	   of	   nine	   years	   of	   a	   trans-­‐Tasman	   actor-­‐
network	  intended	  to	  generate	  action	  between	  the	  two	  Customs	  administrations.	  It	  describes	  the	  
primary	  mechanism	  for	  engagement	  and	  action	  used	  by	  senior	  managers	  during	  this	  time.148	  	  
After	   the	   SEM	  goal	  was	   announced	   in	  2004,	   a	  business	   forum	  called	   the	  Australia-­‐New	  Zealand	  
Leadership	  Forum	  (ANZLF)	  was	  created.	  This	  group	  identified	  early	  a	  desire	  for	  a	  common	  border,	  
creating	   an	   environment	   ripe	   for	   reinvigorating	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   Customs	   relationship.	   A	   New	  
Zealand	   Customs	   memo	   for	   the	   Comptroller	   of	   Customs149,	   written	   around	   this	   time	   notes:	  
‘[w]hile	  relations	  with	  Australia	  continue	  to	  be	  excellent,	  it	  has	  been	  some	  time	  since	  there	  were	  
formal	  Official	  talks	  and	  there	  is	  no	  joint	  work	  programme	  of	  any	  kind’.150	  	  	  
This	  thinking	  was	  taken	  into	  Customs	  Ministerial	  talks	   in	  July	  2005,	  and	  immediately	  followed	  by	  
discussion	   between	   the	   two	   Chief	   Executives.	   After	   these	  meetings,	   the	   two	  Ministers	   issued	   a	  
communiqué	  that	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  high	  level	  steering	  group	  ‘to	  address	  border	  issues,	  
facilitation	   of	   passenger	   movements	   and	   cargo	   processing’	   (Barker	   &	   Ellison,	   2005).	   Officials’	  
intentions	  for	  this	  group	  were	  that	  it	  have	  a	  practical	  focus.151	  	  
Prior	  to	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  High	  Level	  Steering	  Group	  (HLSG),	  officials	  held	  a	  video	  conference	  
to	   plan	   that	  meeting.	   A	   number	   of	   agreements	  were	  made,	   such	   as	  which	   country	  would	   lead	  
which	  work	   item,	  who	  the	   lead	  person	  would	  be,	   to	  have	  a	  purpose	  statement	  and	  develop	   ‘an	  
agreed	  format	  for	  reporting,	  with	  an	  intention	  to	  provide	  the	  same	  report	  to	  both	  Ministers’.152	  
In	   the	   first	   three	  and	  a	  half	   years,	  between	  August	  2005	  and	  March	  2009,	   the	  HLSG	  met	   seven	  
times,	  and	  twice	  together	  with	  the	  Biosecurity	  agencies.	  Sometimes	  these	  meetings	  were	  linked	  to	  
Chief	   Executive	   level	   meetings,	   and	   once	   they	   were	   linked	   to	   a	   Ministerial	   meeting.	   In	   the	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subsequent	  four	  and	  a	  half	  years,	  from	  March	  2009	  to	  November	  2012,	  the	  HLSG	  met	  four	  times,	  
one	  of	  these	  by	  video-­‐conference.	  At	  the	  second	  to	  last	  meeting,	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  there	  would	  
be	  one	  face	  to	  face	  meeting	  and	  three	  video	  conferences	  each	  year.	  As	  at	  May	  2014,	  one	  video	  
conference	   was	   held	   in	   November	   2012	   and	   nothing	   since.	   An	   internal	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	  
paper	  dated	  February	  2014	  noted	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  work	  programme	  and	  re-­‐establish	  more	  
formal	   meeting	   arrangements,153	   echoing	   the	   situation	   nine	   years	   earlier.	   The	   timeline	   below	  
shows	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  meetings	  over	  the	  period	  studied:	  
Figure	  7. HLSG	  Timeline	  2005-­‐2013	  
	  
New	   Zealand	   Customs’	   records	   provide	   an	   account	   of	   the	   content	   and	   actions	   of	   the	   HLSG	  
meetings.	   The	   first	   HLSG	   was	   held	   in	   Sydney	   on	   31	   August	   2005.	   The	   participants	   agreed	   the	  
Purpose	  Statement,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  Customs	  Cooperative	  Arrangement,	  a	  work	  programme	  and	  a	  
timetable.	   	   The	   work	   programme	   topics	   were	   largely	   those	   identified	   in	   the	   Ministers’	  
communiqué,	  covering	  automated	  passenger	  processing,	   two	  trade-­‐related	  topics,	  maritime	  and	  
air	   security,	   intelligence	   sharing	   and	   the	   Oceania	   Customs	   Organisation154	   (OCO).	   The	   Minutes	  
record	   a	   Purpose	   Statement	   and	   a	   Strategic	   Statement	   ‘providing	   the	   vision	   or	   “life”	   to	   the	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document’.155	  Meetings	  were	  to	  be	  held	  ‘once	  or	  twice	  a	  year,	  including	  prior	  to	  annual	  CE	  talks,	  
with	  other	  meetings	  by	  Vidcon’.156	   	  The	  minutes	  record	  that	  the	  next	  meeting	  was	  to	  be	  held	   in	  
February	  2006,	  in	  Wellington.	  	  They	  noted	  the	  agreement	  ‘to	  remove	  contentious	  terms	  from	  the	  
Strategic	   Statement,	   such	   as	   ‘Single	   Economic	  Market’.	   	   The	   discussion	   broadened	   the	   original	  
intention	   to	   progress	   the	   customs-­‐related	   contributions	   to	   the	   SEM	   to	   wider	   customs	   issues	  
beyond	   the	  SEM.157	   	  The	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	   report	   to	   the	  Minister	  of	  Customs	   in	  November	  
2005158	  on	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  Customs	   relationship	  does	  not	  mention	   SEM,	  and	   instead	  paints	   a	  
picture	   of	   common	   issues	   facing	   the	  Australian	   and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	   administrations,	   and	  
places	  the	  Customs-­‐to-­‐Customs	  relationship	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ANZLF.	  This	  deliberate	  removal	  
of	  the	  SEM	  from	  the	  HLSG	  narrative	  is	  interesting.	  It	  elevates	  the	  common	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  
customs	  matters	  and	  though	  the	  SEM	  goal	  is	  invisible,	  it	  is	  still	  present	  –	  an	  effect	  that	  is	  explored	  
later	  in	  this	  Chapter	  and	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  
New	  Zealand	  Customs	  officials	  appear	  to	  have	  used	  the	  2005	  Customs	  Ministers’	  Communiqué	  as	  
a	  stabilising	  point.	  In	  November	  2005,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  updated	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  on	  
the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship,	   including	  a	  review	  of	  the	  agreements	  made	  at	  the	  July	  Ministers’	  
meeting	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  HLSG	  meeting.	  It	  noted	  the	  agreement	  ‘to	  meet	  annually	  at	  
Ministerial	   level,	  and	  at	  chief	  executive	  level	  every	  six	  months’	  and	  ‘Ministers	  themselves	  largely	  
set	  the	  topics	  on	  the	  work	  programme	  during	  their	  Talks’.159	  
The	   second	   meeting	   was	   held	   on	   23-­‐24	   February	   2006,	   in	   Wellington.	   Aside	   from	   the	  
aforementioned	  work	  programme,	  additional	  items	  on	  the	  agenda	  included	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	  new	  Rules	  of	  Origin	  under	  CER,	  which	  had	  just	  been	  announced.160	  	  	  
New	   Zealand	   Customs	   files	   reveal	   a	   process	   for	   preparing	   for	   the	   HLSG	   had	   been	   established,	  
including	   a	   briefing	   plan	   and	   a	   briefing	   template.161	   	   New	   Zealand	   developed	   a	   project	   status	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report	   that	   set	  out	  key	  work	  underway,	   key	  milestones	  met,	  next	  milestones	  and	  key	   risks.	  The	  
2006	  report	  notes	  ‘progress	  has	  been	  made	  on	  most	  items’.162	  	  For	  the	  third	  meeting,	  which	  was	  
scheduled	  for	  5-­‐6	  October	  2006	  in	  Sydney,	  the	  Automated	  Passenger	  Processing	  item	  included	  an	  
update	   by	  Australia	   on	   SmartGate/biometrics.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   topic	   of	   the	  work	   programme,	  
there	  were	  eight	  other	  items	  on	  the	  agenda.163	  One	  of	  these	  was	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  possible	  
involvement	  of	  the	  two	  quarantine	  services	  in	  future.	  	  	  
The	   first	   involvement	  of	   the	  Quarantine	  services	  occurred	  on	  31	  May	  2007	  as	  an	  adjunct	   to	   the	  
fourth	   HLSG,	  which	  was	   held	   on	   1	   June	   2007	   in	   Canberra.	   Topics	   for	   the	   ‘four-­‐way’	   talks	  were	  
Streamlining	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Trade,	   Single	   Window,	   Passenger	   Facilitation	   Initiatives,	   and	   an	  
overview	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  Border	  Sector	  Governance	  Group164	  (BSGG).165	  Three	  actions	  came	  out	  
of	   the	  meeting.	   The	  HLSG	   also	   discussed	   Streamlining	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Trade	   (which	   incorporated	  
the	   original	   trade	   items	   and	   included	   several	   more),	   Passenger	   Processing	   Initiatives	   (in	   which	  
Australia	   provided	   an	   update	   on	   SmartGate),	   OCO,	   Intelligence	   Sharing,	   and	   Other.166	   An	  
unfinished	  report	  to	  New	  Zealand	  Customs’	  senior	  management	  team	  identified	  nine	  ‘Next	  Steps’,	  
three	  of	  which	  were	  joint	  and	  six	  of	  which	  were	  Australia’s	  lead.167	  	  
The	  fifth	  HLSG	  was	  held	  immediately	  before	  a	  Chief	  Executive	  meeting,	  as	  originally	  envisaged.	  The	  
two	  meetings	  were	  fitted	  around	  the	  annual	  conference	  of	  the	  Customs	  Brokers	  and	  Forwarders	  
Council	   of	   Australia	   on	   11	   October	   2007,	   held	   that	   year	   in	   Queenstown,	   New	   Zealand.	   Both	  
Customs	   Chief	   Executives	   were	   scheduled	   to	   present	   in	   the	   conference	   in	   a	   joint	   session,	  
demonstrating	   to	   this	   forum	   the	   close	   connection	   between	   the	   two	   administrations.	   The	   HLSG	  
agenda168	  covered	  the	  four	  main	  items	  on	  the	  work	  programme,	  and	  six	  other	  items,	  including	  the	  
date	  for	  the	  next	  Ministerial	  meeting;	  the	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Chief	  Executives	  meeting	  agenda169	  had	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five	  items,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  ‘Outcomes	  from	  HLSG’.	  The	  extensive	  minutes	  of	  the	  HLSG	  meeting170	  
indicate	   observable	   progress	   had	   been	  made	   on	   the	   Streamlining	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Trade	   item,	   on	  
which	   there	   was	   substantial	   discussion,	   and	   six	   ‘next	   step’	   	   actions;	   for	   Passenger	   Processing	  
initiatives,	   the	  minutes	  note	  a	  workshop	  that	   identified	   five	  key	   tasks,	  which	  clearly	   foreshadow	  
the	  work	  undertaken	  post-­‐March	  2009.	  For	  example,	  out	  of	  five	  tasks	  identified	  in	  a	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  
passenger	  workshop	   (one	   of	   the	   actions	   from	   the	   previous	  meeting),	   one	  was	   to	   develop	   ‘two	  
business	  models	   for	   pre-­‐clearance	   of	   Australian	   and	  New	   Zealand	   passengers	   on	   Trans-­‐Tasman	  
flights	  (concept	  April	  2008,	  completion	  October	  2008)’.171	  Another	  was	  to	  examine	  ‘the	  possibility	  
of	   installing	   part	   of	   the	   SmartGate	   system	   in	   New	   Zealand’;	   a	   third	   was	   to	   examine	   ‘potential	  
quarantine	  initiatives’.172	  	  
A	  month	  before	  the	  sixth	  HLSG,	  three	  officials	  from	  the	  Australian	  Customs	  Service	  (as	  it	  then	  was)	  
visited	  New	  Zealand	  for	  a	   two-­‐day	  workshop	  to	  carry	  out	  one	  of	   the	  Streamlining	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  
Trade	  actions	  from	  the	  fifth	  HLSG	  meeting.173	  The	  sixth	  HLSG	  was	  held	  in	  Brisbane	  on	  2	  April	  2008,	  
along	   with	   another	   four-­‐way	   Customs-­‐Quarantine	   meeting,	   at	   which	   agencies	   shared	   their	  
significant	   activities	   over	   the	   past	   year,	   and	   discussed	   Streamlining	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Trade	   and	  
Passenger	  Facilitation	  Initiatives,	  as	  on	  the	  previous	  occasion.174	  
The	  seventh	  HLSG	  meeting	  on	  8	  October	  2008	   in	  Brisbane	   included	   ‘International	   Issues’	   for	  the	  
first	   time	   (previously	   Pacific	   issues)	   and	   a	   new	   item	   on	   small	   craft.	   There	   was	   also	   an	   ‘action	  
update’	   from	   the	   April	   HLSG	   that	   showed	   Customs	   Ministers	   were	   briefed	   on	   Passenger	  
Facilitation	  developments	  and	  Pacific	  issues	  at	  their	  bilateral	  meeting	  on	  7	  May	  2008.175	  
The	  eighth	  HLSG	  on	  4-­‐5	  June	  2009	  in	  Wellington	  was	  the	  first	  HLSG	  after	  the	  2	  March	  joint	  Prime	  
Ministerial	   statement.	   The	   Passenger	   Facilitation	   item	   focused	   on	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   Customs	  
approach	   to	   a	   draft	   paper	   from	   the	   Australian	   Department	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Cabinet,	   to	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which	   New	   Zealand	   was	   preparing	   a	   multi-­‐agency	   response.	   The	   two	   administrations	   were	  
preparing	  material	  for	  the	  Prime	  Ministers’	  meeting	  in	  August	  2009.	  The	  meeting	  agreed	  to	  a	  two-­‐
pronged	   approach	   –	   SmartGate,	   and	   ‘concrete	   building	   blocks	   for	   an	   enhanced	   passenger	  
experience	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travellers’.176	  For	  Streamlining	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Trade,	  the	  focus	  was	  on	  
providing	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  with	  information	  to	  ‘demonstrate	  the	  high	  level	  of	  efficiency	  already	  
present	  in	  border	  clearance	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade’.177	  Both	  items	  referred	  to	  ‘the	  story’	  the	  two	  
administrations	   sought	   to	   tell	   the	   two	   Prime	  Ministers.	   	   The	   proposal	   to	   conduct	   a	   joint	   Time	  
Release	  Study	  (TRS)178	  was	  also	  endorsed	  at	  the	  meeting.	  
The	  ninth	  HLSG	  was	  held	  almost	  16	  months	  later,	  on	  21-­‐22	  October	  2010	  in	  Melbourne.	  	  The	  first	  
day	   included	   a	   third	   four-­‐way	   Customs-­‐Quarantine	   meeting.	   The	   agenda	   for	   this	   meeting	   was	  
primarily	   focused	   on	   ‘the	   Prime	   Ministers’	   deliverables’179	   across	   both	   travel	   and	   trade,	  
particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  biosecurity	  components.	  The	  Customs-­‐to-­‐Customs	  HLSG	  agenda	  was	  
slightly	   different	   from	   its	   predecessors.	   Passenger	   Facilitation	   Initiatives	   became	   ‘Passengers	  
Vision’	  and	  focused	  on	  what	  was	  called	  ‘the	  Prime	  Ministers’	  trans-­‐Tasman	  passenger	  processing	  
streamlining	   initiatives’.180	   Streamlining	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Trade	  disappeared	  as	   a	  heading,	   and	  was	  
replaced	   by	   two	   individual	   agenda	   items,	   one	   of	   which	   was	   ‘Next	   steps	   for	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
TRS’.181	  Again,	  the	  need	  for	  an	  agreed	  overarching	  story	  was	  identified,	  and	  the	  agencies	  agreed	  a	  
response	  to	  an	  industry	  stakeholder	  proposal	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel.182	  	  
	  An	  even	  bigger	  gap	  of	  almost	  two	  years	  ensued	  until	  the	  next	  HLSG	  meeting	  held	  in	  Auckland	  on	  
15-­‐16	  August	  2012.	  A	  year	  earlier,	  action	  was	  being	  taken	  on	  an	  item	  from	  the	  2010	  HLSG,	  but	  in	  
an	  email	  exchange	  in	  March	  2012,	  initiated	  by	  ACBPS	  (which	  ACS	  had	  become	  in	  2009),	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  the	  initial	  concept	  of	  the	  HLSG	  had	  disappeared,	  and	  that	  the	  format	  and	  the	  agenda	  of	  the	  
meetings	  at	  the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Executive	  level	  would	  in	  future	  be	  more	  fluid.	  	  The	  meeting	  in	  August	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2012	  introduced	  a	  more	  relaxed	  style.	  The	  actions	  arising	  from	  the	  meeting	  reflect	  this	  change.183	  
The	   first	   two	   actions	   arose	   from	   discussions	   on	   Customs	   input	   into	   the	   2012	   Joint	   Productivity	  
Commission	   study	   on	   Strengthening	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Economic	   Relations	   (Australian	   Productivity	  
Commission	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Productivity	  Commission,	  2012c).	  	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  discussions	  ranged	  
across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  areas	  of	  mutual	  interest.184	  
A	  video-­‐conference	  was	  held	  in	  November	  2012,	  after	  which	  no	  further	  meetings	  at	  Deputy	  Chief	  
Executive	  level	  were	  held	  (as	  at	  May	  2014).	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  was	  the	  restructuring	  experienced	  
by	  both	  organisations	  during	  2013	  and	  2014.	  	  While	  some	  of	  the	  same	  senior	  officials	  maintained	  
Deputy	  positions	  as	  at	  June	  2014,	  their	  roles	  changed,	  and	  new	  appointments	  to	  other	  Deputy	  or	  
equivalent	   roles	   meant	   connections	   were	   not	   able	   to	   be	   stabilised.	   	   For	   ACBPS,	   further	  
restructuring	  was	  announced	  in	  May	  2014,	  with	  the	  merging	  of	  ACBPS	  and	  the	  Australian	  agency	  
responsible	  for	  immigration,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  section	  6.2.1.3.	  	  
 Exploring the narratives 6.3.1
The	  story	  of	  the	  HLSG	  is	  in	  many	  respects	  unremarkable.	  We	  can	  see	  it	  as	  an	  actor-­‐network	  that	  
emerged,	   stabilised	   as	   connections	   strengthened	   and	   destabilised	   as	   connections	   fell	   away;	  we	  
can	  also	  see	  it	  as	  a	  transnational	  network185	  of	  senior	  level	  officials.	  	  
However,	   nested	   within	   the	   chronological	   sequence	   of	   events	   are	   several	   narratives,	   some	   of	  
which	  connect	  to	  other	  narratives	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  some	  of	  which	  led	  to	  action.	  There	  were	  three	  
types	  of	  narratives,	  the	  first	  being	  purpose	  narratives	  that	  told:	  
• the	  story	  of	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  the	  HLSG	  –	  how	  the	  group	  worked	  and	  evolved	  
• the	  story	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  work,	  and	  how	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  changed.	  
The	  second	  was	  an	  action	  narrative	  about	  how	  the	  HLSG	  caused	  something	  to	  happen.	  The	  third	  
was	  narratives	  about	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connections:	  
SEM – present but not seen 
• Border	  agency	  connections	  –	  long	  but	  not	  fragile.	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185  (Slaughter, 1997). Rather than a policy community, this network was cross-functional, in that it included officials from 




 Purpose narratives 6.3.1.1
6.3.1.1.1 The purpose of the HLSG - the story of its creation and evolution   
The	   initial	  concept	  of	  the	  HLSG	  was	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  executives	  providing	  direction	  to	  a	  work	  
programme.	  This	  was	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  name	  –	  ‘High	  Level’	  indicating	  senior	  level	  engagement;	  
‘Steering	   Group’	   indicating	   the	   direction-­‐setting	   role	   of	   the	   Group.	   However,	   as	   with	   so	   many	  
organisational	   terms,	   the	   ‘High	   Level	   Steering	   Group’	   quickly	   became	   known	   as	   the	   HLSG.	  
Interestingly,	   it	  was	  never	  referred	  to	  as	  the	   ‘trans-­‐Tasman	  HLSG’	  or	  the	  TTHLSG,	  but	  simply	  the	  
HLSG.	  
Over	   time,	   the	   concept	   and	   personnel	   changed,	   so	   that	   the	   connections	   of	   members	   to	   the	  
originating	  Ministerial	  meeting	  and	  communiqué	  fell	  away.	  The	  stabilised	  and	  stabilising	  artefacts	  
and	  processes	  began	  to	  change	  the	  way	  the	  group,	  and	  the	  actors	  connected	  to	  it,	  operated,	  and	  
this	   reduced	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   HLSG	   members	   to	   have	   transformational	   discussions.	   In	   other	  
words,	   these	   artefacts	   and	   processes	   became	   actants	   that	   created	   stability	   but	   had	   a	   limiting	  
effect,	  as	  explained	  by	  one	  official:	  
I	  thought	  the	  original	  concept,	  where	  it	  was	  set	  up	  to	  be	  a	  targeted,	  focused	  small	  group,	  so	  
that	  you	  could	  have	   frank	  exchanges,	  and	   that	   it	  was	   really	   the	   issues	  of	   concern	  on	  your	  
mind	   from	   one	   administration	   to	   another,	   and	   where	   were	   the	   areas	   where	   we	   could	  
leverage	  off	  each	  other,	  and	  there	  were	  only	  three	  of	  us	  from	  Australia	  needed	  to	  represent	  
Australia,	  and	  likewise,	  only	  a	  small	  number	  needed	  to	  represent	  New	  Zealand.	  I	  felt	  that	  in	  
the	   life-­‐cycle	   of	   all	   of	   these	   groups	   we	   had	   gone	   into	   one	   of	   those	   cycles	   where	   it	   had	  
become	  a	  bit	  like	  form	  over	  substance186,	  and	  we'd	  complicated	  it	  by	  putting	  many	  things	  on	  
the	   agenda.	   It	   didn't	   seem	   as	   though	   it	   was	   a	  meeting	   if	   it	   didn't	   have	   this	   really	   formal	  
agenda	  that	  looked	  as	  though	  we'll	  completely	  packed	  out	  the	  days.	  So	  in	  a	  sense	  the	  form	  I	  
think	  reduced	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  the	  conversation	  about	  the	  issues	  (Official	  A6,	  lines	  96-­‐105).	  
Another	  referred	  to	  the	  more	  generic	  need	  to	  refresh	  connections:	  
And	  I	  think	  the	  same	  story	  with	  the	  HSLG	  –	  had	  a	  big	  momentum	  for	  a	  while	  –	  particularly	  
that	  structure	  –	  HLSG-­‐CE's	  meeting-­‐Ministers	  –	  but	  you	  need	  new	  blood	  at	  some	  stage	  where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




you	  need	  a	   refreshed	   look	  at	   it	   and	  you	  need	   to	  either	  kick-­‐start	   it	  or	   say	   'we'll	  do	   it	   in	  a	  
different	  way'.	  Because	  the	  relationship	  changes,	  and	  people	  change,	  and	  the	  focus	  changes,	  
so	  what	  you're	  doing	  changes,	  so	  that	  forum	  may	  not	  be	  appropriate	  (Official	  8,	   lines	  121-­‐
125).	  
This	  description	   illustrates	   Latour’s	  assertion	   that	   ‘if	   you	   stop	  making	  and	   remaking	  groups,	   you	  
stop	  having	   groups	   ‘	   (Latour,	   2007,	   p.	   35).	   Latour	   goes	  on	   to	   say:	   ‘this	   cannot	  be	  done	  without	  
looking	  for	  vehicles,	  tools,	  instruments,	  and	  materials	  able	  to	  provide	  such	  stability	  .	  .	  .	  since	  they	  
have	  to	  make	  the	  grouping	  reach	  a	  bit	  further	  and	  stand	  a	  bit	  longer’	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  35).	  	  
He	  notes	  the	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  alliances	  in	  mitigating	  the	  effects	  of	  change:	  ‘Every	  time	  
an	   ally	   is	   abandoned,	   replacements	   need	   to	   be	   recruited’	   (Latour,	   1987,	   p.	   125).	   	   Interviewees	  
noted	  the	  impact	  of	  changes	  to	  key	  personnel	  and	  organisational	  changes	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  
HSLG,	  for	  example:	  
the	  relationship	  was	  a	  lot	  more	  personal	  in	  the	  past,	  because	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  people	  
that	  we	  had	  engaged	  with	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  .	  .	  .	  and	  now,	  because	  there’ve	  been	  a	  
lot	  of	  changes	  .	  .	  .	  that’s	  been	  total	  sort	  of	  turnover.	  So	  what	  I	  see	  is	  that	  gradually	  rebuilding.	  
The	  thing	  is,	  the	  nature	  of	  Australian	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  has	  been	  changing	  as	  
well.	  The	  border	  protection	  bit	  has	  been	  growing	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  its	  total	  role,	  over	  quite	  a	  
few	  years	  now.	  You	  know,	  the	  guns	  they	  get	  are	  getting	  bigger	  and	  all	  of	  that,	  and	  so	  .	  .	  .	  I	  
think	   the	  organisations	   today	  aren’t	  quite	  as	   similar	   in	  nature	  as	   they	  were	   five	  years	  ago	  
(Official	  6,	  lines	  208-­‐217.	  
The	   purpose	   of	   the	   HLSG	   changed	   in	   practice,	   if	   not	   formally.	   	   One	   reason	   given	  was	   that	   the	  
relationship	  no	  longer	  needed	  to	  be	  steered:	  
Oh,	  I	  think	  it’s	  just	  part	  of	  evolution.	  We	  had	  a	  work	  programme	  .	  .	  .	  a	  lot	  of	  stuff	  got	  done,	  
and	  the	  relationship	  matured	  over	  time,	  and	  it	  became,	  I	  guess,	  less	  important	  to	  be	  having	  




and	  ‘there	  isn’t	  really	  any	  steering	  role	  for	  the	  High	  Level	  Steering	  Group’	  (Official	  21).187	  Another	  
was	  that	  by	  2012,	  the	  HLSG	  had	  changed	  from	  a	  formal	  structure	  to	  a	  more	  informal	  gathering:	  
So	  the	  HLSG	  was	  structured,	  had	  agendas,	  it	  came	  out	  with	  action	  items	  and	  programmes	  of	  
work	   and	   all	   those	   sorts	   of	   things.	  What	   it’s	   now	   evolved	   into	   is	   much	   more	   of	   a	   more	  
informal	   relationship	  management	   type	   vehicle,	   and	   so	  when	  we	   interact,	   it’s	   a	   lot	  more	  
about	   keeping	   up	   with	   what	   each	   other’s	   doing	   and	   where	   we	   do	   see	   value	   in	   working	  
together	  on	  something,	  then	  we	  take	  that	  opportunity	  and	  progress	  that	  (Official	  6,	  lines	  33-­‐
38).	  
It	   is	   interesting	   that	   the	   ‘machine’	   –	   the	   meeting	   arrangements,	   agendas	   and	   minutes	   –	   that	  
initially	   stabilised	   the	   HLSG	   ended	   up	   constraining	   its	   ability	   to	   refresh	   its	   connections	   and	   its	  
matters	  of	  concern.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  HLSG	  purpose	  ceased	  to	  exist	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  concern,	  resulting	  
in	  no	  translation	  and	  thus	  no	  action,	  and	  so	  it	  ceased	  to	  exist	  as	  an	  actor-­‐network.	  
6.3.1.1.2 The purpose of the work – the story of matters of concern 
This	  narrative	  traces	  the	  changes	  of	  topics	  –	  the	  raison	  d’être	  of	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  work	  programme	  
in	  which	  practical	  solutions	  implied	  action.	  	  
In	   2005,	   the	   two	  Ministers	   responsible	   for	   Customs	   agreed	   the	   items	   on	   the	  work	   programme,	  
which	   officials	   then	   jointly	   acted	   on	   over	   several	   years,	   adding	   new	   topics	   as	   the	   original	   ones	  
were	   completed.	   	   These	   topics,	   which	   implied	   trans-­‐Tasman	   agreement	   on	   those	   matters	   of	  
concern	  relevant	  to	  Customs,	  were	  primarily	  about	  trade	  and	  travel	  facilitation,	  but	  also	  included	  
some	  joint	  intelligence	  and	  Pacific-­‐related	  activities.	  	  Within	  this	  frame,	  new	  items	  were	  added	  or	  
the	  focus	  of	  existing	  items	  was	  changed,	  depending	  on	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  two	  administrations	  
between	  meetings.	  At	  one	  point,	  at	  the	  seventh	  HLSG	  meeting,	  officials	  briefed	  Ministers	  on	  two	  
of	   the	   work	   items	   that	   had	   been	   part	   of	   the	   original	   remit	   for	   the	   group,	   creating	   an	   implicit	  
referral	  back	  to	  the	  original	  matters	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  group.	  
In	  2009,	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  work	  topics	  took	  on	  that	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  deliverables	  initiated	  by	  
the	   two	   Prime	  Ministers.	   A	   year	   later,	   the	   need	   for	   an	   overarching	   story	   for	   these	   items	   was	  
identified.	  By	  2012,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  two	  Customs	  organisations	  had	  diverged,	  reflecting	  a	  focus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




on	  sovereign	  issues	  more	  than	  trans-­‐Tasman	  issues:	  
.	  .	  .	  for	  quite	  understandable	  reasons,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  border	  interests	  have	  
been	  diverging	  over	  the	  past	  two	  or	  three	  years	  –	  primarily	  on	  the	  Australian	  side	  because	  of	  
the	   increase	   in	  concern	  over	  the	   illegal	   immigration	  boat	  people	  from	  up	  north,	  and	  that’s	  
caused	  a	  shift	  in	  budget,	  from	  border	  facilitation	  to	  border	  protection.	  And	  on	  our	  side,	  our	  
Prime	  Minister	  maintained	  the	  same	  expectations	  around	  facilitation	  of	  travel	  and	  trade,	  and	  
so	  the	  primary	  objectives	  of	  the	  two	  organisations	  are	  slightly	  divergent,	  which	  means	  that	  
the	  border	  facilitation	  processes	  are	  being	  developed	  in	  different	  ways	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  
Tasman	  (Official	  6,	  lines	  33-­‐45).	  
One	  Australian	  official	  noted	  how	  events	  in	  the	  present	  can	  trigger	  memories,	  and	  highlighted	  the	  
need	  to	  periodically	  revisit	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  past	  to	  determine	  if	  they	  have	  become	  a	  matter	  
of	  concern.	  The	  example	  given	  occurred	  as	  part	  of	  the	  HLSG	  work	  programme:	  
You	  know,	   it	  sticks	   in	  my	  memory	  the	  trial	  of	  trying	  to	  have	  the	  export	  entry	  as	  an	   import	  
entry	  here,	  and	  it	  didn't	  succeed,	  and	  you	  have	  to	  reflect	  on	  “well,	  why	  didn't	   it	  succeed?”	  
and	   if	   we	   really	   wanted	   to	   make	   it	   happen,	   what	   would	   we	   have	   to	   do	   to	   make	   it	   go	  
differently?	  So	  it's	  just	  a	  complete	  raft	  of	  different	  issues	  that	  we've	  addressed	  over	  the	  years	  
that,	   as	   something	  happens,	   it	   triggers	  a	  memory	  of	   “Yes,	   let's	   go	  and	   look	  at	   that	  aspect	  
again”	  (Official	  A6,	  lines	  236-­‐241).	  
 Action narrative – how the HLSG caused something to happen   6.3.1.2
Interviewees	  tell	  a	  story	  of	  the	  HLSG	  as	  an	  actant	  –	  it	  caused	  something	  to	  happen,	  although	  not	  
always	  visibly	  so:	  	  	  
I	  always	   felt	   that	   the	  key	  area	   that	  was	  underplayed	  –	   in	   that	   the	  HLSG	  had	  actually	  done	  
some	   quite	   good	   things	   of	   in	   the	   first	   few	   years	   of	   its	   existence	   –	   was	   the	   enforcement	  
cooperation,	   and,	   you	   know,	   some	   of	   the	   areas	   of	   cooperation	   that	   we	   had	   progressed	  
through	   intelligence	   exchange,	   and	   the	   links	   between,	   at	   the	   time,	   [Official]	   and	   his	   co-­‐	  
what's	  the	  word?	  –	  his	  equivalent	  were	  actually	  producing	  really	  good	  benefits	   in	  terms	  of	  
increased	  information	  sharing	  and	  actually	  some	  decent	  operations	  in	  that	  area,	  and	  I	  always	  
felt	   that	  was	  underplayed	   in	   the	  HLSG	  space	  with	   its	   focus	  on	   trade	  and	   travel	   facilitation	  




Its	  formal	  structures	  and	  protocols	  created	  an	  impetus	  for	  action.	  The	  meetings	  provided	  a	  means	  
by	  which	  other	  connections	  could	  be	  maintained:	  
I	  guess	  my	  personal	  view	  is	  they’re	  [meetings]	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  them,	  and	  to	  make	  that	  
sustainable,	  because	  people	  move	  on,	   and	  you	   can’t	   establish	   those	   relationships	   through	  
email	   or	   phone.	   You	   need	   to	   have	   sat	   face	   to	   face,	   is	   my	   personal	   view.	   	   But	   that’s	   not	  
necessarily	  what	  made	  really	  strong	  relationships.	  So	  that	  gave	  the	  opportunity	  –	  HLSG	  and	  
meetings	  like	  that	  –	  regular	  meetings	  at	  CE	  level	  and	  so	  on	  –	  gave	  the	  opportunity	  to	  form	  
those	   connections,	   but,	   for	   example,	   I	   know	   that	   at	   Deputy	   CE	   level,	   there	   were	   regular	  
phone	   discussions,	   and	   that’s	   a	   sign	   to	   me	   that	   the	   relationship	   is	   working	   –	   that	   those	  
weren’t	  officials-­‐organised188	  (Official	  7,	  lines	  170-­‐177).	  
The	   heart	   of	   the	   HLSG	   was	   the	   meetings,	   which	   were	   the	   focus	   for	   action,	   with	   the	   previous	  
meeting’s	  action	  items	  and	  the	  date	  set	  for	  the	  forthcoming	  meetings	  providing	  bookends	  to	  that	  
action.	  This	   can	  be	   inferred	   from	   the	   timing	  of	   the	  workshops,	  which	  were	  held	   just	  before	   the	  
HLSG	  meetings,	  and	  from	  the	  progress	  report	  that	  ticked	  off	  previous	  action	  items	  and	  added	  new	  
ones	  to	  the	  list.	  Action	  was	  also	  related	  to	  the	  matters	  of	  concern,	  with	  reports	  of	  progress	  on	  the	  
agenda	  topics,	  and	  resulting	  discussion	  at	  the	  meetings	  resulting	  in	  a	  series	  of	  ‘next	  step’	  actions.	  	  	  
These	   actions	   reached	   forward	   to	   the	   future.	  When	  we	   examine	   the	   events	   triggered	   in	  March	  
2009,	  we	  will	   see	   that	   the	  HLSG	   set	   the	   groundwork	   for	   those	   events	   to	   occur.	   The	  HLSG	  work	  
programme	  foreshadowed	  the	  March	  and	  August	  2009	  work	  –	  a	  kind	  of	   ‘forward	  connection’	   to	  
SmartGate	   in	  New	  Zealand,	  and	   the	   feasibility	   study	   for	  a	  pre-­‐clearance	  model	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
travel.	  	  	  
Once	  discussed	  (i.e.	  translated)	  and	  agreed,	  some	  of	  the	  actants	  became	  stabilised	  artefacts,	   for	  
example,	   the	   final	   versions	   of	   the	   purpose	   statement,	   the	   meeting	   agendas	   and	   the	   minutes.	  
These	  were	  clearly	  identifiable	  in	  New	  Zealand	  Customs’	  electronic	  filing	  system.189	  	  	  
Interviewees	  also	   talked	  of	   the	  HLSG	  as	   a	  mechanism	  of	   ‘non-­‐action’.	   Their	   comments	  highlight	  
the	  importance	  of	  purpose	  in	  getting	  to	  action.	  	  One	  official	  pointed	  to	  uncertainty	  of	  purpose	  for	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189 Because there was no central trans-Tasman file repository accessible to both countries, this system contained no visibility 




the	  HLSG	  itself	  which	  resulted	  in	  discussion	  only,	  not	  action:	  
Australian	   International190	   had	   an	   action	   in	   probably	   about	   2009	   to	   review	   the	   HLSG	   in	  
tandem	  with	  us,	  and	  that	  never	  really	   led	  to	  anything.	  So	  “what	  was	  the	  role	  of	  the	  HLSG,	  
what	  was	  the	  role	  of	  the	  two	  Customs	  agencies,	  where	  did	  our	  responsibilities	  lie,	  what	  did	  
we	  want	  out	  of	  CEs,	  what	  did	  we	  want	  out	  of	  Ministers?”	  We	  usually	  managed	  to	  get	  enough	  
together	  to	  have	  a	  Minister's	  discussion	  but	  often	  it	  wasn't	  really	  firmly	  agreed	  about	  how	  it	  
would	  proceed,	  and	  it	  needed	  decisive	  direction	  from	  CEs	  at	  their	  discussion	  for	  there	  to	  get	  
things	  sorted	  out.	  And	  you	  probably	  want	  –	  or	  you	  should	  have,	  at	  that	  lower	  level	  down	  –	  
you	  should	  actually	  have	  agreement	  most	  of	  the	  time	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  186-­‐193).	  
Another	   official	   reiterated	   the	   lack	   of	   impetus	   and	   uncertainty	   of	   purpose,	   this	   time	   of	   agenda	  
items	  in	  the	  meetings:	  
.	  .	  .	  there	  were	  probably	  some	  people	  particularly	  in	  the	  High	  Level	  Steering	  Group	  that	  felt	  
that	   the	  discussions	  weren’t	   as	   valuable	   as	   they	  might	  have	  been	  and	   that	   it	  wasn’t	   clear	  
what	  the	  purpose	  of	  some	  of	  the	  agenda	  items	  was	  (Official	  7,	  lines	  123-­‐125).	  
 .Trans-Tasman Narratives 6.3.1.3
6.3.1.3.1 SEM – present but not seen 
Initially,	  officials	  broadened	  their	  work	  beyond	  the	  SEM	  –	  the	  HLSG	  was	  explicitly	  NOT	  about	  the	  
SEM,	  but	  was	  still	  aligned	  with	   it,	   in	  that	  a	   large	  part	  of	  the	  focus	  was	  about	  harmonisation	  and	  
automation	  of	  the	  processing	  of	  people	  and	  goods	  across	  the	  two	  countries’	  borders.	  	  
From	  the	  time	  of	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  on	  2	  March	  2009,	  the	  HLSG’s	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
story	   gradually	   changed	   so	   that	   the	   work	   of	   the	   HLSG	   supported	   the	   actions	   arising	   from	   that	  
statement.	  For	  a	   short	   time	  after	   the	  March	  and	  August	  2009	  Prime	  Ministerial	   statements,	   the	  
HLSG’s	  work	   programme	   ran	   in	   parallel	   to	   the	  multi-­‐agency	   deliverables	   for	   Streamlining	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  Travel	  and	  eventually	  took	  on	  the	  aspect	  of	  those	  deliverables	  –	  it	  was	  not	  a	  big	  switch,	  
but	   it	  could	  be	   interpreted	  as	   the	  matter	  of	  concern	   (and	  thus	   the	  story)	  switching	   from	  border	  
management	   objectives	   to	   SEM	   objectives.	   The	   correlation	   between	   the	   Streamlining	   trans-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Tasman	  Travel	  work	  programme	  ceasing	   in	  February	  2012191	  and	  the	  HLSG	  faltering	  to	  a	  stop	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  supports	  this	  interpretation.	  	  	  
6.3.1.3.2 Border agency connections – long but potentially fragile 
As	  explained	  earlier	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Customs	  connection	  is	  nicely	  illustrated	  by	  
the	  two	  Chief	  Executives	  jointly	  presenting	  to	  the	  2007	  Australia	  Customs	  Brokers	  and	  Forwarders	  
Council	  of	  Australia.	  The	  HLSG	  provided	  a	  forum	  for	  working	  through	  differences	  and	  providing	  a	  
platform	  for	  joint	  or	  collective	  action,	  such	  as	  developing	  a	  joint	  story	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  work	  in	  
2009.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  Biosecurity	  agencies	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  dialogue.	  
In	   the	   explanation	   below,	  Official	   8	   articulates	   the	   translation	   processes	   of	   Australian	   and	  New	  
Zealand	  officials	  and	  politicians	  to	  address	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  matter	  of	  concern,	  acknowledging	  the	  
difficulty	  of	  getting	  to	  this	  point	  when	  the	  two	  countries	  start	  with	  different	  matters	  of	  concern:	  
You	  know,	  is	  there	  alignment	  between	  the	  things	  that	  we	  would	  like	  to	  achieve	  and	  what	  the	  
Australians	  would	  like	  to	  achieve,	  and	  that's	  often	  a	  difficult	  process,	  but	  you’ve	  got	  to	  have	  
the	   discussion,	   so	   you	   need	   to	   have	   the	   forum	   to	   have	   the	   discussion	   and	   create	   the	  
frameworks	  that	  enable	  those	  things	  that	  we	  both	  want	  to	  work.	  It's	  not	  really	  a	  negotiation,	  
but	   you	   know	   it	   is	   a	   discussion.	   And	   then	   you	   need	   the	   political	   backing,	   and	   that's	   –	   for	  
officials	  is,	  you	  know,	  putting	  up	  the	  clear	  advice,	  weighing	  up	  all	  the	  other	  things	  that	  we've	  
got	  on	  that	  we	  want	  to	  achieve	  –	  whether	  this	  is	  more	  important	  ahead	  of	  anything	  else	  or	  
not,	   and	   Ministers	   will	   either	   do	   what	   they	   normally	   do,	   which	   is	   either	   support	   what	  
officials'	  advice	  is	  or	  they'll	  give	  clear	  direction	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  246-­‐254).	  
They	   then	   articulate	   what	   they	   think	   that	   matter	   of	   concern	   is	   for	   the	   way	   the	   two	   countries	  
address	  challenges:	  
I	  mean,	  we've	  both	  got	  other	  challenges	  as	  well,	  and	  I	  sometimes	  think	  that	  we	  need	  to	  quite	  
recognise	  that	  we've	  got	  these	  other	  challenges,	  and	  I	  do	  think	  that	  sometimes	  we	  miss	  the	  
boat	  –	  both	  countries	  –	  in	  actually	  “well,	  what	  can	  we	  do	  jointly	  to	  actually	  look	  at	  the	  things	  
that	  we've	  both	  got	  problems	  with	  or	  issues	  that	  we	  have?”	  So	  that	  space	  should	  be	  created	  
as	  well	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  254-­‐258).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




One	   official	   noted	   the	   effect	   of	   not	   maintaining	   the	   connections	   between	   the	   two	   Customs	  
administrations:	  
I	  think	  there	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  continuous	  dialogue	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  to	  
make	  sure	  that	  we	  don’t	  drift	  away	  as	  opposed	  to	  not	  necessarily	  drift	  closer	  or	  get	  closer	  or	  
have	   the	   same	   process	   on	   both	   sides.	   .	   .	   .	   I	   think	   there’s	   a	   danger	   if	   we	   don’t	   have	   a	  
continuous	  dialogue,	  that	  we’ll	  go	  our	  way	  and,	  more	  particularly,	  they’ll	  go	  theirs	  (Official	  3,	  
lines	  412-­‐417).	  
The	  words	  ‘to	  make	  sure	  we	  don’t	  drift	  away’	  evokes	  a	  picture	  of	  boats	  that	  could	  either	  be	  close	  
by	  or	  drift	  off	  in	  different	  directions.	  	  
When	  we	  look	  at	  the	  HLSG	  narratives	  and	  their	  connections	  and	  overlaps,	  we	  see	  three	  things:	  
• HLSG	  matters	  of	  concern	  are	  connected	  with	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  narrative	  more	  strongly	  
than	  the	  SEM	  narrative	  
• There	  is	  a	  strong	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  narrative	  that	  is	  not	  SEM	  
• The	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Customs	   narrative	   is	   strongly	   connected	  with	   facilitation	   and	   enforcement	  
narratives	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  WCO.	  
These	  connections	  are	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  8	  below.	  The	  darker	  blue	  and	  thicker	  lines	  represent	  the	  
stronger	  connections	  and	  the	  size	  of	   the	  shape	   indicates	   the	  relative	  size	  of	   the	  narrative	   in	   the	  
HLSG	  work,	  both	  explicit	  and	  implicit.	  	  This	  diagram	  includes	  the	  narratives	  from	  Chapter	  5,	  from	  
which	  the	  work	  of	  the	  HLSG	  drew.	  These	  narratives	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  7.	  
Figure	  8. Connections	  into	  and	  between	  HLSG	  narratives	  




6.4 Story	  2:	  SmartGate	  
SmartGate	   is	   an	   automated	   processing	   system	   that	   enables	   international	   passengers	   to	   self-­‐
process	   through	   the	   first	   layer	   of	   immigration	   and	   customs	   controls.	   There	   are	  many	   different	  
types	  of	  automated	  passenger	  processing	  systems	  around	  the	  world,	  with	  the	  SmartGate	  system	  
being	  used	  in	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  UK,	  Norway	  and	  some	  other	  European	  countries.192	  
Australia	  started	  implementing	  SmartGate	  in	  2007.	  It	  is	  now	  available	  for	  eligible	  Australian,	  New	  
Zealand,	   Singapore,	   UK	   and	   US	   passport	   holders	   arriving	   in	   Brisbane,	   Gold	   Coast,	   Sydney,	  
Melbourne,	  Adelaide,	  Perth,	  Cairns	  and	  Darwin	  international	  airports.	  Holders	  of	  Swiss,	  Canadian	  
and	  Irish	  passports	  were	  also	  being	  trialled	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing.	  
New	  Zealand	  started	  implementing	  SmartGate	  in	  December	  2009.	  In	  November	  2014,	  the	  Minister	  
of	  Customs	  reported	  in	  Parliament:	  ‘10	  million	  people	  have	  now	  used	  the	  technology.	  We	  have	  a	  
new	  1-­‐week	  record	  of	  76,000	  people,	  which	  was	  set	  last	  week,	  and	  we	  are	  rapidly	  approaching	  the	  
record	  of	  1	  million	  people	  every	  3	  months’.193	  
SmartGate	   is	   not	   installed	   at	   all	   New	   Zealand’s	   international	   airports,	   only	   the	   three	   ‘gateway’	  
international	   airports	   of	   Auckland,	   Wellington	   and	   Christchurch	   that	   deal	   with	   the	   greatest	  
proportion	   of	   travellers.	   At	   December	   2014,	   SmartGate	  was	   available	   for	   eligible	   New	   Zealand,	  
Australian,	   UK	   and	  US	   passport	   holders	   arriving	   at	   and	   departing	   from	   these	   airports,	   with	   the	  
addition	  of	  more	  nationalities	  planned.	  
Today,	   SmartGate	   New	   Zealand	   nestles	   comfortably	   in	   the	   Customs	   precinct	   of	   these	   three	  
airports.	   It	   is	   unremarkable.	   More	   and	   more	   passengers	   choose	   it	   over	   being	   processed	   by	   a	  
Customs	   officer.	   From	   the	   moment	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	   John	   Key,	   successfully	   passed	   the	  
‘initiation	   test’	   at	   the	   official	   opening	   on	   3	   December	   2009,	   the	   ‘becoming’	   of	   SmartGate	   New	  
Zealand	  was	  black	  boxed.	  Key	   inserted	  his	  passport	   into	   the	   kiosk,	   received	  a	   ticket,	   placed	   the	  
ticket	  into	  the	  gate	  apparatus,	  had	  his	  photo	  taken,	  and	  the	  gate	  opened,	  letting	  him	  through	  to	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the	   other	   side.194	   The	   actor-­‐network	   of	   SmartGate	   was	   stabilised	   and	   ready	   for	   the	   travelling	  
public	  at	  large.	  
The	   story	   of	   the	   success	   of	   SmartGate	   has	   been	   told	  more	   than	   once.	   Eppel,	   Lips,	   Sylvester,	   &	  
Pacheco	  (2013)	  describe	  and	  analyse	  the	  SmartGate	  story	  in	  their	  paper	  on	  innovation	  in	  the	  New	  
Zealand	  Public	  Sector.	  Through	  conducting	  a	  network	  analysis,	   they	  highlight	   the	  significant	   role	  
played	  by	  ACBPS,	  the	  strong	  drive	  from	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister,	  strong	  agency	  leadership	  
and	  collaboration	  with	  other	  agencies	  and	  private	  sector	  players.	  The	  New	  Zealand	  Office	  of	  the	  
Auditor-­‐General	  also	  told	  the	  story	  in	  their	  report	  on	  successful	  technology	  projects	  (Office	  of	  the	  
Auditor-­‐General	  New	  Zealand,	  2012).	  	  
This	   thesis	   tells	   different	   SmartGate	   stories.	   It	   unpacks	   the	   black	   box	   of	   the	   ‘becoming’	   of	  
SmartGate	   to	   reveal	   the	  many	   connections	   back	   in	   time	   and	   even	   forward	   into	   the	   future;	   the	  
debates	  and	  uncertainties	   in	   the	  policy	  process;	   the	  creation	  and	   falling	  away	  of	  actor-­‐networks	  
and	  the	  narratives	  that	  drove	  action.	  	  
 The starting point/s – tracing connections back 6.4.1
One	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  record	  notes	  30	  July	  2008	  as	  a	  starting	  point.195	  That	  was	  the	  date	  that	  
the	   New	   Zealand	   Cabinet	   approved	   New	   Zealand	   Customs’	   trialling	   of	   SmartGate,	   with	   a	  
requirement	  to	  report	  back	  on	  the	  results	  in	  August	  2009.	  	  
However,	  this	  research	  reinforces	  Latour’s	  statement	  that	  when	  you	  are	  tracing	  an	  actor-­‐network,	  
there	  is	  no	  beginning.	  You	  have	  to	  just	  choose	  a	  point	  in	  time	  (Latour,	  2013).	  For	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  
to	  trace	  SmartGate	  back	  to	  2004,	  when	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  SEM	  was	  announced,	  and	  to	  1998,	  when	  
ANZCERTA	  was	  extended,	  and	   to	  1983	  when	  CER	  was	   signed,	  and	   to	   the	  sharing	  of	   	   technology	  
thinking	   between	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   administrations	   in	   the	   1980s,	   because	  
SmartGate	  New	  Zealand	  is	  connected	  to	  all	  these	  events.	  We	  can	  also	  point	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  
the	   formal	   Customs	   to	   Customs	   Arrangement,196	   which	   set	   the	   scene	   for	   cooperation	   and	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 See ‘Stuff’ video, retrieved on 11 March 2015 from http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/3125011/Video-John-Key-opens-
SmartGate 
195 New Zealand Customs, (Undated, created on 22 May, 2009). ‘SmartGate Cabinet Paper – Chronology of Events’.[File 
note] 




overtly	   connected	   with	   SmartGate	   through	   the	   three	   schedules	   relating	   to	   SmartGate	   added	  
between	  2008	  and	  2011.	  
In	  the	  two	  years	  prior	  to	  2008,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  had	  been	  keenly	  watching	  ACBPS	  design	  its	  
SmartGate	  system,	  being	  built	  with	  technology	  provider	  Morpho,	  and	  absorbing	  what	  ACBPS	  was	  
learning	   about	   which	   they	   had	   been	   generous	   in	   sharing	   with	   New	   Zealand	   Customs.197	   The	  
Comptroller	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  tells	  it	  like	  this:	  
So	  I	  remember	  thinking	  .	  .	  .	  	  “I	  wonder	  what	  the	  Australians	  are	  doing	  on	  this?”	  So	  I	  asked	  the	  
question,	  and	  they	  said	  that,	  oh	  they’d	  been	  trialling	  this	  thing	  called	  SmartGate;	  so	  I	  actually	  
rang	  Michael	  -­‐	  Michael	  Carmody	  -­‐	  and	  I	  said	  to	  him,	  “Where	  are	  you	  at	  with	  your	  automated	  
processing?”	  .	  .	  .	  [He	  replied]”	  .	  .	  .	  and	  we’re	  pretty	  close	  to	  actually	  making	  a	  decision	  about	  
introducing	  this,	   into	  Australia	  for	  passenger	  processing	  on	  arrival.”	  So	  I	  said,	  “Can	  I	  have	  a	  
look	  at	  it?”	  He	  said,	  “Yeah,	  by	  all	  means,	  come	  across.”	  He	  said,	  “We’re	  looking	  at	  putting	  it	  
into	  Brisbane	  first	  up”.	  	  So	  I	  went	  across,	  and	  I	  went	  to	  Brisbane,	  had	  a	  look	  at	  this	  –	  and	  this	  
was	  the	  sort	  of	  trial,	  at	  about	  –	  I	  don’t	  know,	  I	  can’t	  remember	  now,	  but	  probably	  four	  or	  five	  
gates	  –	  four	  gates,	  maybe.	  And	  I	  instantly	  realised	  that	  .	  .	  .	  	  if	  Grandma	  [X]	  was	  going	  to	  be	  
travelling	  across	   the	  Tasman,	   the	   last	   thing	   she	  needed	  was	   to	  have	  a	  different	   system	   to	  
what	  was	  being	  used	  on	  the	  Tasman	  (Lines	  144-­‐158).	  	  
Thus,	   the	  Comptroller’s	  view	  was	  that	  passengers	  needed	  to	  have	  the	  same	  experience	  on	  both	  
sides	  of	  the	  Tasman	  Sea.	  Later	  in	  2007	  after	  the	  Australian	  SmartGate	  system	  was	  implemented,	  
the	  Comptroller	  saw	  it	  working.	  	  He	  immediately	  saw	  that	  if	  New	  Zealand	  had	  the	  same	  system,	  it	  
would	   facilitate	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel.198	   In	   2008,	   ACBPS	   offered	   to	   loan	   New	   Zealand	   a	   gate	   to	  
enable	  it	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  trial,	  which	  included	  testing	  its	  compatibility	  with	  New	  Zealand's	  border	  
processing	  system,	  CusMod.	  
The	   ANZLF’s	   border	   sub-­‐group199,	   in	   which	   the	   Comptroller	   of	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   was	   very	  
active,	  had	  aspirations	  for	  a	  common	  border	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  One	  official	  commented	  
on	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  sub-­‐group:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Facilitated by the HLSG connections. 
198 Interview. 




There	  was	  a	  really	  strong	  drive	  for	  a	  very	  unclear	  end-­‐point,	  but	  you	  know,	  a	  domestic-­‐like	  
experience,	  borderless	  travel,	  whatever	  it	  is,	  automated	  processes,	  whatever	  .	  .	  .	  there	  was	  a	  
kind	  of	  vague	  desire	  from	  the	  Leaders’	  Forum	  for	  something	  to	  be	  done	  in	  that	  space	  and	  to	  
work	  on	  that	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  106-­‐109).	  
Simon	  Le	  Quesne	  noted	  in	  his	  thesis	  on	  the	  ANZLF	  that:	  
Conversations	  on	  a	  common	  border	  and	  developing	  shared	  solutions	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  clean	  
energy	  and	  food,	  climate	  change	  and	  scientific	  challenges	  have	  all	  added	  impetus	  to	  a	  shared	  
consensus	  on	  economic	  and	  institutional	  integration	  (Le	  Quesne,	  2011,	  p.	  115).	  
In	  New	   Zealand	   in	   2007,	   a	   new	   set	   of	   connections	  was	   created	   that	   put	   a	   new	   focus	   on	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  border	  activities	  –	  a	  'border	  sector',200	  with	  the	  formal	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  BSGG	  
and	  a	  Border	  Sector	  Secretariat	  (Border	  Secretariat)	  hosted	  by	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs.	  	  Trans-­‐
Tasman	  passenger	  facilitation	  was	  part	  of	  this	  group’s	  work	  programme.	  It	  was	  not	  new	  work,	  but	  
rather	  a	   'gathering	  up'	  of	  existing	  work,	  for	  which	  the	  HLSG	  was	  already	  a	  key	  connection	  point.	  
The	  SmartGate	  trial	  was	  one	  of	  the	  items	  on	  the	  work	  programme.201	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	   discussions	   between	   diplomats,	   discussions	   between	  New	  
Zealand	   senior	   officials	   and	   briefings	   by	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   on	   opportunities	   to	   further	  
streamline	  passenger	  processing	  to	  manage	  increasing	  volumes	  were	  also	  occurring,	  and	  had	  been	  
for	  several	  years.202	  The	  cyclical	  requests	  to	  Government	  from	  border	  agencies	  for	  more	  funding	  
to	   manage	   these	   increases	   at	   airports	   were	   recognised	   as	   unsustainable.	   New	   thinking	   was	  
needed.	   	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   processes	   were	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   these	   discussions	   because	  
volumes	   were	   highest	   on	   flights	   between	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australia.	   As	   an	   example,	   Table	   5	  
below	  shows	  the	  changes	  in	  volumes	  of	  flights	   in	  the	  month	  of	  December	  from	  2008	  to	  2014.203	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200  Agencies responsible for border management, covering customs, biosecurity/quarantine and food safety, and 
immigration functions, along with related interests of transport regulation and passport issuance. 
201 I was acting Manager of the Border Secretariat at the time. 
202 Interviews with senior New Zealand officials. 
203 Number of flights is the best available indicator of demand and thus a proxy for passenger volumes, even though not all 
flights are full. Statistics on international travel don’t include New Zealanders, so are not a true reflection of travel volumes. 
Retrieved from Tourism/International Travel and Migration/Number of flights by direction and overseas port (Annual-




This	   table	   shows	   the	   steep	   increase	   in	   volumes	   being	   experienced	   in	   2008,	   the	   subsequent	  
levelling	  out	  from	  2010	  to	  2012,	  and	  steeper	  increases	  in	  2013-­‐2014:	  
 Volume	   of	   arriving	   and	   departing	   flights	   between	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australian	  Table	  5.
airports	  in	  the	  month	  of	  December	  2008-­‐2014	  
	  
The	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  New	  Zealand,	  elected	  in	  November	  2008,	  assumed	  the	  Tourism	  portfolio.	  As	  
such,	  he	  was	  very	   interested	   in	   technological	  developments	   in	   the	  airline	   industry,	   and	   saw	   the	  
potential	  for	  it	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border.	  A	  New	  Zealand	  official	  told	  it	  like	  this:	  
John	  Key	  was	  really	  enamoured	  with	  the	  way	  Air	  New	  Zealand	  was	  using	  technology	   in	   its	  
check-­‐in	  processes,	  and	  kept	  saying	  “well,	  why	  does	  it	  just	  have	  to	  be	  Air	  New	  Zealand?	  Why	  
can’t	  border	  agencies	  do	  smart	  stuff	  like	  that?”	  And	  so	  he	  was	  up	  for	  sort	  of	  reengineering	  
processes	   at	   the	   border.	   The	   trans-­‐Tasman	   relationship	   looked	   like	   the	   one	   to	   focus	   on	  
because	   obviously	   the	   degree	   of	   travel	   was	   high,	   the	   possibilities	   of	   doing	   something	  
jointly	  were	  much	  higher	   there	   than	  elsewhere.	  We’d	  had	  a	  history	  of	  very	   free	  and	  open	  
transport	   and	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  movement	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   So	   that	   was	   the	  
obvious	  place	  to	  develop	  a	  pilot	  project	  (Official	  13,	  41-­‐48).	  
Officials	   from	   a	   range	   of	   agencies	   regularly	   provided	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   and	   Trade	  
(MFAT)	  with	  briefings	  prior	  to	  the	  biannual	  meetings	  of	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand.	  The	  Customs’	  briefing204	  for	  the	  February	  2009	  meeting	  urged	  for	  continued	  priority	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






















given	   to	   streamlining	   border	   processes.	   It	   reads	   ‘Consistent	   with	   our	   approach	   to	   the	   SEM	  we	  
should	   be	   looking	   at	   the	   minimum	   necessary	   impediments	   to	   people	   and	   goods	   crossing	   our	  
borders.’	   It	   then	  goes	  on	   to	   say	  how	   important	   it	   is	   to	  business,	   as	  highlighted	  by	   the	  ANZLF	   in	  
2008.	   The	   content	   of	   the	   briefing	   refers	   to	   New	   Zealand’s	   discussions	   with	   Australia	   about	  
SmartGate,	   refers	   to	   opportunities	   in	   travel	   and	   trade,	   and	   the	   means	   to	   progress	   them	   via	  
ANZLF’s	  common	  border	  working	  group	  and	  bilateral	  officials	  and	  ministerial	  Customs	  meetings.	  
The	   specific	   border-­‐related	   commitment	   to	   ‘reduce	   remaining	  barriers	   at	   the	  borders	   to	  ensure	  
that	   people	   and	   goods	   can	  move	  more	   easily	   between	   the	   two	   countries’	   (Key	  &	  Rudd,	   2009a)	  
could	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  all	  these	  connections	  that	  preceded	  that	  2	  March	  2009	  joint	  statement	  by	  
the	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Prime	  Ministers	   –	   the	   usual	   type	   of	   joint	   statement	   that	   was	  
always	  released	  after	  these	  biannual	  meetings.	  	  
On	  20	  August	  2009,	   the	   two	  Prime	  Ministers	  met	  again,	  and	  announced	   the	  next	   steps	  –	   ‘.	   .	   .	  a	  
joint	  plan	  to	  streamline	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel,	  with	  improvements	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  early	  as	  next	  year’	  
(Key	  &	  Rudd,	  2009b).	  	  The	  roll	  out	  of	  SmartGate	  New	  Zealand	  and	  a	  trial	  to	  test	  the	  feasibility	  of	  
integrating	   the	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australian	   SmartGate	   systems	   were	   key	   parts	   of	   that	  
announcement.	  	  
What	  follows	  is	  the	  story	  of	  what	  occurred	  between	  those	  two	  announcements,	  and	  beyond.	  	  
 Unpacking the ‘black box’ of the Cabinet decision 6.4.2
This	  account	  of	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Government’s	  decision	  to	  implement	  SmartGate	  in	  New	  
Zealand	   is	   drawn	   from	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   records	   and	   email	   communications205,	   and	  
interviews.	   The	   emails	   trace	   a	   sometimes	   minute	   by	   minute	   series	   of	   debates,	   circulating	  
meanings	   and	   translations	   that	   occurred	  within	   Customs	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   that	   decision.	  While	  
these	  debates	  were	  happening,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  was	  preparing	   the	  organisation	   for	  a	   live	  
trial	  of	  the	  loaned	  SmartGate	  system	  in	  Auckland	  International	  Airport.	  
Things	  went	  smoothly	  over	  the	  first	  two	  weeks	  after	  the	  Joint	  Statement.	  On	  Friday	  6	  March,	  the	  
Chief	   Executive	   of	   Department	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Cabinet	   briefed	   border	   sector	   Chief	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Executives	  about	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  approach	  to	  the	  2	  March	  joint	  statement	  –	  a	  long	  term	  (a	  trans-­‐
Tasman	   common	   border)	   and	   a	   short	   term	   (SmartGate)	   approach.206	   The	   BSGG	   was	   made	  
collectively	  accountable	  for	  ensuring	  both	  these	  'deliverables'	  were	  achieved.207	  On	  the	  following	  
Tuesday,	  10	  March,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  met	  with	  the	  Chief	  Executives	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  and	  
MAF,	  seeking	  delivery	  of	  something	  tangible	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  (2009).208	  	  Later	  that	  day,	  New	  
Zealand	   Customs	   was	   confirming	   arrangements	   for	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   to	   visit	   the	   SmartGate	  
laboratory.	  
On	   the	  next	  day,	  DPMC	  passed	  on	   to	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	   the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  wish	   to	  make	  
SmartGate	  implementation	  a	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  portfolio	  priority.209	  By	  18	  March,	  two	  weeks	  
after	  the	  release	  of	  the	  Joint	  Statement,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  had	  drafted	  a	  Cabinet	  paper	  which	  
it	   distributed	   to	   MAF	   and	   the	   Department	   of	   Labour	   (DoL)210	   for	   comment	   the	   following	   day.	  
Informal	   engagement	   between	   senior	   officials	   from	   those	   agencies	   revealed	   their	   surprise,	   and	  
discomfort	  with	  the	  process.	  
On	  20	  March,	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  advised	  that	  a	  BSGG	  meeting	  scheduled	  for	  7	  April	  had	  been	  
brought	  forward	  to	  2	  April	  so	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  the	  DPMC	  could	  attend,	  and	  SmartGate	  had	  
been	  added	  to	  the	  agenda.	  	  
On	  23	  March,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  visited	  the	  room	  where	  SmartGate	  was	  being	  tested	  and	  tried	  it	  
for	  himself.	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  I	  briefed	  my	  senior	  officer	  on	  internal	  feedback	  I	  had	  received	  about	  
a	  multiagency	  meeting	  convened	  by	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  to	  discuss	  initial	  issues	  and	  proposals	  –	  	  
some	   senior	   executives	   from	   other	   agencies	   were	   concerned	   about	   the	   process	   and	   lack	   of	  
consultation.	  This	  was	  confirmed	  in	  my	  interviews,	  where	  one	  official	  commented	  that	  within	  their	  
agency:	  ‘SmartGate	  was	  very	  high	  on	  the	  agitation	  list	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  would	  achieve	  and	  what	  
that	  would	  mean	  for	  [that	  agency’s]	  mandate	  and	  control	  of	  the	  people	  flow	  system’	  (Official	  16,	  
lines	   190-­‐192).	   This	   in	   part	   related	   to	   an	   earlier	   decision	   by	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   to	   trial	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Australia’s	   SmartGate	   technology	   in	   place	   of	   a	   multi-­‐agency	   project	   on	   the	   automation	   of	  
passenger	  clearance	  processes	  underway	  at	  the	  time.211	  	  
The	  Chief	  Executives	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  and	  DoL	  met	  to	  address	  DoL’s	  concerns	  and	  agreed	  
to	   a	   joint	   Cabinet	   paper.	   On	   the	   same	   day	   in	   a	   different	   place,	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   was	  
accommodating	  MAF’s	  needs	  within	  the	  SmartGate	  trial.	  
‘Between	  a	  rock	  and	  a	  SmartGate’	  –	  the	  subject	  line	  of	  an	  email	  on	  25	  March	  2009	  brings	  to	  life	  
the	  challenge	  the	  Comptroller	  of	  Customs	  was	  facing	   in	  delivering	  the	  SmartGate	  system	  in	  nine	  
months,	  and	  his	  need	  for	  the	  support	  of	  his	  BSGG	  colleagues	  to	  do	  so.	  He	  specifically	  drew	  on	  the	  
mandate	  from	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  citing	  the	  ‘Commander’s	  Intent’.	  
On	  27	  March,	  the	  Officials	  of	  the	  Economic,	  Growth	  and	  Innovation	  Cabinet	  Committee	  met	  with	  
New	  Zealand	  Customs	  and	  DoL	  to	  get	  them	  to	  explain	  their	  respective	  views.	  
By	  2	  April,	  a	  calendar	  month	  after	  the	  Joint	  Statement,	  and	  also	  the	  day	  of	  the	  BSGG	  and	  the	  day	  
when	  the	  Ministers	  of	  Immigration	  and	  Customs	  visited	  the	  SmartGate	  laboratory,	  the	  email	  trail	  
shows	  the	  debate	  between	  agencies	  was	  continuing.	  On	  8	  April,	  when	  the	  Economic	  Growth	  and	  
Innovation	   Cabinet	   Committee	   (EGI)	   met,	   new	   concerns	   were	   raised	   by	   the	   Minister	   for	  
Biosecurity,	   and	   EGI	   asked	   for	   a	   revised	   paper	   for	   Cabinet	   on	   20	  April.	   Two	  weeks	   later,	   on	   15	  
April,	  the	  so-­‐called	  final	  paper	  was	  drafted	  but	  it	  was	  clear	  there	  were	  still	  significant	  differences	  
of	   opinion	   between	   the	   agencies	   on	   the	   content.212	   On	   16	   April,	   the	   Chief	   Executive	   of	   DPMC	  
withdrew	  the	  paper	  and	  deferred	   it	   for	  a	  week,	  making	   it	  clear	   they	  were	  not	  going	  to	  accept	  a	  
paper	  when	  the	  agencies	  didn’t	  agree.	  The	  Comptroller	  of	  Customs	  said	  in	  an	  email	  on	  the	  same	  
day	  ‘I’m	  not	  sure	  what	  the	  unified	  position	  is	  but	  we	  will	  have	  to	  have	  one’.213	  He	  appealed	  again	  
to	  his	  colleagues.	  
On	  20	  April,	  the	  BSGG	  held	  another	  meeting,	  convened	  by	  DPMC.214	  The	  outcome	  was	  agreement	  
on	  a	  pilot,	  with	  a	  fixed	  end-­‐date.	  On	  21	  April,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  circulated	  another	  draft	  paper	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213 Email, 16 April 2009. 




reflecting	   this	   agreement.	   On	   the	   same	   day,	   a	   parallel	   debate	   surfaced	   internally	   within	   New	  
Zealand	   Customs	   over	   the	   feasibility	   of	   including	   SmartGate	   for	   arrivals	   and	   departures	   in	   the	  
budget	  bid.215	  	  
On	   Wednesday	   22	   April,	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   circulated	   internally	   and	   to	   the	   other	   border	  
agencies	   the	   revised	   Cabinet	   paper,	   now	   called	   ‘Pilot	   of	   Automated	   Passenger	   Processing	  
Clearance	  in	  New	  Zealand‘.	  The	  change	  of	  title	  was	  to	  address	  the	  other	  agencies’	  concern	  about	  
the	  choice	  of	  SmartGate	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘done	  deal’.216	  Informal	  advice	  on	  the	  same	  day	  indicates	  
one	  of	  the	  agencies	  would	  still	  not	  recommend	  their	  Minister	  sign	  the	  paper,	  and	  on	  the	  next	  day,	  
that	   the	   other	   agency	   also	   had	   some	   concerns.	   However,	   later	   the	   following	   day,	   advice	   was	  
received	   that	   the	   agencies	   had	   all	   agreed.	   Nevertheless,	   further	   emails	   revealed	   one	   of	   the	  
agencies	  was	  very	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  process,	  which	  prompted	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  to	  initiate	  
a	  meeting	  to	  clear	  the	  air	  and	  work	  on	  moving	  forward.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  realisation	  that	  there	  needed	  
to	  be	  a	  regular	  senior	  level	  meeting	  between	  the	  two	  agencies	  ‘as	  a	  start	  of	  a	  new	  ongoing	  way	  of	  
engaging’.217	  
On	   Friday	   24	   April,	   the	   Cabinet	   paper	  was	   submitted	   to	   the	   Cabinet	   Office	   and	   on	  Monday	   27	  
April,	   Cabinet	   asked	   that	   the	  paper	   be	   resubmitted	   after	   the	   Strategy	  Cabinet	   Committee	   (STR)	  
scheduled	  for	  4	  May	  had	  considered	  the	  proposal,	  alongside	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  that	  had	  been	  
conducted	  in	  parallel	  to	  SmartGate	  (refer	  to	  Chapter	  6.5).	  	  
On	   Monday	   4	   May,	   two	   months	   after	   the	   Joint	   Statement,	   STR	   agreed	   to	   a	   roll-­‐out	   of	  
SmartGate.218	   On	   the	   same	   day,	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   re-­‐circulated	   the	   revised	   ‘final’	   Cabinet	  
paper	  with	  changes	  reflecting	   the	  STR	  decision.	  As	  part	  of	   this,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  consulted	  
with	  ACBPS	  on	  wording,	  with	  ACBPS	  promptly	   replying	  the	  next	  day.	  On	  Wednesday	  6	  May,	   the	  
paper	  was	  sent	  to	  Ministers	   for	  signature	   in	  preparation	  for	  the	  Cabinet	  meeting	  on	  Monday	  11	  
May.	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On	  Thursday	  7	  May,	  the	  Minister	  for	  Biosecurity	  visited	  the	  SmartGate	  laboratory,	  and	  on	  11	  May	  
Cabinet	   agreed	   to	   the	   roll-­‐out	   of	   SmartGate	   at	   Auckland,	   Wellington	   and	   Christchurch	  
international	  airports,	  for	  both	  arrivals	  and	  departures.219	  This	  decision	  was	  kept	  confidential	  for	  
the	  announcements	  on	  20	  August	  2009.	  
On	  15	  October	  2009,	  the	  Customs	  and	  Excise	  Amendment	  Bill	  had	  its	  first	  reading	  and	  was	  passed	  
into	  law	  on	  7	  December	  2009.	  This	  law	  change	  permitted	  the	  use	  of	  biometric	  technology	  such	  as	  
SmartGate	  for	  the	  processing	  of	  people	  at	  the	  border.	  	  
On	  3	  December	  2009,	   the	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	   formally	  opened	  SmartGate	  at	  Auckland	  
International	   Airport.	   Below	   are	   pictures	   of	   SmartGate	   in	   operation	   in	   Auckland	   International	  
Airport.	  
Figure	  9. 	  Images	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  SmartGate	  set	  up	  
	  
Source:	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  
 Postscript 6.4.2.1
By	   June	   2010,	   SmartGate	   had	   been	   successfully	   implemented	   in	   Christchurch	   and	   Wellington,	  
ahead	  of	  the	  planned	  timetable.	  New	  Zealanders	  took	  to	  the	  system	  quickly,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  
numbers	  of	  passengers	  using	  SmartGate	  exceeded	  expectations	  and,	  percentage-­‐wise,	  exceeded	  
the	  uptake	  in	  Australia	  when	  it	  was	  first	  introduced	  there.220	  Australian	  officials	  commented	  that	  
uptake	  also	  increased	  in	  Australia	  after	  SmartGate	  was	  implemented	  in	  New	  Zealand.221	  Since	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 New Zealand Government, (2009). ‘Implementation of SmartGate Automated Passenger Clearance in New Zealand’, 
CAB Min (09) 16/19. 
220 ‘New Zealand Customs, SmartGate Expansion Business Case’ (2010). 




initial	  implementation,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Government	  has	  funded	  a	  further	  set	  of	  SmartGates	  and	  
New	  Zealand	  Customs	  has	  continued	   to	   look	   for	  ways	   to	   improve	   the	  uptake	  and	  experience	  of	  
SmartGate.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   Australia	   was	   trialling	   two	   different	   automated	   options	   for	  
outbound	  travel222	  at	  airports.	  One	  official	   likened	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	   to	  competing	   in	  a	  
horse	  race:	  
So	  it	  started	  with	  a	  small	  beginning	  and	  we	  were	  sort	  of	  like	  the	  small	  horse	  that	  was	  at	  the	  
back	  of	  the	  race	  on	  the	  final	  straight	  at	  the	  Melbourne	  cup,	  and	  suddenly	  we	  came	  charging	  
up	  the	  outside	  and	  crossed	  the	  line	  first	  (Official	  24,	  lines	  86-­‐88).	  
 Narratives 6.4.2.2
6.4.2.2.1 Trans-Tasman border narratives 
All	  the	  significant	  considerations	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  clearance	  
processes	   to	   facilitate	   travel	   occurred	   prior	   to	   March	   2009.	   The	   Comptroller	   of	   New	   Zealand	  
Customs	  saw	  the	  opportunity	  provided	  by	  SmartGate;	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  New	  Zealand	  saw	  the	  
potential	  of	  technology,	  if	  not	  SmartGate	  in	  particular,	  to	  make	  a	  difference	  to	  travel;	  MFAT	  made	  
the	  link	  with	  SEM	  –	  border	  processes	  affect	  trade	  and	  labour	  flows;	  the	  ANZLF	  wanted	  a	  common	  
border,	  or	  at	  least	  some	  streamlining	  of	  border	  processes;	  Customs	  made	  overt	  reference	  to	  SEM	  
in	  its	  briefings	  for	  the	  Feb	  2009	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting.	  
We	   see	   here	   more	   than	   one	   matter	   of	   concern	   but	   all	   were	   about	   getting	   smarter	   border	  
processes	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  What	  the	  joint	  statement	  of	  2	  March	  2009	  did	  was	  
focus	  them	  on	  a	  single	  objective	  –	  ‘reduce	  remaining	  barriers	  at	  the	  borders	  to	  ensure	  that	  people	  
and	   goods	   can	   move	   more	   easily	   between	   the	   two	   countries’.	   When	   this	   happened,	   the	  
Comptroller	  of	  Customs	  knew	  how	  to	  use	  this	  focus	  to	  get	  action	  and	  to	  generate	  a	  decision.	  The	  
primary	  narrative	  presented	   to	  Cabinet	  by	   the	   three	  BSGG	  Ministers	  was	   that	  SmartGate	  would	  
benefit	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travellers,	   and	   thus	   meet	   the	   objective	   in	   the	   2	  March	   2009	   joint	   Prime	  
Ministerial	   statement.	   This	   was	  made	   clear	   in	   the	   Executive	   Summary	   of	   the	   Cabinet	   paper.	   In	  
addition,	  it	  provided	  the	  following	  policy	  objectives:	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	  relevant	  policy	  objectives	  are:	  
• providing	  a	  quality	  experience	  for	  passengers	  that	  is	  much	  more	  closely	  aligned	  to	  the	  
domestic	  travel	  experience	  
• system	   and	   process	   alignment	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Tasman	   (accepting	   that	   policy	  
differences	  may	   remain)	  and	   improved	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  border	  processes	  over	  
time	  
• maintenance	   or	   enhancement	  where	   possible,	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	   risk	  management	  
assurances	  especially	  relating	  to	  biosecurity,	  immigration	  and	  preventing	  contraband	  
coming	  into	  New	  Zealand	  	  
• ensuring	   that	   implementation	   now	   will	   not	   preclude	   structured	   evaluation	   of	   the	  
future	  needs	  for	  enhancing	  automated	  passenger	  processing	  (Office	  of	  the	  Minister	  
for	   Biosecurity,	   Office	   of	   the	  Minister	   of	   Immigration,	   &	   Office	   of	   the	  Minister	   of	  
Customs,	  2009,	  p.	  4).	  
When	  introducing	  the	  proposed	  amendments	  to	  the	  Customs	  and	  Excise	  Act	  to	  Parliament	  needed	  
to	  implement	  SmartGate,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  reiterated	  the	  benefits	  to	  passengers,	  although	  
it	   was	   not	   the	   first	   thing	   he	   said.	   For	   his	   Parliamentary	   colleagues,	   he	   started	   with	   the	   longer	  
waiting	   times	   experienced	   by	   the	   public	   and	   promoted	   SmartGate	   as	   providing	   ‘a	   faster,	  more	  
streamlined	   exit	   through	   border	   processing’	   for	   low-­‐risk	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   passport	  
holders.	  He	  then	  went	  on	  to	  say:	  
The	  effect	  of	  these	  amendments	  is	  to	  allow	  the	  use	  of	  automated	  processing	  systems	  at	  the	  
border,	   which	   is	   something	   that	   will	   benefit	   the	   travelling	   public	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	  
Government’s	   objectives	   to	   improve	   the	   border	   crossing	   experience	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
travellers	  (Williamson,	  2009).	  	  
Other	  points	  made	  by	  the	  Minister	  were	  that	  the	  role	  of	  Customs	  officers	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  
important	   and	   that	   SmartGate	  would	   enhance	   that	   role	   by	   enabling	   them	   to	   focus	   on	  high	   risk	  
travellers.	  
The	  order	   and	   content	   of	   these	  narratives	   points	   to	   two	  different	   dynamics.	   For	   officials	   to	   get	  
Cabinet	  approval	   (via	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs),	   they	  had	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  benefits.	  




problem	   and	   reassure	   Members	   of	   Parliament	   that	   the	   SmartGate	   solution	   wasn’t	   going	   to	  
undermine	  the	  role	  of	  border	  officials.	  	  	  
In	  tailoring	  his	  narratives,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  was	  participating	  in	  different	  assemblages.	  He	  
was	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  both,	  but	  the	  connections	  with	  Cabinet	  processes	  
and	  his	  Cabinet	  colleagues	  were	  different	  from	  those	  with	  Parliament	  as	  a	  whole,	   the	   legislative	  
process	   and	   the	   inclusion	   of	   other	   political	   parties.	   His	   speech	   to	   Parliament	   was	   establishing	  
connections	  with	  Members	   of	   Parliament	  whose	   particular	  matters	   of	   concern	  would	   not	   have	  
been	  addressed	  by	  the	  ‘pure’	  trans-­‐Tasman	  narrative.	  
6.4.2.2.2 SmartGate telling its own story  
SmartGate	   helped	   tell	   the	   story	   that	   caused	   people	   to	   act	   in	   particular	  ways.	   It	   was	   a	   physical	  
entity	   that	   could	   be	   seen,	   touched	   and	  used,	   and	   about	  which	   there	  were	   existing	   connections	  
demonstrating	  its	  functionality;	  it	  generated	  fierce	  debate	  between	  agencies	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  
it	  provided	  the	  best	  value	  for	  money	  for	  government;	  it	  persuaded	  politicians	  that	  this	  technology	  
was	  indeed	  going	  to	  create	  a	  new,	  simpler	  border	  process:	  
SmartGate	  was	  the	  biggest	  surprise	  to	  me.	  I	  mean,	  that	  was	  .	  .	  .	  buried	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  
PM's	  briefing	  with	  a	  few	  figures,	  and	  a	  story	  that	  we'd	  been	  talking	  about	  for	  a	  while,	  and	  he	  
really	  ran	  with	  that.	  You	  know,	  picked	  it	  up	  and	  said	  “this	  will	  be	  great”.	  So,	  I	  guess	  what	  the	  
ability	  of	  political	  leaders	  to	  look	  at	  something	  –	  actually	  to	  read	  the	  brief	  <laughter>223	  is	  the	  
first	  thing,	  and	  then	  run	  with	   it	   is	  –	  and	  where	  their	  mind-­‐set	  might	  be	  is	  always	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  
surprise.	  Well,	   it's	  not	  always	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  surprise,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  surprise	  (Official	  8,	  
lines	  287-­‐292).	  
	  
.	  .	  .	  when	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  came	  down	  he	  brought	  his	  passport	  with	  him	  and	  did	  it	  a	  few	  
times	  and	  said,	  “Let’s	  do	  it”	  (Official	  19,	  lines	  180-­‐181).	  
SmartGate	  also	  caused	  the	  airport	  companies	  to	  reconfigure	  their	  internal	  space	  to	  accommodate	  
the	  new	  technology.224	  In	  Actor-­‐Network	  terms,	  because	  SmartGate	  was	  a	  machine	  that	  had	  some	  
capabilities	  greater	  than	  a	  human,	   it	  was	  not	   just	  an	  actant,	  but	  a	  powerful	  actant	  for	  the	  trans-­‐
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Tasman	  objective:	   ‘It’s	  the	  power	  exerted	  through	  entities	  that	  don’t	  sleep	  and	  associations	  that	  
don’t	  break	  down	  that	  allow	  power	  to	  last	  longer	  and	  expand	  further’	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  70).	  
The	  public	  narrative	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  system	  in	  New	  Zealand	  started	  with	  the	  debates	  in	  
Parliament	  over	  the	  Customs	  and	  Excise	  Act	  Amendment	  Bill	  in	  October	  2009	  but	  really	  only	  began	  
in	   earnest	   once	   the	   first	   SmartGates	  were	   implemented.	   The	   first	  media	   item	  was	   the	   video	  of	  
John	  Key	  opening	  the	  SmartGate	  precinct	  on	  3	  December	  2009.	  In	  this	  video,	  Key	  was	  depicted	  as	  
a	  classical	  Greek	  hero	  undergoing	  an	  initiation	  test,	  which	  he	  successfully	  completes,	  thus	  passing	  
through	  the	  gate	   into	  the	  welcome	  on	  the	  other	  side.	   	  This	  was	  a	  highly	  symbolic	  and	  theatrical	  
event,	  with	  SmartGate	  ‘requiring’	  the	  initiate	  (John	  Key)	  to	  undergo	  a	  series	  of	  actions.	  
Passengers’	  and	  politicians’	  experience	  of	  SmartGate	  prompted	  them	  to	  tell	  stories	  about	  it.	  The	  
Minister	   of	   Customs	   gave	   a	   ‘before	   and	   after’	   story	   about	   what	   people	   told	   him	   about	   their	  
experiences	  of	  SmartGate:	  
Ministers	  quite	  regularly	  talk	  about	  it,	  but	  it’s	  more	  to	  do	  with	  their	  personal	  view,	  and	  it’s	  
more	   to	   do	   with	   their	   constituency	   thing.	   It’s	   interesting	   the	   number	   of	   people	   –	   Paula	  
Bennett	  only	  a	  week	  ago,	  she	  said	  “Oh,	  I’ve	  got	  some	  friends	  came	  through	  the	  airport	  the	  
other	   day,	   and	   they	   love	   you	   and	   they	   love	   SmartGate	   and	   they	   think	   it’s	   just	  wonderful,	  
Maurie.	  You’re	  great”	  and	  they	  get	  that	  all	  the	  time.	  Well,	  what	  you	  get	  as	  a	  constituent	  MP	  
if	  the	  border’s	  awful	  is	  just	  letters	  and	  phonecalls,	  and,	  you	  know	  “Bloody	  hopeless,	  I	  waited	  
an	  hour	  and	  a	  half	   to	  get	   through	  your	  customs	  queues	  the	  other	  day	   .	   .	   .	  ”	  We	  don’t	  see	  
that.	  We	  don’t	  see	  it.	  We	  used	  to.	  I	  know,	  I	  was	  one	  of	  the	  complainants,	  many	  years	  ago.	  
Customs	  at	  Auckland	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  just	  appalling.	  It	  was	  like	  some	  Eastern	  European	  .	  .	  .	  
border	   guards.	   You	   don’t	   get	   that	   now.	   You	   get	   people	   hearing	   the	   birds	   chirping	   at	  
Auckland,	  and	  they	  walk	  up,	  and	  they	  walk	  through	  and	  they’re	  clean	  and	  they’re	  done,	  and	  
only	  the	  ones	  that	  we’re	  wanting	  to	  get	  do	  we	  get.	  I’m	  amazed	  at	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  
make	  a	  comment.	  I	  go	  to	  a	  Rotary	  breakfast	  and	  get	  told	  “God,	  you’ve	  done	  a	  great	  job	  at	  the	  
border”.	   So	   that’s	   refreshing,	   ‘cause	   the	   in-­‐tray	  will	   always	   focus	   your	  mind	   about	  what’s	  
working	  and	  not.	  Don’t	  ever	  think	  that	  the	  general	  public	  won’t	  write	  to	  you	  when	  they’re	  
unhappy.	  I’ve	  even	  had	  letters	  from	  Australians,	  who’ve	  said	  “the	  experience	  of	  arriving	  into	  




6.4.2.2.3 Different realities result in different matters of concern 
As	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  multiplicity	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  ANT,	  and	  one	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  revealed	  
in	   any	   ANT	   analysis:	   ‘Different	   realities	   are	   enacted	   in	   different	   practices,	   and	   this	   is	   a	   chronic	  
condition’	  (Law,	  2011,	  p.	  5).	  These	  different	  realities	  can	  be	  centred	  on	  the	  same	  thing,	  but	  rather	  
than	   representing	   different	   perspectives	   of	   one	   world	   view,	   according	   to	   Annemarie	  Mol	   they	  
reflect	   different	  worlds,	   different	   realities	   through	   different	   practices	   that	  may,	   or	  may	   not,	   fit	  
together	   (Law	   &	   Hassard,	   1999;	   Mol,	   2010b;	   Mol	   &	   Law,	   2002).	   For	   example,	   her	   analysis	   of	  
arteriosclerosis	   revealed	   that	   the	   disorder	   showed	   itself	   differently	   depending	   on	   how	   people	  
were	  interacting	  with	  it	  (Law,	  2011).	  	  
In	  the	  SmartGate	  story,	  SmartGate	  was	  ‘practised’	  differently	  by	  different	  agencies.	  It	  wasn’t	  just	  a	  
piece	   of	   technology	   that	   read	   a	   passport	   and	   took	   a	   photo	   of	   the	   person	   who	   presented	   the	  
passport	   to	   compare	   the	   two	   photo	   images.	   For	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   and	   ACBPS,	   it	   was	   a	  
facilitation	   tool	   to	  give	   trans-­‐Tasman	  travellers	   (Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  passport-­‐holders)	  a	  
common	  trans-­‐Tasman	  experience.	  For	  New	  Zealand	  Customs,	  it	  enabled	  the	  organisation	  to	  meet	  
the	   ‘commander’s	   intent’	   by	   ‘simply	   automating	   a	  process	   that	  we	  do’	  which,	   according	   to	  one	  
official,	   meant	   ‘there	   was	   no	   reason	   for	   others	   to	   actually	   have	   any	   concerns,	   interests	   or	  
otherwise’	  (Official	  21,	  lines	  165-­‐168).	  	  
It	  was	  also	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  other	  objectives:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  suited	  our	  organisational	  
agenda	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  were	  able	  to	  seek	  investment	  and	  build	  on	  our	  reputation	  as	  a	  very	  
effective	  border	  management	  organization’	  (Official	  22,	  lines	  67-­‐70).	  	  
There	  were	  also	  matters	  of	  concern	  within	  Customs	  where	  aspects	  of	  the	  SmartGate	  proposal	   in	  
terms	  of	  its	  effect	  on	  managing	  the	  ‘overflowings’	  were	  being	  questioned.	  The	  following	  comment	  
related	  to	  that	  questioning,	  which	  the	  official	  saw	  as	  legitimate	  and	  necessary:	  
I	  think	  in	  our	  organization	  we’ve	  still	  got	  some	  people	  who	  rightly	  look	  through	  the	  rear	  view	  
mirror	  but	  perhaps	  can’t	   .	   .	   .	   see	  two	  or	  three	  years	  out.	  They’re	  reliant	  on	  their	  historical	  
experiences,	  which	   is	  good,	   and	   you	  need	   that,	   but	  we	  need	  people	  who	   can	   .	   .	   .	   carry	   a	  
vision	  (Official	  22,	  lines	  216-­‐221).	  
For	  the	  other	  border	  agencies,	  SmartGate	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  input	  and	  loss	  of	  mandate;	  for	  




Commission,	  characterising	  the	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  as	  Customs	  having	  a	  vertical	  view	  and	  
the	  other	   agencies	   having	   a	   horizontal	   view:	   ‘SSC	   at	   the	   time	  described	   it	   “look	  both	   views	   are	  
absolutely	  pure	  but	  we’re	  actually	  each	  coming	  at	  it	  from	  different	  angles”’	  (Official	  21,	  lines	  220-­‐
221).	  
Each	  of	   these	   realities	   resulted	   in	   a	   different	  matter	   of	   concern.	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  officials	  
were	   required	   to	   achieve	   a	   single	   articulation	   of	   the	   task	   at	   hand.	   If	   they	   couldn’t	  move	   those	  
matters	  of	  concern	  to	  become	  the	  same	  as	  Customs’,	  they	  needed	  to	  find	  an	  accommodation,	  a	  
peaceful	  overlapping	  rather	  than	  a	  contested	  intersection	  of	  those	  concerns.	  	  
6.4.2.2.4 Power narrative 
The	  story	   told	  about	  SmartGate	   is	  a	   tale	  of	  power	  relations	   that	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  Latour’s	  
stories	  of	  power	   in	   the	   science	   community,	   and	   the	   role	  of	   inscriptions	   in	   creating	  winners	   and	  
losers	   in	   turning	  matters	  of	   concern	   into	  matters	  of	   fact	   (Latour,	  1987).	   Latour	  emphasises	   that	  
power	  is	  the	  end	  of	  a	  process,	  not	  something	  that	  inherently	  ‘is’:	  
	  .	  .	  .	  it’s	  so	  important	  to	  maintain	  that	  power,	  like	  society,	  is	  the	  final	  result	  of	  a	  process	  and	  
not	  a	  reservoir,	  a	  stock,	  or	  a	  capital	  that	  will	  automatically	  provide	  an	  explanation.	  Power	  and	  
domination	  have	  to	  be	  produced,	  made	  up,	  composed	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  69)	  
The	  6	  March	  discussion	  was	  an	  early	  translation	  of	  the	  Joint	  Statement	  into	  what	  in	  policy	  parlance	  
is	   called	   ‘a	   deliverable’	   (the	   implementation	   of	   SmartGate	   in	  New	   Zealand	   by	  December	   2009).	  
Once	  the	  deliverable	  had	  been	  identified,	  officials	  then	  carried	  out	  a	  series	  of	  translations	  that	  led	  
to	   action.	   The	   Cabinet	   paper	   finally	   approved	   on	   11	  May	   was	   one	   of	   those	   actions.	   It	   was	   an	  
inscription	  –	   the	   representation	  of	   the	   ‘other	  world	   just	  beneath	   the	   text’	   (Latour,	  1987,	  p.	  69).	  
That	   ‘other	   world’	   was	   the	   debates	   and	   circulating	   meanings	   needed	   to	   get	   to	   a	   point	   of	  
agreement.	   The	   emails	   were	   inscriptions	   that	   were	   also	   actants,	   in	   that	   their	   content	   caused	  
people	  to	  translate,	  to	  transform,	  to	  take	  action.	  The	  changing	  content	  represented	  the	  translation	  
of	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  it	  prompted	  new	  actions	  each	  time.	  The	  discussion	  below	  expands	  
on	  these	  points.	  
New	  Zealand	  Customs	  officials	  had	  a	   lot	  of	  thick	  connections	   in	  this	  process	  –	  they	  provided	  the	  
human	   voice	   of	   SmartGate;	   they	   spoke	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Prime	   Minister	  




New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  Prime	  Ministers	   collectively;	   and	   they	  held	   the	  pen,	  which	  enabled	  
them	   to	   frame	   the	   narrative,	   including	   making	   explicit	   the	   above	   connections:	   ‘Individuals	  
sometimes	   do	   not	   so	   much	   exercise	   power	   by	   virtue	   of	   who	   they	   are,	   but	   by	   virtue	   of	   which	  
macro-­‐actors	  they	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of’	  (Czarniawska-­‐Joerges	  &	  Hernes,	  2005,	  pp.	  115–116).	   
As	  detailed	  in	  the	  section	  above,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  had	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  accommodating	  the	  
different	  realities	  and	  matters	  of	  concern	  experienced	  by	  the	  other	  agencies.	  The	  Chief	  Executive	  
of	  DPMC	  was	  the	  gatekeeper	  who	  required	  Customs	  to	  present	  to	  Cabinet	  a	  paper	  representing	  a	  
position	   agreed	   by	   all	   three	   border	   agencies	   and	   their	   Ministers.	   One	   official	   recounted	   their	  
experience	  of	  this	  gatekeeper	  role:	  	  
So	  basically	  [the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  DPMC]	  said	  “I’ll	  talk	  to	  the	  other	  Chief	  Executives.	  Can	  you	  
go	  back	  and	  talk	   to	   the	  teams	  that	  are	  working”.	  So	   [Chief	  Executive	  of	  Customs]	  sent	  me	  
back	  into	  a	  meeting	  on	  the	  7th	  floor	  of	  the	  Wellington	  Customhouse	  where	  Immigration	  and	  
our	  people	  had	  been	  locked	  in	  discussion	  for	  two	  or	  three	  hours	  going	  around	  in	  circles,	  and	  I	  
just	  went	  back	  and	  advised	  them	  of	  where	  the	  conversation	  had	  got	  to	  with	  between	  [the	  
Chief	  Executives	  and	  Customs	  and	  DPMC]	  and	  said	  “Look,	  you	  need	  to	  smell	  the	  tea	  leaves,	  
guys.	   	   Prime	   Minister	   wants	   this	   .	   .	   .	   There’s	   already	   collateral	   damage	   been	   done	   .	   .	   .	  	  
because	  of	   the	  way	  we’re	   collectively	   dealing	  with	   this.	   Stay	   focused	  on	   the	  main	   game.”	  
Anyway,	   after	   that,	   the	   next	   day	   I	   think,	   or	   the	   next	   two	   days,	   the	   paper	  was	   confirmed,	  
some	  more	  work	  was	  done	  and	  we	  got	  it	  through	  the	  system	  (Official	  22,	  lines	  506-­‐521).	  
The	   emails	   that	   revealed	   considerable	   anxiety	   about	   the	   wording	   of	   various	   parts	   of	   the	  
SmartGate	  Cabinet	  paper	   lend	   support	   to	   Latour’s	   argument	   that	   facts	   are	  made	  when	   there	   is	  
agreement	  on	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  (Latour,	  1987),	  for	  the	  words	  represent	  more	  than	  just	  the	  
meaning	   of	   the	   text;	   they	   represent	   the	   end	   point	   of	   the	   debates.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	  
transformation	  of	   the	  multiple	  matters	  of	   concern	   into	  a	   single	  matter	  of	   concern,	   and	  a	   single	  
‘owner’	  of	  that	  matter	  of	  concern	  when	  approved	  by	  Cabinet	  became	  a	  ‘matter	  of	  fact’.	  	  Getting	  to	  




were	  negotiated	  and	  renegotiated,	  with	  the	  final	  version	  reflecting	  whose	  voice	  was	  going	  to	  be	  
heard	  in	  history	  –	  that	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  (Latour,	  1987).225	  	  
My	   research	   has	   revealed	   the	   emotions	   involved	   in	   getting	   to	   this	   point	   of	   a	   single	   matter	   of	  
concern.	   Law	  and	  Singleton	  call	   the	  emotion	   felt	  during	  debates	   ‘lived	  experience’	   (Law,	  2004b;	  
Law	  &	   Singleton,	   2006).	   The	   following	   comments	   provide	   some	   insight	   into	   officials’	   emotional	  
responses	  to	  the	  situation:	  
.	  .	  .	  we	  had	  quite	  a	  difficult	  little	  battle	  between	  Customs,	  MAF	  and	  Immigration	  around	  the	  
Cabinet	  paper	  that	  went	  up.	  The	  debate	  was	  around	  being	  very	  clear	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  
extent	  of	  the	  costs,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  benefits,	  and	  where	  the	  productivity	  gains	  would	  come	  
from.	   There	   was	   a	   fair	   bit	   of	   push	   and	   shove	   and	   angst	   around	   all	   of	   that.	   It	   became	  a	  
somewhat	  unpleasant	  process	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  the	  paper	  nailed	  (Official	  13,	  lines	  66-­‐70).	  
	  
SmartGate	  was	  very	  high	  on	  the	  agitation	  list	  within	  Immigration,	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  would	  
achieve	   and	  what	   that	  would	  mean	   for	   Immigration’s	   sort	   of	  mandate	   and	   control	   of	   the	  
people	  flow	  system,	  from	  an	  Immigration	  point	  of	  view	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  190-­‐192).	  
Law	   suggests	   lived	   experience	   becomes	   invisible	   when	   it	   is	   ‘not	   being	   enacted	   elsewhere	   in	   a	  
publicly	   transportable	   form’	   (Law,	   2004b,	   p.	   8).	   In	   the	   SmartGate	   policy	   process,	   the	   ‘lived	  
experience’	   was	   visible	   only	   to	   the	   officials	   involved.	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   debates	   were	  
publicly	  known,	  and	  from	  which	  the	  passions	  could	  only	  be	  inferred,	  was	  through	  a	  single	  article	  in	  
the	   technology	   section	   of	  www.Stuff.co.nz	   on	   5	   April	   2010,	   drawn	   from	   an	   Audit	   New	   Zealand	  
report	  on	  the	  SmartGate	  procurement	  process.226	  	  	  
The	  Cabinet	  paper	  played	  a	   central	   role	   in	   turning	  agencies’	  matters	  of	   concern	   into	  matters	  of	  
fact	  as	  both	  an	  actant	  and	  an	  ‘obligatory	  point	  of	  passage’	  (Latour,	  1987);	  it	  caused	  people	  to	  act	  
in	   certain	   ways,	   and	   getting	   to	   a	   version	   with	   agreed	   wording	   was	   a	   point	   through	   which	   the	  
actors/actants	   (i.e.	   officials	   and	   SmartGate)	   had	   to	  pass	   to	   ensure	   their	   interests	  were	  met	   (i.e.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 This research is limited by lack of access to the same level of data from agencies other than Customs. However, given 
Customs’ central role in the BSGG and lead agency on the SmartGate policy process, I submit that we can assume the key 
debates and circulating meanings have been represented. Given the available evidence, it would also be reasonable to assume 
that internal discussions in and between other border agencies were occurring at the same time. 





continued	  political	  and	  public	  sector	  support).	  	  Figure	  10	  below	  depicts	  these	  dynamics.	  
Figure	  10. Policy	  translations	  	  -­‐	  getting	  from	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  matters	  of	  fact	  
	  
	  
6.4.2.2.5 The border sector narrative 
The	   three	   border	   agencies	   were	   part	   of	   the	   same	   ‘border	   sector’	   grouping,	   led	   by	   the	   Chief	  
Executives.	   However,	   during	   the	   policy	   process	   for	   commissioning	   SmartGate,	   their	   debates	  
indicated	  they	  were	  operating	  within	  different	  paradigms.	  Latour’s	   insight	  about	  the	  intersection	  
of	  different	  paradigms	  helps	  illuminate	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  SmartGate	  debates	  detailed	  above.	  He	  
argues	  ‘no	  one	  lives	  in	  a	  “culture”,	  shares	  a	  “paradigm”,	  or	  belongs	  to	  a	  “society”	  before	  he	  or	  she	  
clashes	  with	  others’	  (Latour,	  1987,	  p.	  201).	  ‘They	  [the	  clashes]	  reveal	  the	  extent	  of	  a	  network	  and	  





Viewing	  the	  BSGG	  this	  way,	  it	  appears	  not	  to	  have	  been	  a	  stabilised	  network.	  The	  key	  actors	  had	  
not	   reached	   a	   point	  where	   they	  were	   clear	   about	  what	  would	   stay	   inside	   and	  what	  would	   fall	  
through.	  The	  BSGG	  grouping	  was	  a	  means	  by	  which	  things	  could	  be	  made	  to	  happen	  but	  it	  didn’t	  
of	   itself	   cause	   people	   to	   do	   things,	   that	   is,	   it	   didn’t	   create	   clashes	   with	   others.	   	   However,	   the	  
determination	  of	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  DPMC	  to	  get	  the	  three	  agencies	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  SmartGate	  
proposal	   indicates	   that	   the	  BSGG	  was	  seen	  by	  others	  as	  a	  network	  and	  therefore	   the	  key	  actors	  
were	  being	  driven	  by	  others	  to	  make	  it	  so.	  	  	  
6.5 Story	  3:	  The	  longer	  term	  work	  -­‐	  March	  to	  August	  2009	  
In	  parallel	  to	  the	  approval	  process	  for	  SmartGate,	  the	  ‘longer	  term	  work’	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  Chief	  
Executive	  of	  DPMC	  at	  his	  6	  March	  meeting	  with	  the	  BSGG	  followed	  a	  quite	  different	  path	  in	  New	  
Zealand.	   It	  was	  border	  sector-­‐focused	  and	  was	   intended	  to	  be	  overtly	   trans-­‐Tasman.	   	   I	  was	  very	  
involved	  in	  this	  work,	  being	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  representative	  on	  the	  working	  group	  set	  up	  
to	  design	  a	  new	  model	  for	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel.	  
Ten	  days	   after	   the	   joint	   statement,	   on	  12	  March,	   Customs	  hosted	   the	   first	   of	   two	  multi-­‐agency	  
workshops	  held	  that	  month.	  The	  first	  was	  called	  by	  DPMC,	  as	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  at	  
which	  the	  official	  from	  DPMC	  set	  the	  scene	  with	  expectations	  and	  key	  messages	  –	  very	  important	  
for	  getting	  border	  officials	  to	  understand	  what	  was	  important	  and	  what	  they	  had	  to	  do.	  The	  record	  
of	  the	  workshop	  shows	  these	  expectations	  very	  clearly.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  work	  required	  of	  border	  
agencies.	  Note	  the	  strong	  narrative	  grounded	   in	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  but	  focused	  on	  
the	  wishes	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  Prime	  Minister:	  
Recent	  events	   (including	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Prime	  Ministerial	   talks)	   require	  border	  agencies	  
to	  accelerate	  their	  work	  programme	  to	  provide	  a	  visible,	  tangible	  difference	  this	  year,	  with	  
some	  ‘announceables’	  by	  20	  August.	  
and	  
• The	  focus	  on	  trans-­‐Tasman	  is	  the	  start	  of	  a	  wider	  programme	  of	  work.	  The	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
area,	  focussing	  on	  NZ	  and	  Australian	  passport	  holders,	  enables	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  
facilitation	  to	  be	  delivered	  to	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  travellers.	  
• The	  PM	  has	  travelled	  across	  the	  US/Canadian	  border	  and	  he	  wants	  that	  experience	  for	  




however	  the	  report	  will	  benefit	  from	  analysis	  of	  other	  international	  models.	  
• The	  PM	  is	  looking	  for	  more	  alignment	  and	  harmonisation	  with	  Australia.	  227	  
The	  second	  expectation	  was	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  work	  to	  be	  done.	  The	  group	  had	  to	  have	  a	  draft	  plan	  
in	   a	   week,	   a	   draft	   report	   to	   BSGG	   members	   by	   24	   March	   and	   a	   final	   report	   to	   DPMC	   by	   27	  
March.228	  	  	  
In	   the	   workshop,	   officials	   traversed	   a	   large	   number	   of	   operational	   considerations,	   such	   as	  
legislation,	   airport	   check-­‐in	   times,	   infrastructure,	   costs,	   ownership,	   assumptions,	   and	   an	   agreed	  
future	  state.	  The	  Border	  Secretariat	  ended	  the	  written	  record	  with	  the	  following	  narrative	  about	  
possibility	  and	  opportunity:	  	  
Points	  to	  Remember	  as	  we	  Proceed	  
• This	  work	  is	  a	  high	  priority	  for	  the	  PM.	  
• This	  work	   presents	   a	   significant	   opportunity	   for	   the	   border	   sector	   to	   demonstrate	  
collaborative	  working,	  to	  deliver	  quality	  joined	  up	  advice,	  and	  to	  see	  some	  significant	  
results	  in	  a	  short	  timeframe.	  
• We	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  what’s	  possible,	  and	  not	  be	  constrained	  by	  current	  barriers.	  If	  
there	  are	  barriers	   they	  should	  be	  noted	  –	  as	  well	  as	  what	   it	  would	  take	  to	  remove	  
them.	  
• Within	  what	  is	  possible,	  or	  what	  is	  currently	  happening,	  we	  should	  also	  consider	  what	  
can	  be	  accelerated.	  
• We	  need	   to	   identify	   the	  positives	  and	  negatives	  of	   the	  various	  options,	  put	   this	   to	  
Ministers,	  and	  they	  will	  decide	  on	  the	  course	  of	  action.229	  
The	   second	   workshop,	   held	   over	   three	   days	   less	   than	   a	   week	   later,	   resulted	   in	   a	   future	   state	  
paragraph:	  
The	  ideal	  future	  state	  is	  a	  model	  based	  upon	  recommended	  international	  practice	  (including	  
the	   International	   Air	   Transport	   Association	   Simplified	   Passenger	   Travel	   Interest	   Group	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 ‘Trans-Tasman Travel Workshop 12 March 2009 – Key Points and Agreed Actions’, pp. 1-2. 
228 Ibid. 




recommended	   process	   flow),	   the	   sharing	   of	   data,	   and	   the	   use	   of	   emerging	   technology	  
(including	   automation).	   It	   is	   designed	   to	   simplify	   the	   travel	   experience	   for	   passengers	  
without	  compromising	  security	  and	  border	  control.	   It	   requires	  cooperation	  between	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  governments	  and	  their	  agencies	  and	  travel	  industry	  stakeholders.230	  
Evident	  from	  the	  record	  of	  the	  workshop	   is	  the	  referencing	  back	  to	  earlier	  work	  and	  decisions	  –	  
legislation,	  a	  Cabinet	  decision	  made	  in	  2001	  that	  required	  100%	  border	  screening	  for	  biosecurity,	  a	  
2007	  project	  to	  introduce	  a	  standard	  for	  passenger	  processing,	  and	  the	  International	  Air	  Transport	  
Association	  (IATA)	  Simplified	  Travel	  Processing	  model.	  	  The	  written	  records	  reiterate	  some	  of	  the	  
DPMC	   requirements	   (‘PM	   wants	   “enhanced	   passenger	   experience	   for	   NZ,	   Australian	   passport	  
holders”‘),	  embellished	  with	  additional	  ideas,	  such	  as:	  
‘Key	  words:	  visibility,	  harmonisation,	  simple’	  
‘Include	   international	   comparison	   for	   context,	   incl,	   NZ	   [sic]	   island	   advantage	   and	  
biosecurity	  requirements.’	  
‘Stakeholders	  crucial’	  
‘Articulate	  a	  benefit	   story,	  why	   is	   it	  better,	  how	  does	   it	  benefit	   the	  economy?’	   ‘Highlight	  
the	  opportunities	   the	  TT231	  provides:	  similar	  quarantine	  processes,	  can	  trial	  both	  sides	  of	  
the	  Tasman’	  
And	  highlights	  concerns:	  
‘Are	  there	  barriers	  and	  what	  are	  they?’	  
‘Our	  proposal	  will	  not	  eliminate	  queues’	  
‘.	   .	   .	  we	  lack	  coordination	  –	  we	  need	  to	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  problem	  under	  control	  –	  and	  
that	  would	  benefit	  from	  other	  work’.232	  
What	  we	  see	  here	   is	  a	  record	  of	  the	  DPMC	  ‘directives’	  translated	   into	  officials’	  own	  terms.233	  Of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Border Secretariat, ‘Future State – paragraph agreed at Trans-Tasman Travel workshop 17 March 2009’. 
231 Trans-Tasman. 
232 Ibid.  
233 The last point could be interpreted as “bureaucracy-maximising”. This is a term developed by William A. Niskanen in his 
seminal 1971 book, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, in which he argued that bureaucrats maximise their own interests 
in expenditure of their organisation’s discretionary budget which contributes to the growth of the state (Blais & Dion, 1991).  
In the situation above, officials are not dealing with a budget, but they are dealing with others’ likely perceptions of their 




particular	   interest	   is	   the	  continued	   language	  of	  possibility.	  The	  Border	  Secretariat	   translated	  the	  
progress	   to	   senior	   officials	   from	   the	   border	   sector	   agencies234	   into	   a	   positive	   story,	   but	   with	   a	  
caution:	   ‘Agencies	  will	   need	   to	   clearly	   identify	  what	   is	   doable	   in	   the	   short	   term,	  medium,	   long	  
term.	  This	  could	  be	  a	  risk	  from	  a	  cohesive	  sector	  approach’.235	  
From	   the	   workshop	   material,	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   quickly	   developed	   and	   circulated	   draft	  
options	   and	   recommendations	   for	   the	   draft	   paper	   for	   the	   BSGG.	   Rather	   than	   starting	  with	   the	  
barriers	   and	   saying	  how	   to	  get	  over	   them,	   the	  options	   focused	  on	  what	  was	  possible	   and	  what	  
would	  be	  needed	  to	  implement	  the	  options.	  	  
The	   records	   show	   a	   version	   of	   the	   collated	   comments,	   with	   each	   agency’s	   input	   showing	   as	   a	  
different	   colour.236	   Here,	   technology	   (the	   word	   processing	   programme)	   was	   an	   actant,	   as	   the	  
Border	   Secretariat	   used	   it	   to	   show	   all	   the	   participants	   how	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   had	  
incorporated	   their	   comments.	   It	   also	   created	   transparency	   for	   the	   agencies	   about	   what	   one	  
another	  had	  said.237	  
On	  27	  March,	   the	  Chair	   of	   the	  BSGG	   signed	  off	   and	   sent	   the	  paper238	   to	   the	  Chief	   Executive	  of	  
DPMC	   in	   preparation	   for	   a	   discussion	  with	   him	   and	   his	   officials	   on	   2	   April.	   Key	  messages	   from	  
DPMC	   picked	   up	   in	   the	   paper	   were	   that	   there	   would	   be	   substantial	   progress	   that	   year,	   for	  
announcement	   in	   August	   2009,	   resulting	   in	   changes	   that	   would	   be	   akin	   to	   a	   domestic	   travel	  
experience.	   In	   building	   the	   case	   for	   the	   proposals,	   the	   paper	   drew	   on	   ‘.	   .	   .	   the	   importance	   of	  
“reducing	  the	  impact	  of	  borders”‘	  (para.	  5)	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  SEM,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ANZLF	  in	  that,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  Key’s	  	  interest	  in	  the	  US/Canada	  border	  model.	  
Translations	   by	   officials	   expanded	   on	   those	   ideas	   with	   ‘reducing	   interventions	   where	   possible,	  
“hiding”239	  processes	  where	  possible,	  and	  ultimately	  working	  towards	  greater	  harmonisation	  with	  
Australia,	   followed	  by	  a	  possible	  common	  border’	   (para.	  7).This	  was	  the	  first	  overt	  mention	  of	  a	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common	  border.	  Embellishments	  were	  seen	  in	  details	  such	  as	  ‘a	  TTT240	  proposal	  which	  accelerates	  
existing	   passenger	   facilitation	   initiatives	   and	   proposes	   some	   new	   initiatives’	   (para.	   2)	   and	   ‘the	  
existing	   Border	   Sector	  Governance	  Group	  work	   programme	  provides	   a	   solid	   platform	   for	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  travel	  developments’	  (para.	  13).	  	  
The	   paper	   presented	   three	   options,	   the	   third	   and	   most	   extreme	   option	   being	   ‘a	   step	   change’	  
(para.	  20),	  ‘a	  dramatically	  different	  passenger	  experience	  coupled	  with	  enhanced	  government	  risk	  
assessment	  and	  response	  capability’	   (para.	  21)	  and	   ‘multiple	  elements’	   that	  would	  need,	  among	  
other	  things,	  ‘to	  be	  supported	  by	  new	  information	  systems’	  (para.	  22).	  	  
The	   paper	   signalled	   areas	   needing	   further	   attention,	   including	   alignment	   with	   Australia	   and	  
engagement	  with	  MFAT,	  and	  engagement	  with	  stakeholders.	  	  At	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  BSGG	  and	  the	  
Chief	  Executive	  of	  DPMC	  on	  2	  April,	   the	   latter	  commented	   that	   ‘the	  paper	   responds	  well	   to	   the	  
issue	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  raised’	  (i.e.	  officials	  had	  translated	  it	  well).	  Chief	  Executives	  noted	  the	  
need	  for	  more	  detail,	  building	  on	  the	  ideas	  in	  the	  paper,	  ‘and	  what	  the	  likely	  dividend	  would	  be	  for	  
New	  Zealand’.241	  	  
The	  BSGG’s	  endorsement	  of	   this	  paper	   and	   its	   subsequent	   acceptance	  by	   the	   recipient	  was	   the	  
first	   major	   stabilising	   point	   for	   the	   work.	   However,	   as	   the	   events	   following	   will	   illustrate,	   the	  
narrative	  was	  by	  no	  means	  stable.	  
Throughout	  April,	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  also	  May,	  officials	  had	  been	  expressing	  varying	  degrees	  of	  
concern	  about	  the	  risks	  from	  working	  so	  fast,	  given	  the	  number	  of	  unknowns	  and	  uncertainties.242	  
In	  an	  update	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  workshop	  I	  had	  facilitated,	  I	  noted	  ‘.	   .	   .	  
another	  important	  conclusion	  was	  confirming	  that	  what	  we	  are	  proposing	  for	  TT	  is	  complex	  –	  we	  
won’t	  really	  know	  the	  effect	  of	  changing	  our	  processes	  so	  dramatically,	  so	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  test	  
our	  assumptions	  as	  we	  go’.243	  	  
There	  were	  also	  tensions,	  such	  as	  the	  artificial	  separation	  of	  the	  SmartGate	  stream	  of	  work	  from	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the	  longer	  term	  work,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  between	  officials	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  that	  saw	  New	  
Zealand	   Customs	   officials	   having	   to	   be	  mindful	   of	   how	   they	   referred	   to	   SmartGate.244	   Another	  
point	  of	  tension	  was	  disagreement	  on	  how	  agencies	  were	  representing	  their	  different	  roles,	  and	  
most	  of	  all,	  the	  very	  tight	  timeframes	  –	  one	  day	  to	  provide	  feedback	  on	  a	  paper	  for	  a	  meeting	  of	  
the	   Officials	   Committee	   for	   Strategy	   Cabinet	   Committee	   (OSTR),	   and	   five	   hours	   for	   the	   Border	  
Secretariat	   to	   incorporate	  those	  comments	  and	  send	  the	  paper	  to	  OSTR	  before	  the	  meeting	  the	  
next	  afternoon.	  The	  Border	  Secretariat	  then	  had	  to	  incorporate	  OSTR	  comments	  for	  submission	  to	  
the	   Cabinet	   Office	   three	   working	   days	   later.	   This	   timeframe	   provided	   little	   time	   for	   review	   or	  
reflection.245	  
On	   30	   April,	   the	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   on	   the	   working	   group	   held	   their	   first	   meeting	   with	  
Australian	   officials,	   in	  which	   each	   country’s	   initiatives	  were	   shared	   and	   discussed.	   The	  minutes	  
highlight	  that	  an	  unknown	  for	  Australian	  senior	  officials	  was	  what	  the	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister’s	  
wish	   for	   further	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	  developments	  meant	   in	  practical	   terms.246	  There	  were	   two	  
‘Agreed	   next	   steps’	   from	   the	  meeting	   –	   to	   agree	   on	   shared	  messages	   for	   communication	  with	  
industry	   (both	   Customs	   Chief	   Executives	   were	   due	   to	   meet	   with	   their	   respective	   industry	  
representatives	   over	   the	   following	   few	   weeks),	   and	   to	   gather	   more	   information	   to	   inform	   an	  
upcoming	  HLSG	  meeting.	  
On	   4	  May,	   the	  Minister	   of	   Customs	   introduced	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   paper	   to	   the	   Strategy	  
Cabinet	   Committee.247	   Notable	   was	   the	   use	   of	   an	   A3-­‐sized	   paper	   covered	   with	   diagrams	   and	  
minimal	  text	  as	  the	  main	  communication	  device.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  early	  public	  service	  examples	  
of	   this	   form	   of	   briefing.	   	   The	   first	   page	   distinguishes	   between	   a	   common	   border	   and	   an	   inter-­‐
border,	  an	  inter-­‐border	  being	  ‘a	  practical	  first	  step	  towards	  a	  common	  border’	  (phase	  2	  on	  page	  2	  
of	  the	  briefing).248	  The	  second	  page	  sets	  out	  a	  two-­‐phased	  representation	  of	  proposed	  changes	  to	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  border	   flows.	  An	  aide	  memoire	   I	  wrote	   for	   the	  Minister	  noted	   that	  with	  Phase	  2,	  
‘significantly	   increased	   numbers	   of	   passengers	   are	   able	   to	   experience	   the	   near	   domestic	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experience’.249	  Page	  2	  of	  the	  A3	  is	  reproduced	  below.	  
Figure	  11. Options	  proposed	  for	  changes	  to	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  flows	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Ministers	   decided	   that	   officials	   should	   work	   on	   the	   Phase	   Two	  model	   and	   asked	   for	   a	   further	  
report	  on	  details,	  costings	  and	  timings	  of	  the	  initiatives	  to	  achieve	  this.	  The	  timing	  of	  this	  report	  
was	  set	  for	  6	  July.250	  
The	  Border	   Secretariat	   continued	   to	   coordinate	  activity	  with	  New	  Zealand	  border	   agencies,	   and	  
also	   kept	   in	   contact	  with	   the	  ACBPS	   lead	   for	   the	  Australian	  border	   agencies.251	  On	  21	  May,	   the	  
Border	   Secretariat	  held	  a	  workshop	   to	   flesh	  out	   the	   content	  of	   the	  detailed	  Cabinet	  paper.	   The	  
minutes	   from	  this	  workshop	  note	  a	  number	  of	   issues,	  assumptions	  and	  unknowns,	   reports	   from	  
DoL	  and	  MAF	  officials	  on	  their	  Australian	  counterpart	  agencies’	  thinking	  about	  the	  work,	  and	  a	  list	  
of	  action	  points.252	  	  
In	  early	   June,	  New	  Zealand	   received	  a	   formal	  paper	   from	  Australia	  on	  options	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
passenger	   facilitation.	   New	   Zealand’s	   response	   was	   to	   be	   communicated	   from	   New	   Zealand’s	  
DPMC	   to	   Australia’s	   PM&C,	   and	   would	   inform	   the	   Border	   Ministers’	   paper	   to	   Cabinet	   (now	  
scheduled	  for	  22	  July).	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  discussions	  on	  options	  were	  to	  have	  been	  assisted	   in	  early	  
July	  by	   talks	  between	   the	   two	  Ministers	   responsible	   for	  Customs,	  but	   the	  dates	  were	  no	   longer	  
suitable.	  
By	  late	  June,	  the	  timeframe	  for	  completing	  the	  detailed	  Cabinet	  paper	  was	  getting	  very	  tight.	  The	  
Border	  Secretariat	  distributed	  a	  timeline	  that	  required	  13	  steps	  to	  be	  taken	  between	  24	  June	  and	  
27	   July.253	   In	   parallel	   to	   this	   paper,	   MAF	   officials	   were	   preparing	   a	   paper	   on	   streamlining	  
biosecurity	  processes	  at	  airports,	  on	  which	  they	  consulted	  with	  the	  other	  border	  agencies.254	  Both	  
papers	  cross-­‐referenced	  each	  other	  and	  Cabinet	  was	  asked	  to	  associate	  the	  two	  papers.	  	  
The	  papers	  were	  duly	  submitted	  on	  22	  July,	  and	  Cabinet	  approved	  the	  ‘announceables’	  for	  the	  20	  
August	   Australia-­‐New	   Zealand	   Prime	   Ministerial	   meeting.255	   The	   Joint	   Statement	   issued	   on	   20	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August	   2009	   read	   ‘The	   Prime	  Ministers	   also	   agreed	   to	   a	   joint	   plan	  to	   streamline	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
travel,	  with	  improvements	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  early	  as	  next	  year’,256	  and:	  
	  	   both	  governments	  would	  bring	  sustained	  focus	  to	  making	  new	  progress	  in:	  
• further	  streamlining	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel,	  working	  towards	  full	  implementation	  of	  
a	   new	   trans-­‐Tasman	   passenger	   clearance	  model;	   and	   work	   on	   streamlining	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  goods	  trade	  (Key	  &	  Rudd,	  2009b).	  
 Narratives 6.5.1
This	  story	  contains	  three	  narratives	  –	  one	  about	  ‘what’	  was	  to	  be	  produced,	  another	  about	  ‘how’	  it	  
was	  produced	  and	  the	  third	  about	  ‘why’	  it	  was	  produced.	  	  
The	  ‘what’	  narrative	  is	  straight-­‐forward.	  New	  Zealand’s	  DPMC	  asked	  for	  a	  paper,	  it	  was	  delivered,	  
and	  then	  developed	  further	  for	  Cabinet	  to	  decide	  on.	  Cabinet	  chose	  a	  model,	  and	  asked	  for	  more	  
detail	   in	   a	   report.	   Officials	   developed	   the	   report,	   and	   the	   Prime	   Ministers	   announced	   some	  
deliverables.	   	   There	   were	   some	   tensions	   and	   uncertainties	   along	   the	   way,	   but	   DPMC	   kept	   the	  
pressure	   on	   border	   agencies,	   and	   they	   delivered	   on	   time	   and	  met	   expectations.	   	   Contact	   with	  
Australia	  was	  limited,	  but	  enough	  for	  the	  deliverables	  to	  be	  jointly	  agreed.	  
The	   ‘how’	   narrative	   has	   three	   key	   components	   that	   affected	   action	   –	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Border	  
Secretariat	  as	  a	  mediator,	  the	  role	  of	  translations	  and	  inscriptions	  in	  creating	  shared	  meaning	  and	  
providing	  a	  visible	  depiction	  of	  the	  future	  vision.	  	  
The	   ‘why’	   narrative	   is	   about	   providing	   visible	   improvement	   for	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	  
passport	   holders	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year	   through	   streamlining	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel.	   This	  was	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 With further detail:  
‘The plan includes roll out of the automated SmartGate passenger clearance system in New Zealand, and improvements to 
screening and processing for low risk passengers on both sides of the Tasman.  They also agreed to trials of direct exit paths 
for passengers and the transfer between Australia and New Zealand of x-ray images for more efficient biosecurity 
screening.   To foster long-term improvements, Australia and New Zealand will explore further streamlining passenger 
processing through studies on pre-clearing passengers at point of departure and through expanding and integrating 





provide	   a	   path	   to	   a	   common	   border,	   as	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   SEM.	   A	   secondary	  
narrative	  linked	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  work	  to	  pacification	  of	  people	  flows	  more	  generally.	  
 Uncertainties across the narratives affecting action 6.5.1.1
The	  uncertainties	   during	   this	   stage	   of	   the	  work	   created	  many	   instabilities.	  Officials	   experienced	  
doubts	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  the	  long	  term	  model	  would	  be	  comprised	  of,	  how	  the	  different	  
parts	  of	  it	  would	  work	  and	  what	  the	  long	  term	  effects	  would	  be	  –	  	  despite	  the	  apparent	  confidence	  
of	   words	   in	   the	   reports	   such	   as	   ‘a	   dramatically	   different	   passenger	   experience	   coupled	   with	  
enhanced	   government	   risk	   assessment	   and	   response	   capability’.	   The	   uncertainties	   affected	   the	  
actions	  of	  officials:	  
.	  .	  .	  often	  what	  happens	  is	  you	  have	  that	  broad	  political	  statement,	  like	  the	  2009	  statement,	  
and	  so	  officials	  get	  excited,	  try	  to	  come	  up	  with	  solutions	  to	  match	  that,	  and	  the	  solutions	  are	  
a	  bit	  vague	  and	  unclear,	  and	  therefore	  in	  discussion	  we	  were	  never	  really	  sure	  between	  the	  
two	  countries	  what	  we	  were	  actually	  trying	  to	  do	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  176-­‐180).	  
Tight	   timeframes	  meant	   officials	   were	   not	   confident	   about	   the	   assumptions	   they	   were	  making	  
about	  how	  things	  would	  work	  in	  the	  new	  design,	  or	  that	  the	  risks	  were	  manageable.	  Dates	  were	  
unstable	  –	  dates	  for	  papers	  to	  be	  discussed	  by	  Cabinet;	  dates	  of	  Ministers’	  meetings.	  In	  the	  former	  
case,	  this	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  by	  providing	  more	  time	  to	  develop	  the	  required	  detail;	  in	  the	  latter,	  
it	   removed	  an	  opportunity	   to	   test	  New	  Zealand’s	   thinking	  with	  Australia	  at	   the	  ministerial	   level.	  
This	  would	  have	  reduced	  one	  area	  of	  uncertainty.	  
The	   intersections	   between	   the	   actor-­‐network	   that	  was	   implementing	   SmartGate	   and	   the	   actor-­‐
network	   that	  was	   designing	   the	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Travel	  model	   and	   producing	   ‘announceables’	   for	  
the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  on	  20	  August	  created	  instability	  in	  relationships,	  in	  terminology	  and	  
in	  the	  material	  being	  produced	  for	  the	  longer	  term	  work.	  	  
Uncertainty	   was	   present	   in	   Australia,	   when,	   by	   the	   end	   of	   April,	   neither	   the	   expression	   of	   the	  
Prime	   Minister’s	   desire	   for	   further	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   developments	   was	   clear	   in	   a	   practical	  
sense,	  nor	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  Government	  to	  provide	  funding.257	  This	  uncertainty	  ensured	  that	  





this	   stage	   of	   the	   work	   would	   not	   be	   joint,	   though	   the	   New	   Zealand	   remit	   was	   to	   look	   for	  
opportunities	  for	  joint	  work.258	  
 The ‘how’ narrative 6.5.1.2
The	  New	  Zealand	  working	  group	  set	  up	  to	  design	  the	  new	  model	  was	  the	  physical	  manifestation	  of	  
what	   became	   a	   new	   actor-­‐network	   that	   was	   set	   up	   to	   build	   another	   actor-­‐network	   clustered	  
around	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  new	  trans-­‐Tasman	  model.	  As	  for	  the	  SmartGate	  story,	  the	  actor-­‐network	  
linked	   to	   the	  Prime	  Minister,	  but	   in	   this	  group,	   that	   link	  was	  mediated	  by	  DPMC,	  who	  provided	  
strong	  direction	  that	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  wanted	  a	  new	  model,	  and	  who	  translated	  
the	  Prime	  Minister’s	   intent	   into	  a	  different	  name	  from	  the	  one	  chosen	  by	  officials.	  The	  officials’	  
name	  was	   connected	   to	   the	   IATA	   ‘simplified	   travel’	  work;	   the	  DPMC	  name	   connected	   to	   trans-­‐
Tasman.	  
The	   new	   actor-­‐network	   drew	   on	   the	   existing	   connections	   created	   by	   the	   Border	   Sector	   –	   its	  
governance	  structure	  for	  decision-­‐making,	  its	  work	  programme	  and,	  most	  significantly,	  the	  Border	  
Secretariat	  –	  and	  on	  New	  Zealand	  Customs’	  connections	  with	  ACBPS.	  	  The	  connection	  of	  the	  New	  
Zealand	   border	   agency	   actor-­‐network	   with	   Australia	   occurred	   via	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   –	   a	  
connection	   that	   was	  made	   easier	   by	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   hosting	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   and	  
having	   established	   connections	   into	   the	   ACBPS,	   which	   was	   the	   lead	   agency	   for	   the	   Australian	  
border	  agencies.	  	  
In	  this	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  work,	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  actor-­‐network	  comprised	  the	  connection	  between	  
the	  Border	  Secretariat	  and	  the	  nominated	  person	  in	  ACBPS.	  There	  were	  other	  connections,	  such	  as	  
the	  bilateral	  connections	  between	  the	  respective	  Customs,	  Immigration	  and	  Biosecurity	  agencies,	  
but	  they	  were	  more	  an	  intersection	  than	  a	  part	  of	  it,	  except,	  perhaps,	  the	  Customs	  connection.	  
The	  Border	  Secretariat	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	   in	  getting	  to	  action,	  ensuring	  a	  consistent	  and	  single	  
message	  from	  New	  Zealand,	  but	  also	  gatekeeping	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  translating	  the	  2	  March	  
political	   statement	   into	   action	   and	   translating	   the	   many	   comments	   on	   the	   draft	   papers	   that	  
occurred	  during	  this	  period,	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  final	  arbiter:	  
And	  when	  we	   took	   it	   [the	  draft	  paper]	   there,	   it	  was	   like,	  well	   –	   I	  mean,	  not	   in	   a	   vacuum,	  





obviously.	  It	  was	  like,	  well	  ‘this	  is	  can't	  be	  reconciled’	  .	  .	  .	  “So	  actually,	  I	  know	  more	  about	  this	  
than	   they	  do,	   right	   now”	  and	   I'd	  worked	  with	   [the	  Australian	  official]	   .	   .	   .	   [we]	   had	  had	   a	  
number	  of	  pre-­‐conversations,	  so	   in	  a	  way,	  we	  worked	  out	  the	  detail	  of	   the	  final,	  and	  then	  
this	  was	  the	  sort	  of	  .	  .	  .	  playout	  of	  that	  process,	  and	  then	  an	  agreement	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  407-­‐
412).	  
The	  Border	  Secretariat	  was	  more	  than	  a	  coordinating	  body.	  It	  developed	  or	  provided	  the	  definitive	  
version	  of	  documents	  and	  artefacts	  that	  helped	  stabilise	  the	  work	  enough	  to	  enable	  decisions	  to	  
be	  made	  and	  the	  next	  steps	  to	  be	  identified.	  It	  played	  a	  key	  mediation	  role	  in	  ensuring	  deadlines	  
were	  met,	  messages	  from	  DPMC	  were	  correctly	  incorporated	  into	  the	  discussions	  and	  reports,	  and	  
in	  connecting	  with	  Australia.	  The	  Border	  Secretariat’s	  role	  changed	  the	  way	  in	  which	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
work	  was	  undertaken:	  
An	  interesting	  point	  that	  stands	  out	  to	  me	  about	  that	  particular	  announcement	  –	  the	  2009	  
PMs’	   announcement	   –	   is	   that	   a	   lot	   of	   that	   activity	   was	   done	   by	   the	   border	   sector.	   So	   –	  
especially	  post	  that	  2009	  announcement	  –	  where	  we	  would	  have	  previously	  had	  individual	  
dialogues	  with	  Customs	  and	  the	  various	  agencies	  –	  MAF	  for	  example	  would	  have	  dialogue	  
with	   its	   counterpart.	   Post-­‐2009,	   a	   lot	   of	   that	   was	   actually	   done	   by	   the	   Secretariat,	   in	  
particular	  the	  travel	  work	  that	  was	  announced	  in	  that	  statement	  (Official	  7,	  lines	  36-­‐41).	  
The	  unique	  qualities	  of	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  contributed	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  this	  
role:	  
And	  I	  think	  one	  thing	  I	  would	  say	  from	  a	  policy	  point	  of	  view,	  this	  wasn't	  a	  typical	  'of	  the	  time'	  
policy	  process.	  It	  wasn't	  perfect,	  it	  wasn't	  all	  consulted	  .	  .	  .	  It	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  sort	  of	  pragmatic	  
strategy	  and	  operational	  delivery	  and	  it	  was	  sort	  of	  more	  of	  a	  hodgepodge	  of	  things	  –	  “get	  
something	  moving”	  –	  which	  is	  why	  I	  think	  the	  Secretariat	  in	  the	  end	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  good	  
place	  to	  do	  it,	  because	  we	  weren't	  a	  policy	  shop	  at	  all.	  You	  know,	  we	  wouldn't	  be	  at	  risk	  of	  
not	  doing	  the	  normal	  process	  or	  doing	  our	  standard	  or	  whatever,	  'cause	  we	  didn't	  have	  one.	  
We	  didn't	  have	  a	  norm	  or	  a	  standard	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  337-­‐344).	  
6.5.1.2.1 How officials’ translations affect their actions 
A	   series	   of	   translations	   occurred	   after	   the	   release	   of	   the	   Prime	   Ministers’	   joint	   statement.	  




oversee	   the	   ‘new	  model’	  work	   indicate	   they	  were	  working	   from	   a	   brief	   from	   the	  New	   Zealand	  
Prime	  Minister.	  Border	  sector	  officials	  then	  set	  about	  translating	  that	  intention	  into	  action:	  ‘I	  guess	  
the	   thing	   that	  happened	   in	  2009	  was	  we	  all	  of	  a	   sudden	  had	  a	  deadline	  or	  a	   report.	   There	  was	  
some	  momentum,	  and	  the	  structures	  came	  around	  that.	  So	  there	  was	  much	  greater	  coordination’	  
(Official	  7,	  lines	  56-­‐58).	  
The	  task	  of	  officials	  was	  to	  translate	  the	  2	  March	  2009	  political	  statement	  into	  action.	  	  The	  formal	  
and	  informal	  documents	  present	  part	  of	  how	  that	  was	  done;	  the	  interviews	  fleshed	  out	  the	  way	  in	  
which	   the	   translations	  occurred.	  One	  official	  described	  how	   the	   first	   task	   for	   the	  working	  group	  
was	  to	  ‘get	  collective	  buy-­‐in	  that	  there	  was	  a	  task	  here	  which	  actually	  had	  substance	  to	  it’,	  since	  
‘aspects	   of	   this	   have	   all	   been	   tried	   before’	   (Official	   16).	   The	  minutes	   of	   the	   first	  working	   group	  
workshop	  show	  how	  the	  participants	  explored	  that	  task	  from	  many	  angles.	  The	  official	  continued:	  	  
.	  .	  .	  so	  despite	  advice	  twenty	  five	  years	  ago,	  actually	  it	  was	  a	  new	  thing,	  so	  I	  think	  part	  of	  what	  
we	  were	  doing	  was	  just	  reconnecting	  on	  the	  current	  task,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  new	  
political	  lead	  interest	  in	  achieving	  something.	  So	  kind	  of	  clarifying	  the	  instruction	  (Official	  16,	  
lines	  132-­‐135).	  
Here,	  Official	  16	  separated	  the	  current	  task	  from	  the	  past.	  The	  ‘aspects	  of	  this	  have	  all	  been	  tried	  
before’	  was	  a	  kind	  of	  fact,	  particularly	  for	  the	  officials	  involved	  who	  had	  experienced	  these	  earlier	  
attempts.259	  What	  is	  significant	  about	  Official	  16’s	  statement	  is	  that	  they	  translated	  this	  ‘fact’	  back	  
into	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  by	  producing	  new	  evidence.	  	  
One-­‐day	   turnarounds	   for	   feedback,	   and	   sometimes	   less,	   challenged	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   Border	  
Secretariat	   in	  particular	  to	  meet	  those	  deadlines.	   In	  this	  respect,	  the	  very	  tight	  timeframes	  were	  
an	  actant	  –	  they	  made	  officials	  act	  in	  certain	  ways	  and	  they	  sped	  up	  the	  processes	  of	  translation.	  
Translation	  of	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  did	  occur	  with	  Australian	  officials:	  
Yes,	  we	  did	  talk	  to	  Australia,	  but	  what	  does	  a	  common	  border	  actually	  mean	  and	  the	  factors	  
that	  would	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  and	  what	  are	  the	  types	  of	  things	  that	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  
do.	   So	   that	   was	   more	   .	   .	   .	   “Yeah,	   we	   do	   have	   a	   job	   to	   do.	   Yes,	   but	   also	   what	   are	   the	  
parameters	  of	  that	  job?”	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  311-­‐315).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




6.5.1.2.2 Inscriptions leading to action 
The	  narratives	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  work	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  records	  –	  in	  the	  minutes	  of	  
meetings	  and	  formal	  papers;	  in	  the	  diagrams;	  in	  the	  email	  exchanges;	  and	  in	  the	  memories	  of	  the	  
people	  involved.	  	  
The	  way	  the	  meeting	  minutes	  were	  recorded	  played	  a	  very	  important	  role	  in	  turning	  narrative	  into	  
action.	   As	   Border	   Secretariat	   minutes	   tended	   to	   record	   the	   discussions	   as	   well	   as	   the	   actions	  
required	  and	  next	  steps,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  trace	  the	  narrative	  attached	  to	  the	  actions	  that	  were	  to	  
be	  taken.	  Not	  all	  minutes	  do	  this	  -­‐	  some	  contain	  only	  the	  actions	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  meeting.	  For	  
example,	   the	   HLSG	   meeting	   records	   evolved	   into	   a	   list	   of	   the	   action	   items,	   sometimes	   with	  
commentary	  on	  what	  was	  discussed,	  and	  sometimes	  with	  no	  commentary.	  
The	  power	  of	   inscriptions	  to	  trigger	  an	  experience	  of	   the	  past	  and	  the	  future	  was	  more	  overt	   in	  
this	  story	  than	  in	  the	  SmartGate	  story.	  First	  was	  the	  power	  of	  an	  historical	  inscription	  to	  implant	  
itself	  in	  a	  person’s	  memory.	  An	  official	  described	  the	  effect	  an	  old	  document	  had	  on	  them.	  It	  was	  
not	  the	  content	  but	  the	  physical	  look	  of	  a	  typewritten	  document	  that	  captured	  their	  attention.	  The	  
interviewee	  was	  quite	  animated	  when	  recalling	  ‘[an	  official]	  at	  that	  meeting	  tabled	  a	  1980	  Cabinet	  
paper.	  I	  can	  still	  see	  the	  type	  –	  you	  know,	  the	  Times	  New	  Roman	  –	  that	  typewriter	  sort	  of	  Cabinet	  
paper’	   (Official	   16,	   lines	   125-­‐126).	   For	   this	   person,	   the	   type-­‐face	   evoked	   the	   experience	   of	   an	  
earlier	   time	  before	  computers,	  when	   there	  were	  only	   typewriters.	  Seeing	   this	  document	  was	  so	  
much	  more	  than	  the	  content	  of	  an	  old	  paper.	  It	  transported	  this	  person	  back	  to	  another	  time.	  	  
Another	  type	  of	  inscription	  was	  the	  A3.	  This	  was	  a	  new	  communication	  tool	  for	  officials	  in	  2009.	  By	  
using	   an	  A3	   sized	   sheet	   of	   paper,	   it	  was	   possible	   to	   present	   a	  whole	   proposal	   on	   one	   sheet	   of	  
paper	  (one	  or	  both	  sides)	  by	  way	  of	  boxes	  of	  text,	  pictures,	  graphs	  and	  diagrams.	  One	  interviewee	  
fondly	   remembered	   the	  A3	  presented	   to	   the	  Strategy	  Cabinet	  Committee:	   ‘our	   lovely	  A3	   -­‐	   I	   can	  
remember	  the	  light	  blue	  bits	  and	  a	  map	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	  some	  arrows	  and	  the	  flow	  numbers’	  
(Official	   16,	   lines	   316-­‐317).	   Again,	   the	   interviewee	   remarked	   on	   the	   form	   of	   the	   A3,	   not	   the	  
content.	  It	  was	  the	  visual	  effect	  that	  was	  remembered.	  	  
Coloured	  diagrams	  were	  a	  way	  of	  making	  the	  future	  visible,	  and	  thus	  helped	  Ministers’	  decision-­‐
making.	  At	   the	  Strategy	  Cabinet	  Committee,	   the	  diagrams	  helped	  Ministers	   transform	  the	  Prime	  




common	  border	  and	  an	   intra-­‐border	  and	  between	  a	   staged	  model	  and	  an	  advanced	  model;	   the	  
diagrammatic	  form	  for	  the	  latter	  was	  carried	  into	  the	  July	  Cabinet	  paper,	  providing	  a	  connection	  
between	  what	  had	  been	  decided	  and	  what	  was	  to	  be	  decided.	  These	  diagrams	  couldn’t	  have	  the	  
same	   impact	  as	  a	  SmartGate	   in	  providing	  an	  experience,	  but	  as	  Official	  16	   indicated,	   they	  could	  
create	  a	  memorable	  visual	  effect	  that	  helped	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
 Different realities leading to different matters of concern 6.5.2
Sitting	  beneath	  the	  above	  narratives	  were	  the	  same	  sorts	  of	  different	  realities	   identified	  coming	  
out	  of	  Story	  2.	  This	  part	  of	  the	   longer	  term	  story	  revealed	  several	  matters	  of	  concern,	  not	  many	  
directly	  related	  to	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement.	  	  That	  statement	  was	  a	  call	  to	  action	  that	  had	  
yet	   to	  occur.	   In	  applying	  Latour’s	  distinction	  between	  matters	  of	  concern	  and	  matters	  of	   fact	   to	  
this	   sort	   of	   future-­‐focused	   initiative,	   we	   would	   expect	   matters	   of	   concern	   to	   be	   much	   more	  
prevalent	  than	  matters	  of	  fact.	  
In	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  between	  the	  border	  agencies	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  
the	  Border	  Secretariat	  to	  develop	  a	  cohesive	  view:	  ‘So	  a	  really	  big	  challenge	  was	  how	  to	  see	  this	  as	  
a	  whole	  in	  a	  collective	  New	  Zealand	  Inc.	  way	  and	  not	  as	  us	  as	  different	  agencies	  trying	  to	  protect	  
or	  advance	  our	  bit	  of	  it’	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  172-­‐174).	  
There	   were	   different	   matters	   of	   concern	   even	   within	   one	   organisation.	   The	   Comptroller	   of	  
Customs’	  matter	  of	  concern	  was	  turning	  SmartGate	  into	  a	  fact;	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  senior	  
leadership	  were	   concerned	   about	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	  work	   on	  border	   agency	  
relationships260;	  New	  Zealand	  Customs’	  officials’	  matters	  of	  concern	  were	  to	  not	  mislead	  Ministers	  
(i.e.	   to	   tell	   an	  accurate	   story,	  not	  a	   ‘fudged’	   story,	  particularly	   in	   terms	  of	  agency	   functions	  and	  
how	  the	  model	  would	  work	  in	  practice),	  and	  to	  not	  expose	  the	  organisation	  to	  risks	  just	  because	  
there	  were	  tight	  timeframes;	  Australia’s	  matters	  of	  concern	  (as	  reported)	  were	  that	  New	  Zealand	  
might	  want	   them	   to	   open	   up	   their	   borders,	   and	   their	   overall	  matters	   of	   concern	   about	   people	  
smuggling	  and	  protecting	  the	  border.	  
Rather	  than	  a	  joint	  matter	  of	  concern	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agencies,	  there	  
was	  a	  dual	  process:	  





You	  know,	   it	  was	  a	  combined	  process,	  Australia-­‐New	  Zealand,	  but	  some	  early	  engagement	  
on	  the	  Australian	  side	  realised	  ok	  .	  .	  .	  we’re	  not	  going	  to	  be	  developing	  this	  in	  tandem	  really.	  
We’re	  going	  to	  be	  developing	  up	  our	  thinking	  with	  checking	   in	  from	  time	  to	  time	  so	  we’re	  
not	  totally	  off	  the	  planet,	  but	  actually	  then	  lining	  up	  once	  we’re	  more	  developed	  (Official	  16,	  
lines	  234-­‐238).	  
And	  one	  where	   it	  was	  not	   initially	  clear	   to	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  whether	   it	  was	  yet	  a	  matter	  of	  
concern	  for	  the	  Australian	  border	  agencies:	  
So	  we’d	  sort	  of	  said	  “we	  think	  this	  could	  be	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  work,	  and	  that	  we	  obviously	  
need	  to	  work	  up	  detail,	  engaging	  with	  you”	  and	  to	  be	  [sigh]	  frank,	  like	  they	  were	  just	  happy	  
to	   let	   us	   go	   ahead	   and	   do	   it,	   because	   I	   think	   they	  were	   still	   working	   out	  whether	   it	   was	  
serious	  or	  not	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  255-­‐257).	  
6.6 Story	   4:	   Delivering	   on	   the	   20	   August	   announcements	   -­‐	   September	   2009	   to	  
February	  2012	  
After	   this	   intensive	  March	   to	   August	   period,	   the	   border	   agencies	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Tasman	  
worked	  on	  delivering	  the	  initiatives	  announced	  on	  20	  August.	  The	  character	  of	  the	  delivery	  work	  
was	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  initial	  period,	  which	  had	  been	  very	  politically-­‐driven.	  In	  New	  Zealand,	  
DPMC	   was	   much	   less	   involved,	   the	   work	   progressed	   at	   a	   slower	   pace	   and	   the	   joint	   initiatives	  
implied	   a	   more	   trans-­‐Tasman	   effort.	   One	   official	   explained	   how	   people	   operated	   in	   this	   post-­‐
August	  2009	  period:	  
But	  the	  heat	  came	  off	  big	  time.	  I	  mean,	  people	  were	  still	  prepared	  to	  be	  engaged	  but	  unlike	  
prior	  to	  that,	  after	  August	  –	  for	  the	  next	  few	  months,	  that's	  when	  on	  the	  New	  Zealand	  side,	  
people	   started	   to	  not	  be	   available	   for	  meetings,	   and	  other	  priorities	   had	   come	  up,	  where	  
before,	  it	  didn't	  happen	  so	  much	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  416-­‐419).	  
	  And	   ‘certainly	  explicitly	   it	  was	  never	  said	  “oh,	  you	  can	  relax	  a	  bit	  now”	  but	   that's	  definitely	   the	  
message	  people	  got,	  or	  took,	  or	  whatever.	  And	  also	  because	   I	   think	  the	  study/research	  was	   less	  




A	  progress	  report	  on	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  presented	  on	  13	  October	  2009	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Programme	  
Update	  to	   the	  BSGG	  records	  what	  was	  underway.261	  The	  BSGG	  also	  discussed	  a	  paper	  on	  Trans-­‐
Tasman	   trade,	   which,	   at	   two	   months	   after	   the	   20	   August	   announcements,	   had	   yet	   to	   be	  
addressed.262	   	   On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   work	   was	   being	   done,	   or	   so	   it	   seemed.	   A	   closer	   examination	  
reveals	  that	  some	  of	  this	  supposed	  ‘progress’	  was	  the	  result	  of	  work	  already	  in	  train	  prior	  to	  the	  
August	   2009	   announcements.	   The	   truly	   new	   work	   was	   the	   two	   joint	   studies	   –	   Australia	   had	  
provided	   a	   draft	   Terms	   of	   Reference	   for	   the	   joint	   SmartGate	   integration	   study	   and	   the	   pre-­‐
clearance	  study,	  and	  a	  joint	  New	  Zealand	  response	  was	  underway.	  
These	  two	  studies	  ran	  in	  parallel,	  but	  as	  they	  tell	  two	  different	  stories,	  they	  have	  been	  described	  
separately,	  starting	  with	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  study.	  
 The SmartGate integration study 6.6.1
The	  joint	  SmartGate	  integration	  study	  involved	  the	  two	  Customs	  administrations,	  the	  technology	  
provider	  Morpho,	  and	  the	  Gold	  Coast	  International	  Airport.	  The	  terms	  of	  reference	  (TOR)	  for	  the	  
study	   were	   agreed	   at	   a	   trans-­‐Tasman	   teleconference	   held	   on	   13	   November	   2009.263	   Officials	  
agreed	   to	   start	   the	   feasibility	   study	   by	   January-­‐February	   2010.264	   	   New	   Zealand	   had	   provided	  
comments	   on	  Australia’s	   draft	   prior	   to	   the	  meeting.	   The	  minutes	   indicate	   there	  was	   no	   debate	  
about	   content	   and	   that	   a	   clear	   driver	   for	   action	   was	   the	   next	   meeting	   of	   the	   Prime	  Ministers	  
planned	  for	  the	  following	  February.	  	  
A	  related	  action	  was	  for	  the	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agencies	  to	  confirm	  the	  TOR	  at	  
the	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  meeting	  planned	   for	  4	  December,	   and	   ‘develop	  a	  project	  plan	  with	   clear	   tasks,	  
timings	  and	  milestones’,265	  also	  to	  be	  finalised	  at	  that	  4	  December	  meeting.	  On	  1	  December	  2009,	  
the	  Border	  Secretariat	  reported	  to	  MFAT266	  that	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  study	  was	  on	  track	  and	  
advised	  border	  agencies	  of	  a	  proposed	  Cabinet	  paper	  early	  the	  following	  year.267	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Border Secretariat. (13 October 2009). ‘Programme Update for the BSGG Meeting’ [Report]. 
262 BSGG. (13 October 2009). ‘Streamlining Trans-Tasman Goods Trade’ [Report]. 
263 The pre-clearance study was also discussed at this teleconference. 
264‘Trans-Tasman Passenger Facilitation Teleconference, Minutes’, 13 November 2009.  
265 Ibid. 
266 Border Secretariat, ‘Streamlined_Trans_Tasman_travel from Secretariat with agency input’, e-file: ‘091201. 




I	   participated	   in	   the	  meeting	   in	  Auckland	  on	   4	  December	   2009	   –	   held	   the	   day	   after	   the	   official	  
opening	  of	  SmartGate	  at	  Auckland	  International	  Airport	  at	  which	  a	  number	  of	  Australian	  officials	  
were	  present.	  A	  total	  of	  18	  officials	   from	  five	  New	  Zealand	  agencies	  and	  the	  Border	  Secretariat,	  
and	  four	  Australian	  agencies	  attended	  the	  meeting.	  I	  recall	  that	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  actions	  
were	  quickly	  agreed,	  with	  most	  of	  the	  discussion	  focused	  on	  the	  joint	  ‘pre-­‐clearance’	  study.268	  	  
On	  6	  May	  2010,	  at	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Border	  Sector	  Ministerial	  Group,	  Ministers	  
discussed	  the	  Border	  Sector	  work	  programme.	  The	  A3	  prepared	  by	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  for	  that	  
meeting	   identified	   the	   ‘Process	   Deliverable’	   for	   the	   SmartGate	   integration	   study	   as	   an	   ‘options	  
interim	  report	  back	  to	  BSGG	  due	  June	  2010,	  final	  report	  December	  2010.’269	  
On	   8	   June,	   the	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	  Ministers	   responsible	   for	   customs	  matters	   met	   to	  
discuss	  trans-­‐Tasman	  passenger	  facilitation	  among	  other	  topics.	  The	  two	  administrations	  aimed	  to	  
get	  Ministerial	  support	  for	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  joint	  work,	  and	  thus	  exchanged	  briefing	  material	  to	  
ensure	   the	  messaging	  was	   consistent	   for	  both	  Ministers.	  The	  Talking	  Points	   in	   the	  New	  Zealand	  
brief	   included	   ‘Integrating	   our	   SmartGate	   systems:	   progressing	   well,	   but	   need	   to	   maintain	  
momentum’,	  and	  suggested	  that	  the	  Rugby	  World	  Cup	  in	  2011	  would	  be	  a	  ‘good	  deadline	  for	  the	  
first	  visible	  milestone	  –	   integrating	  SmartGate	   in	  New	  Zealand	  with	  SmartGate	  at	  one	  Australian	  
airport’.	   This	  was	   intended	   as	   a	   one-­‐way	   pilot.	   The	   brief	   indicates,	   however,	   that	   New	   Zealand	  
wanted	  a	  two-­‐way	  trial.270	  	  	  
The	  Australian	  brief	  states	  that	  good	  progress	  was	  being	  made	  on	  all	  the	  initiatives	  announced	  on	  
20	  August	  2009.	  The	  joint	  feasibility	  study	  was	  positioned	  as	  part	  of	  more	  detailed	  information	  on	  
the	   further	   rollout	   of	   SmartGate	   in	  Australia.	   It	   included	  a	   section	  on	   the	   value	  of	   an	  outwards	  
SmartGate	   capability	  which	  would	   require	   a	   budget	   proposal,	   and	   advises	   a	   proposed	   outward	  
trial	  in	  the	  2010-­‐11	  financial	  year.271	  
One	  action	  to	  come	  out	  of	  that	  Ministerial	  meeting	  was	  for	  each	  Minister	  to	  send	  a	  letter	  to	  their	  
Prime	   Minister	   seeking	   endorsement	   for	   the	   agreed	   next	   steps.	   During	   June,	   ACBPS	   and	   New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 See Chapter 6.6.2. 
269 ‘BSGG Working together to secure our borders and strengthen our economy’ (A3). 
270 New Zealand Customs Service, ‘Meetings with Hon Brendan O’Connor, 8 June 2010’.  




Zealand	  Customs	  officials	  drafted	  and	  exchanged	  their	  versions	  of	  the	  letters	  to	  ensure	  they	  told	  
the	   same	   story.272	   The	   wording	   of	   the	   opening	   sentence	   was	   indeed	   the	   same	   in	   both	   letters,	  
though	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   body	   of	   the	   letters	   was	   worded	   quite	   differently	   reflected	   the	  
different	   issues	   of	   importance	   to	   each	   Minister.	   For	   Australia,	   the	   issue	   was	   the	   need	   for	   an	  
injection	  of	  funds	  if	  it	  was	  to	  implement	  SmartGate	  outwards;	  for	  New	  Zealand	  the	  agreement	  at	  
the	  meeting	  for	  a	  two-­‐way	  trial273	  was	  considered	  worth	  announcing	  at	  the	  next	  Prime	  Ministerial	  
meeting.	  	  
The	  BSGG	  Deputies	  Group	   in	  New	  Zealand	  noted	   that	   the	  Prime	  Ministers	  would	  announce	   the	  
SmartGate	   integration	   trial	   (at	   their	  meeting	  planned	   for	   February	   the	   following	  year).274	  On	  29	  
November	   2010,	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   reported	   to	   the	  Minister	   of	   Customs	   the	   outcomes	   of	  
discussions	   at	   a	   four-­‐way	   Customs-­‐Quarantine	  meeting	   in	  Melbourne	   on	   21	  October	   2010.275	   A	  
key	   section	   of	   the	   report	   highlights	   and	   explains	   the	   reasons	   for	   a	   change	   in	   scope	   of	   the	  
SmartGate	  integration	  trial	  from	  that	  discussed	  by	  the	  two	  Ministers	  in	  June.	  	  	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  study	  and	  subsequent	  trial,	  officials	  from	  both	  countries	  met	  regularly	  to	  
work	  through	  the	  operational	  practicalities	  of	  setting	  up	  and	  running	  the	  trial.276	   In	  parallel	  with	  
this	  operational	  activity,	  a	  policy	  programme	  was	  underway,	  covering	  a	  privacy	  impact	  assessment	  
(which	   each	   country	   was	   required	   to	   carry	   out	   and	   which	   needed	   to	   be	   consistent	   with	   each	  
other),	  governance	  and	  operational	  protocols,	  an	  interagency	  protocol	  for	  New	  Zealand	  agencies,	  
and	   a	  Gazette	  Notice	   as	   required	   by	  New	   Zealand’s	   Customs	   and	   Excise	   Act	   1996.277	   This	  work	  
drew	  on	  the	  existing	  Customs	  Cooperative	  Arrangement	  and	  accompanying	  Second	  Protocol.	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Figure	  12. A	  mini-­‐case	  study:	  Coordination	  meeting	  	  
On 23 February 2011, I recorded a regular meeting of two policy people (one of whom was me), and one 
operations person, the purpose of which was to coordinate operations and policy work for SmartGate 
integration. However, the discussion at this meeting was wider.  
The meeting was focused on deliverables – an interagency agreement, a privacy impact assessment, 
a report-back to Cabinet, and the work needed to prepare for that, and planning for future projects, as well as 
discussion on SmartGate integration plans – and for a meeting with an Australian colleague the next day. The 
report-back to Cabinet involved discussion on a passenger survey, and referenced a range of related current 
and future work in the trans-Tasman passenger processing space. 
There were many references to near-future initiatives, how some would be implemented, what other 
agencies were doing with their initiatives (which were to be referred to in the report-back), and how the inter-
agency requirements would be managed post-implementation. Discussions referred frequently to the 
passenger experience, e.g. the usability of screens for integration, of passports at the gate, privacy, 
communication about the integrated system. The SmartGate work with Australia was being viewed with the 
passenger in mind. One official referred several times to ‘usability’ and ‘flow’.  
The Privacy Commissioner was talked about several times, in relation to the Privacy Impact 
Assessment, and obviously had some influence.  
The previous report to Cabinet on SmartGate implementation included a reference to other agencies’ 
projects contributing to streamlined trans-Tasman travel, and so the report-back being talked about clearly 
needed to refer to these projects as well. Participants seemed to have a good knowledge of these projects, 
which were being treated quite separately from one another.   
There was lots of laughter during this meeting. While the matters being discussed were practical, there 
were obviously lots of little contextual jokes. For example, I said ‘Or do you think that the implementation in a 
sense will never finish?’ at which one official laughed and which I clearly thought funny also, as I continued on 
‘because it’s always developing into something else’ with laughter in my voice (lines 33-35). Then the official 
answered seriously ‘It’s evolving and it will evolve for a while.’ (Line 36) 
There was a recognition that the SmartGate report-back needed to be presented in the wider context 
of initiatives for trans-Tasman travel also being implemented by MAF and Immigration New Zealand. 
A	  Border	  Secretariat	  brief	  provided	  to	  MFAT	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  to	  be	  
held	   on	   15-­‐16	   February	   notes	   the	   good	   progress	   being	   made,	   the	   agreement	   of	   the	   Customs	  




Zealand	  to	  Australia)	  and	  a	  comment	  on	  what	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  make	  it	  two-­‐way.278	  The	  usual	  
joint	  statement	  following	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  did	  not	  refer	  specifically	  to	  the	  integration	  
trial,	   stating	   only:	   ‘The	   Prime	   Ministers	   further	   welcomed	   the	   positive	   steps	   aimed	   at	   making	  
travel	  across	  the	  Tasman	  a	  domestic-­‐like	  experience,	  including	  the	  roll-­‐out	  of	  SmartGate	  and	  joint	  
studies	  looking	  at	  further	  improvements	  to	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel’	  (Key	  &	  Gillard,	  2011,	  para.	  10).	  
The	   trial	   involved	   passengers	   being	   cleared	   through	   both	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   border	  
processes	   in	   one	   step,	   when	   undertaking	   the	   departure	   process	   in	   New	   Zealand.	   It	   had	   three	  
objectives:	  
a. to	   successfully	   facilitate	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travellers	   through	   the	  SmartGate	  automated	  border	  
processing	  system	  
b. 	  to	  integrate	  SmartGate	  departure	  kiosks	  in	  Wellington,	  Christchurch	  and	  Auckland	  with	  the	  
SmartGate	  arrivals	  facility	  in	  the	  Gold	  Coast;	  and	  
c. To	  determine	   the	   feasibility	  of	   introducing	  a	  permanent	   capability	   to	  other	  Australian	  and	  
New	  Zealand	  airports.279	  
The	   governance	   document	   containing	   these	   objectives	   reveals	   the	   many	   areas	   that	   had	   to	   be	  
clarified	   and	  managed	   in	   this	   truly	   integrated	   solution	   –	   the	   roles	   of	   each	   agency,	   the	   roles	   of	  
governance	   committees	   and	   groups,	   ownership,	   handling,	   storage	   and	   transfer	   of	   information,	  
change	  control,	  communication	  processes,	  and	  protocols	  for	  managing	  issues.	  
A	  New	   Zealand	  Customs	   briefing	   for	   the	   Prime	  Ministerial	   talks	   planned	   for	   28	   January	   2012280	  
states	  that	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  trial	  was	  underway	  between	  Auckland	  and	  Christchurch	  and	  
the	   Gold	   Coast	   Airport,	   and	   notes	   ‘currently	   no	   plans	   for	   the	   Australian	   Customs	   and	   Border	  
Protection	  Service	  to	  expand	  this	  trial	  further’.281	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 ‘Australia-New Zealand Prime Ministers’ Talks, New Zealand, 15-16 February 2011, Streamlining Trans-Tasman Travel’. 
279 ‘SmartGate Integration Arrangement between the New Zealand Customs Service and ACBPS’, p. 2.  
280 These talks did not occur. 
281 ‘Australia-New Zealand Prime Ministers’ Talks, Melbourne Australia, 28 January 2012, Update on Streamlining trans-




In	   total,	   the	   trial	   ran	   from	   August	   2011	   to	   July	   2012,282	   after	   which	   it	   was	   closed	   down.283	   In	  
assessing	  the	  results	  of	  the	  trial,	  officials	  noted	  that	  the	  technology	  worked:	  
It	  was	  never	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  system.	  It’s	  an	  Australian	  system	  and	  it’s	  a	  New	  Zealand	  system	  
that	  talk	  to	  each	  other	  –	  or	  they	  don’t	  talk	  to	  each	  other.	  They	  sort	  of	  operate	  in	  harmony	  
with	  each	  other.	  They	  can	  be	  made	  to	  talk	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  integration	  trial	  showed	  that	  
(Official	  5,	  lines	  218-­‐221).	  
However,	  the	  passengers	  behaved	  differently	  from	  expected	  -­‐	  they	  were	  confused	  by	  the	  range	  of	  
choices	  they	  were	  faced	  with:	  	  
It	  was	  approached	  on	  three	  bases,	  I	  guess.	  One	  was	  technical,	  one	  was	  the	  communication	  
issues/security	   and	   the	   third	   was	   the	   passenger	   experience.	   We	   mastered	   the	   first	   two	  
around	  the	   technical	   innovation	  and	   that	   took	  a	   little	  while,	  but	   the	  passenger	  experience	  
effectively	   derailed	   the	   whole	   project	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   –	   I	   think	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   trial,	  
something	  like	  95%	  of	  the	  passengers	  who	  used	  SmartGate	  on	  departure	  from	  New	  Zealand	  
answered	  the	  Australian	  arrival	  questions	  at	  the	  kiosk,	  but	  when	  they	  got	  to	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  I	  
think	  the	  highest	  uptake	  was	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  35%	  that	  went	  straight	  to	  the	  gate	  .	  .	  .	  there	  
were	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  that	  but	  basically,	  when	  it	  broke	  down,	  the	  passengers	  didn’t	  
understand	  what	   they	  were	  doing	   .	   .	   .	   basically	  what	   they	  did	  when	   they	   got	   to	   the	  Gold	  
Coast	  was	  just	  follow	  whoever	  was	  in	  front	  of	  them	  .	  .	  .	  So	  on	  that	  basis,	  the	  grand	  plan	  of	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  integration	  using	  an	  automated	  process	  was	  put	  on	  hold	  (Official	  3,	   lines	  31-­‐
40,	  59-­‐63).	  
I	   remember	   being	   surprised	   about	   these	   results	   when	   told	   about	   them	   at	   the	   time.	   	   My	  
observation	  of	  the	  preparation	  for	  the	  trial	  was	  an	  expectation	  from	  officials	  that	  travellers	  would	  
get	   a	   better	   experience,	   not	   a	   worse	   one.	   	   A	   complementary	   view	   of	   the	   trial	   was	   that	   it	  
‘presented	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   to	   integrating’	   (Official	   18,	   lines	   259-­‐260).	   What	   seemed	  
conceptually	   logical	   was	   found	   not	   to	   play	   out	   in	   practice.	   The	   aspect	   of	   choice	   created	   the	  
problems,	  not	  only	  for	  the	  passengers	  themselves,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  performativity	  of	  the	  border:	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Interviewee:	  What	   the	  Gold	  Coast	   trial	   showed	  was	   that	   if	   it	  was	  a	   selection	  environment	  
that	  you	  opted	  to	  do	  it,	  you	  created	  another	  tier	  of	  travellers	  that	  became	  very	  difficult	  to	  
sort.	   So	   trying	   to	   identify	   visually,	  or	  even	  by	  documentation,	  who	  had	  elected	   to	  use	   the	  
kiosk	  and	  answer	  questions	  at	   the	  New	  Zealand	  end	  became	  very	  difficult,	  and	  as	  a	   result	  
you	  had	  a	  big	  increase	  of	  referrals	  at	  the	  primary	  line	  that	  ultimately	  saw	  reduced	  efficiency	  
as	   opposed	   to	   the	   increased	   efficiency	   that	   was	   obviously	   an	   objective.	   And	   different	  
marketing	   efforts	   were	   tried	   to	   try	   and	   communicate	   that	   across,	   but	   ultimately	   it	   still	  
became	  very	  difficult	  to	  stream.	   	  And	  that	  was	   in	  a	  Gold	  Coast	  airport	  environment.	   If	  you	  
were	  transferring	  that	  to	  Sydney	  or	  Melbourne	  or	  one	  of	  the	  bigger	  centres,	  	  
Interviewer:	  it	  would	  be	  a	  nightmare.	  	  
Interviewee:	  So	  there’s	  challenges	  there	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  265-­‐273).	  
This	  official	  pondered	  on	  the	  opportunities	  of	  streamlining	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  travel	  process,	  and	  
concluded	   that	   differentiating	   trans-­‐Tasman	   passengers	   from	   passengers	   who	   might	   be	   just	  
transiting	  Australia	   on	   the	  way	   to	   somewhere	   else	  would	   create	   a	   range	   of	   complexities	   in	   the	  
border	  process:	  
What	  if	  you	  end	  up	  having	  too	  many	  differentiated	  models	  for	  the	  number	  of	  people	  that	  are	  
on	   the	   aircraft,	   do	   you	   actually	   start	   working	   against	   your	   objective	   in	   that	   you	   start	  
confusing	  people	  around	  what	  they’re	  doing?	  Is	  it	  in	  fact	  easier	  just	  to	  have	  a	  blanket	  “Just	  fill	  
all	  these	  in”	  even	  if	  you	  didn’t	  need	  them	  from	  everybody?	  Because	  if	  you’d	  said	  in	  one	  flight	  
they	  don’t	  and	  another	  flight	  they	  do,	  you	  just	  end	  up	  creating	  too	  many	  inefficiencies.	  And	  I	  
think	  a	  lot	  of	  that	  mirrors	  the	  sort	  of	  what	  we’ve	  seen	  in	  the	  Gold	  Coast,	  and	  presents	  I	  think	  
the	  biggest	  challenge	  in	  terms	  of	  next	  steps	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  space	  –	  is	  what	  can	  
you	   do	   that	   you	   can	   apply	   across	   the	   board	  without	   difficult	   differentiation	   having	   to	   be	  
done,	  because	  every	  time	  you	  have	  to	  stream	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  passenger	   in	  the	  airport	  
environment,	   you	   introduce	   inefficiencies	   to	   a	   border	   flow	   and	   you	   introduce	   resource	  
requirements	  for	  the	  agency	  to	  stream	  them	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  285-­‐295).	  
This	  trial	  therefore	  showed	  how	  policy	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  performativity	  of	  border	  processes	  and	  that	  




 Phase one of the ‘pre-clearance feasibility study’ 6.6.2
As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  on	  13	  November	  2009,	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  held	  
the	   teleconference,	  chaired	  by	  Australia’s	  Department	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Cabinet,	   to	  discuss	  
the	  two	  joint	  studies	  –	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  study,	  and	  the	  pre-­‐clearance	  study.	  	  	  
An	  email	  to	  me	  from	  the	  	  Border	  Secretariat	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  meeting	  (I	  was	  called	  in	  to	  attend	  at	  
the	  last	  minute)	  provided	  five	  documents	  for	  the	  teleconference	  –	  two	  draft	  Terms	  of	  Reference	  
and	  three	  memos	  from	  New	  Zealand	  to	  Australia	  providing	  New	  Zealand’s	  responses	  to	  the	  draft	  
Terms	  of	  Reference	  documents.	  An	  accompanying	  email	  from	  DPMC	  suggested	  to	  Australia	  that	  a	  
face	   to	   face	  meeting	  would	   be	   a	   good	   next	   step,	  which	   the	   Australia	   and	  New	   Zealand	   border	  
agency	  coordinators	  should	  work	  with	  each	  other	  to	  arrange.	  
My	  handwritten	  notes	  on	  the	  Agenda	  show	  the	  negotiation	  areas	  for	  New	  Zealand.284	  I	  recall	  being	  
called	  to	  a	  ‘pre-­‐meeting’	  of	  border	  agency	  officials	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  teleconference,	  where	  
we	  worked	  through	  New	  Zealand’s	  position	  on	  the	  agenda	  items,	  led	  by	  the	  Border	  Secretariat.285	  	  
The	  minutes286	  make	   it	   possible	   to	   trace	   the	   two	   countries’	   different	  matters	  of	   concern	   at	   the	  
start,	  and	  the	  movement	  to	  agreement	  to	  progress	  an	  independent	  scoping	  study.	  This	  was	  agreed	  
as	  a	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  ‘pre-­‐clearance	  study’	  and	  would	  require	  contracting	  a	  consultant.	  At	  the	  end	  
of	   the	  meeting,	  officials	  agreed	   to	  a	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   trans-­‐Tasman	  meeting	  on	  4	  December	  2009	   to	  
finalise	  arrangements.	  	  
The	  4	  December	  meeting	  occurred,	  and	  minutes	  were	  agreed	  via	  email.	  After	  much	   finessing	  of	  
the	   wording	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   officials,	   a	   Work	   Order	   was	  
agreed	  and	  ACBPS	  asked	  for	  proposals	  for	  the	  work	  from	  two	  of	  its	  preferred	  consultants.287	  The	  
Work	  Order	  had	  two	  parts	  –	  Part	  A	  (Phase	  One)	  was:	  	  
To	  provide	  the	  Governments	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  with	  a	  suite	  of	  practical	  options	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for	   further	   streamlining	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel,	   that	   would	   achieve	   or	   contribute	  
substantially	  to	  a	  seamless	  traveller	  experience	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  in	  line	  with	  our	  joint	  
Prime	  Ministers	  statements.288	  	  
In	   January,	   the	   officials	   from	   the	   two	   countries	   agreed	   evaluation	   criteria	   (again	   by	   email)	   for	  
assessing	   the	   two	   consultants’	   submissions.	   The	   Border	   Secretariat	   coordinated	   New	   Zealand	  
input,	  and	  in	  the	  week	  of	  18	  January	  2010,	  a	  teleconference	  was	  held	  with	  Australia	  to	  agree	  on	  
the	   preferred	   contractor,	   Capgemini.289	   ACPBS	   managed	   the	   contract	   and	   hired	   Capgemini	   to	  
conduct	  the	  study.	  	  	  
The	  study	  was	  to	   involve	   interviews	  with	  border	  agencies	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Tasman	  and	  with	  
major	   industry	   stakeholders.	   On	   10	   February,	   the	   Chair	   of	   the	   BSGG	   sent	   to	   the	   industry	  
stakeholders	  a	  letter290	  advising	  them	  of	  the	  study	  and	  that	  Capgemini	  would	  be	  contacting	  them.	  
Interviews	  of	  industry	  stakeholders	  and	  border	  officials	  began	  at	  the	  end	  of	  February	  2010.	  	  
On	  Thursday	  1	  April,	  12	  weeks	  after	  the	  Work	  Order	  was	  signed,	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agencies	  met	  
to	   discuss	   the	   initial	   draft	   report	   from	   Capgemini	   in	   preparation	   for	   a	   discussion	   the	   Border	  
Secretariat	  was	  to	  have	  with	  ACBPS	  the	  following	  Wednesday.	  MAF	  and	  Customs	  representatives	  
were	  not	  able	  to	  attend,	  so	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  had	  to	  get	  their	  input	  by	  email.	  On	  Tuesday	  6	  
April,	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  sent	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  meeting	  to	  the	  border	  agency	  representatives,	  
giving	   MAF	   and	   Customs	   less	   than	   a	   day	   to	   provide	   their	   comments.	   Those	   comments	   were	  
provided	  shortly	  before	  5pm,	  with	  both	  agencies	  noting	  the	  need	  to	  be	  pragmatic.291	  
Five	  weeks	   later,	  on	  10	  May,	   the	   first	   ‘final’	  draft	  was	  completed.	  This	  was	   the	  date	  of	   the	   first	  
version	   in	   the	   revised	  history	   in	   the	   report,	  which	  shows	  a	   further	   seven	  versions	  until	   the	   final	  
report	  was	  submitted	  on	  9	  June,292	  four	  of	  which	  were	  prompted	  by	  feedback	  from	  the	  Australian	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and	  New	  Zealand	  agencies.	  Documents	  show	  the	  internal	  debate	  within	  the	  ACBPS	  at	  senior	  levels	  
and	  that	  Australia’s	  PM&C	  department	  had	  become	  involved.	  
On	  19	  May,	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  set	  up	  an	  urgent	  phone	  call	  with	  their	  Australian	  contact.	  They	  
updated	   their	   manager	   at	   2:10	   pm	   with	   the	   good	   news	   that	   Australian	   officials	   were	   positive	  
about	  being	  able	  to	  accept	  the	  current	  draft	  as	  final.	  These	  two	  officials	  had	  reached	  agreement	  
that	  both	  countries	  would	  accept	  the	  report	  with	  several	  caveats.	  
The	  memo	  to	  the	  Senior	  Officials	  Group	  (SOG)	  on	  the	  same	  day	  reflects	  this	  change	  and	  also	  sets	  
out	  the	  next	  steps,	  with	  Australian	  agencies	  meeting	  on	  Friday	  21	  May	  to	  consider	  the	  final	  draft,	  
and	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  video	  conference	  scheduled	  for	  Friday	  28	  May	  to	  confirm	  sign	  off	  of	  the	  report	  
and	  to	  discuss	  an	  approach	  to	  Phase	  2	  for	  the	  PMs’	  meeting	  due	  to	  take	  place	  in	  late	  June.	  	  It	  also	  
summarised	  how	  New	  Zealand	  feedback	  had	  been	  addressed	  in	  the	  attached	  version.293	  
Two	   days	   later,	   the	   picture	   changed,	   with	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   indicating	  more	   deliberations	  
were	  happening	   at	   the	  Australian	   end	   and	   ‘[i]t	   is	   a	   long	   and	  winding	   road,	   but	  Aus	   [sic]	   is	   very	  
engaged	  and	  I	  think	  we	  aren’t	  too	  far	  off	  a	  final	  Phase	  1’.294	  	  
An	  email	   from	   the	  Border	  Secretariat	   to	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  on	   the	  day	  of	   the	  28	  May	  video-­‐
conference	   stated:	   ‘Striking	   a	   balance	   of	   aspiration	  with	  pragmatic	   progress	   –	   here	   is	   the	  New	  
Zealand	  plan	  going	  into	  the	  video-­‐conference	  today’	  [emphasis	  in	  original].	  This	  plan	  signalled	  New	  
Zealand’s	  wish	  for	  ‘some	  additional	  joint	  work	  .	  .	  .	  to	  proceed	  urgently’.295	  [Original	  emphasis.]	  	  
The	   Secretariat	   draft	   minutes	   of	   this	   meeting	   begin	   with:	   ‘This	   has	   been	   an	   interesting	   and	  
complex	  study’.296	   It	  appears	   the	  sign	  off	  of	   the	  Phase	  1	   report	  was	  quickly	  confirmed.	   	  The	  56-­‐
page	  report	  detailed	  the	  possible	  models	  with	  their	  pros	  and	  cons,	  as	  well	  as	  setting	  out	  the	  terms	  
for	   a	   scoping	   study	   that	   would	   define	   a	   vision	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel,	   review	   and	   assess	   the	  
existing	  end	   to	  end	   trans-­‐Tasman	  passenger	  process	  against	   that	   vision	  and	  develop	  a	   roadmap	  
and	  business	  case.	  It	  identified	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  risks	  that	  could	  be	  expected	  in	  progressing	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the	  study,	  such	  as	  not	  meeting	  political	  or	  stakeholder	  expectations,	  and	  a	  much	  larger	  number	  of	  
considerations	   covering	   14	   topics	   such	   as	   biosecurity,	   collection	   of	   information,	   revenue,	   and	  
legislation.	  It	  estimated	  the	  costs	  of	  carrying	  out	  this	  scoping	  study	  at	  between	  $3-­‐4	  million.297	  	  
Most	  of	  that	  28	  May	  video-­‐conference	  was	  focused	  on	  next	  steps,	  including	  some	  new	  initiatives	  
and	  a	  joint	  investment:	  	  
.	  .	  .	  in	  a	  short	  further	  study	  which	  will	  deliver	  an	  agreed	  future	  state	  vision;	  an	  assessment	  of	  
how	   far	   our	   joint	   package	   of	   initiatives	   will	   go	   toward	   meeting	   this	   vision;	   and	   an	  
identification	  of	  any	  remaining	  gaps	  which	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  agreed	  future	  action.298	  	  	  
A	  suggested	  timeframe	  for	  the	  work	  was	  3-­‐4	  weeks.	  A	  meeting	  of	  the	  two	  Customs	  Ministers	  on	  8	  
June	   was	   confirmed	   ‘as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   confirming	   the	   agreed	   the	   [sic]	   future	   steps	   and	  
communicating	   upwards	   to	   Prime	  Ministers’.299	  Officials	   agreed	   to	   coordinate	  messaging	   to	   the	  
two	  Prime	  Ministers,	  and	  engagement	  with	  industry.300	  	  
New	  Zealand	  officials	  took	  the	  next	  steps	  agreed	  at	  this	  meeting	  to	  the	  BSGG	  on	  1	  June	  2010	  for	  
executive	   level	  confirmation.	   	  The	  Chair’s	  talking	  points	  note	   ‘The	  Department	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  
and	  Cabinet	  is	  comfortable	  with	  the	  approach	  that	  has	  been	  agreed’.301	  
The	   final	   version	   of	   the	   Phase	   1	   report	   (entitled	   ‘Streamlining	   trans-­‐Tasman	   Passenger	   Travel:	  
Terms	  of	  Reference’)	   is	  dated	  9	  June	  2010.	  Originally	  planned	  to	  take	  four	  weeks,	  the	  work	  took	  
almost	  five	  months	  to	  complete.	  Most	  of	  the	  delay	  was	  caused	  by	  officials	  working	  with	  Capgemini	  
to	  finalise	  the	  content	  of	  the	  report.	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300 Along with the SmartGate integration study. 




 Designing a ‘domestic-like experience’ 6.6.3
On	  3	   June	  2010,	   the	  Border	  Secretariat	  sent	   to	   their	  contact	  point	   in	  ACBPS	  the	  briefing	   for	   the	  
New	  Zealand	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  for	  the	  8	  June	  Customs	  Ministers	  meeting	  and	  commented	   ‘It	  
aligns	  with	  your	  one’.302	   	  The	  New	  Zealand	  briefing	  notes	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Minister	  of	  Customs’	  
actions	   in	   the	   meeting,	   as	   Chair	   of	   the	   Border	   Sector	   Ministerial	   Group,	   to	   endorse	   officials’	  
proposals	   to	   further	   streamline	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel,	   and	   for	   the	   two	  Ministers	   to	  write	   to	   their	  
respective	  Prime	  Ministers	  advising	  them	  of	  these	  agreements.303	  
This	   briefing	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘domestic-­‐like	   experience’	   in	   conjunction	   with	   ‘a	   new	   streamlined	  
passenger	  model’.	  It	  presents	  the	  work	  of	  officials	  in	  a	  proactive	  light:	  ‘Rather	  than	  having	  the	  next	  
steps	   as	   a	   further	   joint	   study	   only,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australian	   senior	   officials	   have	   agreed	   to	  
proceed	   concurrently	   with	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   approach’.304	   ‘Prong	   one’	   of	   the	   approach	   was	   to	  
implement	   the	   existing	   and	   some	   additional	   initiatives;	   ‘Prong	   two’	   was	   to	   conduct	   a	   study	   to	  
develop	  a	  future	  state	  vision.	  
The	  Australian	  brief	  also	  seeks	  their	  Minister’s	  agreement	  for	  the	  proposals	  (New	  Zealand’s	  ‘two-­‐
pronged	  approach’)	  and	  notes	  benefits	  to	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  were	  already	  being	  seen	  out	  of	  the	  
20	  August	  initiatives.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  joint	  study	  just	  completed,	  it	  notes	  ‘while	  it	  was	  agreed	  that	  
a	  common	  border	  could	  continue	   to	  be	  a	   joint	  aspirational	  goal,	   there	  are	  significant	  hurdles	   to	  
overcome	  that	  would	  prevent	  this	  being	  achieved	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term’.305	  It	  also	  sets	  out	  
constraints	  on	  other	  models	  in	  the	  study.	  
On	  file,	  a	  draft	  Work	  Order	  to	  Capgemini	  for	  the	  further	  short	  study	  to	  develop	  a	  model	  that	  would	  
deliver	   a	   ‘domestic-­‐like	   experience’,	   and	   assess	   existing	   initiatives	   against	   it,	   contained	   New	  
Zealand	  comments	  dated	  2	  July	  2010.306	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Email, 3 June 2010. 
303 These letters were drafted and sent to the respective Prime Ministers in late June/early July 2010. 
304 Footnote 270.  
305 Footnote 271, p. 5. 




The	   July	   2010	   Prime	  Ministers’	  meeting	  was	   cancelled	   because	   of	   Australia’s	   governing	   Labour	  
Party	  leadership	  change	  and	  the	  calling	  of	  the	  snap	  election	  for	  21	  August	  2010.	  The	  subsequent	  
delay	  in	  progressing	  the	  second	  Capgemini	  study	  was	  later	  attributed	  to	  these	  political	  events.307	  	  
In	  December	  2010,	  ACBPS	  finally	   issued	  the	  Work	  Order	   for	   the	  study.308	  The	  Border	  Secretariat	  	  
provided	  advice	   for	  a	  meeting	  of	  Border	  Sector	  Deputies	  on	  6	  December	   that	  a	  briefing	   for	   the	  
Prime	  Minister	   for	  his	  meeting	  with	   the	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister	   in	  February	  2011	  would	  be	   ‘a	  
high	  priority	  for	  border	  Ministers’.309	  At	  the	  next	  meeting	  of	  Border	  Sector	  Deputies	  on	  8	  February	  
2011,	   the	  Border	  Secretariat	  advised	  attendees	   that	   the	  key	  messages	   in	   the	  brief	   included	   ‘We	  
will	   continue	   to	  assess	  how	   far	   the	  package	  of	   joint	   initiatives	   takes	  us	   toward	  a	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	  
experience	  and	  identify	  any	  remaining	  gaps	  for	  future	  action’.310	  
On	  16	  February	  2011,	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  had	  a	  teleconference	  with	  Capgemini	  
to	   provide	   the	   project	   leader	   ‘an	   opportunity	   to	   provide	  New	  Zealand	   and	  Australia	   a	   common	  
understanding	  of	  how	  Capgemini	  would	  undertake	  the	  short	  study	  to	  define	  “domestic-­‐like”	  travel	  
between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand’.311	  The	  minutes	  outline	  previous	  issues	  encountered	  in	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  work,	   notes	   key	   reference	  documents,	   and	   that	  Capgemini	  would	   seek	   any	  model	   they	  
developed	  to	  ‘look	  to	  have	  benefits’	  in	  security,	  service	  and	  savings.	  	  	  
The	   joint	   Prime	  Ministerial	   statement	   from	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   Prime	  Ministers’	   meeting	   on	   the	  
same	  day	  included:	  	  
The	  Prime	  Ministers	  further	  welcomed	  the	  positive	  steps	  aimed	  at	  making	  travel	  across	  the	  
Tasman	   a	   domestic-­‐like	   experience,	   including	   the	   roll-­‐out	   of	   SmartGate	   and	   joint	   studies	  
looking	  at	  further	   improvements	  to	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  (Key	  &	  Gillard,	  2011,	  p.	  para	  10).	  
[My	  emphasis]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 BSGG, ‘Border Sector Work Programme: Period ending 28 February 2011’ [Report to Border Ministers]. 
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310 ‘Border Sector Deputies Group Agenda Item 4 – Brief for Australia’- New Zealand Prime Ministers’ talks: New Zealand 
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  And	  in	  her	  address	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Parliament,	  also	  on	  16	  February,	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister	  
Julia	  Gillard	  stated	  	  
During	  my	  visit,	  I've	  been	  pleased	  to	  discuss	  with	  Prime	  Minister	  Key	  the	  excellent	  progress	  
being	   achieved	   on	   the	   SmartGate	   project	   to	   create	   borderless	   travel	   between	   our	   two	  
countries.	   A	   joint	   study	   will	   commence	   this	   month	   to	   examine	   how	   we	   create	   a	   truly	  
‘domestic-­‐like’	  aviation312	  experience	  (Gillard,	  2011).	  [My	  emphasis]	  	  
The	  BSGG	  report	  for	  the	  Border	  Sector	  Ministerial	  meeting	  in	  March	  2011	  advises	  that	  the	  short	  
joint	  study	  would	  be	  finished	  in	  June	  2011,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  guide	  next	  steps.313	  	  This	  study	  was	  
one	   of	  many	  work	   items	   on	   the	   New	   Zealand	   border	   sector	   work	   programme	   for	   streamlining	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  travel,	  as	  set	  out	  in	  Figure	  13	  overleaf:314	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On	  28	  March	  2011,	  Capgemini	  signed	  the	  Work	  Order315	  –	  three	  months	  after	  ACBPS	  had	  issued	  it	  
–	  and	  by	  6	  April,	  work	  was	  underway.	  A	  New	  Zealand	  official	  spent	  1	  ½	  days	  in	  Canberra,	  including	  
a	  half-­‐day	  focus	  group	  meeting	  at	  ACBPS	  and	  meetings	  with	  the	  (then)	  Australian	  Department	  of	  
Immigration	  and	  Citizenship	  and	  Australian	  Quarantine	  and	  Inspection	  Service.	  This	  was	  followed	  
by	   a	   day	   in	   Melbourne,	   where	   they	   attended	   the	   Australian	   National	   Passenger	   Facilitation	  
Committee	  meeting.	   	   These	   activities	  were	   all	   related	   to	   the	   joint	   short	   study.316	   The	   following	  
week,	  an	  ACBPS	  official	  spent	  a	  week	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  mostly	  participating	  in	  the	  joint	  short	  study	  
work.317	   	  Official	  10	   indicated	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  used	   the	  ACBPS	  official	  as	  a	   touchstone	  –	   ‘I	  
wonder	  what	   the	  Australians	   are	   going	   to	   think’318	   –	   reflecting	   the	  work	  was	   not	   really	   joint	   in	  
nature:	  
Interviewer:	  Did	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  officials	  ever	  get	   together	   in	   the	  same	  room,	  
around	  a	  	  whiteboard,	  and	  kind	  of	  work	  on	  that	  ‘togetherness’<stuff>	  together?	  	  	  
Interviewee:	  Only	  kind	  of	  virtually,	  except	  when	  we	  started	  the	  Capgemini	  research.	  We	  did	  
allow	  a	   token	  person	  to	  go	  across	   the	  ditch,	  so	   [an	  official]	  went	  across	  as	   the	  token	  New	  
Zealander	  with	  the	  Australians,	  and	  [Australian	  official]	  came	  over	  to	  us	  for	  a	  week	  so	  we	  did	  
have	  that	  but	  no,	  we	  never	  really	  did	  have	  much	  engagement	  (lines	  277-­‐282).	  
On	  23	  May,	  a	  meeting	  of	  New	  Zealand	  border	  sector	  senior	  officials	  was	  provided	  with	  an	  update	  
on	   the	   Capgemini	   work.	   The	   Border	   Secretariat	   note	   indicates	   the	   study	   was	   progressing	   well.	  
Senior	   officials	   were	   informed	   that	   the	   following	   outcome	   statement	   for	   the	   definition	   of	  
‘domestic-­‐like’	  was	  agreed:319	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	   passengers	   are	   able	   to	   complete	   all	   international	   travel	   processes	   prior	   to	  
departure.	  On	  arrival	  these	  passengers	  can	  pick	  up	  their	  bags	  and	   leave,	  unless	  authorities	  
need	  to	  intervene.320	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Footnote 308. 
316 Interview; Border Secretariat, ‘[Official] To Canberra & Melbourne 6-8 April 2011’. 
317 ACBPS, ‘[Official] – ACBPS Trans-Tasman Travel Joint Short Study (with Capgemini)’. Personal involvement, also.  
318 Line 307. 
319 That the agreement was trans-Tasman was implied.  




In	   the	  six	  months	  between	  8	   July	  and	  9	  December	  2011,	   respective	  meetings	  held	  by	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  Travel	  Officials	  Working	  Group	  (TTTWG),	  border	  sector	  senior	  officials	  and	  the	  BSGG	  were	  
as	  follows:321	  
• 8	  meetings	  of	  the	  TTTWG	  
• 2	  SOG	  meetings	  
• 3	  BSGG	  meetings	  
• 3	  meetings	  on	  the	  Joint	  Border	  Management	  System	  
• 1	  stakeholder	  meeting	  
• 1	  video	  conference	  with	  Australian	  officials	  
• 1	  meeting	  with	  MFAT	  
• A	  series	  of	  meetings	  on	  current	  initiatives	  
The	  BSGG	  agencies	  were	  actively	  engaged	  at	  all	  levels	  in	  considering	  how	  to	  use	  and	  communicate	  
the	  second	  Capgemini	  report.	  Senior	  officials	  accepted	  the	  report	  on	  19	  July,322	  and	  by	  27	  July,	  the	  
Secretariat	  had	  developed	  a	  diagrammatic	  version	  of	  the	  report,	  as	  an	  aid	  for	  communication:	  
I	  still	  think	  that	  A3	  cutesy	  little	  diagram	  that	  we	  did	  was	  bloody	  great,	  ‘cause	  that	  was	  kind	  of	  
where	  we	   could	   get	   to?	   And	   yet	   I	   think	   in	   some	   regards,	   there	  was	   a	   feeling	   that	   it	   just	  
maybe	  was	  potentially	  too	  hard	  (Official	  10,	  lines	  467-­‐469).	  
And	  
I	  know	  that	  it	  went	  to	  Ministers,	  and	  Ministers	  really	  liked	  it	  –	  they	  wanted	  more.	  I	  know	  A3s	  
were	  sort	  of	  de	  rigueur	  at	  the	  time	  –	  probably	  old	  hat	  now,	  but	  it	  was	  just	  a	  simple	  way	  of	  
being	  able	  to	  tell	  that	  story	  quite	  succinctly	  (Official	  10,	  lines478-­‐482).	  
This	   official’s	   earlier	   comment	   about	   the	   ‘cutesy	   A3’	   reveals	   an	   emotional	   connection	  with	   the	  
document	  (Figure	  14	  overleaf).	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Border Secretariat, (undated). ‘Post Capgemini Meetings’. 




Figure	  14. The	   	   Border	   Secretariat’s	   diagrammatic	   representation	   of	   the	   Capgemini	   work	  	  	  	  
translated	  for	  presentation	  to	  the	  BSGG323	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




On	  Tuesday	  6	  September,	  the	  New	  Zealand	  TTTWG	  appears	  to	  have	  discussed	  a	  timeline	  of	  ‘next	  
steps’	   from	   the	   next	   BSGG	   meeting	   on	   27	   September	   to	   the	   Joint	   Prime	   Ministers’	   meeting	  
planned	  (but	  unconfirmed)	  for	  26-­‐28	  January	  2012.	  The	  notes	  prepared	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  meeting	  
contain	  many	   questions,	   designed	   to	   clarify	   what	   was	   to	   be	   prepared	   for	   the	   Prime	  Ministers’	  
meeting	  and	  to	  manage	  any	  risks,	  and	  for	  engagement	  with	  stakeholders.324	  
On	  Friday	  23	  September,	   I	  sought	  urgent	   input	   from	  within	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  on	  a	  brief	   for	  
the	   Comptroller	   (for	   the	   BSSG	   meeting	   on	   27	   September)	   on	   the	   Capgemini	   ‘domestic-­‐like	  
experience’.	   The	   input	  was	  provided	   less	   than	   two	  hours	   later.325	   	   	   The	  brief	   expresses	   concern	  
about	   the	   lack	   of	   Australian	  mandate	   to	   progress	   SmartGate	   integration	   from	  Australia	   to	  New	  
Zealand,	  and	  the	  conflict	  that	  the	  definition	  of	   ‘domestic-­‐like	  experience’	  would	  potentially	  have	  
on	  New	  Zealand	  Customs’	  existing	  priorities	  for	  SmartGate.326	  
On	  27	  September	  2011,	  the	  BSGG	  met	  ‘to	  discuss	  the	  next	  steps	  following	  last	  meeting’s	  brief	  on	  
the	  Capgemini	   report	  on	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Travel’.327	  They	  agreed	   that	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  would	  
work	   with	   Australian	   officials	   and	   key	   stakeholders	   on	   a	   programme	   of	   work	   based	   on	   the	  
Capgemini	  model	   (‘as	  a	   starting	  point’),	   ‘subject	   to	   support	   from	  the	  Chair	  of	   the	  Border	  Sector	  
Ministerial	  Group’.	  	  They	  also	  asked	  for	  some	  analytical	  work	  on	  ‘the	  risks,	  implications,	  indicative	  
costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   potential	   elements	   of	   a	   programme	   of	   work	   based	   on	   the	   model	   in	   the	  
Capgemini	  report’	  and	  a	  draft	  paper	  outlining	  the	  plans	  for	  the	  next	  steps.328	  
On	  28	  September,	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  circulated	  minutes	  from	  a	  22	  September	  TTTWG	  meeting	  
held	  to	  ‘discuss	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  common	  border’.	  	  The	  minutes	  note	  ‘further	  work	  is	  needed	  
to	  reach	  a	  definition	  .	  .	  .’,	  with	  an	  action	  point	  for	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  to	  write	  ‘a	  one	  page	  brief	  
summarising	  why	  we	   need	   a	   definition,	  what	   it	  would	   be	   used	   for,	   the	   elements	   of	   a	   common	  
border,	  and	  how	   it	  would	  be	   framed	   for	  our	  current	  project	   (and	  how	   it	  aligns	  with	  work	  being	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Border Secretariat, ‘Next Steps for TTT work – for Discussion at the TTTWG Meeting on Tuesday 6 September 2011’. 
325 Email exchange. 
326 ‘Customs Brief: Agenda Item 2 Briefing on ‘domestic-like’ trans-Tasman travel’ [draft]. 





done	  by	  MFAT)’.329	  The	  email	  trail	  reveals	  significant	  contention	  about	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  purpose	  
of	  the	  meeting	  in	  those	  minutes.	  	  	  
On	   26	  October,	   the	   	   Border	   Secretariat	   attempted	   to	   clarify	   further	   contention	   from	   an	   official	  
over	  the	  level	  of	  advice	  officials	  should	  provide	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  before	  seeking	  his	  
(or	   joint)	   agreement	   to	   the	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	   definition.	   The	   Border	   Secretariat	   stated	   that	   more	  
analysis	  would	  be	  needed	  on	  the	  report	  before	  seeking	  agreement	  for	  anything.330	  This	  was	  to	  be	  
discussed	  at	  a	  video-­‐conference	  with	  Australian	  officials	  –	  an	  event	  that	  occurred	  on	  9	  November	  
2011.	  	  As	  well	  as	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  briefing	  (which	  New	  Zealand	  was	  to	  develop	  and	  share	  with	  
Australian	   officials),	   the	   action	   points	   were	   about	   the	   release	   of	   the	   Capgemini	   report	   to	  
stakeholders.	  Each	  country	  indicated	  they	  would	  approach	  the	  release	  differently.331	  
By	   the	   14	   December	   BSGG	   meeting,	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   had	   developed	   a	   Draft	   Preliminary	  
Project	   Plan.332	   	   As	   well	   as	   providing	   a	   timetable	   of	   work	   to	   be	   done,	   this	   plan	   traced	   the	  
background	  of	   the	  work	   from	  March	  2009,	   related	   the	  work	   to	   the	  SEM	  principles,	   summarised	  
Australia’s	  actions	  and	  engagement	  with	  their	  Minister	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  and	  updated	  the	  BSGG	  on	  
the	  Capgemini	   study.	   In	   short,	   it	   told	   the	   story	  of	   the	  development	  of	   the	  model,	   including	   the	  
future-­‐focused	  aspect,	  which	  comprised	  two	  work-­‐streams	  and	  10	  tasks,	  situating	  that	  story	  firmly	  
in	  the	  SEM	  frame.	  The	  decision	  on	  the	  release	  of	  the	  draft	  plan	  to	  Australian	  officials	  was	  deferred	  
until	   the	   following	   BSGG	  meeting	   on	   20	   January	   2012.333	   The	   primary	   purpose	   of	   that	   January	  
BSGG	  meeting	  was	  to	  discuss,	  in	  a	  closed	  session	  of	  Chief	  Executives	  and	  their	  Deputies,	  the	  future	  
of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  border	  sector.	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  open	  section	  of	  the	  
meeting,	  which	  also	   included	   representatives	   from	  border	   sector	   senior	  officials	  and	   the	  Border	  
Secretariat.	  	  The	  minutes	  record	  that	  the	  BSGG	  ’agreed	  to	  engage	  with	  airports	  and	  airlines	  in	  mid	  
February	  2012	  following	  announcements	  from	  Ministers	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  border	  sector’.	  The	  
purpose	  was	  to	  have	  been	  to	  gauge	  these	  stakeholders’	  views	  ‘on	  realising	  a	  ‘domestic-­‐like’	  travel	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 BSGG, ‘Meeting Minutes – The definition of common border’, 22 September 2011, p. 2. 
330 Email exchange. 
331 BSGG, ‘Meeting Minutes – Video conference with Australian officials’, 9 November 2011. 
332 Border Secretariat, ‘Draft Preliminary Project Plan Trans-Tasman Travel: “Domestic-like Experience” Project, 5 
December 2011, Version 1.3’. 




experience	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travellers’,	   as	   long	   as	   it	   was	   done	   in	   a	   way	   that	   aligned	   with	  
Australia.334	  
At	   this	   time,	   the	  New	  Zealand	  Biosecurity	  and	   Immigration	  agencies	  were	  undergoing	   structural	  
change	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   was	   focusing	   on	   the	   new	   computer	   system	   it	   was	   building	  
jointly	   with	   MAF.	   Engagement	   with	   industry	   therefore	   didn’t	   happen	   and	   decisions	   on	   the	  
Capgemini	  Phase	  2	  report	  were	  deferred	  until	  after	  decisions	  were	  made	  about	  Future	  Directions.	  
One	  official	  recalled	  how	  this	  occurred:	  
CEs335	  asked	  us	  to	  go	  away	  and	  do	  some	  further	  thinking	  about	  “what	  are	  the	  implications”.	  
We	   did	   some	   work	   on	   the	   implications,	   and	   then	   that	   was	   handed	   over	   to	   MPI,	   and	  
essentially,	  the	  consideration	  of	  that	  was	  put	  on	  hold	  because	  of	  the	  future	  of	  the	  border	  .	  .	  .	  
[then]we	  provided	  that	  Capgemini	  report	  back	  out	  to	  those	  airlines	  that	  had	  fed	  information	  
into	  that	   report.	  So	  we	  had	  engaged	  with	  the	  airlines	  and	  the	  airports	  on	  that	   report,	  and	  
they	   provided	   information	   into	   that	   report,	   and	   then	  we	   provided	   them	  with	   a	   copy	   and	  
asked	   for	   comments	   on	   that.	   And	   so	  we	   got	   that	   far,	   and	   that’s	  where	   I	   think	   it	  was	   left	  
(Official	  10,	  lines	  365-­‐67,	  377-­‐381).	  
Another	  official	  described	  the	  continued	  interest	  from	  their	  agency’s	  stakeholders’:	  
[O]ur	  group	  had	  consulted	  with	  a	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  about	  the	  Capgemini	  work	  and	  	  the	  
likes	   of	   Federated	   Farmers	   and	   Hort336	   New	   Zealand	   had	   expressed	   concerns	   about	  
facilitation	  without	  carefully	  managing	  risk	  at	  the	  border,	  and	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  any	  
initiatives	  weren't	  going	  to	  lessen	  risk	  management	  at	  the	  border.	  So	  there'd	  just	  been	  a	  long	  
silence.	   I	   think	   they	   had	   contacted	   us,	   asking	   “so	  what's	   going	   on?”	   and	  we	   engage	  with	  
those	  stakeholders	  in	  various	  fora	  anyway	  all	  the	  time,	  so	  I	  think	  it	  had	  come	  up	  and	  was	  like	  
flicked	  to	  me	  “what's	  happening?”	  (Official	  4,	  lines	  139-­‐144).	  
ACBPS	  did	  not	  object	   to	  putting	  a	  hold	  on	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	  work.	   That	  organisation	  was	  
facing	   increasing	   pressure	   from	   illegal	   entry	   by	   sea	   (‘boat	   people’)	   facilitated	   by	   people	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smugglers.337	   In	   addition,	   officials	   involved	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Tasman	   were	   questioning	   the	  
value	  to	  be	  gained	  from	  the	  significant	  financial	  investment	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  to	  implement	  
the	  consultant's	  model,	  given	  that	  the	  SmartGate	  and	  biosecurity	  changes	  had	  already	  delivered	  
most	  of	   the	  benefits,	  and	  that,	  as	   for	  goods	  processes,	   the	  real	  bottlenecks	  were	  not	  caused	  by	  
government.	  One	  Australian	  official	  remarked:	  ‘I	  think	  realities	  of	  cost	  came	  into	  it,	  and	  what	  was	  
the	  overall	   .	   .	   .	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  total	  size	  of	  the	  issues	  we	  were	  dealing	  with	  at	  the	  airport,	  did	   it	  
justify	  the	  costs	  for	  that	  market?’	  (Official	  A7,	  lines	  114-­‐116).	  
The	  update	  for	  the	  Prime	  Ministers’	  meeting	  on	  28	  January	  2012	  was	  never	  used,	  as	  the	  meeting	  
was	  cancelled.	  That	  update	  highlighted	  the	  progress	  since	  the	  announcements	  on	  20	  August	  2009,	  
highlighted	  the	  analysis	  being	  done	  ‘on	  the	  risks,	  benefits,	  costs	  and	  implications	  of	  realising	  [the]	  
desired	   future	   state’,338	   that	   is,	   the	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	   experience,	   and	   noted	   a	   number	   of	   other	  
initiatives.	  
No	  further	  border-­‐wide	  trans-­‐Tasman	  engagement	  occurred	  until	  2	  November	  2012,	  when	  there	  
was	  another	  trans-­‐Tasman	  video-­‐conference,	  in	  which	  ‘Recap	  on	  trans-­‐Tasman	  initiatives	  including	  
Cap	   Gemini	   [sic]’	   was	   one	   of	   four	   agenda	   items.339	   New	   Zealand	   border	   agencies	   provided	  
Australia	  with	  an	  update	  on	  their	  ‘Future	  Directions’	  work,	  including	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  paper.	  
There	  were	  to	  two	  references	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  trans-­‐Tasman:	  
Government	   expectations	   of	   improved	   service	   delivery	   are	   also	   reflected	   in	   its	   vision	  
statement	  for	  future	  trans-­‐Tasman	  passenger	  processing:	  
“The	   ideal	   future	   state	   for	   passenger	   processing	  would	   be	   designed	   to	   simplify	   the	   travel	  
experience	   for	   passengers	   without	   compromising	   security	   and	   border	   control.	   It	   would	  
require	   cooperation	   between	   governments	   and	   their	   agencies	   as	   well	   as	   travel	   industry	  
stakeholders	  in	  both	  countries.”	  [CAB	  Min	  (09)	  16/2	  refers].	  
	  
	  This	   vision	   was	   articulated	   by	   the	   Prime	   Ministers	   of	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australia	   as	   an	  
expectation	   that	   both	   countries	  will	  work	   towards	   a	   “domestic-­‐like”	   experience	   for	   trans-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337’Irregular movement of people – maritime’, ACBPS Annual Report 2011-12. Retrieved from 
http://www.customs.gov.au/aboutus/annualreports/2012/part03/1_7_irregular_movement_of_people_maritime.html . 
338 Border Secretariat, (28 January 2012). ‘Update on Streamlining Trans-Tasman Travel’ [Briefing]. 




Tasman	   travellers	   (Office	   of	   the	  Minister	   for	   Primary	   Industries,	   Office	   of	   the	  Minister	   of	  
Immigration,	  &	  Office	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs,	  2012,	  para	  18,	  p.4).	  
And	  in	  the	  section	  ‘New	  Initiatives:	  What	  Will	  Be	  Delivered’:	  
	   These	  new	  initiatives	  will	  improve	  service	  delivery	  through	  the	  following	  changes	  .	  .	  .	  
1. There	   will	   be	   one	   primary	   line	   for	   most	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   passport	  
holders	   for	   immigration,	   customs	   and	   biosecurity	   purposes,	   and	   two	   for	   other	  
passport	  holders	  .	  .	  .	  
(Office	  of	  the	  Minister	  for	  Primary	  Industries	  et	  al.,	  2012,	  p.	  para	  24,	  p.5)	  
This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  recommendation	  that	  Cabinet	  note	  the	  point	  above.	  	  
 Industry stakeholder interventions 6.6.4
While	  not	  a	  focus	  of	  this	  research,	  the	  role	  of	  industry	  stakeholders	  has	  been	  ever-­‐present	  in	  the	  
documents	  and	  interviews,	  though	  the	  view	  we	  get	  is	  primarily	  through	  officials’	  eyes	  rather	  than	  
directly	  from	  the	  stakeholders	  themselves.	  Stakeholders	  appear	  first	  via	  the	  organised	  space	  of	  the	  
ANZLF,	  created	  in	  2004;	  they	  appear	  in	  interviewees’	  stories	  about	  SmartGate,	  they	  appear	  in	  the	  
stories	  of	  the	  two	  joint	  studies	  and	  they	  continue	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  media	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  	  
Several	  officials	  noted	  that	  the	  drivers	  for	  streamlining	  travel	  and	  trade	  came	  from	  industry	  more	  
than	  from	  the	  governments:	  
I	  guess	  what	  I’m	  thinking	  is	  that	  we	  have	  a	  clear	  role	  to	  play,	  we	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  do	  
things	  differently	  without	  compromise,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  influencing	  is	  done	  by	  	  –	  the	  drivers	  
of	   change,	   in	  my	  view	  anyway,	  are	  managed	  by	   industry	  or	  business	   (Official	  3,	   lines	   378-­‐
381).	  	  
More	  specifically,	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  recounted	  connections	  and	  influence	  the	  Government	  had	  
with	   industry	   and	   the	   influence	   of	   those	   connections	   on	   the	   introduction	   of	   SmartGate	   in	  New	  
Zealand:	  
Business	  people	  are	  connected	  into	  the	  Government;	  they	  are	  people	  who	  travel	  across	  the	  
Tasman	  and	  back	  maybe	  in	  the	  same	  day	  or	  overnight	  –	  they	  don’t	  have	  too	  many	  bags,	  they	  




[sic]	  “Good	  job	  mate	  –	  I’m	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  airport	  in	  five	  minutes	  flat”	  (Official	  22,	  lines	  326-­‐
330).	  
Official	  2	  commented	  on	  Australian	  industry	  interest	  and	  influence	  in	  both	  studies:	  
I	  was	  there	  at	  the	  Ministerial	  meetings	  and	  the	  meetings	  with	  their	  senior	  executive	  that	  was	  
their	  deputy	  CE	  level,	  with	  the	  industry	  players	  and	  there	  were	  some	  strong	  lobby	  groups	  in	  
Australia,	   with	   the	   airline	   and	   the	   airport	   companies’	   interest	   trying	   to	   push	   their	   own	  
agendas	  with	  the	  senior	  officials	  in	  Australia	  at	  that	  government	  to	  government	  level	  (Official	  
2,	  lines	  431-­‐434).	  
Industry	  stakeholders	  were	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  first	  study	  and	  continued	  to	  let	  border	  agencies	  
on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Tasman	  know	  that	  they	  were	  interested	  in	  what	  progress	  was	  being	  made	  on	  
the	   new	   trans-­‐Tasman	   model.	   Some	   industry	   stakeholders	   produced	   documents	   arguing	   for	  
changes	   to	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel,	   and	  proposing	   their	   own	   solutions,	   both	   at	   the	   time	   and	  more	  
recently	  and	  there	  have	  been	  media	  announcements	  from	  industry	  groups	  throughout	  the	  period	  
of	  study.340	  This	  is	  one	  official’s	  view	  of	  their	  ‘putting	  pen	  to	  paper’:	  
Qantas	  and	  the	  travel	  industry	  over	  in	  Australia	  .	  .	  .	  certainly	  got	  their	  views	  down	  on	  paper	  
and	   threw	   them	   off	   to	   all	   and	   sundry.	   It	   was	   interesting	   to	   see	   their	   perspective.	   Their	  
perspective’s	  purely	  in	  terms	  of	  facilities	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  travel.	  I	  think	  their	  assumption	  was	  
just	   common	   external	   border	   with	   basically	   no	   internal	   border	   for	   Australian	   and	   New	  
Zealand	  citizens.	  That	  sort	  of	  thing	  (Official	  5,	  lines	  366-­‐371).	  	  	  
The	  minutes	  of	   the	  meeting	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agency	  officials	  on	  30	  
April	  2009341	  sets	  out	  those	  officials’	  ‘take’	  on	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  industry	  attitudes.	  New	  
Zealand	   industry	   stakeholders	  were	   generally	   positive	   about	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  work;	   Australian	  
airlines	   were	   interested	   in	   reducing	   costs,	   including	   a	   model	   that	   precluded	   border	   agency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Examples of reports are: 1.  Jetstar’s “Access Economics” report released in August 2010, as reported on the news in 
Australia. Retrieved on 11 March 2015 from http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/jetstars-call-to-drop-
passenger-checks-for-new-zealand-bound-traffic/story-e6frfq80-1225900315938  This report was sent to politicians and 
Chief Executives. It is not publicly available. 2. & 3.:The Tourism and Transport Forum Australia wrote two reports - 
“Special Treatment for a Special Relationship” August 2013 and “Bringing Our Neighbour Closer” August 2014. Retrieved 
from http://www.ttf.org.au/Content/aviation.aspx . Examples of media items are found at (Creedy, 2009), retrieved on 11 
March 2015 from http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0905/S00097.htm and (‘Push for passport-free travel’, 2012). 




intervention	  on	  arrival	   into	  Australia.	  Officials	  noted	   the	   ‘go	  ahead’	   attitude	  of	  Brisbane	  Airport	  
and	  the	  opportunities	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  work	  from	  its	  Airports	  in	  the	  Future	  project.	  
On	   Friday	   6	   August	   2010,	   ACBPS	   senior	   executives	  met	  with	   representatives	   of	   Qantas/Jetstar,	  
who	  were	  advocating	  a	  model	  that	  was	  different	  from	  that	  chosen	  by	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  
officials.	  The	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Counsellor,	  present	  at	  the	  meeting,	  reported	  to	  New	  Zealand	  
that	  industry	  would	  be	  engaged	  in	  the	  further	  work.342	  
On	  Monday	  14	  February	  2011,	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  sought	  feedback	  from	  New	  Zealand	  agencies	  
on	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand’s	  proposal	  to	  release	  the	  summary	  paper	  based	  on	  the	  Capgemini	  
Terms	   of	   Reference	   report.	   Customs	   noted	   there	   were	   implications	   that	   needed	   to	   be	   worked	  
through.343	  	  By	  1	  April	  2011,	  the	  summary	  had	  still	  not	  been	  released.344	  I	  had	  a	  particular	  interest	  
in	  that	  I	  was	  writing	  a	  report	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  seeking	  approval	  for	  a	  low-­‐level	  release	  of	  
this	  and	  other	  information	  to	  industry	  stakeholders.	  One	  official’s	  comment	  on	  industry’s	  reaction	  
in	  Australia	  to	  the	  postponing	  of	  the	  work	  in	  2011-­‐12	  was:	  
The	  only	   feedback	   I’ve	  been	  given	  on	  that	  was	   I	  heard	   .	   .	   .	   that	   there	  was	  push-­‐back	   from	  
industry	   around	   the	   cost	   of	   achieving	   that,	   and	   that	   was	   the	   reason	   given	   –	   the	   level	   of	  
investment	   required	   wasn’t	   commensurate	   with	   the	   outcomes	   that	   would	   have	   been	  
achieved.	  And	  I	  think	  that	  goes	  back	  to	  my	  earlier	  point	  about	  .	  .	  .	  the	  level	  of	  interest	  that	  
industry	  had	  in	  investing	  in	  some	  of	  the	  changes	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  made,	  noting	  that	  .	  .	  .	  
again	   that	   issue	   of	   them	   all	   wanting	   a	   solution	   for	   them,	   which	   would	   give	   them	   a	  
competitive	   advantage;	   and	   the	   other	   factor	   being	   that	   the	   Passenger	  Movement	   Charge	  
was	  non-­‐negotiable.	  Yeah,	  so	  it	  sort	  of,	  in	  my	  view,	  took	  the	  wind	  out	  of	  the	  sails;	  or	  the	  heat	  
out	  of	  the	  argument,	  or	  however	  you	  want	  to	  phrase	  it	  (Official	  A5,	  lines	  217-­‐226).	  
Interviewees	  had	  a	  lot	  to	  say	  about	  industry	  influence	  and	  involvement:	  
On	  the	  industry	  side	  of	  things,	  I	  think	  the	  biggest	  issue	  came	  down	  to	  competition	  between	  
different	  players	   in	   industry,	  and	  while	   they	  would	  all	  as	  a	  body	  talk	  about	   the	   issues	   that	  
governments	  brought	  or	  caused	  .	  .	  .	  we	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  difficulty	  getting	  true	  consensus	  among	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the	   different	   industry	   players	   on	   the	   solution	   because	   there’s	   such	   a	   competitive	   edge	  
between	  them	  that	  it	  was	  never	  really	  truly	  collaborative	  (Official	  A5,	  lines	  64-­‐69).	  
And	  a	  surprise:	  
Yeah.	  I	  think	  I	  was	  a	  bit	  taken	  aback	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  were	  keen	  to	  try	  and	  .	  .	  .	  do	  
something	  with	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman;	  but	   .	   .	   .	  to	  some	  extent	   I	  thought	  they	  were	  a	  bit	  naive,	  
too;	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   took	   them	   a	   long	   time	   to	   read	   the	   politics	   around	   the	   Passenger	  
Movement	  Charge	  in	  Australia	  in	  particular.	  You	  know,	  when	  they	  were	  fighting	  over	  trying	  
to	  reduce	  air	  fares	  below	  $150,	  when	  $47	  at	  the	  time	  of	  that	  was	  the	  Passenger	  Movement	  
Charge,-­‐you	  really	  wondered	  what	  else	  they	  could	  do	  with	  that	  margin.	  So	  that	  sort	  of	  took	  
me	   back	   a	   fair	   bit.	   And	   of	   course	   they	   did	   a	   lot	   of	   lobbying	  within	   government,	   and	   that	  
meant	  that	  we	  sort	  of	  had	  to	  tell	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  story	  .	  .	  .	  I	  would	  have	  thought	  that	  
there’s	  other	  markets	  out	  there	  that	  would	  have	  been	  more	  important	  to	  them	  –	  that	  was	  
probably	  my	  biggest	  surprise	  (Official	  A5,	  lines	  392-­‐400,	  417-­‐19).	  
One	  New	  Zealand	  official	  reflected	  on	  the	  different	  agendas	  for	  each	  country	  in	  the	  second	  study,	  
which:	  
.	   .	   .	  was	  an	  exercise	   in	  getting	  an	   independent	  body	  to	  show	  how	  tricky	   it	  might	  be	  –	  that	  
how	   long	   term	   it	  would	  be,	  how	  much	   it	  might	   cost.	   From	  New	  Zealand’s	  point	  of	   view,	   I	  
think	  we	  had	  a	  slightly	  more	  purist	  attitude	  that	  something	  independent	  would	  be	  a	  genuine	  
basis	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  industry,	  because	  industry	  had	  its	  own	  ideas	  about	  what	  passport-­‐
free	   or	   borderless	   travel,	   or	   removing	   the	   remaining	   barriers	   looked	   like.	   Of	   course,	   the	  
Australian	  industry,	  funnily	  enough,	  concentrated	  on	  their	  taxation	  regime	  over	  there	  .	   .	   .	   I	  
think	  both	  countries	  had	  their	  sort	  of	  different	  agendas	  for	  it	  (Official	  5,	  lines	  460-­‐467).	  
There	  was	  some	  sensitivity	  about	  stakeholder	  involvement	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  work,	  given	  officials’	  
knowledge	  of	   the	  positions	  of	   some	  key	  players.	   Selected	   stakeholders	  were	   invited	   in,	  but	   in	  a	  
controlled	  way,	  and	  the	  information	  that	  was	  passed	  back	  to	  them	  was	  also	  controlled.	  Were	  they	  
part	   of	   the	   actor-­‐networks	   of	   the	   longer	   term	  work?	   Indirectly,	   yes,	   in	   that	   officials	   translated	  
industry	   views	   into	   their	   work	   but	   not	   directly,	   in	   that	   the	   translations	   undertaken	   by	   industry	  
were	  directed	  into	  reports	  and	  speeches	  and	  media	  releases	  that	  did	  not	  really	  have	  much	  direct	  




 Discussion on the Phase 1 and 2 studies 6.6.5
Designing	  a	  future	  model	  is	  an	  uncertain	  and	  therefore	  unstable	  endeavour.	  The	  stories	  of	  the	  two	  
studies	  reveal	  the	  mechanisms	  officials	  used	  to	  reduce	  that	  uncertainty	  –	  meetings	  and	  mediators	  
to	  enable	  officials	  to	  translate	  the	  announcement	  into	  meaning,	  purpose	  and	  form;	  inscriptions	  to	  
stabilise	  meaning,	  purpose	  and	  form.	  For	  example,	  the	  work	  started	  with	  translating	  the	  intention	  
of	  the	  work	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  political	  statements	  into	  a	  description	  in	  the	  work	  orders	  for	  the	  two	  
joint	   studies;	   once	   the	   contractor	   was	   selected,	   officials	   worked	   with	   them	   to	   translate	   their	  
proposal	  into	  an	  agreed	  approach	  and	  a	  plan.	  This	  involved	  many	  discussions	  and	  adjustments	  for	  
both	  studies	  before	  agreement	  was	  reached.	  We	  can	  therefore	  see	  that	  translation	  in	  public	  policy	  
can	  be	   a	   very	   practical	   process.	   The	  biggest	   areas	   of	   debate	   for	   both	   studies	  were	   the	   reports.	  
Figure	  15	  below	  documents	  the	  steps	  the	  officials	  took	  to	  implement	  the	  deliverables	  coming	  out	  
of	   20	   August	   2009	   joint	   Prime	   Ministerial	   statement.	   It	   shows	   also	   where	   the	   debates	   and	  
translations	  occurred.	  











The	  narratives	  of	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  trial	  and	  the	  ‘domestic-­‐like’	  model	  were	  both	  similar	  
and	  different.	  
The	  similarity	  came	  from	  the	  lead	  provided	  by	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statements	  of	  2009	  and	  
2011.	  The	  sustained	  focus	  on	  the	  original	  remit	  from	  the	  first	  period	  led	  by	  the	  two	  Departments	  
of	   Prime	   Minister	   and	   Cabinet	   was	   striking.	   The	   two	   2009	   joint	   statements	   provided	   ongoing	  
intent	  and	  the	  2011	  statement	  provided	  a	  refreshed	  focus	  on	  a	  ‘domestic-­‐like	  experience’.	  	  These	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  narratives	  continued	  to	  shape	  the	  vision	  and	  commitment	  to	  delivery,	  and	  meetings	  
and	   workshops	   both	   provided	   the	   means	   for	   turning	   these	   narratives	   into	   action	   and	   were	   in	  
themselves	  part	  of	  that	  action.	  	  	  
However,	   the	   details	   on	   action	   differed	   between	   the	   SmartGate	   integration	   trial	   and	   the	   new	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  model.	   For	   the	   former,	  officials	   from	  both	   countries	  had	   to	  work	   together	  on	   the	  
technical	  requirements,	  as	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  create	  an	  integrated	  system.	  This	  was	  a	  perhaps	  the	  
only	  truly	  joint	  action	  in	  all	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  stories	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  was	  akin	  to	  an	  EU-­‐type	  of	  
integration	   where	   policy	   and	   design	   was	   joint	   and	   delivery	   was	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   relevant	  
member	   countries.	  Officials	   drew	  on	   trans-­‐Tasman	  Customs-­‐to-­‐Customs	  mechanisms	   to	   provide	  
structure	  to	  the	  joint	  aspects	  of	  the	  trial.	  	  
In	  comparison,	  the	  other	  joint	  studies	  were	  conducted	  severally	  more	  than	  jointly,	  with	  each	  set	  of	  
border	  agencies	  developing	  a	   ‘country	  position’	  before	  combining	   to	  negotiate	  an	  agreed	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   position.	   Each	   country	   brought	   different	   capabilities	   to	   bear,	   with	   Australia	   providing	  
access	   to	   its	   preferred	   contractor	   system,	   and	   New	   Zealand	   contributing	   significant	   intellectual	  
effort	  through	  the	  coordinating	  mechanism	  of	  the	  Border	  Secretariat.	  	  This	  way	  of	  operating	  was	  
more	   like	   two	  sovereign	  nations	  working	  together	   than	  of	   regional	   integration,	  even	  though	  the	  
output	  was	  a	  ‘joint’	  model.	  The	  data	  has	  shown	  that	  developing	  a	  comprehensive	  future-­‐focused	  
‘domestic-­‐like’	  model	  was	  hard	  work	  with	  no	  easy	  solutions.	  
There	   were	   also	   interesting	   nuances.	   Domestic-­‐like	   was	   not	   solely	   about	   regional	   integration.	  
Unlike	   the	   different	   experience	   provided	   to	   EU	   and	   non-­‐EU	   passport-­‐holders,	   the	   new	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   model	   aimed	   at	   creating	   a	   domestic-­‐like	   experience	   for	   all	   travellers.	   This	   potentially	  




[T]here	  will	  be	  a	  dilutionary	  effect	  on	  the	  experience	  for	  the	  New	  Zealanders	  and	  Australians	  
that	   the	  channels	   that	  were	  available	   solely	   to	   them	  before	  will	   increasingly	  be	   filled	  with	  
other	  travellers,	  which	  will	  therefore	  make	  their	  process	  less	  streamlined,	  the	  feel	  of	  it	  being	  
less	  targeted	  and	  being	  a	  special	  ‘tier’	  of	  traveller,	  which	  it	  will	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  whether	  
that	  will	  stimulate	  a	  demand	  for	  “well,	  what’s	  next	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  market?	  What	  
are	  you	  going	  to	  do	  and	  deliver	  for	  me	  next	  to	  make	  my	  travel	  experience	  better	  than	  these	  
other	  nationals?”	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  220-­‐226).	  
The	   other	   narrative	   that	   played	   out	   in	   these	   stories	   was	   a	   matter	   of	   concern	   relating	   to	   the	  
pacification	  of	  border	  flows	  which	  emerged	  near	  the	  end	  of	  2011.	  Around	  that	  time,	  the	  focus	  for	  
the	  Australians	  shifted	  from	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  to	  the	  increasing	  passenger	  volumes:	  	  
All	  of	  this	  work	  falls	  into	  the	  broader	  Traveller	  Processing	  of	  the	  Future	  programme	  of	  work	  
that	  they	  have	  been	  operating	  within	  Australian	  Customs.	  That	  piece	  of	  work	  is	  very	  broad.	  
It’s	  not	  solely	  in	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  context.	  And	  ultimately	  I	  think	  you	  have	  to	  take	  it	  right	  back	  
to	  what	  is	  its	  driver,	  and	  its	  driver	  again	  has	  been	  “how	  are	  we	  going	  to	  manage	  the	  volumes	  
that	  are	  going	  to	  be	  coming	  through	  these	  airport	  environments	  with	  no	  further	  resourcing,	  
or	  declining	  resourcing?”	  And	  so	  as	  a	  result,	  its	  focus	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  space	  is	  probably	  
fairly	  minimal,	  and	  again,	  these	  are	  concepts	  that	  could	  well	  be	  trialled,	  and	  I	  think	  that’s	  the	  
ultimate	  view	  in	  Australia	  is	  that	  New	  Zealand	  remains	  a	  trial	  test-­‐bed	  environment	  for,	  you	  
know,	  advances	  in	  this	  space,	  which	  would	  then	  be	  extended	  to	  other	  markets	  once	  they’ve	  
been	  tested	  out,	  and	  that’s	  probably	  where	  it	  will	  stay,	  I	  think,	  for	  quite	  a	  while	  (Official	  18,	  
lines	  248-­‐258).	  
Industry	  narratives,	   as	   lived	  out	   in	  officials’	  heads,	  had	   some	  effect	  on	  officials’	   actions	   through	  
specific	  matters	  of	  concern.	  For	  example,	  Australian	  officials	  were	  deeply	  aware	  of	  their	  aviation	  
industry’s	   narrative	   about	   user	   charges	   through	   the	  work	   of	   the	  National	   Passenger	   Facilitation	  
Committee,	  which	  was	   a	   forum	   that	   involved	   officials	   and	   industry	   representatives.	   This	   official	  
saw	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  officials	  as	  appropriate	  in	  light	  of	  that	  narrative:	  
I	   think	   that	   it	  was	   good	   that	   our	   Prime	  Ministers	   didn’t	   over-­‐commit,	   because	   that	   could	  
have	  had,	  you	  know,	  some	  interesting	  outcomes;	  about	  what	  was	  .	  .	  .	  trying	  to	  identify	  what	  
could	   be	   realistically	   achieved.	   Sure,	   if,	   if	   the	  decision	  of	   the	  government	  was	   to	  drop	   the	  




didn’t	  happen;	  and,	  I	  guess,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  things	  but	  I	  think	  we	  worked	  very	  well	  within	  the	  
government	  agencies;	  I	  mean,	  I	  think	  it	  was	  very	  important	  that	  we	  all	  understood	  .	  .	  .	  what	  
our	  constraints	  were,	  and	  to	  communicate	  that	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  with	  the	  airlines;	  and	  
eventually,	  I	  think,	  the	  airlines,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree	  the	  airports;	  they	  took	  longer	  to	  accept	  
those	  messages.	  But	  they	  did	  eventually	  (Official	  A5,	  lines	  405-­‐315).	  
New	  Zealand’s	  MAF	   (now	  MPI)	  officials	  were	  constantly	  checking	   the	  work	  on	   the	  domestic-­‐like	  
model	  against	   the	   likely	   reactions	  of	   the	  most	  vocal	  of	   their	   stakeholders,	  and	   included	  them	   in	  
the	  consultation	  on	  the	  draft	  model:	  
A	  key	  consideration	  for	  MPI	  is	  providing	  assurance	  to	  our	  primary	  industry	  stakeholders	  that	  
we	  are	  managing	  risk	  and	  they	  don't	  want	  to	  see	  any	  real	  or	  perceived	  lessening	  of	  border	  
protection.	  	  We	  have	  to	  take	  their	  concerns	  into	  account,	  and	  so	  some	  key	  industry	  bodies	  
were	   consulted	  and	   involved	  and	   they	  expressed	   the	   concerns	   you	  would	  expect	   them	   to	  
express	  (Official	  9,	  lines	  275-­‐280).	  	  	  
 Revealing the future through reference points  6.6.5.2
Dotted	  throughout	  the	  Phase	  1	  &	  2	  studies	  are	  points	  at	  which	  officials	  agreed	  on	  terminology	  and	  
descriptions,	  for	  example,	  the	  agreed	  description	  of	  ‘domestic-­‐like’.	  These	  activities	  stabilised	  part	  
of	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  future,	  enabling	  officials	  to	  move	  on	  to	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  design.	  But	  even	  
when	  agreed,	  these	  reference	  points	  were	  still	  unstable.	  One	  Australian	  official	  commented	  on	  the	  
terminology	  used	  for	  the	  second	  study:	  
I	   think	  there’s	  a	   lot	  of	  confusion	  at	  that	  time	  caused	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘domestic-­‐like	  
experience’	   .	   .	   .	   It	   couldn’t	   be	   a	  domestic	   experience	   as	   long	   as	   you’ve	   got	   two	   sovereign	  
states;	   it	   couldn’t	   be	   the	   same	   as	   a	   domestic	   travel	   experience.	   It	   could	   be	   domestic-­‐like	  
(Official	  A5,	  lines	  138-­‐142).	  
Documents	   provided	   the	   same	   sort	   of	   reference	   points.	   Officials	  were	   intent	   on	   the	   two	   study	  
reports	  being	  signed	  off,	  often	  by	  Chief	  Executives;	  meeting	  minutes	  were	  circulated	  for	  comment,	  
and	  were	  sometimes	  hotly	  debated	  before	  becoming	  ‘final’;	  ‘next	  steps’	  within	  those	  minutes	  set	  




These	  observations	  highlight	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘future	  state’	  is	  invisible	  until	  it	  is	  revealed,	  and	  
while	  it	  is	  being	  revealed,	  it	  is	  unstable.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  through	  the	  policy	  process,	  each	  part	  is	  
stabilised,	   albeit	   temporarily,	   as	   it	   is	   revealed.	   The	   inscriptions	   were	   the	   end	   results	   of	   all	   the	  
meetings,	   phone	   calls,	   emails	   and	   other	   translation	   mechanisms	   that	   gradually	   revealed	   the	  
‘streamlined	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel’	   future	   state,	   part	   by	   part.	   Czarniawska	   indicates	   how	  
inscriptions	  are	  narrative:	  
A	  practice	  or	  an	  institution	  cannot	  travel;	  it	  must	  be	  simplified	  and	  abstracted	  into	  an	  idea,	  or	  
at	  least	  approximated	  in	  a	  narrative	  permitting	  a	  vicarious	  experience,	  therefore	  converted	  
into	  words	  or	  images.	  Neither	  can	  words	  or	  images	  travel	  until	  they	  have	  materialized,	  until	  
they	  are	  embodied	  or	  objectified	  (Czarniawska,	  2009,	  p.	  425).	  
She	   is	   highlighting	   the	   fact	   that	   inscriptions	   embodying	   an	   idea	  make	   a	   story	   portable	   so	   that	  
others	   can	   experience	   something	   of	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   it.	   Until	   the	   picture	  was	   finalised,	   it	  was	  
difficult	   for	   officials	   to	   enrol	   others	   outside	   their	   actor-­‐network	   in	   that	   future	   state.	   Official	   10	  
described	  how	  the	  A3	  diagram	  that	  the	  Border	  Sector	  translated	  on	  to	  one	  page	  out	  of	  the	  second	  
Capgemini	  study	  enabled	  officials	  to	  do	  this:	  
And	  ok,	  so	  we	  had	  the	  dogs	  and	  the	  Hawaiian	  shirts	  and	  things,	  but	  you	  could	  just	  see	  “ok,	  
this	   is	  what	  we’re	   talking	   about	  here”,	   you	   know?	  Even	   though	  probably	   .	   .	   .	   there	  was	   a	  
whole	  lot	  of	  water	  to	  go	  under	  the	  bridge	  to	  say	  what	  it	  was	  actually	  going	  to	  look	  like,	  right?	  
So	  it	  was	  our	  stab,	  “based	  on	  what	  we	  think	  and	  what	  we’d	  want,	  this	  is	  what	  we	  reckon”.	  So	  
it	  was	  –	  yeah,	  it	  was	  cheeky	  but	  it	  told	  a	  good	  story,	  so	  I	  think	  we	  got	  away	  with	  it	  (Official	  10,	  
lines	  523-­‐529).	  
 Difficulties with translating intent into shared meaning 6.6.5.3
The	   close	   connection	  with	  DPMC	   that	   enabled	  New	  Zealand	  agencies	   to	   get	   clear	  on	   the	  Prime	  
Ministerial	   intent	   in	   the	   initial	   stages	   of	   2009	   was	   largely	   absent	   for	   the	   Phase	   1	   and	   Phase	   2	  
studies	  that	  developed	  the	  new	  model	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel.	  Interviewees	  from	  the	  three	  New	  
Zealand	  border	  agencies	  commented	  on	   the	   lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  what	  else	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  
wanted	   delivered,	   aside	   from	   automated	   passenger	   processing	   and	   simplified	   biosecurity	  




seemed	  to	  have	  a	  slightly	  different	  perspective	  about	  what	  it	  meant,	  and	  especially	  what	  it	  meant	  
in	  a	  doing	  sense	  –	  like	  what	  our	  role	  was	  to	  contribute	  to	  that’	  (Official	  4,	  lines	  44-­‐46).	  
The	   trans-­‐Tasman	   did	   not	   have	   a	   supranational	   body	   for	   the	   joint	   work	   that	   could	   act	   as	   the	  
mediating	  body	  between	  participants,	  as	  it	  would	  have	  had	  in	  an	  EU	  sort	  of	  arrangement.	  Instead,	  
there	  were	  three	  mediators	  who	  took	  on	  this	  role.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  Capgemini	  consultants	  who	  
mediated	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  officials;	   the	  second	  was	  the	  Border	  Secretariat,	  
which	  spoke	  on	  behalf	  of	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agencies;	  the	  third	  was	  the	  ACBPS	  lead	  official,	  who	  
spoke	  on	  behalf	  of	  Australian	  border	  agencies.	  	  
These	   mediators	   created	   strong	   connections	   between	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   border	  
agencies,	  albeit	  quite	  narrow	  in	  reach	  and	  short-­‐lived.	  They	  also	  set	  up	  meetings	  both	  within	  each	  
country	   and	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   that	   provided	   a	   vehicle	   for	   concentrated	   ‘translation	  
sessions’.	   Their	   roles	   meant	   they	   were	   also	   the	   final	   stabilising	   point	   for	   meaning	   and	   for	  
documentation.345	  
Supporting	   my	   assessment	   of	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   as	   an	   actant,	   the	   disestablishment	   of	   the	  
Border	  Secretariat	  in	  2011	  created	  a	  gap	  that	  interfered	  with	  action,	  according	  to	  one	  official:	  
Look,	  these	  are	  concept	  discussions	  that	  I’ve	  had,	  but	  where	  we	  are	  –	  this	  is	  where	  we	  are	  
probably	   missing	   something	   like	   a	   strong	   secretariat	   to	   drive	   forward	   –	   is	   to	   take	   these	  
conceptual	  viewpoints	  and	  to	  package	  them	  for	  greater	  acceptance	  within	  both	  the	  CEO	  and	  
government	  levels	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  238-­‐240).	  
The	  Capgemini	  consultants	  travelled	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  translating	  the	  stories	  they	  heard	  
on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  Tasman	  into	  one	  consolidated	  story	  (in	  the	  first	  study,	  through	  interviews;	  in	  
the	   second,	   through	   workshops).	   Capgemini	   provided	   the	   only	   human	   actors	   to	   have	   a	   joint	  
picture	  in	  this	  work.	  There	  was	  clearly	  a	  lot	  of	  border	  agency	  translation	  occurring	  throughout	  the	  
process	  also.346	  
So	  we	  had	  these	  initial	  workshops,	  which	  the	  consultants	  ran	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Tasman,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 As far as it applies to Australia, this statement is based on the ACBPS role in speaking for the other agencies. 





and	  then	  the	  consultants	  took	  away	  the	  information	  that	  they	  got	  from	  the	  officials	  on	  both	  
sides,	  and	  then	  turned	  it	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  draft	  –	  initially	  the	  draft	  definition.	  And	  then	  we	  had,	  
as	  I	  was	  saying	  before,	  20	  working	  days	  to	  provide	  that	  feedback	  back	  on	  that	  draft	  .	  .	  .	  	  and	  
essentially	  it	  was	  an	  agreed	  definition	  in	  20	  working	  days,	  so	  they	  corralled	  us	  together,	  and	  
they	  took	  that	  and	  turned	  it	  into	  something,	  and	  then	  we	  spent	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	  time	  working	  
through	  to	  develop	  up	  something	  that	  we	  kind	  of	   liked.	  So	  I	  think,	   if	   I	  remember	  correctly,	  
actually	  New	  Zealand	  provided	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  feedback	  on	  that	  in	  that	  draft.	  The	  Australians	  
not	  so	  much.	  But	  we	  really	  took	  it	  apart	  and	  added	  bits	  as	  we	  saw	  fit	  so	  it	  was	  quite	  different,	  
I	  think,	  by	  the	  time	  we’d	  finished	  with	  it	  (Official	  10,	  lines	  354-­‐363).	  
The	  short	  timeframes	  allotted	  to	  the	  work	  –	  four	  weeks	  for	  the	  first	  study	  and	  12	  weeks	  for	  the	  
second	  –	  indicate	  everyone	  thought	  this	  would	  be	  a	  straightforward	  process.	  However,	  it	  was	  not.	  
Even	  with	  the	  mediators,	  the	  Phase	  1	  study	  took	  five	  months	  to	  complete,	  and	  Phase	  2	  took	  seven.	  
Examination	  of	  the	  primary	  data	  revealed	  that	  the	  delays	  resulted	  from	  the	  debates,	  within	  New	  
Zealand	   in	   particular,	   between	   officials	   over	   meanings,	   both	   in	   meetings	   and	   afterwards	   as	  
discussions	   were	   inscribed	   into	  minutes	   and	   papers.	   It	   wasn’t	   as	   if	   there	  was	   some	   underlying	  
issue	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  resolved.	   In	  both	  cases,	   the	  debates	  were	  what	  one	  would	  expect	   from	  
any	  work	  in	  which	  individuals	  worked	  together	  to	  agree	  the	  wording	  of	  an	  idea	  or	  approach.	  	  The	  
concept	  of	  circulating	  meanings	  helps	  us	  see	  why	  translation	  can	  take	  time	  before	  a	  meaning	  or	  
expression	   is	   able	   to	   be	   stabilised.	   Individuals	   bring	   to	   the	   table	   all	   their	   own	   connections	   and	  
associations	   not	   just	   with	   their	   own	   organisations,	   but	   also	   with	   their	   personal	   histories	   and	  
matters	  of	  concern.	  
Once	  meaning	  was	  agreed,	   two	  particular	  mechanisms	  appeared	  to	  enable	  action	  –	   inscriptions,	  
and	  the	  minutes	  of	  meetings,	  especially	  the	  ‘next	  steps’.	  
6.7 Story	  5:	  Streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  
As	  described	   in	   the	  Section	  6.3,	   the	  HLSG	  completed	  a	  number	  of	   initiatives	   to	  streamline	  trade	  
prior	   to	   March	   2009	   including	   some	   scoping	   studies.	   The	   messages	   coming	   from	   the	   Prime	  




However,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  April	  2009,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  was	  given	  a	  reminder	  ‘don’t	  forget	  about	  
goods’.347	   	   In	   response	   to	   the	   joint	   Prime	   Ministerial	   statement,	   work	   on	   streamlining	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   trade	   began	   in	  May	   2009,	   with	   a	   report348	   prepared	   for	   the	   BSGG	   and	   the	   HLSG.	   The	  
report	  drew	  on	   international	   comparative	  data	  on	   trading	  efficiency.	   It	   noted	   the	  prevalence	  of	  
small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  traders,	  who	  often	  use	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  market	  as	  a	  first	  experience	  of	  
exporting.	   	   It	   also	   noted	   the	   business	   perceptions	   of	   high	   barriers	   to	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	   as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  actual	   low	  level	  of	  barriers	  to	  trade,	  that	  the	  barriers	  spanned	  the	  players	  in	  the	  
whole	   supply	   chain,	   while	   also	   noting	   that	   there	   were	   improvements	   the	   two	   Customs	  
administrations	  could	  undertake.	  	  	  
A	   July	  2009	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  briefing	   for	  upcoming	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Prime	  Ministerial	   talks349	  
addressed	  Trade	  in	  Goods.	  It	  identified	  the	  opportunity	  presented	  by	  each	  country’s	  development	  
of	  its	  own	  trade	  single	  window350	  and	  signalled	  the	  joint	  time	  release	  study	  (planned	  by	  the	  HLSG	  
in	  2008).	   In	   the	   same	  month,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  developed	  a	   simplified	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	  
supply	  chain	  as	  an	  action	  from	  the	  HLSG.351	  This	  diagram	  (Figure	  16	  below)	  shows	  the	  estimated	  
length	  of	  time	  for	  each	  stage	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  sea	  cargo	  supply	  chain	  if	  the	  supply	  chain	  was	  
simplified.	  
Figure	  16. 	  Simplified	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Sea	  Cargo	  Supply	  Chain	  
	  
Source:	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	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A	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   paper352	   	   sets	   out	   some	   ‘blue	   skies’	   thoughts	   on	  where	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
goods	  trade	  could	  be	  streamlined.	  	  Three	  of	  the	  ideas	  in	  this	  paper	  were	  presented	  as	  ‘blue	  skies	  
initiatives’	   in	  the	  ‘Streamlining	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Goods	  Trade’	  paper353,	  going	  beyond	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  stocktake	  of	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agency	  trade	  initiatives,	  which	  alone	  would	  have	  fulfilled	  the	  
requirements	   of	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Prime	   Minister’s	   Action	   Plan.354	   The	   paper	   sought	   BSGG’s	  
agreement	   to	   explore	   further	   opportunities	   for	   streamlining	   trans-­‐Tasman	   goods	   trade,	   and	  
report-­‐back	  in	  early	  2010.	  
In	  the	  same	  month,	  the	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  administrations	  conducted	  the	  first	  
cross-­‐jurisdictional	  time	  release	  study	  in	  the	  world,	  using	  the	  WCO	  TRS	  tool.	  The	  results	  confirmed	  
that	   the	   release	   time	  was	  very	  competitive	   in	  global	   terms,	  with	  almost	  all	   goods	  entering	  New	  
Zealand	  being	  cleared	  before	  they	  reached	  the	  New	  Zealand	  border.	  Figure	  17	  below	  shows	  the	  
sea	   cargo	   clearance	   times	   from	   one	   country	   to	   the	   other	   (Australian	   Customs	   and	   Border	  
Protection	  Service	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Service,	  2010,	  p.	  20).	  
Figure	  17. Trans-­‐Tasman	  goods	  clearance	  times	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Most	  of	   the	  barriers	   identified	  occurred	  on	  the	  Australian	  side	  and	  related	  to	  business	  practices	  
such	   as	   port	   and	   carrier	   operating	   hours,	   as	   well	   as	   from	   Australia	   not	   having	   the	   deferred	  
payment	  facility	  of	  New	  Zealand:	  
I	  can	  remember	  sitting	  around	  the	  table	  with	  the	   industry,	  and	  we	  put	   it	   [the	  time	  release	  
study]	  out,	  and	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  they	  just	  said	  “Yeah,	  well	  that’s	  right,	  you’re	  not	  the	  barrier”.	  
And	  yet	  you	  know,	  before	  then	  they’d	  all	  felt	  comfortable	  in	  us	  believing	  that	  we	  were	  the	  
barrier.	  So	  it	  did,	  it	  quietened	  –	  and	  it’s	  the	  old,	  the	  old	  story:	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  fact	  helps	  to	  deal	  
with	  emotion	  at	  times	  (Official	  A7,	  lines	  262-­‐267).	  
On	  1	  December	  2009,	  the	  first	  of	  four	  interagency	  workshops	  to	  discuss	  potential	  areas	  for	  further	  
work	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  space	  was	  held,	  involving	  representatives	  from	  MAF,	  New	  Zealand	  
Food	  Safety	  Authority	   (NZFSA),	  New	  Zealand	  Customs,	   and	   the	  Border	   Secretariat.	   This	  was	   the	  
first	   time	   this	   particular	   group	   of	   officials	   had	   met	   to	   discuss	   this	   topic,	   although	   many	   were	  
known	  to	  one	  another.	  In	  the	  section	  ‘Problem	  Definition’,	  the	  record	  of	  the	  meeting	  stated:	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  is	  difficult	  to	  define	  and	  separate	  from	  the	  other	  trade	  that	  New	  Zealand	  
has.	   Trade	   from	   Australia	   does	   not	   necessarily	   originate	   in	   Australia,	   but	   could	   be	  
transhipped.	   It	   could	  prove	  difficult	   to	   streamline	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	   in	   isolation	  of	  other	  
trade.355	  
The	  notes	  included	  a	  table	  of	  current,	  proposed	  and	  ‘horizon’	  initiatives.	  My	  handwritten	  notes	  on	  
the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	   file	  copy	  provided	  added	   information	  about	   the	  status,	   including	   two	  
initiatives	  completed,	  and	  one	  deleted	  as	  not	  a	  focus	  for	  2010.	  
An	  update	  prepared	  by	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  about	  the	  workshop	  for	  the	  Australia-­‐New	  Zealand	  
Prime	  Ministers’	  Action	  Plan	  progress	  report	  (requested	  by	  MFAT)	  stated:	  
The	  group	   felt	   a	  wider	   view	  of	   the	  New	  Zealand	   supply	   chain	   is	   required,	   including	   global	  
trade,	   to	  help	   the	   sector	   identify	  more	   clearly	  where	  barriers	   to	   trade	   are	   and	  where	   the	  
sector	  would	  best	   focus	   its	  collective	  resource	  to	  facilitate	  trade.	  Senior	  sector	  officials	  are	  
meeting	  pre-­‐Christmas	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  progress	  this	  work.356	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On	  17	  December	  2009,	  the	  BSGG	  met	  for	  a	  ‘Way	  Forward’	  discussion.	  	  The	  record	  of	  the	  meeting	  
noted	  Trade	  as	  one	  of	  five	  focus	  areas	  for	  the	  Border	  Sector	  for	  2010,	  and	  also	  noted	  ‘that	  there	  
will	  be	  a	  particular	  (but	  not	  exclusive)	  focus	  on	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade’.357	  	  	  
The	   second	  workshop	  was	  held	  on	  14	   January	  2010.358	  Next	   steps	   included	   further	   research	  on	  
material	   available	   to	   help	   develop	   a	   conceptual	   model,	   a	   plan	   of	   potential	   actions,	   clarify	  
governance,	  have	  another	  workshop	  and	  report	  to	  the	  BSGG.	  	  
The	   third	   workshop	   was	   held	   on	   18	   February	   2010.	   	   The	   notes	   from	   the	   meeting	   record	  
substantive	  discussion	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  a	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Trusted	  Trader	  Scheme.	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  
New	  Zealand	  could	   implement	   it	  unilaterally	  but	   ‘the	  benefit	  of	   such	  a	  scheme	  would	  be	  higher	  
should	   Australia	   also	   implement	   it’.359	   The	   next	   steps	   would	   include	   identifying	   ‘potential	  
companies	   that	  may	   benefit’.360	   Customs,	   NZFSA	   and	   biosecurity	  managers	   were	   to	   attend	   the	  
next	   (trans-­‐Tasman)	  Consultative	  Group	  on	  Biosecurity	  Cooperation	   (CGBC).	  A	   further	  workshop	  
was	  to	  be	  organised	  by	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  for	  April	  2010.	  	  
This	   fourth	   workshop	   was	   held	   on	   15	   April	   2010.	   	   The	   notes	   from	   the	   workshop	   record	   the	  
disappointing	  results	  of	  analysis	  using	  information	  held	  by	  the	  agencies.	  The	  participants	  decided	  
they	   needed	   to	   go	   direct	   to	   importers	   and	   ask	   them.361	  One	   official	   described	   the	   search	   for	   a	  
matter	  of	  concern:	  
.	  .	  .	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  probably	  2011,	  where	  I	  think	  the	  questions	  had	  been	  asked	  for	  quite	  a	  
while	  around	  “well	  what	  do	  we	  do	  next	   in	   the	   trade	   space?”	  and	   there	   really	  wasn’t	   very	  
clear	  direction	  on	  what	   to	  do	  next	   in	   that	  space.	   I	  do	  remember	  working	  on	  some	  activity	  
with	  other	  agencies,	  where	  a	  number	  of	  agencies	  were	  brought	  together	  and	  everybody	  was	  
proposing	   “well,	   could	   we	   do	   this?	   Could	   we	   do	   that?”	   and	   I	   remember	   at	   one	   of	   those	  
meetings	  highlighting	  “well,	  why	  are	  we	  second-­‐guessing	  what	  we	  need	  to	  do?	  Why	  don’t	  we	  
ask	   industry	  what	   they	  want,	   rather	   than	   coming	  up	  with	  pieces	  of	  work	   that	   could	  be	  of	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questionable	  value?”	  And	  I	  know	  that	  there	  were	  some	  workshops	  I	  believe	  Food	  Safety	  took	  
a	   lead	   on,	  which	  were	   to	   bring	   together	   a	   number	   of	   traders	   to	   solicit	   their	   views,	   and	   I	  
believe	  the	  indications	  of	  attendance	  were	  so	  poor,	  I	  believe	  it	  may	  have	  even	  been	  called	  off	  
(Official	  18,	  lines	  158-­‐167).	  
A	   border	   sector	   approach	   to	   the	   CGBC	   meeting	   was	   also	   agreed.	   A	   draft	   ‘Streamlining	   Trade’	  
timeline	   of	   initiatives	   that	   integrated	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	   with	   domestic	   trade	   initiatives	   was	  
updated.	   Trans-­‐Tasman	   Trade	   was	   no	   longer	   a	   specific	   focus	   area,	   demonstrating	   a	   set	   of	  
connections	  created	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose	  falling	  away	  when	  that	  purpose	  was	  shown	  to	  no	  longer	  
be	  a	  matter	  of	  concern.	  	  
However,	   trade	   work	   between	   the	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   administrations	   was	  
proceeding	   via	   the	  HLSG.	   The	   two	   countries	   have	   different	   types	   of	   exports	   –	  Australia	   exports	  
bulk	   commodities	   like	   minerals	   and	   coal;	   New	   Zealand	   does	   not.	   This	   means	   that	   information	  
needed	  to	  export	   the	  goods	   is	  more	  detailed	   in	  New	  Zealand	  than	  Australia.	  The	   implications	  of	  
this	  were	   discovered	  when,	   as	   part	   of	   the	  HLSG	  work	   programme	   in	   2010,362	   the	   two	   Customs	  
administrations	  assessed	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  single	  window:	  	  
The	   long	   term	   aspiration	  was	   the	   ability	   to	   take	  messaging	   at	   –	   a	   single	   point	   of	   export,	  
where	   reporting	  was	  provided	   to	   the	  export	  Customs	  administration.	   I	   should	   say	   “export	  
country”,	  because	  that	  should	  be	  a	  single	  portal	  for	  all	  of	  the	  domestic	  agencies	  on	  one	  side	  
of	  the	  Tasman	  –	  and	  for	  that	  data	  to	  be	  also	  provided	  to	  the	  importing	  country	  so	  that	  the	  
traders	  basically	  get	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  able	  to	  report	  once	  for	  all	  New	  Zealand	  agencies	  
and	  all	  Australian	  agencies,	  with	  consequent	  savings	  that	  they	  would	  have	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  
25-­‐30).	  
The	  outcomes	  of	  that	  work	  were	  not	  quite	  what	  either	  agency	  expected:	  
I	  worked	  with	  the	  Australians	  who	  came	  over	  and	  had	  a	  look	  at	  the	  data	  capture	  we	  did	  in	  
New	  Zealand	  Customs	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  closely	  the	  data	  elements	  that	  Australia	  captured	  on	  
departure	  and	  importation	  married	  up	  with	  the	  New	  Zealand	  data	  elements.	  The	  outcomes	  
of	  that	  work	  were	  probably	  quite	  surprising	  for	  both	  parties	  in	  that	  we	  actually	  had	  a	  less	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




an	  alignment	  with	  the	  Australian	  data	  sets	  –	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  data	  sets	  
–	   than	  Australia	  had	  with,	   for	   instance,	   I	   think	   it	  was	  Korea,	   Japan	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  
Asian	  economies.	  The	  correlation	  was	  very	  low.	  I	  think	  around	  thirty	  per	  cent,	  or	  something	  
like	  that	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  36-­‐43).	  
Aspirations	   for	   export	   data	   from	   one	   country	   being	   used	   as	   import	   data	   for	   the	   other	   were	  
therefore	  unable	  to	  be	  realised	  at	  that	  time.	  However,	  Official	  18	  did	  not	  consider	  the	  book	  was	  
closed	  on	  that	  aspiration:	  
So	  I	  think	  the	  opportunity	  still	  sits	  there,	  but	  the	  reality	  is	  it	  hasn't	  been	  moved	  very	  far.	  We	  
did	  have	  a	  teleconference	  with	  the	  Australian	  Customs	  executive	   in	  approximately	  2010	  to	  
talk	  about	  opportunities	  in	  that	  space,	  and	  I	  believe	  the	  offer	  at	  the	  time	  was	  particularly	  for	  
someone	   in	   Australian	   Customs	   to	   come	   over	   and	   participate	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
business	   case,	   but	   I	   think	   from	  both	   parties,	   it	  wasn't	   very	   explicit	   or	   clear	   how	   that	  was	  
going	   to	   work,	   what	   the	   invitation	   was,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   cost-­‐benefit	   equation	   that	  
existed.	  And	  as	  a	  result,	  it	  didn’t	  get	  a	  lot	  of	  traction	  and	  hasn’t	  progressed	  since	  (Official	  18,	  
lines	  66-­‐73).	  
A	   2011	  Border	   Secretariat	   document	   lists	   nine	   goals	   and	  16	   initiatives.363	   The	  only	   reference	   to	  
Australia	  is	  under	  the	  initiative	  ‘Bilateral	  Engagements’	  where	  Australia	  is	  noted	  as	  New	  Zealand’s	  
key	  trading	  partner.	  These	  initiatives	  included	  both	  joint	  and	  individual	  agency	  activities.	  
In	  2013,	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Customs	  trade	  discussion	  had	  moved	  again.	   It	  was	  occurring	  between	  
the	  two	  senior	  Customs	  managers	  responsible	  for	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  goods/cargo	  flows.	  
In	  frequent	  phone	  contact,	  they	  discussed	  issues	  common	  to	  both	  countries,	  such	  as	  revenue	  risk,	  
internet	  trading	  and	  data	  in	  supply	  chains.	  Their	  focus	  was	  responding	  to	  new	  business	  practices	  
and	   understanding	  what	   facilitating	   the	  whole	   supply	   chain	  means,	   of	  which	   trans-­‐Tasman	   is	   a	  
part:	  
My	  view	  would	  be	  that	  the	  preponderance	  of	  evidence	  based	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  “heat	  in	  the	  
kitchen”	  is	  that	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  supply	  chain	  doesn't	  need	  to	  go	  any	  faster	  for	  the	  majority	  
of	   businesses,	   and	   certainly	   in	   a	   business	   sense,	   I	   don't	   see	   companies	   coming	   to	   us	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




saying	  “We	  want	  to	  save	  ourselves	  a	  day	  in	  the	  supply	  chain.	  What	  do	  we	  need	  you	  to	  help	  
us	   to	   do?”	   In	   fact,	   their	   focus	   is	   often	   on	   different	   trades	   –	   the	   Chinese	   trade,	   it's	   the	  
Americas	  trade	  –	  you	  know,	  it's	  not	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  space	  (Official	  17,	  lines	  104-­‐108).	  
One	  Australian	  official	  acknowledged	  that	   if	  ACBPS	  developed	  a	  trusted	  trader	  programme,	  New	  
Zealand	  would	   be	   near	   the	   top	   of	   countries	   they	  would	  want	   to	   develop	   a	  mutual	   recognition	  
agreement	   with	   ‘because	   we	   know	   what	   your	   standards	   are,	   we	   know	   what	   your	   compliance	  
regime	  is	   like,	  so	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  feel	  that	  we	  had	  the	  trust	   in	  the	  assurance	  that	  you	  were	  
providing	  through	  that	  secure	  export	  scheme’	  (Official	  A6,	  lines	  52-­‐54).	  
On	  the	  New	  Zealand	  side,	  the	  lack	  of	  drive	  from	  industry	  for	  improved	  trans-­‐Tasman	  processes	  is	  
surprising,	  given	   the	   traders	  who	   find	   it	  hard	   to	  break	   into	   the	  Australian	  market	  and	   therefore	  
probably	  need	  some	  assistance	  are	  the	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises:	  ‘the	  real	  issue	  for	  me	  
is	  how	  we	  collectively	  in	  government	  –	  and	  we	  particularly	  –	  can	  facilitate	  ease	  of	  access	  to	  that	  
single	   economic	   market,	   in	   theory	   for	   them,	   because	   most	   multinational	   companies,	   they've	  
conquered	  the	  single	  economic	  market	  (Official	  17,	  lines	  208-­‐210).	  
Some	   interviewees	   considered	   the	   benefit	   from	   cooperating	   in	   the	   trade	   space	   was	   not	   from	  
making	  up	  joint	  projects	  but	  from	  ‘sharing	  best	  practice	  ideas,	  and	  learning	  from	  one	  another	  .	  .	  .	  
as	   far	   as	   I’m	   aware,	   there’s	   not	   a	   lot	   of	   demand	   from	   traders	   for	  much	   trade	  work	   to	   happen’	  
(Official	  7,	   lines	  89-­‐90,	  93-­‐94).	  Another	  official	  described	   the	   lack	  of	   clarity	  around	  objectives	   in	  
relation	  to	  barriers,	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  ANZLF	  and	  the	  HLSG	  as	  mechanisms	  used	  to	  try	  and	  solve	  
this	  unclarified	  problem:	  	  
On	  the	  trade	  front,	  the	  drive	  came	  from	  the	  Australia-­‐New	  Zealand	  Leaders	  Forum	  and	  a	  kind	  
of	  mythical	   concern	   that	   customs	  was	   still	   a	   barrier	   to	   the	   fast	   and	   efficient	   clearance	   of	  
goods,	   and	   that	   concern	  was	  based	  around	   the	   time	   it	   took	   for	   goods	   to	   get	   through	   the	  
processes	   and	   across	   the	   Tasman	   and	   so	   on.	   So	   the	   Time	   Release	   Studies	   were	   very	  
important	   in	   showing	   that	   actually	   there	   is	   a	   story	   here,	   but	   it's	   not	   about	   customs	   and	  
biosecurity.	  It's	  about	  the	  things	  that	  we	  thought	  it	  was.	  It's	  logistics	  control,	  how	  when	  you	  
book	  your	  ships	  and	  book	  the	  containers	  to	  go	  on	  the	  ships,	  it's	  the	  Australian	  port	  and	  how	  
they	  operate	  and	  New	  Zealand	  port	  and	  how	  that	  operates	  as	  well.	   	  But	  there	  had	  been	  a	  
real	  drive	  from	  at	  least	  the	  time	  since	  we	  started	  working	  with	  –	  on	  the	  HLSG	  in	  2005/2006	  




overcome	   from	  a	   border	   perspective,	  without	   an	   acknowledgement	   that	   “Actually,	   do	  we	  
know	  what	  we're	  talking	  about?”	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  95-­‐105).	  
 Trans-Tasman Trade Narratives 6.7.1
 SEM/ trans-Tasman trade 6.7.1.1
The	  trans-­‐Tasman	  goods	  trade	  narrative	  started	  with	  examining	  ways	  to	  simplify	  the	  customs	  part	  
of	   the	   supply	   chain.	   A	   key	   idea	   was	   the	   trade	   single	   window	   concept	   promoted	   by	   the	  WCO;	  
another	  idea	  was	  to	  measure	  the	  efficiency	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  customs	  processes	  by	  way	  of	  a	  WCO	  
TRS	   tool.	   So	   here	   we	   can	   see	   specifics	   of	   the	   global	   narrative	   being	   brought	   into	   the	   regional	  
border	  narrative.	  
 Matters of concern 6.7.1.2
While	   officials	   had	   been	  working	   on	   trade	   facilitation	   prior	   to	   the	  March	   2009	   joint	   statement,	  
they	   could	   have	   stopped	   once	   they	   had	   fulfilled	   the	   minimum	   requirement	   of	   a	   stocktake	   of	  
initiatives.	  Something	  prompted	   them	  to	  do	  more,	  even	  after	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
border	  processes	  was	  established	  through	  the	  TRS.	  It	  was	  as	  though	  another	  narrative	  was	  playing	  
out	  –	  one	  that	  drove	  border	  agencies	  to	  think	  they	  should	  be	  doing	  something	  to	   improve	  what	  
the	   absence	   of	   industry	   complaints	   indicated	   was	   already	   an	   easy	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trading	  
environment.	   	   By	   2010	   the	   connections	   needed	   to	   progress	   the	   suggested	   activities	   fell	   away,	  
indicating	   that	   while	   narrative	   might	   drive	   action	   for	   a	   while,	   without	   a	   matter	   of	   concern	  
important	  to	  either	  group	  of	  border	  agencies,	  whether	   internally	  or	  externally	  driven,	   it	  couldn’t	  
do	  so	  for	  long.	  	  The	  interviews	  support	  this	  interpretation.	  
One	   official	   thought	   the	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	   came	   from	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
global	  financial	  crisis:	  
The	  reality	  was	  that	  was	  the	  global	   financial	  crisis	  environment.	   If	  not,	  was	  underway,	  was	  
certainly	  building	  through	  that	  period	  and	  traders	  were	  very	  focused	  on,	  you	  know,	  bottom	  
lines	  in	  key	  –	  core	  aspects	  of	  their	  business,	  and	  probably	  weren’t	  interested	  in	  focusing	  on	  
more	   undefined	   sort	   of	   programmes	   of	  work.	   So	   there	   certainly	  wasn’t	   any	   drive	   coming	  
from	   industry.	   I	   remember	   [the	  Chief	   Executive	  of	  ACBPS]	   saying	   something	   similar	   at	   the	  
time	   at	   one	   of	   the	   meetings	   I	   attended,	   where	   he	   indicated	   that	   he	   wasn’t	   getting	   any	  




in	  that	  space,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  clearance	  times.	  The	  Time	  Release	  Studies	  supported	  that.	  So	  
in	   the	   trade	   space,	   I	   think	   that,	   if	   you	   like,	  we	  were	   asking	   the	  question	   around	  what	  we	  
could	  do	  when	  actually	  there	  was	  nobody	  really	  from	  the	  industry	  side	  of	  the	  agenda	  asking	  
for	  anything	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  172-­‐181).	  
But	  lack	  of	  action	  wasn’t	  just	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  matters	  of	  concern.	  The	  structural	  differences	  in	  each	  
country’s	   customs	  data	   arose	   from	   the	   different	   nature	   of	   each	   country’s	   exports	   –	   differences	  
that	   even	   the	   global	   trading	   system	  couldn’t	   address.	  Without	   the	  data	   able	   to	  be	  harmonised,	  
there	  could	  not	  be	  an	  integrated	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  portal,	  unless	  the	  border	  requirements	  were	  
to	  be	   removed	  altogether.	  This	  was	  a	   technical	  problem	  that	   the	  Customs	  administrations	  were	  
not	  going	  to	  drive	  on	  their	  own	  to	  solve.	  The	  lack	  of	  industry	  or	  political	  push	  indicated	  that	  again,	  
the	  matter	   of	   concern	   was	   not	   big	   enough	   to	   drive	   some	   types	   of	   action	   (the	   big,	   challenging	  
types).	  
A	  matter	   of	   concern	   that	   came	   through	   in	   the	   interviews	  was	  where	   the	   trade	   discussions	   are	  
really	  occurring	  –	  looking	  out	  to	  other	  markets	  such	  as	  ASEAN	  and	  the	  US.364	  	  
 The problem that wasn’t a problem and the fact-making that put it to bed 6.7.1.3
This	   lack	   of	   matters	   of	   concern	   led	   officials	   to	   question	   the	   problem	   they	   were	   meant	   to	   be	  
solving.	   Unclear	   objectives	   led	   to	   an	   unclear	   narrative	   –	   something	   that	   emerged	   from	   several	  
interviews.	   Border	   agencies	   responded	   in	   part	   by	   providing	   evidence	   to	   industry	   that	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  border	  agencies	  were	  neither	  causing	  supply	  chain	  delays	  nor	  creating	  barriers	  to	  trans-­‐
Tasman	   trade.	   Official	   8’s	   comment	   ‘there	   is	   a	   story	   here,	   but	   it’s	   not	   about	   customs	   and	  
biosecurity	  .	  .	  .	  .	  It's	  logistics	  control,	  how	  when	  you	  book	  your	  ships	  and	  book	  the	  containers	  to	  go	  
on	  the	  ships,	   it's	   the	  Australian	  port	  and	  how	  they	  operate	  and	  New	  Zealand	  port	  and	  how	  that	  
operates	  as	  well’365	  captures	  this	  point	  well.	  
By	   accepting	   the	   border	   agencies’	   evidence,	   industry	   stakeholders	   helped	   create	   the	   ‘fact’	   that	  
border	  agencies	  are	  not	  creating	  barriers	  to	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade.	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6.8 Insights	   and	   conclusions	   about	   the	   performativity	   of	   the	   policy	   processes	   for	  
managing	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border/s	  
Before	   discussing	   the	   findings	   on	   the	   research	   question,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   capture	   some	  of	   the	  
insights	   about	   the	   performativity	   of	   policy	   processes	   used	   to	   help	   manage	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
borders.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	   in	  the	  next	  Chapter,	  these	   insights	  have	  their	  part	  to	  play	   in	  the	  overall	  
findings.	  
The	   political	   statement	   of	   the	   two	   Prime	  Ministers	   appears	   to	   have	   had	   several	   effects	   on	   the	  
performativity	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  policy	  processes.	  First,	   it	  temporarily	  generated	  a	   level	  of	  
focused	   activity	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Tasman	   but	   not	   particularly	   'joint'	   activity.	   Existing	  
connections	  were	  put	  to	  new	  purposes	  and	  new	  actor-­‐networks	  started	  to	  develop.	  However,	   in	  
the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   space,	   these	   new	   actor-­‐networks	   gradually	   unravelled	   as	   the	   intense	  
focus	  of	  the	  first	  few	  months	  eased	  off,	  or	  as	  senior	  officials'	  attention	  moved	  elsewhere,	  so	  that	  a	  
more	  'business	  as	  usual'	  set	  of	  relationships	  resumed.	  	  
In	  the	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  workstream,	  the	  actor-­‐network	  in	  New	  Zealand	  had	  hardly	  
started	   to	   form	   before	   it	   fell	   away	   –	   it	   was	   not	   connected	   to	   a	   significant	   enough	   matter	   of	  
concern.	   The	   clearance	   times	   for	   goods	  were	   not	   a	   concern	   for	   traders;	   the	   opportunities	   and	  
areas	  of	  possible	  improvement	  were	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  politicians	  or	  senior	  officials	  –	  not	  
in	   either	   country,	   nor	   in	   bilateral	   discussions.	   There	  were	   no	   debates	   or	   issues	   to	   be	   resolved.	  
There	  was	  nothing	  to	  trace.	  As	  for	  travel,	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connections	  quickly	  reverted	  to	  'business	  
as	  usual'	  agency-­‐specific	  relationships.	  
 The trans-Tasman policy process 6.8.1
This	   section	   examines	   in	  more	   detail	   what	   ANT	   performativity	   tells	   us	   about	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
policy	  process	  for	  managing	  borders.	  A	  simple	  view	  is	  that	  performativity	  comes	  from	  the	  action,	  
the	  action	  comes	  from	  the	  translation	  and	  the	  translation	  comes	  from	  unresolved	  debates.	  What	  
was	   striking	   in	   the	   interviews	   was	   the	   lack	   of	   visible	   areas	   of	   policy	   debate.	   This	   was	   in	   part	  
because	   the	   contentious	   policy	   areas	   –	   biosecurity	   and	   immigration	   –	   were	   excluded	   from	  
consideration.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  policy	  arena	  was	  truly	  border	  management,366	  rather	  than	  policy	  
that	  is	  implemented	  at	  the	  border.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The	   lack	   of	   debate	   wasn’t	   because	   there	   was	   nothing	   to	   debate,	   for	   example,	   the	   technical	  
problems	  of	  developing	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  single	  trade	  window	  in	  Story	  5;	  interviewees	  talked	  about	  
potential	  areas	  of	  debate	  such	  as	  the	  problems	  caused	  by	  using	  different	  cost-­‐benefit	  frameworks,	  
which	  the	  following	  interchange	  exposes:	  
Interviewer:	  I’ve	  not	  heard	  it	  really	  talked	  about	  in	  the	  New	  Zealand	  context.	  It	  sounds	  to	  me	  
like	  an	  actual	  area	  of	  debate	  that	  hasn’t	  been	  debated	  is	  what’s	  made	  up	  of	  getting	  a	  really	  
good	  understanding	  of	  one	  another’s	  cost-­‐benefit	  um	  frames.	  
Official:	   I	   think	   that’s	   important	   to	   understand,	   because	   I	   think	   at	   the	   moment	   there’s	  
probably	  very	  different	  perspectives	  that	  come	  into	  play	  when	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  is	  being	  
considered.	  
Interviewer:	  And	  basically	  people	  –	  they’re	  all	  talking	  past	  each	  other.	  	  
Official:	  They’re	  either	  talking	  past	  each	  other,	  or	  they’re	  talking	  ineffectually	  to	  each	  other,	  
because	  one	  person’s	  just	  not	  putting	  the	  same	  impetus	  on	  something	  that	  the	  other	  party	  
is.	  So,	  I	  certainly	  think	  that’s	  an	  area	  that	  could	  be	  –	  needs	  to	  be	  looked	  at	  probably	  further.	  I	  
think	  there’s	  a	  useful	  discussion	  point	  as	  a	  minimum	  there,	  for	  what	  do	  you	  put	  your	  value	  
on	  when	  you’re	  looking	  at	  a	  cost	  benefit	  decision	  in	  that	  context	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  331-­‐341).	  
Rather	  than	  matters	  of	  contention	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  debated,	  officials	  were	  working	  with	  a	  range	  
of	  matters	  of	   concern	   that	  were	  different	   for	  different	  groups,	  as	  drawn	  out	   in	  each	  of	   the	   five	  
stories.	  What	   these	  stories	  appear	   to	  be	  showing	   is	   that	  unless	  both	   countries	  have	  a	  matter	  of	  
concern	   relating	   to	   each	   other’s	   country,	   there	   is	   no	   translation	   occurring	   between	   them.	   It	  
doesn’t	   have	   to	   be	   the	   same	  matter	   of	   concern,	   but	   there	   has	   to	   be	   one,	   as	   described	   by	   one	  
official:	   ‘So	   we	   didn’t	   all	   have	   the	   same	   reason,	   but	   we	   did	   all	   have	   a	   strong	   enough	   reason’	  
(Official	  16,	  lines	  161-­‐2).367	  	  
Border	  management	  policy	  actor-­‐networks	  thus	  appear	  to	  blink	  in	  and	  out	  of	  existence	  as	  matters	  
of	   concern	  connect	  and	  activate	  and	   then	  disconnect	  and	  deactivate	   them.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   is	  
only	   performative	   if	   there	   are	   matters	   of	   concern	   and	   translations	   are	   occurring	   about	   those	  
matters	  of	  concern.	  This	  intermittency	  brings	  to	  mind	  Anni	  Dugdale’s	  insights	  about	  the	  oscillating	  
effect	  of	  assemblages	  moving	  from	  stability	  to	   instability	   in	  her	  research	  on	  policy-­‐making	  about	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




intra-­‐uterine	  devices	  in	  Australia	  (Anni	  Dugdale	  in	  Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999).	  	  	  	  
Many	  actions	  officials	  took	  were	  focused	  on	  working	  through	  the	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  
reach	  a	  point	  where	   there	  was	  only	  one	  matter	  of	  concern.	  These	  actions	  were	  akin	   to	  Latour’s	  
‘fact-­‐making’	   in	   science,	  manifesting	   through	   actions	   like	   evidence-­‐gathering	   (IATA	  model,	   TRS),	  
and	   developing	   a	   definitive	   record	   of	   events	   through	   meeting	   minutes	   that	   became	   a	   fixed	  
reference	  point	  for	  the	  future,	  especially	  if	  they	  were	  government	  Cabinet	  minutes	  (Latour,	  1987).	  	  
There	  was	  even	  a	  question	  about	  whether	  the	  processes	  officials	  were	  performing	  were	  policy	  at	  
all:	  	  
We	  did	  achieve	  some	  good	  things,	  but	   it	  wasn't	  policy.	   It	  was	  sort	  of	  operational	  activities	  
that	  we	   could	  deliver	  quickly	  within	   a	  policy	   context	   –	  because	   the	   real	   policy	  discussions	  
were	   actually	   so	   complex	   and	   not	   lending	   themselves	   to	   a	   big	   suite	   of	   rolling	  workshops	  
between	  April	  and	  May	  essentially.	  So	   then	   it	  became	  “What	  can	  we	  operationally	  deliver	  
and	  frame	  up	  as	  having	  some	  bigger	  policy	  meaning?”	  which	  possibly	  they	  did	  (Official	  16,	  
lines	  323-­‐327).	  
There	  was	  rarely	  any	  recognisable	  policy	  discussion	  and	  there	  were	  not	  many	  Cabinet	  papers	  on	  
either	  side.	  There	  were	  briefings	  to	  Ministers	  and	  Prime	  Ministers	  for	  the	  regular	  Prime	  Ministerial	  
meetings,	   and	  meetings	  between	   the	   two	  Ministers	   responsible	   for	  Customs	  and	   the	   respective	  
border	  sectors.	  	  The	  numerous	  meetings	  and	  workshops	  focused	  on	  making	  the	  future	  visible,	  as	  
for	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   activity	   from	  March	   to	   August	   2009.	   However,	   the	  work	  was	   focused	   on	  
providing	  advice	  to	  and	  delivering	  results	  for	  Government,	  and	  in	  that	  respect	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  fall	  
within	  the	  realm	  of	  policy	  practice.	  	  
In	  their	  Chapter	  ‘Policy	  in	  Practice’,	  Laws	  and	  Hajer	  argue	  that	  concept	  of	  practice	  ‘highlights	  the	  
negotiated	   character	   of	   public	   policy	   and	   does	   so	   in	   a	   way	   that	   relates	   individual	   action	   to	  
institutional	  contexts	  .	  .	  .	  [and]	  actually	  helps	  understand	  how	  to	  conceive	  of	  public	  policy	  making	  
in	  an	  unstable	  world’	  (Moran	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Chapter	  19,	  p.	  421).	  Colebatch	  calls	  policy	  practice	  ‘an	  
exercise	  in	  social	  construction’	  that	  occurs	  in	  ‘an	  arena	  for	  action’	  (Colebatch,	  2005,	  p.	  21).	  An	  ANT	  
way	  of	  expressing	  policy	  practice	  could	  be	  policy-­‐in-­‐performance.	  	  	  	  
What	   this	   thesis	   does	   point	   to	   is	   that	   the	   arena	   for	   action	   in	   this	   thesis	  may	   be	   specific	   to	   the	  




and	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   management	   policy	   are	   different	   in	   terms	   of	   integration,	   and	   the	  
different	   institutional	   arrangements	   mean	   border	   management	   policy	   is	   more	   overt	   and	  
deliberate	  in	  the	  EU	  than	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman.	  Chapter	  6	  highlights	  that	  officials	  approach	  their	  
work	  with	  a	  pragmatic	  and	  adaptive	  attitude,	  for	  example,	  one	  official	  implied	  once	  the	  decision	  is	  
made,	  you	  move	  on	  and	  don’t	  angst	  over	  it:	  ‘Look,	  I	  mean	  it’s	  like	  this	  in	  any	  bureaucracy	  to	  some	  
degree	  –	  you	  make	  your	  point,	  you	  make	  it	  clear	  and	  then	  the	  decision	  is	  made	  by	  someone	  else	  
and	  that’s	  fine’	  (Official	  10,	  lines	  498-­‐99).	  Another	  thought	  that	  to	  reach	  the	  goal	  for	  streamlining	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  trade	  and	  travel,	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  agencies	  should	  work	  together	  when	  it	  
made	  sense	  to	  do	  so,	  not	  to	  force	  the	  issue:	  
I	   think	   if	  we	  keep	   focusing	  on	  continuous	   improvement	  over	   time,	   then	  we'll	  get	  closer	   to	  
that	  goal.	  I	  think	  that	  when	  we	  need	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Australians,	  we	  definitely	  should,	  but	  
maybe	  we	  don't	  need	  to	  create	  artificial	  reasons	  for	  working	  with	  them	  that	  takes	  up	  time	  
for	  all	  of	  us	  (Official	  9,	  lines	  192-­‐196).	  	  
 Performativity of trans-Tasman border management policy practice 6.8.2
While	  interviewees	  had	  experience	  of	  one	  or	  two	  of	  the	  five	  stories,	  no	  one	  had	  experience	  across	  
all	   five,	   except	   perhaps	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Minister	   of	   Customs.	   However,	   there	   were	   many	  
consistent	  and	  sometimes	  common	  elements	  in	  the	  performativity	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  policy	  
practices.	  Latour	  describes	  the	  benefit	  of	  defining	  the	  performativity	  of	  social	  groupings:	  ‘it	  draws	  
attention	  to	  the	  means	  necessary	  to	  ceaselessly	  upkeep	  the	  groups	  and	  to	  the	  key	  contributions	  
made	  by	  the	  analysts’	  own	  resources’	  (Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  35).	  
Digging	   into	   the	   make-­‐up	   of	   the	   assemblages	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   policy	   environment	  
reveals	  some	  actants	  that	  are	  hidden	  ‘in	  full	  view’.	  	  Recalling	  that	  actor-­‐networks	  are	  assemblages	  
of	  actors/actants	  and	  actions	  connected	  through	  translation,	   in	   this	  section	   I	  discuss	  what	  those	  
assemblages	  were	  made	  up	  of	  and	  how	  the	  different	  types	  of	  actors/actants	  acted	  on	  the	  actor-­‐
networks.	  	  
 The assemblages and their interconnections 6.8.2.1
The	   assemblages	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   stories	   were	   not	   necessarily	   the	   same	   as	   the	   formal	  




The	  HLSG	  was	  an	  assemblage	  of	  senior	  officials	  who	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  HLSG	  
meetings	   and	   its	   associated	  minutes	   and	   action	   points,	   and	   by	   their	   officials.	   	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  
structure	  was	  an	  actant,	  as	  discussed	  earlier	   in	  this	  Chapter,	  but	  only	  while	  there	  was	  a	  suitable	  
matter	  of	  concern,	  after	  which	  the	  group	  dissolved	  organically.	  
The	   trade	  work	  generated	  a	  very	   short-­‐lived	  assemblage	  as	  discussed	  earlier	   in	   this	  Chapter.	   Its	  
main	  connection	  was	  with	  the	  work	  already	  done	  in	  the	  HLSG.	  
The	   assemblage	   for	   the	   longer	   term	  work	  was	   gathered	   around	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   in	   New	  
Zealand	  and	  the	  ACBPS	  representative	  in	  Australia.	  The	  senior	  levels	  of	  the	  agencies	  were	  not	  part	  
of	   the	  network	   in	   the	  way	   they	  were	   for	   SmartGate.	   Senior	   officials	  were	  part	   of	   the	   reporting	  
structure	  but	  didn’t	  appear	  to	  do	  much	  translating.	  The	  primary	  senior	  level	  connection	  was	  with	  
DPMC	   in	  both	  countries,	  and	   in	   the	  pre-­‐August	  2009	  work,	   to	  Cabinet	   in	  New	  Zealand.	  After	  20	  
August	  2009,	   the	   formal	   structure	  of	   the	  BSGG	  and	   its	   subcommittees	   kept	   the	  progress	  of	   the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   work	   on	   the	   agenda,	   but	   the	   assemblage	   really	   included	   the	   working	   group	   of	  
officials,	   the	   consultants	   and	   the	   industry	   representatives	   involved	   in	   the	  work.	  Politicians	  were	  
called	  on	  to	  approve	  or	  note	  progress	  and	  this	  translated	  into	  a	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  
about	   the	   work	   in	   2011	   that	   shows	   the	   Prime	   Ministers’	   continuing	   interest.	   However,	   as	  
discussed	  earlier	   in	  this	  Chapter,	   this	  assemblage	  dissolved	  once	  senior	  officials	  deferred	  further	  
action.	  At	  that	  point,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australian	  officials	  talked	  about	  their	  respective	  concerns	  
over	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  of	  the	  model.	  For	  New	  Zealand,	  the	  officials	  questioned	  whether	  the	  benefits	  
would	  be	  worth	  the	  investment	  that	  would	  have	  been	  required;	  for	  Australia,	  industry	  did	  also.368	  
As	   a	   result,	   the	   actor-­‐network	   that	   was	   built	   around	   the	   ‘Streamlined	   trans-­‐Tasman	   Travel’	  
objective	  appeared	  to	  fall	  away.	  Longstanding	  connections	  between	  the	  respective	  pairs	  of	  border	  
agencies	   remained,	   but	   the	   cross-­‐agency	   trans-­‐Tasman	   actor-­‐network	   seemed	   to	   disappear.	  
Interestingly,	   because	   of	   the	   ongoing	   agency	   connections,	   it	   has	   shown	   it	   can	   be	   quickly	  
reactivated,	   as	   it	   was	   in	   November	   2012	   for	   a	   video-­‐conference	   meeting.	   This	   suggests	   this	  
particular	   actor-­‐network	   is	   hibernating,	   rather	   than	   having	   disintegrated.	   	   The	   individual	   actors	  
may	  change,	  but	  the	  institutional	  linkages	  remain:	  ‘We	  do	  have	  a	  positive	  relationship	  which	  has	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




high	  degree	  of	  trust	  and	  even	  with	  the	  change	  in	  personnel,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  changes’	  (Official	  6,	  
lines	  231-­‐232).	  
In	  March	   2014,	   a	   reactivation	   of	   this	   actor-­‐network	   appeared	   imminent,	   involving	   some	   of	   the	  
same	  actors	  and	  many	  new	  ones,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  2015	  as	  the	  centenary	  of	  the	  Australian	  and	  New	  
Zealand	   forces	   (ANZAC)	   who	   battled	   alongside	   each	   other	   at	   Gallipoli	   in	   1915.369	   The	   term	  
‘Streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  Travel’	  was	  still	  being	  used.	  However,	  with	  the	  announcement	  in	  May	  
2014	   of	   the	   disestablishment	   of	   the	   ACBPS	   in	   June	   2015,	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   new	  merged	  
Border	  Force	  to	  become	  operational	  on	  1	  July	  2015,	  any	  further	  moves	  over	  the	  next	  two	  years	  to	  
streamline	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  beyond	  current	  plans	  became	  uncertain.	  
The	   SmartGate	   story	   revealed	   SmartGate	   as	   a	   key	   actant	   in	   an	   assemblage	   gathered	   around	   it.	  
Human	  actors	  spoke	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  SmartGate.	  The	  other	  main	  actant	  was	  
the	  Cabinet	  paper,	  which	  was	  the	  ‘obligatory	  point’	  of	  passage	  for	  the	  delivery	  of	  SmartGate.	  New	  
Zealand	   Customs	   was	   the	   pivotal	   ‘macro-­‐actor’	   in	   connecting	   and	   translating	   between	   these	  
components	  of	  the	  assemblage.	  
The	  SmartGate	  integration	  trial	  was	  one	  of	  the	  deliverables	  announced	  on	  20	  August	  2009	  but	  was	  
never	  part	  of	  the	   longer	  term	  work	  even	  though	  announced	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  The	  officials	  who	  
assembled	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   SmartGate	   integration	   had	   little	   connection	   with	   the	   longer	  
term	  work.	  I	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  connectors	  in	  New	  Zealand	  Customs.	  The	  only	  other	  connection	  
to	   that	  work	  was	   in	   reporting	   to	  MFAT	   in	  New	  Zealand,	   in	  preparation	   for	   the	  Prime	  Ministers’	  
meetings.	  	  
Assemblages	   from	   the	   non-­‐Customs	   border	   agencies	   affected	   their	   contribution	   to	   the	   five	  
assemblages	  above.	  For	  example,	  DoL’s	  engagement	  with	  DIAC	  and	  MPI’s	  engagement	  with	  DAFF	  
continued	  alongside	  the	  five	  border	  stories	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  informed	  their	  input	  into	  the	  work	  and	  
influenced	   their	   views	   on	   its	   relevance.	   In	   New	   Zealand,	   the	   non-­‐trans-­‐Tasman	   aspects	   of	   the	  
BSGG	   work	   programme	   and	   in	   Australia,	   the	   political	   priority	   to	   address	   maritime	   people	  
smuggling	  were	  competing	  matters	  of	  concern.	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The	   five	   assemblages	   described	   above	   intersected	   and	   overlapped	   in	   different	  ways.	   The	   HLSG	  
provided	  a	  key	  platform	  for	  SmartGate	  and	  carried	  out	  much	  of	  the	  work	  that	  would	  have	  been	  
done	   in	   the	   trade	   work	   stream	   if	   it	   hadn’t	   already	   been	   done.	   The	   HLSG	   also	   provided	   a	  
‘streamlining	  trade	  and	  travel’	  cooperative	  narrative	  frame	  and	  a	  mechanism	  for	  adapting	  that	  to	  
the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  of	  March	  2009.	  Once	  the	  work	  began,	  we	  saw	  initial	  tensions	  
between	  the	  SmartGate	  and	  the	  longer	  term	  work.	  After	  SmartGate	  New	  Zealand	  was	  approved,	  
that	   tension	  disappeared,	   leaving	   the	  only	   connection	  between	   the	  SmartGate	   integration	  work	  
and	  the	   joint	  study	   (the	   longer	  term	  work)	   in	   the	   form	  of	  reporting	  on	  progress.	  The	  SmartGate	  
New	  Zealand	  work	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  SmartGate	  integration.	  The	  seeds	  of	  the	  integration	  trial	  
and	  its	  narrative	  were	  therefore	  contained	  within	  and	  depended	  on	  the	  SmartGate	  New	  Zealand	  
work.	  Likewise,	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  up	  to	  20	  August	  2009	  provided	  the	  thinking	  and	  framing	  that	  
helped	  progress	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  after	  20	  August	  2009.	  	  
These	  connections	  are	  depicted	  diagrammatically	   in	  Figure	  18	  below.	  This	  diagram	  highlights	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  overlaps	  and	  intersections	  between	  the	  assemblages	  and	  the	  actions.	  




Most	  of	  the	  Streamlining	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  trade	  work	  was	  done	  pre-­‐
March	  2009	  
Streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
trade	  work	  post-­‐March	  2009The	  HLSG	  provided	  a	  	  mechanism	  for	  progressing	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Officials	  and	  sometimes	  Ministers	  were	  the	  main	  human	  actors	   in	  the	  assemblages.	  Members	  of	  
industry	   appeared	   sometimes,	   but	   not	   often.	   	   One	   interesting	   observation	   about	   some	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  connections	  was	  that	  individual	  connections	  that	  didn’t	  necessarily	  form	  part	  of	  the	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  assemblages	  under	  study	  could	  on	  occasions	  be	  called	  on	  to	  act	  on	  the	  assemblage.	  For	  
example:	  
On	  the	  trade	  space,	   I've	  got	  a	  really	  good	  friend	  at	  DFAT	  and	  good	  friends	  within	  Australia	  
Customs	   who,	   even	   though	   they've	   moved	   around	   as	   well,	   and	   you	   do	   create	   those	  
relationships	  because	  you're	  away,	   talking	  to	  people,	  and	  offshore	  and	   .	   .	   .	   	  you	  build	  that	  
rapport	  over	  time	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  216-­‐219).	  	  
Despite	   decisions	   to	   forestall	   implementing	   the	   new	   trans-­‐Tasman	   model,	   travel	   programme	  
connections	  continued	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  administrations	  beyond	  the	  
closing	  down	  of	   the	  work	  on	  the	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	  model	   in	  early	  2012.	  For	  example,	   the	  personal	  
connections	   a	   New	   Zealand	   Customs	   policy	   manager	   had	   with	   their	   Australian	   counterparts	  
enabled	  a	  senior	  policy	  staff	  member	  to	  be	  looped	  in:	  
My	  manager	   .	   .	   .	   [has]	  good	  personal	  contacts	   into	  there	  [Australia],	  and	  tend[s]	   to	  exploit	  
those	   routes	   rather	   than	   formal	   sort	   of	   discussions.	   I	   mean,	   things’ll	   be	   elevated	   where	  
necessary	  but	  there’s	  a	   lot	  of	   informal	  to-­‐ing	  and	  fro-­‐ing,	  and	  [they’re]	  encouraging	  that	   in	  
the	  staff	  in	  their	  team,	  so	  we	  have	  those	  things	  in	  –	  it’s	  getting	  a	  little	  harder	  now	  because	  
there’s	  so	  much	  chopping	  and	  changing	  within	  ACS	  [sic]	  –	  a	  lot	  of	  [their]	  contacts	  are	  being	  
shuffled	  into	  other	  positions	  (Official	  5,	  lines	  319-­‐324).	  
These	   connections	   were	   strengthened	   through	   reciprocal	   joint	   visits,	   after	   which	   the	   two	  
administrations	   came	   up	   with	   a	   joint	   approach.	   These	   sorts	   of	   connections	   were	   disrupted,	  
however,	  when	  personnel	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  Tasman	  left	  their	  organisation	  or	  were	  moved	  to	  
another	  area	  of	  responsibility.	  	  
 Everyday mechanisms and technologies as tools and actants 6.8.2.2
Two	  mechanisms	  were	  present	   in	  all	  stories	  –	  mechanisms	  that	  swung	  between	  being	  tools	  that	  
were	  enablers	  but	  that	  didn’t	  change	  anything	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  and	  being	  actants	  that	  caused	  
actors	   to	   act/translate.	   These	   mechanisms	   were	   meetings	   and	   workshops,	   and	   the	   electronic	  




Meetings	   and	  workshops	  were	   important	  mechanisms	   for	   enabling	   the	   debate	   and	   translations	  
necessary	   for	   moving	   officials	   from	   one	   stage	   to	   the	   next,	   and	   thus	   were	   actants	   that	   had	   a	  
positive	  effect	  on	  the	  desired	  outcomes.	  When	  one	  of	  these	  mechanism	  failed,	  as	  with	  the	  SOG	  in	  
the	  longer	  term	  work	  part	  2,	  action	  slowed	  and	  was	  in	  danger	  of	  stopping.	  In	  that	  case,	  they	  were	  
also	  actants,	  but	  with	  a	  negative	  effect.	  
Emails,	   electronic	   files,	   electronic	   filing	   systems,	   agendas,	   and	   electronically	   created	   and	   stored	  
minutes	  of	  meetings	  were	  all	  ubiquitous	  electronic	  communications.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  electronic	  
communication	  method	  was	  a	   tool.	   For	  example,	  when	  meeting	   invitations	  were	   sent	  by	  email,	  
email	  was	  a	   tool.	  However,	   in	  certain	   situations,	   the	   tool	  became	  an	  actant,	   such	  as	   the	  Border	  
Secretariat	   use	   of	   ‘Track	   Changes’	   in	  Microsoft	  Word	   to	  make	   the	   changes	   visible	   in	   colour.	   As	  
noted	  in	  Chapter	  6.5,	  this	  created	  transparency	  that	  helped	  build	  the	  trust	  and	  confidence	  of	  the	  
participating	  agencies	  that	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  was	  representing	  their	  interests	  fairly.	  
In	  all	  the	  stories,	  meeting	  minutes	  played	  an	  active	  part	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  A	  human	  wrote	  them,	  
but	  when	   they	  were	   finalised,	   they	  became	   separate	   entities	   that	   acted	  on	   the	  network.	   Those	  
that	   contained	   ‘next	   steps’	   created	   the	   impetus	   for	  work	   to	   be	   done	   before	   the	   next	  meeting.	  
Those	   that	   contained	   a	   full	   record	   of	   the	   discussion	   or	   output	   of	   a	  workshop	  were	   debated	   by	  
participating	  officials,	  until	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  pen	  translated	  their	  comments	  into	  a	  form	  that	  they	  
could	   all	   agree	  on.	   Thus	   the	   finalising	  of	   the	  minutes	  was	   an	   event	   in	   itself.	   The	  naming	  of	   the	  
electronic	  document	  was	  important	  for	  keeping	  track	  of	  versions.	  For	  example,	  minutes	  that	  were	  
still	  under	  debate	  were	  annotated	  Draft	  x;	  minutes	  that	  were	  agreed	  were	  annotated	  Final.	  	  
Another	   example	   of	   technology	   as	   an	   actant	   was	   large	   video-­‐screens	   in	  meeting	   rooms,	   which	  
New	   Zealand	   officials	   used	   as	   a	   large	   computer	   screen	   so	   they	   could	   collectively	   work	   on	   the	  
wording	  of	  a	  document.	  Official	  10	  described	  it	  thus:	  ‘I	  think	  we	  were	  far	  better	  at	  “group-­‐think”	  
than	  they	  [Australia]	  were.	  I	  mean,	  if	  you	  look	  at	  the	  definition	  [of	  domestic-­‐like],	  we	  had	  it	  up	  on	  
–	  didn’t	  we?	  –	  we	  had	  it	  up	  on	  a	  screen,	  we	  had	  a	  computer	  going,	  you	  know.	  We	  could	  actually	  do	  
group	  edit	  document	  stuff’	  (Official	  10,	  lines	  303-­‐306).	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  debates	  about	  wording	  
were	  facilitated	  by	  the	  technology.	  I	  recall	  doing	  this	  group	  editing,	  and	  while	  it	  was	  at	  times	  slow	  
and	  tedious,	  what	  was	  produced	  was	  an	  agreed	  version.	   It	   still	  had	  to	  be	  circulated	  within	  each	  
agency	   for	   wider	   comment,	   but	   the	   starting	   point	   was	   one	   of	   cross-­‐agency	   agreement.	   The	  




remember	  that	  working	  in	  this	  way	  revealed,	  and	  enabled	  working	  through,	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  
which	  words	  were	  interpreted	  not	  only	  by	  different	  people,	  but	  because	  of	  different	  agency	  uses.	  
Email	   usually	   functioned	   as	   a	   tool	   –	   a	   tool	   that	   almost	   replicated	   a	   conversation	   when	   emails	  
occurred	   in	  a	  burst	  only	  minutes	  apart.	  Emails	  were	  also	  often	  copied	   to	  many	  people,	  or	  were	  
forwarded	  on.	  Emails	  had	  effects	  if	  something	  went	  wrong	  in	  the	  transmission,	  or	  from	  not	  being	  
able	  to	  transport	  the	  intended	  tone	  or	  intention	  of	  an	  email	  to	  the	  recipient.	  I	  experienced	  this	  in	  
feedback	  I	  gave	  to	  MAF	  on	  their	  biosecurity	  paper,	  in	  which	  different	  understandings	  could	  have	  
been	  sorted	  more	  effectively	  by	  voice	  or	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  contact.	  	  
Other	   mechanisms	   used	   to	   make	   connections	   were	   video-­‐conferencing	   and	   telephoning.	   The	  
former	  proved	  to	  be	  quite	  challenging	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand.	  One	  official	  explained:	  
[T]he	   working	   group	   spent	   quite	   a	   lot	   of	   time	   together	   and	   a	   lot	   of	   time	   on	   video	  
conferencing,	   which	   ironically	   proved	   to	   be	   quite	   difficult	   getting	   the	   bloody	   video-­‐
conferencing	  to	  work	  properly.	  Our	  telecoms	  service	  provider	  just	  couldn’t	  make	  it	  work.	  We	  
ended	  up	  having	  to	  by-­‐pass	  them	  and	  go	  elsewhere.	  But	  still	   the	  video	   link	  pictures	  would	  
freeze.	   It	   used	   to	   drive	   us	   spare.	   Also	   our	   Australian	   counterparts	   operate	   out	   of	   both	  
Canberra	  and	  Melbourne,	  so	  we	  needed	  three-­‐way	  video-­‐conferencing,	  which	  complicated	  
things	  even	  further	  (Official	  13,	  lines	  308-­‐315).	  
I	  also	  remember	  problems	  with	  technical	  connections	  on	  several	  occasions,	  such	  as	  having	  audio	  
but	   no	   picture,	   or	   picture	   and	   no	   audio,	   or	   the	   picture	   being	   fuzzy.	   Video	   conferencing	   was	  
therefore	   a	   cause	   of	   uncertainty,	   and	   interfered	   with	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   discussions	   between	  
officials.	  
The	  telephone	  was	  a	  major	  connection	  tool	  for	  the	  	  Border	  Secretariat	  and	  ACBPS:	  ‘I	  spent	  quite	  a	  
bit	  of	  time	  talking	  with,	  and	  discussing	  things	  through	  with	  them	  [ACBPS],	  and	  .	  .	  .	  feeling	  the	  pulse	  
of	  where	   they	  were	  at’	   (Official	   10,	   lines	  115-­‐117).	   In	   this	   example,	  because	   the	   telephone	  was	  
taken	  for	  granted,	  it	  was	  not	  even	  mentioned	  as	  the	  communication	  mechanism.	  If	  the	  telephone	  
had	  malfunctioned,	  that	  would	  have	  created	  effects	  that	  would	  have	  seen	  it	  as	  an	  actant.	  
Another	   connection	  mechanism	   that	  was	  directly	   related	   to	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   experience	  
was	  the	  travel	  of	  officials	  by	  air	  from	  one	  country	  to	  the	  other.	  Compared	  with	  the	  other	  types	  of	  




mechanisms,	   such	   as	   the	   HLSG.	   One	   of	   the	   surprises	   was	   that	   there	   was	   barely	   a	   trace	   in	   the	  
records	  or	  the	  interviews	  of	  this	  travel.	  However,	  I	  recall	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  discussing	  the	  need	  
to	   get	   a	   passenger	   view	   of	   the	   longer	   term	   work,	   and	   concluding	   that,	   as	   we	   all	   travelled	  
internationally,	  we	   experienced	   border	   processes	   ourselves.	   The	  most	   oft-­‐mentioned	   barrier	   by	  
these	  officials	  was	  the	  speed	  of	  baggage	  handling,	  which	  wasn’t	  a	  government	  process	  at	  all.	  The	  
New	  Zealand	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  gave	  a	  vivid	  description	  of	  his	  trans-­‐Tasman	  experience	  of	  this	  
very	  problem:	  
I	   can	   tell	   you	   about	   a	   time	   we	   went	   through	   Melbourne.	   We	   were	   facilitated	   by	   their	  
Customs	  man,	  who	  took	  us	  straight	  to	  the	  front	  of	  the	  line,	  stamped	  our	  passports,	  took	  us	  
down	  to	  the	  baggage	  hall,	  and	  we	  were	  waiting	  at	  the	  carousel	  within	  seven	  minutes	  of	  the	  
door	  of	   the	  aeroplane	  opening	  out	   at	   the	   gate	  way	  out	  on	   the	  end	  of	  one	  of	   the	   fingers.	  
Three	  quarters	  of	   an	  hour	   later,	   the	  baggage	  carousel	   turned	  on	  and	  bags	   started	  coming	  
down	  the	  chute.	  So	  what	  was	  the	  point	  of	  the	  facilitation	  of	  all	  the	  Customs?	  In	  that	  case	  I	  
was	  given	  ultra-­‐special	  treatment,	  and	  it	  made	  no	  difference	  (lines	  29—36).	  
These	  mechanisms	  and	  actants	  are	  barely	  visible	  to	  officials	  operating	  in	  the	  policy	  environment,	  
but	   they	   help	   create	   the	   specific	   character	   of	   the	   different	   assemblages.	   For	   example,	   a	  major	  
difference	  between	  trans-­‐Tasman	  and	  domestic	  policy	  processes	  is	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  frequency	  
of	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   meetings.	   The	   telephones,	   emails	   and	   video-­‐conferences	   are	   technologies	   that	  
enable	  other	  ways	  of	  connecting,	  but	  they	  also	  shape	  the	  behaviours	  of	  the	  officials	  who	  are	  using	  
them,	  and	  thus	  act	  on	  the	  process.	  
Anni	  Dugdale	  also	  talks	  about	  the	  role	  of	  materials	  such	  as	  flight	  tickets,	  buildings	  and	  letterheads	  
in	   translating	   participants	   from	   one	   role	   to	   another.	   She	   calls	   this	   ‘bureaucratic	   performance’	  
(Dugdale	  in	  Law	  &	  Hassard,	  1999,	  p.	  118).	  This	  was	  implicit	  throughout	  the	  stories	  in	  that	  materials	  
such	  as	  meeting	  invitations,	  policy	  papers	  and	  briefing	  papers	  played	  a	  part	  in	  translating	  officials	  
from	   representatives	  of	   their	  organisations	   to	  members	  of	  working	  groups;	   from	  a	   coordinating	  
role	  to	  a	  policy	  leadership	  role	  (the	  Border	  Secretariat);	  from	  a	  Chief	  Executive	  to	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  




 The trans-Tasman relationship as macro-actor 6.8.2.3
The	  New	   Zealand-­‐Australia	   relationship,	   particularly	   between	   the	   two	   Customs	   administrations,	  
exists	   in	   people’s	  minds	   as	   a	   concept.	   In	   part	   created	   by	   the	   types	   of	   connections	   and	   actants	  
described	   above,	   it	   is	   also	   something	   that	   both	   sides	   refer	   to	   as	   an	   enabler.	   The	   relationship	  
between	   the	   two	   Chief	   Executives	   is	   nicely	   illustrated	   in	   this	   story	   from	   the	   New	   Zealand	  
Comptroller	  of	  Customs	  about	  the	  inclusion	  of	  New	  Zealand	  in	  the	  Australian	  passport	  lane:	  
It	  was	   really	   the	   relationship	  between	  Lionel	   and	  myself	   that	   forced	   that	   change.	  Because	  
when	  I	  said	  to	  him,	  “Hey,	  why	  can’t	  we	  have	  a	  [sic]	  Australia/New	  Zealand	  Passport	  queue	  in	  
Australia	  –	  we’ve	  got	  one	  in	  New	  Zealand	  -­‐	  you	  could	  just	  –	  Aussies	  come	  through,	  and	  .	  .	  .	  “	  
so	  he	  said,	  “Oh,	  I’ll	  check	  it	  out”,	  and	  when	  he	  checked	  it	  out	  he	  came	  back	  to	  me	  a	  couple	  of	  
times	   and	   said,	   “Oh,	   it’s	   because	   our	   process	   is	   different”;	   and	   I	   actually	  went	   to	   Sydney	  
airport	   and	   got	   them	   to	   illustrate	  why	   it	  was	   so	   difficult.	   And	   they	   said,	   “Oh,	  we	   have	   to	  
stamp	  Australian	  passports,	  and	  therefore	  it	  would	  hold	  Australians	  up	  in	  the	  queue”.	  And	  I	  
said,	  “But	  you	  read	  the	  passports,	  don’t	  you?”	  “Yes,	  we	  do.”	  Ok,	  so	  I	  said	  to	  them	  –	  in	  fact	  
jokingly	  said	  “I’m	  sure	  Aussies	  can	  do	  two	  things	  at	  once,	  stamp	  the	  passport	  and	  read	  it	  in	  
the	  same	  process.”	  Ho,	  ho,	  ho.	  	  He	  came	  to	  New	  Zealand	  on	  a	  visit,	  and	  we	  met	  formally	  –	  
reasonably	  formally	  –	  and	  I	  said	  to	  him,	  “Look	  .	  .	  .	  “	  –	  he’d	  got	  the	  message	  also	  through	  the	  
ANZLF,	  the	  Australian/New	  Zealand	  Leadership	  Forum,	  at	  that	  stage;	  and	  I	  said	  to	  him,	  “Look,	  
why	  is	  it	  so	  difficult?”	  So	  he	  said,	  “Look,	  actually	  I	  want	  to	  go	  back	  and	  check	  this	  out”.	  So	  he	  
went	  back	  to	  Australia	  and	  –	  this	  is	  in	  2005	  –	  he	  rang	  me	  up	  and	  said,	  “I	  just	  thought	  I’d	  give	  
you	  a	  ring;	  as	  of	  the	  25th	  of	  November”-­‐	  I	  think	  I’ve	  got	  the	  date	  right-­‐	  “we’re	  going	  to	  put	  up	  
the	   signs	   for	   Australia/New	   Zealand	   passport-­‐holders	   only”.	   And	   that’s	   how	   it	   happened	  
(lines	  37-­‐54).	  
Another	  official	  commented	  on	  the	  closeness	  as	  enabling	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  to	  be	  a	  test	  bed:	  
Interviewer:	  is	  there	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  a	  New	  Zealand	  -­‐	  Australian	  Customs	  relationship,	  and	  if	  
so,	  what	  does	  that	  mean	  to	  you?	  
Official:	  Yeah,	  ok.	  I	  guess	  there	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  levels.	  One	  is	  because	  we’re	  so	  close	  –but	  not	  
just	  in	  terms	  of	  proximity	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  culturally	  and	  everything	  else;	  we	  used	  to	  say	  “If	  we	  
can’t	  make	  it	  work	  with	  New	  Zealand,	  we	  can’t	  make	  it	  work	  with	  anyone”	  <laughs>.	  So	  it’s	  a	  




of	  government	  are	  very	  similar	  (Official	  A5,	  lines	  253-­‐259).	  
	  Which	  this	  official	  also	  noted	  as	  well	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘strong	  links’:	  
Official:	   I	   think	   it's	   just	   an	   accepted	   element	   that	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   relationship	   in	   this	  
environment,	  that	  there	  are	  strong	  links	  at	  all	  levels,	  that	  the	  single	  economic	  arrangement,	  
you	  know,	  is	  part	  of	  a	  context	  in	  terms	  of	  having	  set	  a	  benchmark	  at	  a	  point	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  
that	   things	   have	  moved	   on	   and	   determinants	   were	   going	   to	   be	  made	   around	   things	   just	  
being	  logical	  to	  do.	  
Interviewer:	  Logical	  to	  do	  because	  .	  .	  .	  ?	  
Official:	   Because,	   you	   know,	   here	   was	   an	   environment	   in	   which	   there	   were	   trusted	  
relationships.	   I	   think	   that	   is	  probably	   the	  biggest	  piece.	  Here	   is	  an	  environment	  of	   trusted	  
relationships	  where	  things	  can	  be	  tested	  and	  put	  in	  place	  and	  where	  there	  is	  an	  acceptance	  
that	  we're	  a	  strong	  linkage	  environment	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  366-­‐373).	  	  
But	  interviewees	  also	  talked	  about	  what	  was	  needed	  to	  keep	  the	  trust	  in	  the	  relationship	  –	  that	  it	  
wasn’t	  automatic,	  and	  for	  New	  Zealand	  in	  particular,	  there	  were	  risks	  from	  assuming	  it	  was:	  
Well,	  reinforcing	  networks	  is	  going	  to	  be	  very	  important,	  and	  just	  continually,	  you	  know,	  not	  
taking	   each	   other	   for	   granted.	   I	   think	   that's	   one	   of	   the	   biggest	   risks	   of	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
environment.	   New	   Zealand	   will	   always	   have	   to	   work	   probably	   harder	   than	   Australia	   to	  
maintain	  its	  relevance	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  –	  their	  focus	  continues	  to	  glance	  south	  every	  
now	   and	   again.	   I	   think	   accepted	   standards	   of	   service	   delivery	   is	   probably	   something	   that	  
would	  be	  useful	  to	  document	  while	  the	  trusted	  relations	  exist.	  That	  might	  not	  be	  necessary,	  
but	   if	   you	   like	   they	   will	   provide	   perhaps	   a	   benchmark	   in	   the	   relationship	   that	   you	   know	  
becomes	   important	   in	   the	  years	   to	  come	  where	  you	  might	   look	  at	  outsourcing	  services	   to	  
another	  country	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  375-­‐382).	  
However,	  ‘the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship’	  is	  not	  a	  single	  entity.	  It	  is	  made	  up	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  –	  of	  
agencies,	  of	  officials	  at	  different	   levels,	  and	  of	  the	  assemblages	  discussed	  above.	   It	  also	   involves	  
international	   linkages,	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   work	   together	   in	  
international	  forums:	  
You’ll	  get	  the	  attachés	  turn	  up	  and	  you’ll	  see	  they’ve	  been	  briefed	  by	  the	  policy	  sections	  too.	  




the.	  .	  .	  	  API/PNR	  .	  .	  .	  group	  in	  the	  WCO,	  which	  is	  good,	  and	  I	  think	  the	  rep.	  in	  Washington	  gets	  
up	  to	  the	  ICAO	  meetings	  in	  Montreal,	  and	  supports	  the	  position	  there	  (Official	  A5,	  lines	  360-­‐
364).	  
My	  experience	  of	  the	  Customs-­‐to-­‐Customs	  relationship370	   is	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	  to	  control	  all	  of	  
the	  interactions	  occurring	  between	  the	  two	  organisations,	  and	  no	  single	  person	  has	  visibility	  of	  it	  
all.	   In	   this	  sense,	   the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship	   is	  a	  collection	  of	  multiplicities	  and	   it	   is	  an	  actor-­‐
network.	  What	  does	  this	  mean?	  As	  we	  have	  seen	   in	  the	   ‘streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel’	  area,	  
the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  the	  work	  –	  through	  the	  HLSG,	  through	  the	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	  model,	   through	  
the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   SmartGate	   integration	   trial	   –	   don’t	   stop	   the	   relationship.	   Interviewees	  
revealed	   how	   easily	   particular	   connections	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   relationship	   can	   be	   severed,	  
through	  events	   such	  as	   the	  movement	  of	   staff	   to	  other	   areas	  or	   roles	  or	   from	   staff	   leaving	   the	  
organisation.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   their	   stories	   revealed	   that	   particular	   connections	   can	   enable	  
rapid	  responses	  to	  events	  and	  can	  springboard	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  actor-­‐networks	  as	  part	  of	  that	  
response,	   as	   with	   the	   DPMC-­‐led	   work.	   These	   then	   become	   'black	   boxed'	   as	   part	   of	   the	  
relationship,	   as	   with	   SmartGate,	   or	   fall	   away,	   depending	   on	   whether	   they	   are	   able	   to	   stabilise	  
themselves	   or	   not.	   Law	   and	   Singleton	   identify	   that	  multiplicity	   and	   incoherence	   are	   sources	   of	  
power:	  	  	  
Instead,	  through	  an	  ANT	  sensibility	  to	  multiplicity,	  power	  emerges	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  masses	  of	  
little	  overlapping	  and	  variably	  successful	  practices.	  We	  can	  get	  this	  out	  of	  Foucault.	  Or	  Butler.	  
But	  what	  we	  also	  learn	  is	  that	  these	  practices	  aren't	  very	  coherent	  either.	  And	  this	  is	  crucial.	  
Because	  it	  means	  that	  if	  one	  fails,	  it	  doesn't	  undermine	  all	  the	  others	  (Law	  &	  Singleton,	  2013,	  
p.	  499).	  	  
One	  could	   infer	  from	  Law	  and	  Singleton	  that	  a	  collection	  of	  assemblages	  of	  different	  practises	   is	  
much	   stronger	   than	   a	   single	   set	   of	   practices.	   The	  many	   levels	   of	   webby	   relations	   in	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   relationship	   span	  a	  whole	   range	  of	   interests	   and	  activities,	   some	  of	  which	   succeed	  and	  
some	  of	  which	   fall	   away.	  However,	   as	   illustrated	   in	  Chapter	  5.3	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  EU,	   failure	  of	  
some	  practices	  in	  a	  network	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  the	  whole	  network	  fails.	  Rather	  than	  being	  
just	  an	  actor-­‐network,	   the	  data	  suggests	   that	   the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship	  made	  up	  of	  officials	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and	  politicians	  is	  a	  macro-­‐actor.	  It	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  actor-­‐networks	  kept	  together	  with	  a	  range	  of	  
stabilising	  devices	  and	  practices.	  As	  such,	  it	  has	  a	  greater	  effect	  on	  policy	  practice	  than	  if	  it	  were	  
just	  the	  individual	  linkages	  at	  the	  agency	  level.	  	  
 Differences between Australia and New Zealand 6.8.2.4
The	  interviews	  revealed	  that	  under	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship	  were	  a	  number	  of	  
differences	   that	   impacted	   silently	   on	   the	   performativity	   of	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   process.	   In	   other	  
words,	  they	  were	  generally	  not	  overt	  but	  existed	  in	  officials’	  minds.	  	  A	  key	  area	  of	  difference	  was	  
in	  matters	  of	  concern:	  
I	  don’t	  think	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  really	  put	  themselves	  in	  the	  shoes	  of	  Australians	  very	  well.	  
I	  don’t	  think	  we	  understand	  their	  motivations	  very	  well.	  Even	  though	  we	  speak	  very	  similar	  
languages	  I	  think	  we	  forget,	  or	  fail	  to	  understand	  the	  things	  that	  Australians	  find	  important	  
and	  reasons	  why,	  and	  I	  think	  there’s	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  that	  the	  other	  way	  too	  (Official	  5,	  lines	  517-­‐
521).	  
However,	  even	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  for	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  border	  officials	  didn’t	  
translate	  into	  the	  sorts	  of	  bitter	  debates	  that	  had	  existed	  for	  years	  in	  the	  area	  of	  food	  safety.	  	  
Different	   priorities	   between	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand	   appeared	   frequently	   in	   interviewees’	  
narratives.	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   often	   referred	   to	   Australia's	   focus	   on	   security	   and	   ACBPS's	  
attention	   on	   people	   smuggling,	   as	   opposed	   to	   New	   Zealand's	   focus	   on	   the	   economy	   and	   New	  
Zealand	  Customs'	  attention	  on	  facilitation.	  One	  New	  Zealand	  official	  reflected	  on	  the	  risks	  of	  not	  
understanding	  the	  dynamics	  of	  Australia’s	  priorities:	  
And	  I	  think	  the	  big	  risk	  in	  terms	  of	  managing	  those	  relationships,	  it's	  when	  the	  priorities	  get	  
out	   of	   synch,	   and	   people	   don't	   see	   it	   as	   priorities	   getting	   out	   of	   synch	   –	   that	   it	   can	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  disengagement	  or	  no	  longer	  interested	  and	  that	  hasn't	  been	  communicated.	  
Whereas	  in	  actual	  fact,	  they	  could	  still	  have	  the	  same	  longer	  term	  interests,	  but	  they've	  got	  
more	  pressing	  priorities,	  just	  as	  our	  priorities	  may	  change	  (Official	  2,	  lines	  411-­‐415).	  	  	  
These	   different	   priorities	   manifested	   as	   different	   lines	   of	   sight	   –	   New	   Zealand	   looking	   west	   to	  
Australia;	   Australia	   looking	   north	   to	   Indonesia	   (in	   relation	   to	   security)	   and	   north	   east	   to	   the	  




to	  a	  lot	  of	  other	  places.	  Certainly	  not	  to	  Europe,	  not	  to	  Asia,	  and	  not	  to	  New	  Zealand’	  (Official	  18,	  
lines	  356-­‐7).	  	  
Another	   difference	   was	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   two	   Customs	   administrations	   worked	   on	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  matters	  cooperatively	  rather	  than	  jointly.	  	  
So	   we	   attend	   to	   New	   Zealanders	   and	   Australians	   –	   we	   look	   at	   it	   from	   New	   Zealand's	  
perspective,	   Australians	   look	   at	   it	   from	   the	   Australian	   perspective.	   You	   know,	   what's	   the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  –	  is	  there	  scope	  to	  develop	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  view	  of	  the	  world?	  I	  don't	  know.	  
Maybe	  there	  should	  be.	  But	  if	  you're	  really,	  really	  working	  well	  with	  another	  agency	  in	  trying	  
to	   find	   some	   common	   outcomes,	   then	   you	   tend	   to	   actually	   pick	   up	   looking	   at	   it	   from	   a	  
broader	  view	  than	  just	  your	  own	  little	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  	  And	  we	  haven't	  done	  that,	  I	  don't	  
think,	  trans-­‐Tasman	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  273-­‐279).	  
One	  official	   comments	  on	   the	  differences	   in	  processes	  and	   terms	   that	   could	   create	  a	   risk	   if	   not	  
seen	  and	  acknowledged:	  
Obviously	  we	  do	  have	  a	  trusted	  relationship,	  but	  how	  much	  do	  we	  actually	  understand	  any	  
differences	   in	   our	   respective	   processes,	   and	   if	   you	   ended	   up	   in	   a	   disputed	   environment	  
around	  that,	  what	  would	  you	  point	  to	  around	  what	  was	  agreed?	  (Official	  18,	  lines	  397-­‐400).	  	  
Differences	   in	   approach	  were	  also	   identified.	  Australian	  projects	   associated	  with	  Canberra	  were	  
subject	  either	  to	  a	  long	  federal	  funding	  process	  or	  a	  very	  politically-­‐driven	  injection	  of	  funds	  after	  
which	   ACBPS	   carried	   out	   a	   long	   scoping	   phase.	   By	   comparison,	   New	   Zealand	  was	   able	   to	   build	  
things	  very	  quickly,	  and	  though	  the	  funding	  cycle	  was	  quicker,	  the	  availability	  of	  funds	  was	  much	  
less.	  
Officials	  frequently	  noted	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  structural	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  on	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   work,	   particularly	   the	   federal-­‐unitary	   government	   difference.	   Another	   structural	  
difference	  of	  relevance	  to	  policy	  practice	  was	  the	  different	  roles	  of	  DMPC.	  Official	  13	  explained:	  
I	   think	   the	   other	   thing	   that’s	   different	   about	  working	  with	  Australia	   is	   understanding	   that	  
their	  Department	  of	  Prime	  Minister	   and	  Cabinet	   is	  much	  bigger	  and	  more	   influential	   than	  
ours.	  They	  have	  300-­‐odd	  people	  on	  board	   in	   their	  equivalent	  of	  our	  DPMC	  Policy	  Advisory	  
Group.	  Something	  of	  that	  order?	  So	  it	  really	  is	  a	  centralised	  policy	  capability.	  That	  means	  that	  




rather	   than	   shaping	  policy	  positions	  themselves.	   So	   they	   become	   much	   more	   the	  
implementers	  and	  conduits,	  rather	  than	  the	  shapers	  of	  public	  policy.	  We	  need	  to	  understand	  
that	  when	  we	  are	  engaging	  with	  them	  as	  well	  (Official	  13,	  lines	  371-­‐377).	  	  
Structural	   differences	   create	   uncertainties	   that	   are	   mitigated	   by	   the	   physical	   presence	   of	   New	  
Zealand	  officials	  in	  Canberra,	  by	  New	  Zealand’s	  formal	  membership	  of	  COAG	  and	  other	  Australian	  
government	  forums,	  by	  formal	  meetings	  and	  agreed	  processes.	  	  These	  mechanisms	  create	  some	  of	  
the	  stability	  of	  the	  macro-­‐actor	  that	  is	  the	  ‘trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship’.	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  macro-­‐
actor	  will	  feature	  in	  answering	  the	  research	  question	  in	  the	  next	  Chapter.	  
 Impediments and enablers of action 6.8.3
Some	  effects	  of	  the	  performativity	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  policy	  practices	  hindered	  or	  interfered	  
with	  the	  action	  of	  networks	  and	  others	  assisted.	  This	  sub-­‐section	  discusses	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  
these	  different	  effects,	  starting	  with	  the	  impediments.	  
One	  of	  the	  features	  of	  the	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  work	  was	  the	  uncertainty	  for	  officials	  
created	  by	  lack	  of	  clarity	  from	  political	  statements:	  
Often	  what	  happens	  is	  you	  have	  that	  broad	  political	  statement,	  like	  the	  2009	  statement,	  and	  
so	  officials	  get	  excited,	  try	  to	  come	  up	  with	  solutions	  to	  match	  that,	  and	  the	  solutions	  are	  a	  
bit	  vague	  and	  unclear,	  and	  therefore	  in	  a	  discussion	  we	  were	  never	  really	  sure	  between	  the	  
two	  countries	  what	  we	  were	  actually	  trying	  to	  do	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  176-­‐180).	  
One	  of	   the	  effects	  of	  uncertainty	   is	   the	   length	  of	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   come	   to	  an	  agreed	  position	  –	  
much	   translation	   was	   evident	   in	   the	   stories	   where	   the	   end	   state	   was	   uncertain.	   We	   know	  
collaboration	  is	  time-­‐consuming	  but	  do	  we	  know	  why	  and	  what	  the	  dynamics	  are?	  These	  studies	  
shed	  light	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  uncertainty	  on	  action,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  collaborative	  work	  
can	  be	  time-­‐consuming	  (Koliba,	  Meek,	  &	  Zia,	  2010;	  Parish,	  2014).371	  
By	   comparison,	  a	   clear,	  decisive	  political	   statement	  enabled	  officials	   to	   speak	  on	  behalf	  of	   their	  
politicians,	  and	  thus	  get	  things	  done:	  	  
Travel	  has	  been	  like	  that,	  but	  it	  took	  –	  you	  know,	  it	  took	  our	  PM	  and	  it	  must	  have	  been	  Rudd	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at	  the	  time	  to	  go	  “Ok,	  New	  Zealand	  will	  implement	  SmartGate.	  Let's	  take	  it	  from	  there.”	  And	  
that	  firm,	  clear	  decision,	  decisive	  kind	  of	  political	  policy	  statement	  gave	  us	  a	  lot	  more	  clarity	  
at	  that	  time	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  180-­‐183).	  
Anne	  Marie	  Slaughter	  outlines	  the	  role	  of	  meetings	  in	  trans-­‐national	  networks:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  the	  simple	  fact	  
of	  a	  meeting	  drives	  a	  desire	  to	  have	  some	  notable	  outcome,	  which	  in	  turn	  forces	  the	  "sherpas"372	  
to	  figure	  out	  what	  initiatives	  might	  be	  ripe	  for	  action	  and	  what	  actions	  might	  usefully	  be	  initiated’	  
(Slaughter,	   2005,	   p.	   37).	   The	   HLSG	   minutes	   appear	   to	   support	   that	   dynamic,	   and	   yet,	   as	   a	  
mechanism,	  the	  HLSG	  faded	  away,	  and	  no	  other	  mechanisms	  for	  joint	  work	  were	  created.	  	  Official	  
10	   described	   how,	   if	   there	  were	   joint	   objectives,	   a	   joint	   committee	  was	   needed	   to	  make	   them	  
happen:	  
We	   had	   talks	   about	   forming	   the	   need	   –	   if	   we	   were	   going	   to	   be	   serious	   about	   this	   stuff,	  
actually	  forming	  these	  joint	  committees,	  actually	  getting	  these	  people	  in	  the	  room.	  If	  you’re	  
really	  going	  to	  have	  a	  joint	  system,	  then	  .	  .	  .	  it	  can’t	  be	  just	  us	  talking	  to	  them	  occasionally.	  It	  
kind	  of	  has	  to	  start	  getting	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  “we”	  thing	  happening,	  and	  we	  never	  did	  kind	  of	  get	  to	  
that	  (Official	  10,	  lines	  471-­‐476).	  
Official	  2	  described	  how	  system	  processes	  create	  stability	  by	  enabling	  the	  work	  to	  continue	  even	  
though	  personnel	  change.	  Part	  of	  that	  stability	  comes	  from	  a	  narrative	  from	  within	  New	  Zealand	  
Customs	  about	  finding	  out	  what	  Australia	  is	  doing	  in	  case	  there	  is	  something	  useful	  there	  for	  New	  
Zealand:	  
Official:	   It's	   a	   combination	   of	   personal	   relationships,	   as	   well	   as	   systems.	   I	   think	   it's	   really	  
important,	   where	   you	   can,	   to	   get	   a	   systematic	   solution	   put	   in	   place	   that	   supports	   the	  
personal	   relationships	   because	   there	   is	   change	   of	   movement,	   and	   people	   have	   different	  
roles.	  	  
Interviewer:	   So	   what	   do	   you	   mean	   by	   a	   system?	   How	   do	   you	   describe	   a	   system	   in	   this	  
context?	  
Official:	  A	  specific	  example	  I'd	  use	  just	  to	  illustrate	  that	  point	  would	  be	  –	  I	  talked	  before	  that	  
information	  exchange	  happens,	  and	  there's	   the	   flow	  there.	  By	  a	  systems	  thing	   I	  mean	  you	  
actually	   embed	   it	   as	   your	   business	   as	   usual	   and	   the	   processes	   that	   are	   followed	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




business	  when	  you're	  conducting	  work.	  So	  when	  people	  change,	  the	  work	  still	  continues	  and	  
it	  continues	  in	  an	  uninterrupted	  way	  so	  .	  .	  .	  it's	  really	  that.	  And	  then	  you	  can	  support	  that	  by	  
putting	   it	   into	   your	   reporting	   functions	   on	   both	   sides.	   So	   it	   actually	   becomes	   part	   of	   the	  
process	  you'd	  follow.	  
Interviewer:	  Is	  that	  happening	  at	  a	  policy	  level	  as	  well?	  
Official:	  Yeah.	  I	  was	  going	  to	  say	  it's	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  thing.	  I	  give	  an	  example	  where	  we	  had	  
individual	  pieces	  of	  policy	  that	  have	  been	  developed,	  and	  then	  on	  occasion	  it	  was	  “Oh,	  let's	  
think	  about	  what	  Australia's	  doing	  so	  we	  can	  inform	  our	  thinking”	  –	  not	  to	  copy	  them,	  but	  
just	   to	   inform	  our	   position.	   That	   has	   now	  been	   set	   as	   part	   of	   our	   process	   to	   develop	   the	  
policy	  –	  that	  it's	  a	  thing	  that	  happens	  automatically,	  it's	  part	  of	  the	  considerations	  that's	  been	  
given	  in	  developing	  any	  policy	  or	  strategy,	  so	  it	  happens	  as	  a	  business	  as	  usual,	  rather	  than	  
leaving	  it	  to	  an	  individual	  to	  think	  of	  and	  then	  perhaps	  know	  somebody	  (Official	  2,	  lines	  375-­‐
396).	  
The	  New	  Zealand	  Customs’	  Counsellor	   in	  Canberra	   is	  another	  stabilising	  mechanism	  through	  the	  
connections	   that	   are	   able	   to	   be	   developed	   and	   maintained.	   This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	   ways	   that	  
overcomes	  the	  physical	  separation	  of	  the	  Tasman	  Sea.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  Counsellor	  is	  expressed	  by	  
one	  official:	  
One	   thing	   I	   should	  highlight	   is	   the	  move	   to	  Canberra	  did	  benefit	  us	  enormously	   at	  making	  
much	  better	  personal	  connections	  across	  a	  range	  of	  levels.	  I	  mean,	  [the	  Counsellor]	  worked	  
really,	   really	  hard	  at	   that,	  and	   I	   think	  he	  did	  a	  good	   job	  over	  that	  time,	  and	  he's	  got	  some	  
very,	  very	  good	  connections	  into	  quite	  important	  decision-­‐makers	  there	  (Official	  8,	  lines	  222-­‐
225).	  
Another	   is	   optimising	   opportunities	   where	   officials	   are	   physically	   present	   together	   such	   as	   the	  
margins	  of	  international	  meetings:	  
Well,	  so	  much	  is	  worked	  out	  in	  the	  margins	  of	  an	  international	  meeting.	  You	  don't	  want	  to	  do	  
stuff	   too	  much	   at	   the	   table.	   You	  want	   to	  have	   it	   organised,	   and	   it	   is	   better	   to	  do	   it	   in	   an	  
environment	  that	  you	  find	  –	  both	   find	  –	  workable,	  so	   for	  Australians	  and	  New	  Zealanders,	  
that's	  often	  a	  bit	  more	  casual	  –	  you	  know,	  dinner,	  or	  whatever	  it	   is.	  And	  I	  think	  that	  works	  




The	  New	  Zealand	  Border	  Sector	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  stabilising	  mechanism	  as	  well	  as	  helpful	  in	  leading	  
to	  action	  (an	  actant).	  The	  following	  official	  compared	  this	  mechanism	  with	  Australia,	  which	  didn’t	  
have	  such	  a	  mechanism:	  
The	  Secretariat,	  which	  was	  sort	  of	  worked	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  glue	  or	  conduit	  for	  all	  those	  different	  
connections	  between	  the	  different	  agencies,	  we	  had	  quite	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  working	  group,	  
which	  had	  representation	  from	  the	  kind	  of	  core	  border	  agencies,	  as	  it	  were,	  you	  know,	  the	  
top	  three	  being	  Immigration,	  Customs	  and	  MPI,	  as	  well	  as	  representation	  from	  Transport	  and	  
Internal	  Affairs,	  who	  obviously	  have	  significant	   interest	   in	   the	  border	  as	  well.	  So	   those	  are	  
the	  five	  agencies	  that	  make	  up	  the	  border	  sector,	  but	  we	  also	  had	  Tourism	  involvement	  as	  
well,	  and	  particularly	  because	  of	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial-­‐led	  nature	  of	  this	  work,	  we	  also	  had	  
DPMC	  –	  Department	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Cabinet	  –	  involved	  in	  that	  at	  a	  kind	  of	  “as	  needs”	  
basis.	   The	   Australians	   don’t	   have	   a	   formal	   sector	   approach,	   and	   so	   theirs	   was	   led	   out	   of	  
Customs,	  with	  the	  other	  agencies	  kind	  of	  invited	  in,	  and	  to	  be	  honest,	  I	  think	  –	  it	  was	  harder	  
for	  them	  to	  take	  a	  coordinated	  approach	  than	  we	  had	  because	  I	  think	  we	  had	  the	  real	  benefit	  
of	  that	  sort	  of	  sector-­‐ingrained	  sector	  approach,	  and	  that	  made	  things,	  I	  think,	  a	  lot	  easier,	  
for	  us	  (Official	  10,	  lines	  100-­‐112).	  
Another	   official’s	   observation	   that	   stabilisation	   didn’t	   last	   coincides	  with	   the	   dismantling	   of	   the	  
Border	  Secretariat:	  
Official:	  the	  very	  programmed	  work	  of	  the	  border	  sector,	  I	  think,	  was	  very	  good	  in	  keeping	  a	  
very	  clear	  focus	  on	  key	  areas	  and	  providing	  very	  clear	  incentive	  and	  driver	  for	  activity	  to	  be	  
undertaken.	  
Interviewer:	  Was	  that	  in	  both	  directions,	  do	  you	  think?	  
Official:	   Yeah,	   it	   was,	   because	   there	   was	   a	   need	   for	   the	   progress	   against	   those	   tasks	   or	  
objectives	   to	   be	   regularly	   reported	  back	   all	   the	  way	   to	   the	   Prime	  Ministers	   on	  both	   sides	  
ahead	  of,	  you	  know,	  meetings	  or	  fora	  between	  them,	  so	  that	  provided	  a	  very	  strong	  spur	  for	  
agencies	  to	  do	  it,	  	  and	  I	  think	  it	  provided	  a	  clear	  mandate	  for	  agencies	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  
Tasman	  to	  lead	  that	  work	  and	  to	  bring	  other	  agencies	  who	  might	  have	  been	  more	  reluctant	  
to	  engage	  in	  activity	  to	  participate	  as	  well,	  	  and	  I	  think	  that	  really	  ended	  around	  the	  end	  of	  




That	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  such	  a	  pivotal	  actor	  in	  the	  early	  parts	  of	  the	  work	  and	  
yet	  was	  dismantled	   later	   in	   the	  work	  warrants	  examination.	  The	  dismantling	  occurred	  at	  a	   time	  
when	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  were	  changing,	  implying	  officials	  in	  New	  Zealand	  thought	  there	  was	  
no	   longer	  a	  need	  for	  a	  unit	   to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agencies	   in	  engagements	  
with	  Australia.	  As	  it	  transpired,	  there	  was	  subsequently	  very	  little	  engagement	  with	  Australia	  from	  
a	  border	  sector	  perspective,	  which	  could	  either	  be	  seen	  as	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  wisdom	  of	  this	  
move	  or	  the	  consequence	  of	  it.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  engagement	  would	  have	  been	  different	  had	  
the	  Border	  Secretariat	  continued	  can	  only	  be	  speculated	  on.	  	  What	  can	  confidently	  be	  concluded	  is	  
that	  the	  changing	  matters	  of	  concern	  that	  moved	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  senior	  officials	  away	  
from	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  focus	  of	   the	  previous	  three	  years	  resulted	   in	   the	  destabilisation	  of	   those	  
particular	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connections	  related	  to	  the	  ‘domestic-­‐like’	  model.	  
 Black boxing and institutional memory 6.8.4
Once	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Cabinet	  made	  its	  decision	  on	  SmartGate,	  the	  debates	  were	  black-­‐boxed	  as	  
they	  were	  no	  longer	  needed	  –	  there	  was	  an	  official,	  definitive	  record.	  However,	  it	  was	  clear	  from	  
the	  interviews	  that	  for	  some	  people	  the	  lid	  is	  still	  not	  closed	  on	  the	  black	  box.	  Some	  interviewees	  
had	  a	   long	  association	  with	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	   involving	  many	   interactions	  –	  public	   servants	  
would	   call	   this	   ‘institutional	  memory’.	   Perhaps	   ‘institutional	  memory’	   is	   useful	   because	   for	   the	  
people	   who	   have	   it,	   the	   history	   of	   a	   policy	   or	   organisational	   initiative	   hasn’t	   ever	   been	   black-­‐
boxed.	  These	  are	  the	  people	  we	  rely	  on	  to	  find	  out	  what	  happened,	  what	  the	  rationale	  was	  for	  a	  
particular	  outcome.	  And	  when	  asked,	  these	  are	  the	  people	  who	  can	  often	  recall	  the	  debates	  and	  
uncertainties	  surrounding	  that	  policy	  or	  initiative.373	  	  	  
They	   are	   also	   the	   people	   who	   can	   potentially	   upset	   a	   set	   of	   stable	   associations,	   through	  
resurfacing	  old	  debates.	  The	  extent	   to	  which	   this	   is	   likely	  will	  depend	  on	  whether	   the	  debate	   is	  
picked	  up	  by	  others.	  	  We	  cannot	  know	  this	  for	  future	  actions,	  but	  we	  can	  gauge	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  past	  action.	  For	  example,	  Latour	  advises	  the	  researcher	  not	  to	  look	  at	  ‘the	  intrinsic	  qualities	  of	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any	  given	  statement	  but	   [to]	   look	   instead	   for	  all	   the	   transformations	   it	  undergoes	   later	   in	  other	  
hands.’	  (Latour,	  1987,	  p.	  59).	  	  
 Conclusions 6.8.5
The	  discussion	  above	  has	  drawn	  out	  elements	  of	  the	  performativity	  of	  policy	  practice	  for	  border	  
management	  both	  within	  and	  between	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  officials.	  It	  has	  also	  raised	  the	  
question	  about	  whether	  the	  performativity	  of	  policy	  practice	  revealed	   in	  this	  thesis	   is	  specific	  to	  
the	   trans-­‐Tasman.	   A	   preliminary	   assessment	   is	   that	   it	   is	   specific	   to	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	  
management	  at	  the	  detailed	  level,	  but	  that	  any	  official	  involved	  in	  policy	  practice	  in	  other	  domains	  
would	  recognise	  the	  experiences	  and	  observations	  within	  these	  pages	  as	  similar	  to	  their	  own.	  	  
Some	   of	   these	   elements	   are	   the	   assemblages	   that	   make	   up	   policy	   practice,	   and	   the	  
interrelationships	  of	  narratives	  and	  practice;	  what	  helped	  create	  stability	  in	  the	  assemblages,	  such	  
as	   the	   role	   of	   tools	   and	  mechanisms,	   and	   what	   interfered	   with	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   actor-­‐
networks.	   Elements	   specific	   to	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   are	   the	  macro-­‐actor	   that	   is	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
relationship,	  and	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  narratives	  of	  separation	  and	  connectedness.	  	  
These	  elements	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  8.	  




Chapter 7  
Findings: The Role of Narrative in Translating the trans-
Tasman SEM Objective into Action 
7.1 Introduction	  
This	  Chapter	  provides	  a	  preliminary	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question:	  
What	  role	  did	  narrative	  play	  in	  the	  way	  border	  policy	  officials	  translated	  the	  political	  goal	  of	  a	  
single	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  market	  into	  action	  after	  the	  Joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  of	  
1-­‐2	  March	  2009?	  	  
Recapping	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  of	  1-­‐2	  March	  2009,	  the	  discussion	  
summarises	  what	  was	  delivered	  to	  politicians,	  and	  then	  traces	  how	  policy	  officials	  translated	  the	  
political	   goal	   into	   action.	   This	   then	   paves	   the	   way	   for	   revealing	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  
different	   narratives	   and	   the	   actions	   that	   resulted,	   and	   a	   preliminary	   answer	   to	   the	   research	  
question.	  	  
7.2 What	  has	  been	  established	  so	  far	  
As	  set	  out	   in	  Chapter	  1,	   the	   joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	   statement	  resulting	   from	  the	  meeting	  of	   the	  
Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   Prime	  Ministers	   on	   1-­‐2	  March	   2009	   was	   significant	   for	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  border	  agencies	  because	  it	  was	  the	  first	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  commitment	  to	  activity	  in	  
the	  border	  domain	   for	  over	  a	  decade.	   It	  was	  also	  one	   in	  which	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  
had	  a	  personal	  interest	  and	  relevant	  portfolio,	  which	  gave	  it	  higher	  political	  visibility	  than	  it	  might	  
otherwise	  have	  had.	  	  
With	   ANT	   as	   an	   underpinning	   theoretical	   base	   for	   both	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   economic	  
integration	  and	  policy	  narrative	  (Chapter	  3),	  I	  established	  border	  management	  as	  part	  of	  the	  global	  
trading	   system,	   demonstrated	   how	   the	   performance	   of	   border	   management	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
regional	   integration	  differs	  from	  border	  management	   in	  EU	  regional	   integration	  (Chapter	  5),	  and	  
identified	  the	  narrative	  implications.	  
I	  then	  described	  the	  connections	  between	  border	  agencies	  in	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  told	  
and	   reflected	   on	   five	   stories	   relating	   to	   activity	   that	   occurred	   after	   2	  March	   2009	   (Chapter	   6).	  	  




performance	  might	   be	   a	   good	   definition	   of	   policy	   practice;	   we	   learned	   that	   this	   performativity	  
involved	  translation,	  matters	  of	  concern,	  and	  different	  assemblages	  that	  experienced	  uncertainty	  
and	   instability;	   that	   everyday	   materials	   were	   actants	   that	   could	   help	   stabilise	   or	   disrupt	   those	  
assemblages;	  we	   learned	   that	   the	  Australia-­‐New	  Zealand	   relationship	   for	  border	  agencies	  was	  a	  
macro-­‐actor	  that,	  despite	  differences,	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  divisive	  debates.	  
The	  next	  two	  sub-­‐sections	  summarise	  the	  action	  that	  occurred	  as	  part	  of	  that	  performativity.	  
 What was delivered  7.2.1
The	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  stories	   illustrate	  how	  politicians,	  and	  therefore	  policy	  practice,	   in	  New	  
Zealand	   in	   particular,	   are	   focused	   on	   ‘deliverables’.374	   I	   will	   therefore	   start	   this	   discussion	   by	  
summarising	  what	  was	  delivered.	  	  	  
For	  trade,	  border	  agency	  officials	  were	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  from	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  
Government	   perspectives,	   there	  weren't	   any	   barriers	   that	  mattered	   and	   that	   therefore	   needed	  
removing.	  What	  officials	  delivered	  was	  evidence	  that	  customs	  and	  biosecurity	  processes	  were	  not	  
causing	   delays	   in	   the	  movement	   of	   goods	   trans-­‐Tasman,	   and	   industry	   appeared	   to	   accept	   that	  
evidence.	   In	   other	  words,	   a	  matter	   of	   concern	  was	   successfully	   translated	   into	   a	  matter	   of	   fact	  
(Latour,	  1987).	  
For	  travel,	  New	  Zealand	  introduced	  SmartGate	  and	  streamlined	  biosecurity	  screening	  processes	  in	  
2009	  and	  2010.	   	  These	  changes	  were	  visible	  to	  travellers,	  and	  SmartGate	  was	  favourably	  written	  
about	  by	  the	  media	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions.	  	  
Through	   the	   longer	   term	   work,	   officials	   from	   the	   New	   Zealand	   border	   sector	   delivered	   a	  
conceptual	   model	   to	   the	   New	   Zealand	   Cabinet	   that	   was	   approved	   in	   principle.	   Trans-­‐Tasman	  
officials	  delivered	   the	  SmartGate	   integration	   trial,	  and	  proved	   it	  was	   technically	   feasible	  but	  not	  
practicable	   for	   passengers	   under	   current	   settings.	   Another	   group	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   officials	  
conducted	   two	   studies	   to	   deliver	   on	   the	   announcements	   of	   20	   August	   2009.	   In	   the	   second	   of	  
these,	   the	   'domestic-­‐like'	   model	   work,	   officials	   had	   identified	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2011	   that	   further	  
streamlining	  could	  be	  done,	  but	  that	  investment	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  expensive	  and	  probably	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




cost-­‐effective.	  This	  was	  not	  explicitly	  reflected	  in	  documents	  at	  senior	  levels,	  but	  was	  evident	  from	  
interviews.	  
What	  this	  thesis	  has	  revealed	  is	  the	  performance	  of	  actions	  by	  officials	  required	  to	  achieve	  these	  
deliverables.	  	  These	  actions	  are	  usually	  invisible	  to	  politicians,	  and	  become	  matters	  of	  concern	  only	  
if	  something	  goes	  wrong.	  But	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  these	  actions	  which	  is	  even	  more	  invisible	  is	  the	  
translations	  that	  occur	  along	  the	  way,	  and	  through	  them,	  the	  creation	  of	  actor-­‐networks	  that	  have	  
a	   particular	   effect	   on	   the	  world	   in	  which	   they	   operate.	   These	   actor-­‐networks	   are	   shown	   to	   be	  
made	   up	   of	   people,	   technologies,	   materials	   and	   processes.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   deliverables	  
discussed	   above	  were	  made	   possible	   through	   the	   performativity	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   and	   domestic	  
policy	  practice.	  
 How policy officials translated the political goal 7.2.2
The	   performativity	   of	   trans-­‐Tasman	   and	   domestic	   policy	   practice	   was	   centred	   around	   officials’	  
translations	   of	   the	   political	   goal	   in	   the	   joint	   Prime	   Ministerial	   statement,	   and	   how	   much	   that	  
statement	  was	  the	  primary	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  officials.	  	  
In	  translating	  that	  political	  goal,	  officials	  didn't	  limit	  themselves	  to	  'barriers'.	  As	  traced	  in	  Chapter	  
6,	  officials	   translated	   the	  words	   in	   the	   joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	   statement	   into	   two	  more	  positive	  
objectives	  -­‐	  'streamlined	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel'	  and	  ‘streamlined	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade'.	  Streamlining	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  enduring	  objective.	  It	  appeared	  first	  in	  the	  HLSG,	  was	  picked	  
up	   in	   the	  March	  2009	  work	   and	   continues	   to	   characterise	   trans-­‐Tasman	  aspirations	   to	   this	   day.	  
‘Streamlining’	  was	  still	  compatible	  with	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  SEM,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  opened	  up	  an	  
opportunity	   space.	   This	   opportunity	   space	  was	  overtly	   created	   for	  New	  Zealand	  border	   officials	  
out	  of	  the	  guidance	  from	  DPMC	  officials,	  who	  were	   in	  turn	  translating	  the	  wishes	  of	  their	  Prime	  
Minister.	  	  
However,	   the	   opportunity	   space	   created	   room	   for	  more	   than	   creative	   thinking.	   It	   also	   created	  
room	  for	  confusion	  in	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  –	  confusion	  that	  we	  saw	  appearing	  and	  reappearing	  in	  
Chapter	  6,	  and	  specifically	  in	  Stories	  3	  and	  4.	  Once	  SmartGate	  and	  biosecurity	  improvements	  were	  
implemented	  in	  New	  Zealand,	  officials	  on	  either	  side	  were	  not	  clear	  about	  the	  further	  barriers	  the	  
two	   Governments	   wanted	   to	   be	   reduced,	   even	   though	   the	   airline	   and	   tourism	   industries	   in	  




One	  official	  viewed	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  as	  a	  shopping	  list:	  
The	   Prime	  Ministers’	   statement	   was	   just	   a	   shopping	   list,	   basically	   –	   an	   outcome	   list.	   You	  
know,	   these	   are	   the	   things	   I	  want	   –	   “I	   really	  want	   a	   nice	   new	   car”	  without	   being	   specific	  
about	  what	  colour	  the	  car	  was	  going	  to	  be,	  or	  the	  engine	  size,	  or	  the	  budget	  you	  were	  going	  
to	   have	   to	   spend	   on,	   so	   officials	   had	   to	   go	   away	   and	   do	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   translation	  
(Official	  5,	  lines	  428-­‐432).	  
Nevertheless,	   this	  confusion	  was	  not	  present	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   longer	   term	  work.	  Officials	  
started	  by	   translating	   the	  words	   in	   the	   joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	   Statement	   into	   shared	  meanings.	  
The	  construction	  of	  these	  shared	  meanings	  through	  translation,	  as	  recorded	  in	  the	  minutes	  of	  the	  
meetings	  and	  workshops,	  was	  one	  of	  officials’	  actions.	  The	  matter	  of	  concern	  (to	  develop	  a	  new	  
model,	   for	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   in	   the	   first	   instance)	   as	   communicated	   by	   DPMC	   officials	   was	  
sufficiently	   compelling	   for	   all	   involved	   to	  be	   able	   to	   construct	   that	   shared	  meaning	   early	   in	   the	  
work.	  This	  enabled	  officials	  to	  then	  translate	  that	  shared	  meaning	  into	  the	  action	  points	  and	  plans	  
and	  workshops	  and	   inscriptions	   that	   followed.	  As	   revealed	   in	  Chapter	  6.8,	   the	   translations	  were	  
stabilised	  by	  a	  number	  of	  actants,	  such	  as	  workshops	  and	  meeting	  minutes	  that	  created	  an	  agreed	  
record.375	  This	  process	  of	   translation	  and	  stabilisation	  was	  a	   feature	  of	   the	  performativity	  of	   the	  
HLSG	  (Chapter	  6.3)	  and	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  (Chapters	  6.5,	  6.6),	  both	  of	  which	  were	  exploratory	  
and	  iterative,	  though	  to	  differing	  degrees.	  	  
However,	   as	   described	   in	   Chapter	   6.6.5.3,	   the	   shared	   meaning	   established	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	  
longer	  term	  work	  was	  somewhat	  different,	  and,	  by	  the	  end	  in	  2012,	  arguably	  not	  shared.	  As	  noted	  
earlier,	  once	  SmartGate	  and	  the	  streamlining	  of	  biosecurity	  processes	  had	  been	  delivered	  in	  New	  
Zealand,	   there	   were	   no	   further	   ‘easy	   wins’.	   Officials	   continued	   to	   be	   driven	   to	   deliver	   on	   the	  
political	  goal	  up	  to	  the	  point	  a	  new	  ‘domestic-­‐like’	  model	  was	  delivered,	  prompted	  in	  part	  by	  the	  
biannual	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meetings	  and	  the	  related	  MFAT	  requests	   for	  update	  reports.	  When	   it	  
came	   to	   implementation,	   however,	   the	   Chief	   Executives	   translated	   the	  matter	   of	   concern	   from	  
developing	  a	  new	  model	  into	  a	  question	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  implementing	  it.	  	  
Another	   dynamic	   of	   the	   longer	   term	  work	  was	   that	   the	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	  model	   involved	   creating	  
something	  out	  of	  nothing.	  The	  story	  of	  that	  ‘something’	  developed	  gradually,	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




performativity	   of	   the	   policy	   process	   in	   the	   form	   of	   many	   little	   actions	   that	   were	   formed	   into	  
diagrams	   (A3s)	   and	  word	   pictures.	  Until	   the	   ‘something’	  was	   substantial	   enough,	   the	   use	   of	   an	  
evaluative	  framework	  (i.e.	  the	  feasibility	  of	  implementing	  the	  model)	  was	  not	  employed.	  Whether	  
it	   could	   have	   been	   employed	   earlier	   is	   difficult	   to	   predict.	   There	   was	   no	   suggestion	   in	   the	  
interviews	  or	  meeting	  records	  of	  any	  attempt	  or	  desire	  to	  do	  so.	  
By	   comparison,	   the	   translations	   of	   the	   joint	   Prime	   Ministerial	   statement	   of	   2	   March	   2009	   by	  
officials	  in	  New	  Zealand	  into	  the	  delivery	  of	  SmartGate	  (Chapter	  6.4.2)	  played	  out	  differently,	  with	  
questions	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  and	  value	  of	  the	  investment	  being	  debated	  at	  the	  beginning.	  It	  then	  took	  
some	   time	   and	   a	   lot	   of	   effort	   for	   border	   officials	   from	   the	   different	   agencies	   to	   get	   to	   a	   single	  
version	   of	   the	   proposal	   that	   they	   were	   willing	   to	   let	   become	   the	   authoritative	   version.	   The	  
translations	  involved	  here	  were	  multiple	  and	  overlapping.	  	  
Connections	   from	   the	   past,	   particularly	   those	   described	   in	   Chapters	   6.3	   and	   6.4.1,	   played	   an	  
important	  part	  in	  the	  inclusion	  and	  the	  actual	  wording	  of	  the	  border	  objective	  in	  the	  2	  March	  2009	  
joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement.	  However,	   the	  wording	  of	   that	  statement	  was	  not	  pre-­‐scripted	  
by	  officials,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  New	  Zealand	  end.	  The	  officials	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  HLSG	  work	  
and	   in	   briefings	   for	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  were	   in	   the	  main	  not	   involved	   in	   the	   translating	  of	   that	  
political	   statement	   into	   action.	  While	   SmartGate	  was	  mentioned	   by	  New	   Zealand	   Customs	   in	   a	  
briefing	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  for	  the	  meeting	  in	  March	  2009,	  the	  request	  for	  a	  new	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  model	   for	   travel	  was	  new	  and	  unexpected.	  As	  such,	  officials	  had	  to	  start	  afresh	   in	  
translating	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  for	  that	  particular	  piece	  of	  work.	  	  
The	  following	  example	  illustrates	  this	  translation	  also	  occurred	  at	  a	  political	  level:	  
I	   also	   talked	   to	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   very	   early	  on,	   and	  he	  basically	   said	  he	  was	  even	  more	  
enamoured	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  us	  having	  a	  borderless	  arrangement.	  Now	  I	  was	  able	  to	  give	  him	  
a	  bit	  of	  background	  on	  that	  almost	  straight	  away	  that	  we’d	  thought	  about	  that	  in	  the	  ‘90s,	  
and	  in	  fact	  we’d	  looked	  to	  go	  into	  a	  –	  well,	  first	  of	  all	  a	  one-­‐nation	  with	  the	  airline	  operation,	  
so	  you	  could	  fly	  within,	  between	  and	  beyond	  any	  airlines	  from	  either	  country	  doing	  it.	  The	  
moment	  we	  began	   looking	  at	  taking	   it	   further	  –	  that	   if	  you	  entered	  at	  one	  point	   into	  New	  
Zealand,	  it	  would	  allow	  you	  to	  go	  domestically	  into	  Australia,	  and	  vice-­‐versa	  –	  it	  just	  became	  




altered	   to	   “as	   near	   as	   possible	   domestic	   experience”376	   because,	   quite	   frankly,	   if	   you’re	  
travelling	   to	   Australia,	   you’ll	   normally	   have	   suitcases.	   Business	   people	   won’t.	   They	   might	  
have	  a	  carry-­‐on	  bag,	  but	  most	  families	  and	  people	  going	  for	  a	  holiday	  and	  that	  will	  have	  a	  
suitcase.	  So	  if	  indeed	  you	  can	  process	  them	  through	  all	  of	  our	  processing	  while	  their	  bags	  are	  
getting	  to	  the	  carousel,	  then	  you’re	  not	  putting	  a	  hold-­‐up	  on	  top	  of	  it	  (Minister	  of	  Customs,	  
lines	  14-­‐20,	  24-­‐29).	  
The	  Minister	  of	  Customs	  drew	  on	  his	  past	  experience	  and	  depicted	  travellers	  moving	  through	  the	  
border	  process	  to	  illustrate	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  why	  some	  options	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  were	  
not	  appropriate.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  modified	  his	  aspiration	  from	  ‘borderless	  travel’	  to	  ‘domestic-­‐
like’,	  which	  is	  what	  officials	  then	  acted	  on.	  
One	   official	   set	   out	   how	   they	  would	   translate	   the	   Prime	  Ministerial	   statement	   into	   action,	   and	  
articulated	  the	  value	  from	  that:	  
So	   I	   think	   your	   second	   point	   about	   the	   strategic	   narratives,	   it's	   about	   first,	   as	   you	   say,	  
generating	   those	   strategic	  narratives	  and	   then	   translating	   them	   into	  action.	   	   You	   translate	  
them	  into	  action	  by	  empowering	  people.	  	  	  You	  know.	  “I've	  given	  you	  this	  direction	  as	  a	  Chief	  
Executive.	   I'm	  quite	   happy	   to	  wear	   a	   bit	   of	   slack	   in	   one	   area	   so	   that	   you	   just	   resolve	   the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   situation,	   and	   once	   that	   is	   resolved,	   you	   then	   will	   free	   up	   mental	   space,	  
resources	   to	   deal	   with	   much	   bigger	   and	   uglier	   issues	   that	   we've	   got	   coming	   down	   the	  
pipeline.”	  I	  mean	  this	   is	  not	  being	  condescending,	  but	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  thing	  is	  essentially	  
low	  hanging	  fruit.	  You	  know,	  you'd	  think	  –	  this	  is	  the	  bit	  that	  you	  get	  faintly	  caught	  up	  in	  –	  
you	  would	   think	  dealing	  with	  New	  Zealand	  administrations	   is	   going	   to	  get	  us	  a	   lot	   further	  
much	  more	  quickly	  than	  dealing	  with	  Chinese	  administrations.	  Surely.	  Part	  of	  you	  says	  “This	  
is	  almost	  the	  citizen	  speaking”	  and	  part	  of	  you	  says	  “Haven't	  we	  got	  all	  that	  sorted	  by	  now?”	  I	  
mean,	   they're	   honorary	   Australians,	   we're	   honorary	   New	   Zealanders,	   we're	   completely	  
indistinguishable.	   We've	   got	  [that	   is,	   Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand]	   a	   different	   sort	   of	   .	   .	   .	  
interrelationship	  with	  the	  trade	  world,	  but	  step	  up	  a	  level	  from	  that	  to	  the	  general	  practices	  
and	  the	  general	   risk	  management	  –	  why	  aren't	  we	   identical	  now?	  Part	  of	  you	  says	  “That's	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 He is referring to the Prime Minister initially talking about a ‘common border’, and it being modified to ‘near as possible 




really	  weird”	  (Official	  A1,	  lines	  415-­‐429).	  
An	  underlying	  dynamic	  occurring	  throughout	  the	  processes	  of	  translation	  was	  the	  performance	  of	  
power.	   The	   ANT	   understanding	   of	   power	   draws	   heavily	   on	   the	   work	   of	   Michel	   Foucault,	   who	  
conceived	  of	  ‘productive	  power’.	  Rather	  than	  being	  exerted	  as	  ‘will’,	  Foucault	  saw	  the	  exercise	  of	  
power	  as	  ‘a	  process	  that	  is	  always	  open	  to	  resistance,	  transformation	  and	  renegotiation’	  (Tikkanen	  
&	   Peltonen,	   2005,	   p.	   9).	   The	   transformation	   and	   renegotiation	   speaks	   of	   translation	   in	   ANT.	  
Tikannen	  and	  Peltonen	  go	  on	  to	  say:	  	  
Foucault’s	  conception	  leads	  to	  a	  relational	  view,	  where	  power	  as	  fixed	  and	  imposed	  is	  always	  
secondary	  to	  the	  prior	  dialogue	  and	  interaction	  between	  two	  or	  more	  actors.	  .	  .	  For	  Foucault,	  
once	  a	  particular	  construction	  gets	  (tentatively)	  stabilized,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  participants	  can	  
be	  channelled	  towards	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  framers	  (Ibid.).	  	  
By	  becoming	  aware	  of	   the	  potential	   for	  dialogue	  and	   interaction,	   there	   is	  potential	   to	   influence	  
power,	  as	  suggested	  by	  Law	  and	  Singleton:	  ‘[t]o	  the	  extent	  that	  ANT	  explores	  the	  contingencies	  of	  
power,	  it	  also	  generates	  tools	  for	  undoing	  the	  inevitability	  of	  that	  power’	  (Law	  &	  Singleton,	  2013,	  
p.	  500).	  This	  is	  because	  dialogue	  and	  interaction	  bring	  with	  them	  uncertainty,	  and	  where	  there	  is	  
uncertainty,	  there	  is	  room	  for	  something	  different	  to	  occur.	  It	  is	  therefore	  unsurprising	  that	  in	  the	  
five	   border	   stories,	   power	   manifested	   in	   different	   ways.	   In	   the	   SmartGate	   story,	   we	   saw	   the	  
translation	   and	   renegotiation	   between	   border	   agencies	  moving	   to	   a	   focusing	   on	   the	   goal,	   once	  
border	  agencies	  agreed	  to	  the	  language	  in	  the	  SmartGate	  Cabinet	  paper	  of	  July	  2009.	  	  Less	  obvious	  
were	   the	   everyday	   negotiations	   –	   the	   content	   of	   agendas,	   the	   wording	   of	   minutes	   in	   official	  
documents,	   the	   setting	   and	   negotiation	   of	   changes	   to	   timeframes.	   We	   also	   saw	   agency	  
representatives	   translating	  multiple	  voices	  within	   their	  organisations	   into	  a	   single	  organisational	  
voice.	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  this	  discussion,	  translation	  is	  intimately	  connected	  with	  action.	  This	  is	  entirely	  
consistent	  with	  and	  expected	  from	  using	  an	  ANT	  approach.	  
7.3 Narratives	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  action	  
Narratives	  do	  not	  result	  in	  action	  on	  their	  own.	  	  As	  discussed	  above,	  it	  is	  the	  performativity	  of	  the	  
border	   policy	   process	   that	   led	   to	   the	   deliverables.	   However,	   in	   this	   section	   I	   demonstrate	   that	  




a	   story	   that	  would	  generate	  action	   (Hajer	  and	  Laws	   in	  Hajer	  &	  Laws,	  2006;	  Polkinghorne,	  1988;	  
White,	  1999)	  through	  the	  performativity	  of	  actor-­‐networks.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  6,	   I	   told	   the	   stories	   about	  and	  drew	  out	   the	  narratives	  of	  each	   trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  
story.	  The	  ‘stories	  about’	  were	  sequential	  narratives.	  They	  each	  had	  a	  beginning,	  a	  middle	  and	  an	  
end.	  They	  told	  the	  story	  of	  what	  happened	  and	  what	  was	  done.	  I	  didn’t	  use	  many	  direct	  quotes	  in	  
these	  ‘stories	  about’	  because	  they	  were	  my	  narratives	  rather	  than	  those	  of	  the	  officials	  involved.	  I	  
needed	  to	  tell	  the	  stories	  in	  order	  to	  get	  to	  the	  ‘drawn	  out’	  narratives.	  	  
 Narratives and actions relating to the joint Prime Ministerial statement of 2 7.3.1
March 2009 
There	  are	  two	  main	  types	  of	  ‘drawn	  out’	  narratives	  –	  those	  centred	  on	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  in	  
the	  work,	  and	  those	  about	  action.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  examine	  these	  narratives	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  
political	   goal	   of	   a	   trans-­‐Tasman	   SEM.	   As	   indicated	   in	   Chapter	   1,	   I	   am	   taking	   the	   joint	   Prime	  
Ministerial	  statement	  of	  2	  March	  2009	  to	  be	  part	  of	  delivering	  on	  the	  SEM.	  	  	  
The	  five	  stories	  in	  Chapter	  6	  each	  had	  narratives	  running	  through	  the	  work	  of	  officials	  that	  related	  
to	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  objectives	  in	  the	  joint	  statement,	  including	  the	  HLSG,	  which	  did	  some	  of	  
the	  groundwork.	  Even	  though	  the	  HLSG	  narrative	  was	  stated	  as	  not	  being	  about	  the	  SEM,	  we	  have	  
seen	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6.3.1,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  HLSG	  was	  never	  not	  about	  SEM.	  
The	  connections	  of	  trade	  and	  travel	  facilitation	  to	  global	  economic	  theory	  which	  in	  turn	  connect	  to	  
regional	  economic	  integration	  theory	  make	  any	  work	  on	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  flows	  connected	  to	  
the	  SEM.	  The	  HLSG	  narrative	  therefore	  included	  and	  maintained	  the	  story	  of	  the	  pacification	  (and	  
overflowing	  –	  I	  was	  surprised	  that	  this	  wasn’t	  addressed	  more	  overtly377)	  of	  goods	  and	  people	  in	  a	  
regional	  setting	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  system.	  	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  6.3,	  the	  purpose	  narrative	  of	  the	  HLSG	  caused	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  
Customs	  officials	   to	   act	   and	   to	  deliver	   some	  products	   together,	   and	  on	   four	  occasions,	   to	  meet	  
with	   their	   Biosecurity	   colleagues.	   These	   actions	   and	   deliverables	   focused	   on	   streamlining	   trans-­‐
Tasman	   trade	   and	   travel,	   along	   with	   improving	   intelligence	   links	   and	   working	   together	   in	   the	  
Pacific.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	  effect,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  HLSG	  was	  a	  prequel	  to	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  working	  groups	  that	  followed	  
the	   2	   March	   2009	   joint	   statement.	   Surprisingly,	   not	   long	   after	   the	   joint	   statement,	   the	   HLSG	  
narrative	   gradually	   diverged	   from	   a	   collective	   narrative	   into	   one	   of	   separation	   and	   tension	   –	   a	  
narrative	  that	  connected	  to	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  history	  rather	  than	  the	  HLSG	  itself.	  It	  was	  as	  though	  
the	   working	   groups	   and	   project	   teams	   set	   up	   to	   deliver	   on	   the	   joint	   statement	   picked	   up	   the	  
narratives	  about	  streamlining	  trade	  and	  travel	  and	  left	  the	  HLSG	  with	  no	  matters	  of	  concern	  worth	  
acting	  on,	  indicating	  a	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  and	  matters	  of	  concern.	  However,	  up	  to	  the	  
end	  of	  2009,	  the	  HLSG	  acted	  on	  two	  narratives	  centred	  on	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  arising	  from	  the	  
joint	   Prime	   Ministerial	   statement.	   These	   were	   the	   need	   to	   continue	   to	   improve	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
passenger	  facilitation	  and	  to	  streamline	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade.	  
The	   relevant	  matter	  of	   concern	   in	   the	  SmartGate	  narrative	  was	  about	  making	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
experience	  for	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  passport	  holders	  travelling	  to	  and	  from	  New	  Zealand	  
the	  same	  as	  travelling	  to	  Australia.	  This	  directly	  addressed	  the	  political	  commitment	  to	  reduce	  the	  
remaining	  barriers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  people	  across	  the	  Tasman.	  Australia	  had	  SmartGate,	  New	  
Zealand	   did	   not.	   New	   Zealand’s	   lack	   of	   SmartGate	   was	   an	   observable	   barrier	   that	   could	   be	  
removed,	  and	  that	  story	  was	  easy	  to	  tell,	  not	  least	  because	  Smartgate	  was	  an	  existing	  actant.	  	  
As	   shown	   in	   Chapter	   6.4.1,	   the	   SmartGate	   story	   was	   underpinned	   by	   all	   the	   discussions	   and	  
debates	   that	   preceded	   the	   SEM	   goal,	   in	   the	   form	   not	   only	   of	   CER,	   but	   also	   the	   subsequent	  
extensions	  of	  CER.	  Even	  though	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  joint	  statement	  there	  were	  many	  actors	  in	  this	  
story	  who	  wanted	   different	   types	   of	   action	   on	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	   and	   travel,	   their	  matters	   of	  
concern	  converged	   into	  a	   single	   representation	   in	   the	   joint	   statement	  –	  a	   convergence	   that	   the	  
New	  Zealand	  Comptroller	  of	  Customs	  was	  able	  to	  work	  with,	  as	  he	  was	  able	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  
all	   of	   these	   different	   interests	   through	   the	   Prime	  Ministers’	   intent,	   assisted	   by	   the	   compelling	  
‘voice’	   of	   SmartGate.	   It	  wasn’t,	   however,	   a	   full	   convergence	   in	   New	   Zealand.	   The	   other	   border	  
agencies	  had	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  that	  cut	  across	  Customs’	  narrative	  and	  that	  they	  tried	  to	  
get	  to	  prevail.	  Because	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  DPMC	  would	  accept	  only	  a	  single	  narrative	  from	  the	  
border	  agencies,	  	  this	  requirement	  created	  a	  subsidiary	  matter	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  Comptroller	  of	  
Customs	   –	   getting	   his	   colleagues	   to	   put	   their	   own	  matters	   of	   concern	   to	   one	   side	   in	   order	   to	  
deliver	   on	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   one.	   The	   debates	   on	   the	   process	   and	   the	   choice	   of	   SmartGate	  




narratives	  led	  to	  a	  diversionary	  kind	  of	  action.	  Once	  SmartGate	  was	  implemented,	  however,	  it	  told	  
its	  own	  story	  about	  being	  easy	  and	  convenient	  to	  use,	  which	  these	  officials	  accepted	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  
fact.378	  This	  was	  a	  narrative	  about	  one	  aspect	  of	  what	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship	  is	  expected	  to	  
look	  like.	  
The	  narratives	  of	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  were	  different	   in	  nature.	  The	  first	  action	  in	  New	  Zealand	  
was	   DPMC	   translating	   the	   joint	   statement	   into	   a	   request	   to	   New	   Zealand	   border	   officials	   to	  
develop	  a	  new	  model	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	  by	  a	  particular	  date;	  Australia’s	  DPMC	  did	  not	  do	  
this.	  Most	   of	   the	  narrative	   in	   that	   first	   time	  period	   therefore	   came	   from	  New	  Zealand	   and	  was	  
about	  how	  to	  design	  and	  present	  a	  new	  model,	  with	  only	  a	  small	  part	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘why’.	  That	  
‘why’	  was	   to	  create	  visible	   improvements	  and	  a	  path	  to	  a	  common	  border.	  Near	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
first	   stage	   of	   the	   work,	   the	   narrative	   of	   officials	   from	   both	   sets	   of	   border	   agencies	   and	   their	  
respective	  DPMCs	  was	  focused	  on	  what	  actions	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  could	  announce	  on	  20	  August	  
2009.	  	  
There	  was	  more	  than	  one	  narrative	  running	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  topic	  and	  the	  
playing	  out	  of	  that	  topic	  into	  the	  ‘what’	  and	  the	  ‘how’.	   	  For	  SmartGate	  integration,	  the	  narrative	  
was	  seen	  by	  officials	  as	  the	  logical	  next	  step	  in	  streamlining	  the	  travel	  experience,	  but	  turned	  out	  
to	   be	   confusing	   for	   passengers.	   For	   this,	   there	  was	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   integration	  work	   itself,	  
which	  was	  very	  much	  about	  the	  action	  and	  enabled	  the	  action	  –	  the	  agreements	  and	  procedures	  
that	  had	  to	  be	  put	   in	  place	   to	  enable	   the	   trial	   to	  occur,	  and	  the	  many	  plans,	  meetings,	  meeting	  
minutes	   and	   action	   points	   required	   to	   make	   the	   trial	   happen.	   When	   that	   particular	   narrative	  
stopped,	   an	   ‘alignment’	   narrative,	   pitched	   at	   a	   more	   strategic	   level	   gradually	   emerged	   that	  
enabled	  each	  country	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  automation	  strategies	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  keep	  some	  
sort	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connection.	  	  
There	  was	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  model	  –	  what	  it	  was,	  how	  it	  would	  
work	   and	   how	   it	   could	   be	   implemented.	   A	   supporting	   narrative	   developed	   about	   the	   way	   the	  
design	  of	  the	  new	  model	  was	  to	  be	  presented	  to	  Ministers,	  for	  which	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  was	  
the	   gatekeeper.	   There	  were	   also	   uncertainty	   narratives	   from	   some	  agencies	   –	   uncertainty	   from	  
working	   on	   a	   new	   design,	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   tight	   timeframes	   that	   cause	   officials	   to	   act	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




different	   ways,	   and	   created	   effects	   on	   the	   progress	   of	   the	  work	   at	   times.	   The	   narrative	   in	   the	  
second	  part	  of	  the	  work	  centred	  on	  the	  term	  ‘domestic-­‐like’,	  focused	  on	  the	  passenger	  experience	  
with	  a	   secondary	  narrative	  about	   the	   lack	  of	   clarity	  about	  what	  officials	  were	   trying	   to	  achieve.	  
This	  lack	  of	  clarity	  created	  uncertainty,	  and	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  a	  feasibility	  narrative	  focused	  on	  
the	  cost-­‐benefit	  of	  implementing	  the	  new	  model.	  
The	  narrative	  in	  the	  trade	  area	  centred	  on	  there	  being	  no	  significant	  barriers	  for	  border	  agencies	  
to	   remove.	   It	  moved	   from	  being	  a	  matter	  of	   concern	   for	   industry	   to	  effectively	  a	  matter	  of	   fact	  
when	  the	  evidence	  of	   the	  WCO	  TRS	  was	  produced.	  While	  a	   few	  technical	   issues	   remained,	   they	  
were	  not	  big	  enough	  to	  tell	  a	  story	  about,	  and	  while	  the	  two	  countries	  had	  issues	  specific	  to	  their	  
own	  countries,	  they	  were	  not	  significant	  enough	  for	  both	  to	  generate	  a	  joint	  story.	  	  
What	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  trade	  area	  was	  action	  being	  driven	  from	  the	  narrative-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making.	  Officials	  
aimed	  to	  prove	  to	  industry	  that	  there	  was	  no	  matter	  of	  concern.	  They	  knew	  from	  their	  own	  data	  
what	   the	   results	  would	  be,	  and	  used	  a	  credible	  method,	   the	  WCO	  TRS,	   to	  help	   them	  create	   the	  
narrative.	  	  This	  source	  was	  credible	  because	  it	  connected	  to	  the	  WCO,	  which	  in	  turn	  connected	  to	  
the	  global	  trading	  system,	  of	  which	  the	  SEM	  objective	  was	  a	  part.	  	  This	  connection	  was	  an	  example	  
of	   an	   actor-­‐network	   with	   folded	   connections	   that	   brought	   concepts	   physically	   and	   temporally	  
distant	  right	  into	  the	  local	  story.	  The	  joint	  statement	  drove	  the	  initial	  action,	  but	  the	  narrative-­‐in-­‐
the-­‐making	  turned	  the	  matter	  of	  concern	  into	  the	  matter	  of	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  no	  barriers	  to	  the	  
movement	  of	  goods	  trans-­‐Tasman.	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  revealed	  layers	  of	  intersecting	  and	  interrupting	  narratives.	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  
narratives	  about	  primary	  matters	  of	  concern	  generated	  action,	  as	  did	  narratives	  about	  the	  work	  to	  
be	  done.	  A	  secondary	  set	  of	  narratives	  that	  led	  to	  different	  types	  of	  action	  was	  about	  uncertainty.	  
That	  action	  was	  the	  further	  translations	  required	  to	  either	  reduce	  or	  to	  remove	  the	  uncertainty.	  
The	  traces	  of	  that	  action	  were	  the	  many	  drafts	  of	  documents,	  and	  the	  requests	  for	  more	  work	  by	  
senior	  officials.	  A	   third	   type	  of	  narrative	  arising	   from	  debate	  about	  different	  matters	  of	  concern	  
led	  to	  diversionary	  action.	  	  
 Connecting into trans-Tasman histories 7.3.2
Contained	   within	   the	   narratives	   of	   officials	   interviewed	   was	   an	   ever-­‐present	   reference	   to	   the	  




long	   association	   between	   the	   two	   Customs	   administrations	   while	   it	   also	   facilitated	   that	  
association.	  	  
The	   trans-­‐Tasman	   relationship	   was	   a	  macro-­‐actor,	   as	   identified	   in	   Chapter	   6.8.2.3,	   and	  was	   an	  
active	  participant	  in	  officials’	  stories	  –	  the	  relationship	  ‘evolved’;	  it	  ‘ebbed	  and	  flowed’,	  it	  needed	  
to	   be	   ‘refreshed’	   or	   ‘kick	   started’.	   They	   described	   the	   many	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   'the	  
relationship'	  was	  performed,	  with	   formal	   and	   informal	  meetings	  playing	  an	   important	   role.	   This	  
indicates	  that	  to	  officials,	  even	  if	  unconsciously,	  the	  relationship	  was	  a	  living	  thing.	  
Underpinning	   these	   stories	   were	   wider	   historical	   links.	   Both	   countries	   were	   colonised	   by	   the	  
British	  Empire	  and	  still	  have	  the	  British	  monarch	  as	  their	  respective	  Head	  of	  State.	  As	  described	  in	  
Chapter	  5.4,	  this	  cultural	  connection	  has	  given	  the	  two	  countries	  a	  common	  language,	  a	  common	  
belief	   in	  democracy	  and	   the	   rule	  of	   law,	   and	  a	   common	   legal	   starting	  point	   in	   the	  Westminster	  
style	   of	   government	   (Mein	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008,	   p.	   21).	   The	   long	   historical	   connection	   between	  
Australia	   and	  New	  Zealand,	  made	  up	  of	   countless	  events	  and	   circulations	  of	  meaning	   that	  have	  
stabilised	   into	  shared	  stories	  appears	  to	  have	  enduring	  power	  as	  a	  narrative.	  We	  see	   it	  revealed	  
not	  just	  through	  the	  regional	  economic	  integration	  connection	  of	  border	  management,	  but	  across	  
the	  breadth	  of	  cultural,	  social	  and	  political	  connections	  traversed	  in	  Remaking	  the	  Tasman	  World	  
(Mein	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   For	   example,	   cultural	   connections	   are	   epitomised	   in	   officials'	   use	   of	  
metaphors	  such	  as	  ‘across	  the	  ditch’,	  through	  expressions	  of	  ‘trust’	  and	  social	  connections	  through	  
behaviours	   such	   as	   ‘meeting	   over	   drinks’;	   political	   connections	   appear	   through	   the	   unusual	  
relationship	  of	   the	   two	  Departments	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Cabinet	  and	   through	  New	  Zealand’s	  
membership	  of	  COAG.	  	  One	  official	  described	  it	  in	  this	  way:	  
[T]he	  way	  we	  looked	  at	  .	  .	  .	  that	  relationship	  was	  quite	  interesting,	  because	  it	  was	  sort	  of	  a	  
hybrid	   foreign	   policy	   relationship	   verses	   almost	   a	   Commonwealth	   State	   relationship;	   now	  
what	   I	  mean	   by	   that	   is	   the	   closeness	   of	   the	   relationship,	   and	   the	   .	   .	   .	   idea	   of	   a	   common	  
economic	  partnership,	  and	  even	  the	  idea	  of	  almost	  common	  borders	  had	  percolated	  through	  
over	  about,	  I	  think,	  2	  or	  3	  decades.	  So	  much	  so	  that	  it	  was	  like	  dealing	  with	  –	  in	  one	  sense	  
you’re	  dealing	  with	  a	  very	  close	  ally	  and	  partner;	  but	  in	  another	  sense	  you	  were	  dealing	  with	  
someone	  who	  is	  around	  the	  table	  for	  –	  I	  mean,	  there	  were	  certain	  COAG	  meetings	  that	  New	  
Zealand	  is	  part	  of;	  and	  that	  Commonwealth/Domestic	  agenda	  as	  well	  that	  New	  Zealand	  had	  




CER	  as	  a	  part	  of	  that	  history	  also	  emerged	  from	  interviewees’	  thinking.	  The	  following	  excerpt	  from	  
an	  Australian	  official	  highlights	  the	  ‘everyday-­‐ness’	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  engagement:	  
To	  be	  perfectly	  honest,	   I	  don't	   think	   the	  announcement	   that	  was	  made	   in	  2009	  has	  had	  a	  
huge	   impact	   on	   us,	   in	   our	   planning.	  We've	   long	   since	   almost	   forgotten	   the	   origins	   of	   the	  
ANZCERTA	   agreement,	   and	   it's	   just	   part	   of	   the	   DNA.	   And	   we	   don't	   do	   anti-­‐dumping	   and	  
countervailing	   cases	   against	   each	   other.	   We	   just	   take	   that	   for	   granted.	   We	   just	   take	   for	  
granted,	  you	  know,	  the	  arrangement	  –	  the	  ANZCERTA	  arrangements	  (Official	  A6,	  lines	  157-­‐
161).	  
However,	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  history	  is	  not	  only	  of	  connection.	  As	  also	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5.4,	  the	  
federation	   of	   Australia	   was	   a	   pivotal	   point	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   relations	   in	   which	   New	   Zealand	  
demarcated	  its	  political	  separation	  from	  Australia.	  Officials	  appear	  to	  have	  translated	  this	  old	  story	  
into	   their	   current	   day	   thinking	   about	   one	   another’s	   countries.	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   tended	   to	  
focus	   on	   the	   differences	   more	   than	   Australians.	   The	   sense	   of	   this	   as	   a	   national	   separation	  
narrative	  was	  implicit	  in	  the	  following	  reflection	  from	  the	  Minister	  of	  Customs:	  
But	  I	  think	  if	  you	  polled	  New	  Zealand	  right	  now	  about	  even	  a	  single	  currency,	  the	  vast	  bulk	  of	  
people	  would	  still	  want	  to	  keep	  our	  own	  dollar.	  If	  they	  were	  drilled	  into	  a	  question	  of	  why,	  I	  
don’t	  think	  they	  could	  give	  you	  a	  good	  answer	  as	  to	  why	  do	  we	  need	  our	  own	  dollar.	  I	  think	  
they	   feel	   that	   it	  gives	  us	  some	  economic	  sovereignty	   that	  we	  can	  maintain	   (Minister,	   lines	  
310-­‐313).	  	  
One	  official	  implied	  the	  effort	  in	  the	  relationship	  is	  somewhat	  one-­‐sided:	  
I	  guess	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  never	  was	  felt	  that	  Australia	  had	  the	  same	  need	  or	  interest	  in	  a	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   partnership	   that	   we	   did.	   Australian	   passengers	   make	   up	   a	   reasonable	  
proportion	  of	  travellers	  to	  New	  Zealand,	  but	  we	  were	  told	  that	  proportionately	  the	  reverse	  
isn’t	  true.	  That	  makes	  it	  a	  challenging	  a	  partnership	  to	  work	  in	  because	  they	  have	  other	  areas	  
of	  focus	  aside	  from	  New	  Zealand	  travellers	  (Official	  9,	  lines	  163-­‐164).	  
New	  Zealand’s	  ability	  to	  deliver	  results	  compared	  with	  Australia	  featured	  frequently,	  for	  example,	  
‘so	   I	   think,	  you	  know,	  being	  viewed	  as	  “the	   little	  country	   that	  could”	   is	  exceptional,	  and	  we	  get	  




On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   were	   frequent	   references	   for	   the	   need	   for	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   to	  
recognise	  that	  Australia	  is	  a	  different	  country	  and	  that	  it	  has	  different	  priorities	  and	  needs:	  
I	  don’t	  think	  New	  Zealand	  officials	  really	  put	  themselves	  in	  the	  shoes	  of	  Australians	  very	  well.	  
I	  don’t	  think	  we	  understand	  their	  motivations	  very	  well.	  Even	  though	  we	  speak	  very	  similar	  
languages	  I	  think	  we	  forget,	  or	  fail	  to	  understand	  the	  things	  that	  Australians	  find	  important	  
and	  reasons	  why,	  and	  I	  think	  there’s	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  that	  the	  other	  way	  too	  (Official	  5,	  lines	  517-­‐
521).	  
There	   were	   also	   some	   almost	   invisible	   (ghost)	   narratives	   lived	   out	   by	   the	   Biosecurity	   and	  
Immigration	   agencies.	   The	   first	   was	   the	   narrative	   about	   MPI’s	   connections	   to	   the	   Australian	  
Commonwealth	   through	   COAG	   and	   the	   joint	   body	   FSANZ.	   	   This	   significant	   narrative	  within	  MPI	  
was	  not	  evident	  to	  non-­‐MPI	  officials	  working	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  work,	  except	  briefly	  in	  the	  work	  
on	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  trade.	  This	  narrative	  could	  be	  characterised	  as	  occurring	  alongside	  
the	  border	  narratives	  and	  intersecting	  intermittently	  but	  not	  interfering	  with	  them379.	  The	  second	  
was	  the	   Immigration	  agencies’	  narrative	  about	  their	  connection	  to	  the	  Five	  Country	  Conference.	  
Officials	  from	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  commented	  on	  this	  connection,	  which	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  
greater	   matter	   of	   concern	   than	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   connection	   that	   overlapped	   through	   the	  
common	  membership	  of	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  officials.	  This	  narrative	  complemented	   the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   work,	   although	   could	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   diversionary	   as	   most	   of	   their	   action	   was	  
focused	  on	  the	  Five	  Country	  Conference.	  	  
 Connecting into wider regional economic integration narratives 7.3.3
In	  Chapter	  2.2,	  I	  noted	  that	  the	  EU	  version	  of	  regional	  economic	  integration	  is	  used	  as	  a	  model	  of	  
regional	   economic	   integration.	   The	   research	   in	   this	   thesis	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   EU	   is	   indeed	   a	  
reference	  point	  for	  consideration	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  in	  border	  management.	  Just	  as	  I	  argued	  in	  
Chapter	   5	   there	   are	   different	   narratives	   in	   the	   EU,	   the	   research	   has	   revealed	   different	   EU	  
narratives	  used	  by	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  officials.	  	  
As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  5.4,	  in	  2011-­‐2012,	  the	  two	  countries’	  Productivity	  Commissions	  conducted	  a	  
joint	   study	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   further	   productivity	   gains	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




relationship.	   The	   study	   contained	   numerous	   references	   to	   the	   EU,	   starting	   with	   the	   following	  
framing:	  
Opportunities	  to	  strengthen	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  ties	  can	  be	  classified	  using	  a	  framework	  
based	  on	  what	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  termed	  the	   ‘four	   freedoms’	  —	  relating	  to	  trade	   in	  
goods	  and	  services,	  and	  the	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  labour.	  Knowledge	  transfers	  and	  the	  
integration	  or	  interaction	  of	  government	  functions	  are	  also	  considered.	  	  
	  
This	  study	  focuses	  on	  areas	  where	  there	  are	  unnecessary	  barriers	  to	  integration	  —	  whether	  
created	   intentionally	   or	   unintentionally.	   They	  may	   arise	   between	   the	   borders	   of	   Australia	  
and	  New	  Zealand	  (typically	  affecting	   international	  transport	  costs);	  at	  the	  border	  of	  one	  or	  
both	   countries	   (for	   example,	   tariffs	   and	  biosecurity	   restrictions);	   and	  behind	   their	   borders	  
(Australian	  Productivity	  Commission	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Productivity	  Commission,	  2012c,	  p.	  8).	  
Within	  the	  body	  of	   the	  document,	  and	   in	  a	  supplementary	  paper	  on	  people	  movements,	   the	  EU	  
model	  was	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  for	  suggestions	  for	  further	  streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel.	  
The	   research	   for	   this	   thesis	   began	   two	   years	   before	   the	   Productivity	   Commissions’	   discussion	  
document	  was	  issued,	  and	  at	  that	  time,	  the	  link	  between	  the	  European	  Union’s	  four	  freedoms	  and	  
the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  CER/SEM	  objectives	  was	  not	  being	  publicly	  discussed,	  and	  had	  no	  visibility	  in	  the	  
border	  management	  world.	   	  However,	   the	   interviews	  with	  New	   Zealand	   and	   Australian	   officials	  
were	  held	  in	  the	  year	  following	  the	  report’s	  release.	  Even	  so,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  implicit	  
and	   explicit	   references	   by	   interviewees	   to	   the	   EU	   and	   comparisons	   with	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
situation	   was	   a	   surprise,	   given	   the	   limited	   exposure	   some	   of	   the	   officials	   had	   to	   the	   Joint	  
Productivity	  Commission	  work.	  My	  surprise	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  varied	  reference	  points	  chosen	  
by	   interviewees.	   If	   the	   Joint	  Productivity	  Commission	  report	  had	  had	  an	   influence,	   I	  would	  have	  
expected	  there	  to	  have	  been	  more	  consistency	  in	  the	  content	  of	  the	  references	  to	  the	  EU.	  	  




There	  were	  references	  to	  the	  lessons	  to	  be	  learned:	  
So,	  but	  I	  think	  in	  any	  environment,	  it's	  a	  case	  of	  changing	  the	  settings	  in	  both	  countries	  to	  a	  
common	  setting.	  I	  mean,	  the	  European	  Union's	  clearly	  worked	  through	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  issues	  
and	   there's	   lessons	   out	   there	   that	   we	   can	   look	   to,	   but	   I	   don't	   think	   we've	   had	   that	  
government	  directive	  to	  really	  make	  this	  happen	  (Official	  A6,	  lines	  272-­‐275).	  
As	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  5.5,	  the	  EU	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  example	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  to	  follow.	  It	  
was	  also	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  –	  ‘if	  they	  can	  do	  it,	  why	  can’t	  we’:	  
What	  I	  remember	  is	  Alan	  Bollard	  turned	  up	  at	  a	  very	  early	  trans-­‐Tasman	  dialogue	  and	  put	  up	  
a	  very	  artful	  PowerPoint	  arguing	  that	  other	  things	  than	  tax	  or	  monetary	  issues	  could/	  should	  
be	   tackled.	  The	  PowerPoint	   showed	  “Australians	   through	   this	   gate	  at	   the	  border	  and	  New	  
Zealanders	  through	  a	  different	  one”.	  He	  said	  “We	  really	  haven't	  made	  as	  much	  progress	  on	  
harmonisation	  at	  the	  border	  as	  we	  ought	  to	  have,	  and	  can	  we	  do	  something	  that	  makes	  it	  
more	  like	  a	  European	  experience	  to	  move	  between	  the	  two	  countries?”	  .	  .	  .	  So	  there	  were	  a	  
whole	   lot	   of	   reasons	   why	   the	   border	   had	   been	   not	   easy	   to	   do	   much	   about.	   They	   were	  
reasons	  of	  substance.	  But	  after	  Alan	  Bollard	  did	  this,	  everybody	  sort	  of	  went	  “Oh,	  yeah,	  we	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  do	  something.	  Why	  can't	  we	  do	  something	  more	  about	  that?”	  (Official	  14,	  
lines	  260-­‐275).	  
One	  official	  noted	  that	  an	  EU-­‐like	  common	  border	  had	  been	  looked	  at	  before:	  
.	  .	  .	  when	  the	  common	  border	  was	  looked	  at	  twenty	  years	  ago,	  and	  I	  think	  common	  border	  
was	   the	   starter	   point,	   rather	   than	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   facilitating,	   those	   issues	  were	   very	  
much	  at	  the	  forefront.	  “What	  would	  be	  the	  implications	  of	  having	  a	  sort	  of	  an	  EU	  –	  a	  mini	  EU	  
between	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand?”	  You're	  basically	  creating	  one	  labour	  market.	  Entering	  
either	   country	   by	   –	   in	   effect	   gives	   you	   entry	   to	   the	   other	   country,	   so	   you'd	   have	   –	   each	  
country	  would	  have	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  the	  people	  coming	  into	  our	  shared	  immigration	  zone	  that	  
we	  were	  applying	  the	  same	  policies	  around	  eligibility	  and	  ineligibility	  at	  the	  extremes,	  and	  at	  
the	  softer	  end,	  you	  know,	  the	  types	  of	  skills	  and	  students	  that	  each	  country	  wanted	  (Official	  
11,	  lines	  106-­‐139).	  




These	  trans-­‐Tasman	  officials	  noted	  how	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  situation	  is	  different	  from	  the	  EU:	  
I	  think	  the	  thing	  for	  me	  around	  trans-­‐Tasman	  cooperation	  is	  that,	  unlike	  in	  Customs,	  there's	  
not	  many	  of	  us	  that	  have	  biosecurity	  controls	  any	  more.	  So	  if	  you	  look	  at	  land	  mass	  borders	  
from	  Europe,	  they	  don't	  control	  the	  movement	  of	  food,	  whereas	  we	  are	  an	  island	  nation	  and	  
we	   still	   have	   that	   protection	   and	   we're	   still	   relatively	   pest	   free	   and	   it's	   –	   that's	   our	  
competitive	  advantage	  (Official	  12,	  lines	  590-­‐594).	  
	  
The	  challenge	  is	  always	  the	  priorities	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  I	  think	  that	  it’s	  the	  difference	  in	  terms	  
of	   in	  some	  ways	  how	  it	   looks	  –	  you’ve	  got	  the	  bloc,	  you’ve	  got	  the	  27	  and	  you’ve	  got	  that	  
dialogue,	  you’ve	  got	  that	  coordination,	  you’ve	  got	  that	  harmonization	  and	  working	  together,	  
whereas	  outside	  of	  that,	  for	  us	  –	  if	  you	  look	  at	  trans-­‐Tasman	  and	  looking	  at	  how	  you	  make	  
the	  border	  more	  efficient	  or	  effective	  –	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  focus	  	  has	  very	  much	  been	  on	  passenger	  
facilitation	   and	   things	   like	   SmartGate.	   Now	   that’s	   the	   difference	   there	   is,	   we	   still	   have	  
separate	  borders.	  So	  we’re	  still	  looking	  at	  how	  do	  you	  streamline	  things	  going	  out	  one	  border	  
coming	  into	  another	  border	  (EU	  focus	  group,	  lines	  421-­‐428).	  
The	  above	  narratives	  are	  mixed	  –	  some	  say	  we	  should	  or	  could	  follow	  the	  EU	  in	  a	  common	  border;	  
others	   say	   why	   we	   are	   different.	   Regardless	   of	   the	   position	   of	   the	   narrator,	   in	   officials’	   and	  
politicians’	  minds	  the	  EU	  was	  a	  not	  infrequent	  point	  of	  reference	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  work.	  From	  
a	  Customs	  perspective,	  the	  EU	  being	  used	  as	  a	  trans-­‐Tasman	  reference	  point	  should	  perhaps	  not	  
have	  been	  the	  surprise	  it	  was.	  Despite	  structural	  differences,	  customs	  practices	  in	  the	  two	  regions	  
are	   recognizably	   similar	   because	   of	   the	   common	  membership	   of	   the	  WCO.	   Officials	   I	   talked	   to	  
referred	  to	  the	  global	  nature	  of	  Customs.	  But	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  WCO	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  and	  
Customs	  officials	  from	  EU	  member	  states	  considered	  that	  the	  EC	  definitely	  tries	  to	   influence	  the	  
WCO	  agenda	  –	  that	  having	  got	  the	  agreement	  of	  27	  member	  states,	  they	  understandably	  want	  the	  
WCO	  to	  adopt	  EU	  approaches.	  This	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  detail	  missing	  from	  narratives	  of	  those	  officials	  in	  
New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  who	  have	  not	  had	  direct	  dealings	  with	  the	  EU.	  
Interviewees’	  comments	  therefore	   indicate	  that	  knowledge	  of	   the	  EU	  common	  border	   is	  broadly	  
known	   in	   Australia	   and	  New	   Zealand	   border	   agencies,	   though	   not	   necessarily	   the	   detail.	   	   Their	  
narrative	  of	  the	  EU	  was	  that	  the	  EU	  created	  a	  single	  external	  border	  and	  removed	  internal	  border	  




awareness	  existed	  in	  the	  records	  as	  only	  one	  or	  two	  explicit	  references	   in	  the	  streamlining	  travel	  
documents.	  One	  explicit	   reference	  was	   the	  A3	  on	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	  discussed	  by	   the	   Strategy	  
Cabinet	   Committee:	   ‘.	   .	   .	   this	   approach	   applies	   e.g.	   in	   the	   Schengen	   area	   of	   the	   EU	   (where	  
participating	  countries	  have	  shared	  border	  control	  requirements)’.380	  	  
This	  A3	  made	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  common	  border	  and	  an	  inter-­‐border	  (one	  with	  streamlined	  
processes	  but	  where	  the	  countries	  maintained	  their	  own	  borders)	  and	  used	  the	  diagrams	  in	  Figure	  
19	  to	  illustrate	  the	  two	  concepts:	  
Figure	  19. Inter-­‐	  versus	  common	  border	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  this	  document,	  the	  EU	  narrative	  was	  another	  way	  of	  making	  the	  future	  visible,	  by	  providing	  an	  
example	  that	  politicians	  could	  picture	  and	  therefore	  use	  to	  assess	  the	  advice	  provided	  by	  officials.	  	  
There	   are	   three	   curious	   features	  of	   the	   EU	   narrative	   in	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  work.	   This	   first	   is	   the	  
focus	   on	   mainland	   Europe	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   reference	   to	   the	  UK,	   which	   has	   a	   relationship	   with	  
mainland	   Europe	   that	   is	   geographically	   and	   conceptually	  much	   more	   similar	   to	   New	   Zealand’s	  
relationship	  with	  Australia	   than	   continental	   Europe.	  As	  described	   in	  Chapter	  5.3.3.1,	  UK	  officials	  
referred	   to	   the	   ‘island	   mentality’.	   There	   was	   a	   mental	   separation	   from	   mainland	   Europe	   not	  
dissimilar	   to	   the	  mental	   separation	   evident	   in	   narratives	   of	   New	   Zealand	   officials	   in	   relation	   to	  
Australia,	   and	   yet	   Australian	   and	  New	   Zealand	   narratives	   about	   the	   EU	  were	   at	   the	   generalised	  
level	  and	  did	  not	  differentiate	  or	  separate	  out	  the	  UK.	  
The	  second	  is	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  EU	  narrative	  in	  the	  trade	  part	  of	  the	  border	  management	  policy	  
work.	   The	   EU	   featured	   only	   in	   streamlining	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel.	   Perhaps	   the	   absence	   can	   be	  
attributed	  to	  the	  different	  policy	  settings	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman.	  The	  European	  Customs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Union	  was	  one	  of	  the	  foundation	  structures	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  key	  lever	  for	  the	  free	  
movement	  of	  trade	  within	  the	  EU	  whereas	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  does	  not	  have	  a	  customs	  union.	  	  
The	  third	  curious	  feature	  is	  that	  the	  EU	  narrative	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  officials	  and	  the	  Minister	  ignored	  
the	   structural	   and	   policy	   differences	   that	   make	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   situation	   somewhat	   different	  
from	   that	   in	   the	   EU.	   	   The	   management	   of	   the	   EU’s	   external	   borders	   falls	   under	   two	   different	  
divisions	  in	  the	  EU	  structure	  –	  Home	  Affairs	  (HOME)	  for	  managing	  people	  flows;	  Tax	  and	  Customs	  
(TAXUD)	  for	  managing	  goods	  flows,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  policy	  such	  as	  enforcement	  of	  criminal	  activity	  
at	   the	   border	   is	   left	   to	   the	   member	   countries	   themselves	   to	   manage.	   	   In	   Australia	   and	   New	  
Zealand,	   both	   Customs	   administrations	   manage	   the	   flows	   of	   both	   people	   and	   goods,	   including	  
enforcement.381	  	  
In	  ANT	  terms,	  the	  EU	  narrative	  was	  a	  powerful	  actant	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  longer	  term	  work	  
–	  powerful	  because	  the	  EU	  itself	  is	  a	  macro-­‐actor	  with	  half	  a	  century	  of	  stories	  both	  its	  own	  and	  by	  
others	  that	  have	  made	  it	  the	  ‘gold	  standard’	  for	  regional	  integration.	   	  However,	  in	   individual	  New	  
Zealand	   border	   agencies,	   the	   regional	   integration	   narrative	  was	   barely	   present,	   either	   in	   formal	  
documents	  or	  in	  interviews.	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  though	  the	  large	  physical	  distance	  between	  Europe	  and	  
New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  has	  made	  the	  EU	  into	  an	  icon	  -­‐	  a	  symbol	  of	  integration	  that	  can	  be	  used	  
for	  many	  purposes.	  	  
References	  to	  other	  regional	  arrangements	  were	  to	  the	  US-­‐Canada	  border	  arrangements	  and	  the	  
free	   trade	   agreement	   between	   Australia,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   the	   Association	   of	   South-­‐East	   Asian	  
Nations.	  The	  latter	  emerged	  in	  several	  places	  as	  a	  narrative	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  
regional	  relationship	  –	  a	  future	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  more	  closely	  aligned	  so	  as	  to	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  
the	  trade	  relationship	  with	  ASEAN.	  This	  position	  was	  spelled	  out	  clearly	  in	  the	  Joint	  Australia-­‐New	  
Zealand	  Productivity	  Commission	  study	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  relationship	  in	  2012:	  
Some	  consider	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  future	  CER	  policy	  should	  not	  be	  on	  what	  they	  see	  as	  the	  now	  
diminishing	  gains	   to	  be	  obtained	   through	   trans-­‐Tasman	  reform,	  but	   rather	  by	  “leveraging”	  
the	  CER	  to	  help	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  integrate	  further	  with	  Asia.	  .	  .	  	  A	  related	  view	  put	  
to	  the	  Commissions	  by	  a	  New	  Zealand	  trade	  negotiator	  was	  that	  a	  customs	  union	  between	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Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  could	  act	  as	  a	  vehicle	   to	  help	   the	   two	  countries	  engage	   in	  and	  
shape	  a	  regional	  integration	  strategy.	  .	  .	  	  Forming	  a	  customs	  union	  would	  necessitate	  a	  joint	  
approach	  in	  future	  trade	  negotiations	  and,	  it	  was	  contended,	  strengthen	  the	  two	  countries’	  
leadership	   credentials	   and	   bargaining	   clout	   within	   the	   region.	   It	   would	   also	   ensure	   that	  
neither	   country	   could	   be	   omitted	   from	   any	   trade	   negotiation	   opportunities	   in	   which	   the	  
other	   was	   engaged	   (Australian	   Productivity	   Commission	   &	   New	   Zealand	   Productivity	  
Commission,	  2012a,	  p.	  20	  of	  Supplementary	  Paper	  A:	  Trade	  in	  Goods).	  
However,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  customs	  union	  was	  rejected	  in	  this	  study,	  as	  was	  leveraging	  CER	  to	  further	  
integrate	  with	  Asia.	  	  The	  final	  report	  noted	  only:	  	  
The	   best	   way	   for	   the	   two	   governments	   to	   position	   their	   economies	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	  
“Asian	   century”	   will	   be	   to	   enhance	   their	   productivity	   and	   competitiveness	   (Overview	   of	  
Australian	  Productivity	  Commission	  &	  New	  Zealand	  Productivity	  Commission,	  2012c,	  p.	  7).	  
 Connecting into global trading narratives 7.3.4
As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   2.2,	   regional	   integration	   is	   a	   subset	   of	   the	   global	   trading	   system.	   The	  
Balassa	  economic	  integration	  hierarchy	  includes	  ‘customs	  union’	  as	  its	  second	  step	  (Balassa,	  1961)	  
and	  the	  WTO	  has	  specific	  rules	  about	  creating	  a	  customs	  union.382	  However,	  the	  explicit	  presence	  
of	  a	  regional	  integration	  narrative	  in	  the	  WCO	  emerged	  only	  in	  2013,	  even	  though	  the	  mechanism	  
had	  existed	  for	  decades.	  Prior	  to	  2013,	  the	  WCO	  narrative	  had	  been	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  system,	  
of	  risk	  management	  and	  enforcement,	  and	  of	  balancing	  facilitation	  and	  control.	  	  
In	  the	  research	  conducted	  for	  this	  thesis,	  the	  global	  trading	  narrative	  surfaced	  in	  references	  to	  
supply	  chains	  and	  trade	  single	  windows,	  in	  the	  WCO	  TRS	  and	  in	  the	  more	  general	  concept	  of	  
removing	  barriers.	  It	  was	  also	  contained	  within	  interviewees’	  references	  to	  the	  WCO.	  The	  WCO	  
was	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  global	  family	  born	  of	  Customs	  administrations’	  need	  to	  connect	  exporting	  and	  
importing:	  
Interviewee:	   For	   customs	   internationally,	   people	   tend	   to	   be	   quite	   like-­‐minded.	   I	   think	  we	  
grew	   up	   where	   Customs	   you	   have	   that	   international	   perspective,	   EU	   and	   wider	   world,	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because	  of	  the	  WCO,	  because	  everything	  we	  do,	  really,	  is.	  
Interviewer:	  Well,	  a	  border	  has	  two	  sides,	  doesn’t	  it?	  	  
Interviewee:	  Exactly,	  a	  border	  has	  two	  sides	  –	  everything	  we’re	  exporting	  goes	  somewhere	  
else,	   everything	  we’re	   importing	   comes	   from	   somewhere	   else,	   so	   it’s	   international.	   It	   just	  
goes	  with	  the	  territory.	  So	  I	  think	  that	  for	  Customs,	  actually,	  one	  of	  the	  real	  strengths	  that	  we	  
have	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  global	  family	  is	  all	  of	  those	  links	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  able	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  phone	  
to	  somebody	  and	  understand	  what’s	  happening	  (E1,	  lines	  443-­‐450).	  
This	  family	  involved	  working	  together	  in	  a	  quality	  way.	  .	  .	  
And	  then	  I	  thought	  about	  coordinated	  border	  management	  –	  a	  different	  term	  which	  was	  –	  I	  
think	  it’s	  a	  WCO	  term	  which	  we	  very	  like	  because	  the	  focus	  is	  there	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  working	  
together,	   not	   the	   kind	  of	   “doing	   it”	   or	   the	   implementation	  of	   doing	   team	  work	   (EU	   focus	  
group,	  lines	  77-­‐80).	  
.	  .	  .	  to	  manage	  facilitation	  and	  security.	  .	  .	  	  
It	   is	   first	   of	   all	   a	   big	   challenge	   for	   all	   the	   relevant	   and	   competent	   authorities,	   including	  of	  
course	  Customs,	  and	  it’s	  a	  big	  challenge	  to	  find	  the	  appropriate	  balance	  between	  facilitation	  
and	  a	  secure	  environment	  –	  securitization	  –	  and	  that’s	  the	  balance	  which	  already	  all	  from	  the	  
WCO	  management	  –	  I	  think	  that’s	  one	  of	  our	  main	  challenges,	  to	  find	  the	  right	  way	  to	  do	  so	  
(Official	  E5,	  lines	  15-­‐20).	  
.	  .	  .	  which	  involved	  juggling	  priorities:	  
So	  a	  lot	  of	  our	  policy	  setting,	  and	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  work	  that	  we	  do	  –	  whether	  it’s	  the	  likes	  of	  the	  
WCO,	  whether	  it’s	  the	  WTO,	  whether	  or	  not	  it’s	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  etc.,	  really	  
looks	   at	   the	   scale,	   or	   the	   complexities	   or	   the	   relevant	   importance	   that	   you've	   got	   at	   the	  
moment.	  	  So	  in	  summing	  that	  up,	  I	  think	  we	  all	  have	  a	  role	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  same	  issues.	  
The	  challenge	  is	  always	  the	  priorities	  at	  the	  time	  (EU	  focus	  group,	  lines	  417-­‐421).	  
For	  Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  administrations,	  the	  WCO	  had	  a	  regional	  component.383	  
It	  was	  connected	  with	  the	  headquarters	  in	  Brussels	  as	  well	  as	  connecting	  with	  industry:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




What	   we're	   doing	   now,	   is,	   as	   the	   regional	   Vice-­‐Chair	   of	   the	   WCO	   is	   currently	   held	   by	  
Australia,	   we've	   suggested	   to	   the	   Australians	   that	   there's	   an	   opportunity	   to	   look	   at	   the	  
linkages	   between	   the	   secure	   trade	   SAFE	   Framework,	   and	   the	   Australians	   attend	   SAFE	   in	  
Brussels	  as	  a	  WCO	  member;	  many	  of	  our	  countries'	  traders	  are	  represented	  in	  those	  forums;	  
obviously	  we	  engage	  with	   industry	  here;	   the	  Australians	  are	  engaging	  with	   industries,	   and	  
many	  of	  those	  industries	  are	  the	  same	  organisations;	  often	  it's	  the	  same	  people	  (Official	  17,	  
lines	  124-­‐129).	  
In	   Chapter	   3.4,	   I	   argued	   that	   border	   administrations	  were	   part	   of	   the	   system	   of	   pacification	   of	  
goods	  and	  people.	   I	  now	  argue	   that	   the	  story	  of	  pacification	  and	  overflowing	   is	  a	  narrative	   that	  
pervades	  the	  practice	  of	  border	  management	  but	  is	  so	  ingrained	  that	  it	  is	  not	  seen	  for	  what	  it	  is.	  
The	  regional	   integration	  narrative	   in	  the	  border	  environment	   is	  not	  strong	  enough	  on	  its	  own	  to	  
explain	   the	   strong	   drive	   for	   streamlining	   border	   processes	   that	   began	  before	   and	   continued	  on	  
after	  the	  cessation	  of	  the	  work	  on	  the	  new	  model	  for	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel.	  One	  piece	  of	  evidence	  
is	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  objective	  to	  harmonise	  the	  differences	  in	  immigration	  policy	  settings.	  Border	  
processes	  were	  not	  one	  of	  the	  outstanding	  areas	  for	  harmonisation.	  Officials	  and	  politicians	  saw	  
opportunities	   to	   do	  more	   to	   streamline	   border	   processes	   –	   particularly	   in	   the	   travel	   area	   with	  
technology	  –	  but	  there	  was	  no	  integration	  narrative	  as	  such.	  Rather,	  the	  narrative	  was	  much	  more	  
related	  to	  the	  global	  trading	  narrative,	  of	  which	  regional	  integration	  is	  a	  subset.	  
There	   is	  a	  clue	   in	  the	  telling	  of	  the	   last	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  HLSG	  meeting	   in	  August	  2012.	   	  Several	  New	  
Zealand	  officials	  at	  that	  meeting	  realised	  that	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  that	  were	  most	  relevant	  to	  
both	   parties	  were	   about	   the	   practice	   of	   border	  management,	   not	   of	   streamlining	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
travel	  and	  trade	  per	  se.	  Other	  clues	  are	  the	  perceptions	  of	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  as	  a	  good	  
testing	  ground	   for	  border	  management	  developments	   (mentioned	  by	  several	   interviewees),	  and	  
the	  expressed	  intentions	  in	  both	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  to	  extend	  SmartGate	  access	  to	  other	  
nationalities.	  	  
Another	  clue	  is	  that	  while	  the	  objective	  (as	  translated)	  to	  streamline	  border	  processes	  might	  have	  
been	  included	  as	  one	  of	  the	  SEM	  actions	  in	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  of	  2	  March	  2009,	  
it	  was	  not	  part	  of	  the	  SEM	  outcomes	  that	  were	  developed	  for	  the	  following	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  
statement	   on	   20	   August	   2009.	   These	   outcomes	   covered	   the	   following	   areas:	   insolvency	   law,	  




corporations	  law,	  personal	  property	  securities	  law,	  intellectual	  property	  law,	  and	  consumer	  policy.	  
The	  streamlining	  trade	  and	  travel	  work	  was	  arguably	  not	  even	  included	  in	  the	  SEM	  principles,	  as	  
these	   were	   listed	   on	   the	   page	   in	   the	   August	   2009	   joint	   Prime	   Ministerial	   statement	   after	   the	  
announcements	  about	  the	  border	  agencies’	  work.	  
A	   third	   clue	   is	   the	   importance	   attributed	   by	   Australian	   and	   New	   Zealand	   interviewees	   from	  
Customs	  and	  Immigration	  administrations	  to	  their	   international	  connections	  –	  WCO	  for	  customs,	  
and	   APEC,	   Five	   Country	   Conference	   and	   the	   Bali	   Ministerial	   Process	   for	   immigration.	   For	  
biosecurity	  there	  is	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  states	  with	  the	  same	  sorts	  of	  controls	  as	  New	  Zealand	  
and	  Australia,	  so	  in	  this	  area	  there	  is	  a	  special	  trans-­‐Tasman	  connection.	  	  
I	   conclude	   that	   this	   global	   trading	   narrative	   provides	   the	   framing	   of	   the	   action	   described	   in	  
Chapter	   6.	   Law	   refers	   to	   framings	   as	   ‘in	   many	   respects	   implicit,	   and	   while	   they	   making	   [sic]	  
knowing	   and	   acting	   possible,	   they	   also	   limit	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility’	   (Appendix	   in	   Law	   &	  
Williams,	  2014,	  p.	  24).	  The	  research	  data	  supports	  this	  notion	  of	  limitation,	  for	  example,	  through	  
the	  surprising	  degree	  of	  homogeneity	   in	  officials’	  descriptions	  of	  the	  matters	  of	  concern	  and	  the	  
work	  to	  be	  done.	  They	  were	  implicitly	  translating	  their	  agency’s	  and	  their	  government’s	  frame	  into	  
the	  description	  of	  what	  mattered	  and	  what	  was	  to	  be	  done.	  For	  the	  officials	  and	  governments	  in	  
this	   thesis,	   the	   global	   narrative	   was	   treated	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact	   that	   framed	   their	   action.	   Law	  
describes	  matters	   of	   fact	   in	   ANT	   as	   depending	   ‘both	   on	   holding	   the	   practice	   (the	   assemblage)	  
together,	   and	   on	   the	   concerns	   that	   are	   embedded	   in	   or	   motivate	   the	   practice	   in	   question’	  
(Appendix	  in	  Law	  &	  Williams,	  2014,	  p.	  22).	  	  
 Connecting into border narratives 7.3.5
The	   joint	   Prime	  Ministerial	   statement	   of	   2	  March	   2009	   called	   for	   a	   reduction	   in	   the	   remaining	  
barriers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  people	  across	  the	  two	  countries’	  borders.	  SmartGate	  was	  
a	  physical	  symbol	  of	  this	  intent.	  	  
This	  thesis	  has	  also	  identified	  two	  different	  types	  of	  border	  narrative	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  
environment	   that	   coexist	   but	   are	   somewhat	   contradictory	   –	   one	  of	   separation	   born	   of	   the	   two	  
countries’	   island	  geography,	  the	  other	  of	  coming	  together	  born	  of	  regional	  economic	   integration	  
arrangements.	  These	  narratives	  are	  different	  from	  and	  cast	  a	  different	   light	  on	  the	  contradiction	  




Wilson	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  The	  UK	  stories	  articulated	  in	  Chapter	  5.3.3	  epitomise	  the	  dynamics	  of	  these	  
two	  narratives.	  	  The	  geographical	  border	  narrative	  for	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  relates	  to	  their	  
island	  status.	  The	  water	  provides	  a	  natural	  physical	  barrier	  that	  colours	  their	  approach	  to	  border	  
management	   and	   the	   mechanisms	   that	   are	   used.	   The	   regional	   economic	   integration	   narrative	  
exists	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  an	  aspiration	  –	  a	  ‘common	  border	  like	  the	  EU’	  –	  but	  is	  not	  connected	  with	  
any	  direct	  translation	  into	  action.	  	  
Both	   narratives	   played	   out	   in	   border	   officials’	   approaches	   to	  managing	   the	   border,	   and	   shaped	  
their	   response	   to	   the	   joint	   Prime	  Ministerial	   statement	   of	   2	  March	   2009.	  Not	   prominent	   in	  my	  
telling	  of	  these	  stories,	  but	  emerging	  strongly	  from	  the	  interviews,	  were	  the	  connections	  between	  
the	   customs,	   biosecurity	   and	   immigration	   narratives	   in	   relation	   to	   managing	   the	   respective	  
borders,	   both	   separately	   and	   cooperatively.	   These	   narratives,	   as	   indicated	   in	   Chapter	   6.2,	  were	  
primarily	  about	  obtaining	  and	  sharing	  knowledge	  about	  and	  assessing	  the	  risk	  from	  overflowings	  
and	   sharing	   experiences	   and	   practical	   developments	   to	   help	   manage	   that	   risk.	   Part	   of	   the	  
narratives	  were	  about	  opportunities	  and	  plans	  for	  the	  future	  –	  the	  many	  little	  things	  that	  can	  be	  
done	  to	  improve	  the	  management	  of	  risk	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  travellers.	  For	  example:	  
We're	  just	  at	  the	  point	  of	  now	  “how	  can	  we	  get	  rid	  of	  visa	  labels	  in	  passports?”	  and	  “How	  can	  
we	  get	  rid	  of	  rubber	  stamps	  at	  the	  border?”	  –	  just	  little	  things	  which	  probably	  look	  quite	  little	  
from	  a	  passenger	  point	  of	  view	  but	  actually	   take	  quite	  a	  bit	  of	   investment	  of	   systems	  and	  
processes	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  happen	  (Official	  11,	  lines	  311-­‐314).	  
Officials	   talked	   about	   their	   own	   agencies’	  work	   and	   how	   that	   connected	  with	   the	   other	   border	  
agencies.	  While	   there	  was	   not	   complete	   understanding	   between	   agencies,	   there	  was	   a	   definite	  
border	  management	  story	  being	  told	  –	  a	  story	  of	  performance,	  as	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.3.	  This	  is	  
because,	   for	   border	   agencies	   (not	   just	   Customs	   administrations)	   there	   is	   a	   language	   of	   borders	  
that	  enabled	  officials	  to	  translate	  the	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement.	  Their	  description	  of	  their	  
border	   role	   is	   the	   same	   across	   agencies,	   despite	   differences	   in	   mandate	   and	   function:	  
‘Traditionally,	   Customs	   and	   quarantine	   are	   both	   trying	   to	   do	   the	   same	   thing	   –	   facilitate	   trade,	  
facilitate	  people,	  use	  a	  risk	  management	  approach’	  (Official	  12,	  lines	  616-­‐617).	  
They	  define	  their	  world	  by	  using	  terms	  that	  represent	  both	  physical	  barriers,	  such	  as	  the	  gates	  and	  
booths	   through	   which	   travellers	   have	   to	   pass	   (‘primary	   processing’),	   and	   invisible	   or	   opaque	  




action	  described	  in	  Chapter	  6	  didn’t	  have	  to	  be	  at	  an	  airport	  to	  develop	  their	  policy	  papers.	  Like	  
the	   cosmologist	   described	   by	   Latour	   below,	   policy	   officials	   used	   the	   language	   and	   stories	   of	  
borders	   to	   frame	   the	   detail	   of	   their	  work:	   ‘.	   .	   .	   the	   theory	   of	   relativity	   allows	   a	   cosmologist	   to	  
circulate	   among	   the	   galaxies	   without	   leaving	   her	   little	   office	   in	   the	   Paris	   Observatory’	   (Latour,	  
2013,	  p.	  84).	  Latour	  is	  metaphorically	  describing	  an	  actor	  using	  tools	  and	  representations	  to	  bridge	  
the	   gap	   between	   one	   reality	   and	   another.	   	   What	   border	   agencies	   are	   doing	   is	   translating	   the	  
diverse	   locations	   and	  materials	   that	  make	   up	   the	  management	   of	   the	   border	   into	   a	   connected	  
narrative.	  Their	   language	  and	   tools	   represent	   the	  border	  and	   the	  barriers	   they	  are	  meant	   to	  be	  
reducing.	  	  
The	  following	  diagram	  illustrates	  the	  main	  types	  of	  connections	  that	  have	  affected	  the	  narratives	  
discussed	   in	   this	   Chapter.	   It	   highlights	   the	   locus	   and	   predominance	   of	   economic	   integration	  
narratives,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  separation	  narratives	  associated	  with	  managing	  risk.	  	  





Figure	  1. Some	  connections	  and	  associations	  in	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  stories	  




What	  this	  diagram	  doesn’t	  show	  is	  how	  these	  narratives	  affected	  one	  another.	  However,	  we	  get	  
some	  clues	  from	  the	  different	  assemblages	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  18	  in	  Chapter	  6.8.2,	  which	  included	  
co-­‐dependant,	   cooperative	   and	   collaborative	   narratives.	   The	   different	   types	   of	   narratives	  
emerging	   from	   the	   connections	   in	   the	   diagram	   above	   can	   swing	   between	   co-­‐dependent,	  
cooperative	   and	   collaborative,	   depending	   on	   the	   matters	   of	   concern	   and	   how	   the	   different	  
narratives	   interact.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   potentially	   collaborative	   ‘common	   border’	   narrative	   was	  
translated	   into	   a	   cooperative	   ‘streamlining’	   narrative	   as	   it	   interacted	   with	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
separation	  narrative.	  Closely	  connected	  to	   this	   separation	  narrative	  was	   the	  global	   ‘overflowing’	  
narrative	   of	   risk	   and	   to	   the	   ‘common	   border’	   narrative	   was	   the	   global	   pacification/facilitation	  
narrative,	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  model	  narrative	  and	  the	  cultural	  connection	  narrative.	   	  These	   interactions	  
will	  be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  next	  Chapter.	  	  
7.4 Answering	  the	  research	  question	  
	  
What	  role	  did	  narrative	  play	  in	  the	  way	  border	  policy	  officials	  translated	  the	  political	  goal	  of	  a	  
single	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  market	  into	  action	  after	  the	  Joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  meeting	  of	  
1-­‐2	  March	  2009?	  	  
We	   have	   seen	   that	   officials	   translated	   the	   SEM	   goal	   through	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   joint	   Prime	  
Ministerial	  statements	  of	  2	  March	  and	  of	  20	  August.	  The	  data	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  initial	  translation	  
came	   from	  different	   sources	   –	   in	  New	  Zealand	   from	   the	  Comptroller	   of	   Customs,	   and	   from	   the	  
Chief	   Executive	   of	   DPMC;	   in	   Australia,	   from	   their	   PM&C.	   Different	   players	   on	   both	   sides	   then	  
picked	  up	  those	  initial	  translations	  and	  made	  them	  their	  own.	  	  
We	  have	  also	  seen	  that	  the	  process	  of	  translation	  involves	  performativity	  and	  that	  performativity	  
in	  policy	  practice	  appears	  to	  require	  matters	  of	  concern	  as	  well	  as	  action.	  The	  shared	  stories	  of	  the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  Customs	  relationship,	  underpinned	  by	  the	  shared	  stories	  of	  being	  members	  of	  the	  
WCO	   family	   and	   the	   global	   trading	   narrative,	   appear	   to	   have	   created	   a	   powerful	   base	   for	  
connecting	   the	   two	   countries’	   border	   agencies	   on	   common	   matters	   of	   concern,	   through	   their	  
respective	  Customs	  administrations.	  However,	  those	  shared	  stories	  don't	  of	  themselves	  generate	  
action.	  For	  example,	  looking	  at	  the	  official	  documentation	  of	  the	  two	  Customs	  administrations	  in	  
2010-­‐2011	   when	   there	   was	   still	   a	   strong	   focus	   on	   the	   work	   that	   sprang	   from	   the	   joint	   Prime	  




Tasman	   that	   supports	   that	   work.	   The	   narrative	   that	   the	   two	   governments	   were	   working	   to	  
streamline	   travel	  between	   the	   two	  countries	  was	  carried	   into	   the	   formal	  documents	  of	   the	   two	  
Customs	  administrations,	  as	  in	  the	  ACBPS	  Annual	  report	  of	  2010-­‐11:	  
The	  Australian	  and	  NZ	  Governments	   remain	  committed	  to	  exploring	  options	   that	  have	  the	  
potential	   to	   further	   streamline	   travel	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   In	   late	   2010,	   Prime	  
ministers	   Julia	  Gillard	  and	   John	  Key	   jointly	  endorsed	  a	  new	  program	  of	  work	   in	  support	  of	  
that	   commitment.	   This	  program	   includes	   a	   feasibility	   study	   that	   explores	   the	  potential	   for	  
integration	   of	   the	   Australian	   and	   NZ	   SmartGate	   systems	   and	   considers	   a	   SmartGate	  
Departures	   capability	   within	   Australia.	   Further	   initiatives	   look	   to	   improve	   biosecurity	  
screening	  and	  processing	  of	  low-­‐risk	  passengers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Tasman.	  
	  
Another	   key	   initiative	   is	   a	   joint	   study	   aimed	   at	   delivering	   a	   ‘domestic-­‐like	   experience’	   for	  
trans-­‐Tasman	  travel.	  This	  study	  includes	  an	  assessment	  of	  how	  far	  the	  joint	  program	  of	  work	  
meets	  this	  objective	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  any	  gaps	  that	  could	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  future	  
agreed	   action	   by	   respective	  Governments.	  Work	   on	   the	   short	   study	   is	   due	   to	   be	   finalised	  
during	  July	  2011.384  
and	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Statement	  of	  Intent	  2011-­‐2014:	  
There	   is	  an	  ongoing	  drive	  to	  progress	  a	  Single	  Economic	  Market	  with	  Australia.	  Australia	   is	  
New	  Zealand’s	  largest	  trading	  partner	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  our	  international	  travellers	  fly	  on	  trans-­‐
Tasman	   routes.	   New	   Zealand	   and	   Australia	   acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   closer	  
economic	   relationship	   to	   our	   respective	   future	   prosperity.	   It	   is	   reflected	   in	   a	   shared	  
commitment	  to	  accelerate	  efforts	  towards	  greater	  trans-­‐Tasman	  economic	  integration,	  and	  
includes	   continued	   progress	   of	   the	   Single	   Economic	  Market	   agenda.	   There	   is	   a	   continued	  
need	  to	  improve	  facilitation	  that	  recognises	  the	  benefits	  of	  streamlined	  processes,	  supported	  
by	   modern	   technology	   to	   improve	   border	   experiences	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   traders	   and	  
travellers.385  
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However,	  if	  we	  look	  at	  2013-­‐14	  official	  documents,	  we	  see	  an	  absence	  of	  reference	  to	  the	  trans-­‐
Tasman	  work	   in	  the	  ACBPS	  Corporate	  Plan	  and	  a	   less	  prominent	  mention	  than	  previous	  years	   in	  
the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Annual	  Report.	  In	  the	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  Statement	  of	  Intent	  2014-­‐
2017,	   there	   was	   a	   Ministerial	   priority	   to	   ‘[d]eliver	   more	   efficient,	   streamlined,	   and	   secure	  
passenger	   facilitation	   for	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   and	   low-­‐risk	   travellers	   from	   other	   key	   partner	  
countries’.386	   The	   only	   reference	   to	   Australia	   in	   the	   supporting	   text	   of	   this	   2014	   document387	  
noted	   increasing	   volumes	   from	   Australia,	   and	   then	   focused	   on	   upgrading	   SmartGate	   and	  
extending	   its	   use	   to	   other	   nationalities.	   What	   we	   see	   is	   the	   continued	   presence	   of	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  work,	  which,	  without	  a	  matching	  narrative	   from	  Australia,	   is	  not	  connected	   to	  anything	  
meaningful	  at	  this	  stage,	  but	  which	  keeps	  the	  narrative	  alive	  for	  that	  to	  occur.	  
One	   New	   Zealand	   official	   who	   had	   spent	   a	   lot	   of	   time	   with	   ACBPS	   officials	   remarked	   that	  
Australian	   Customs	   officials	   rarely	  mentioned	   the	   SEM.	   Even	  when	   it	   was	   discussed	   at	   the	   last	  
HLSG	  meeting	   in	  2012,	   the	  official	  noted:	   ‘I	   think	   it	  was	  very	  evident	   in	   the	  environment	   that	   it	  
really	  wasn't	  a	  core	  element	  in	  terms	  of	  determining,	  driving	  or	  informing	  where	  effort	  was	  going	  
to	   fall’	   (Official	   18,	   lines	  358-­‐364).	   So	   the	  official	   narratives	   indicate	  an	   intention	   to	   act,	   or	   that	  
there	  has	  been	  action,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  they	  play	  a	  role	  in	  generating	  action.	  	  
What	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   closer	   examination	   of	   policy	   activities	   is	   that	   the	   way	   the	   stories	   are	  
translated	   through	   relationships	   appears	   to	   generate	   action.	   Translation	   not	   only	   is	   action,	   but	  
also	   carries	   action.	   An	   example	   of	   translation-­‐in-­‐action,	   with	   circulating	  meanings	   evolving	   into	  
something	  different	  from	  the	  start	  is	  depicted	  by	  Official	  2:	  
So	  what	  our	  thinking,	  and	  with	  us	  now	  going	  to	  look	  at	  alternatives,	  instead	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  
process,	  we're	  actually	   looking	  at	  the	  data,	  and	  why	  we	  use	  data	  elements	  to	  extract	  –	  we	  
sort	   of	   developed	   our	   thinking	   further,	   and	   this	   is	   part	   of	   the,	   I	   guess,	   organic	   process	   of	  
developing	  the	  policy	  and	  the	  strategies,	  and	  the	  operational	  planning.	  I	  think	  we'll	  actually	  
get	  a	  better	  product	  as	  a	  result	  of	  that.	   I	  think	  we'll	  get	   longer	  term	  benefits	  but	  they'll	  be	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much	  greater	  than	  if	  we'd	  simply	  automated	  the	  process	  and	  integrated	  that	  process,	  we	  still	  
would	  have	  had	  a	  process	  that	  people	  would	  have	  to	  go	  through,	  but	  by	  looking	  at	  it	  from	  a	  
perspective	  of	   looking	  at	  data	  elements	  that	  we	  want	  to	  capture	  to	  manage	  risk,	  and	  keep	  
track	  of	  who's	  crossing	  our	  border	  to	  or	  from	  NZ,	  then	  that's	  put	  us	  in	  a	  space	  now	  where	  we	  
can	  actually	  start	  questioning	  why	  we	  need	  those	  data	  elements	  for	  government	  purposes,	  
and	  then	  use	  technology	  in	  other	  ways	  to	  capture	  that	  data	  where	  you	  can	  actually	  reduce	  
process.	  So	  I	  think	  that's	  a	  longer	  term	  benefit	  that	  we'll	  get	  from	  it	  (Lines	  450-­‐454,	  457-­‐465).	  
We	  can	  see	  the	  translation	  being	  described	  in	  this	  narrative	  and	  thus	  we	  can	  see	  how	  translation	  
makes	  narrative.	  In	  other	  words,	  narrative	  emerges	  out	  of	  translation,	  just	  as	  action	  does.	  Matters	  
of	  concern	  are	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  translation	  and	  are	  also	  what	  narratives	  are	  about,	  but	  not	  
exclusively.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  input	  from	  interviewees,	  matters	  of	  concern	  can	  be	  deeply	  
personal,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  nested	  within	   larger	  matters	  of	  concern.	   In	  the	  analysis	  above,	  those	  
larger	  matters	   of	   concern	   span	   organisational,	   governmental	   and	   intergovernmental	  matters	   of	  
concern.	  
It	  must	   also	   be	   recognised	   that	   not	   all	   stories	   are	   shared,	   and	   that	   some	   stories	   ‘intersect	   and	  
interfere	  with	  one	  another’	  (Law,	  2000),	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  stories	  about	  streamlining	  trans-­‐
Tasman	   travel.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   narrative,	   matters	   of	   concern	   and	   action	   occur	   within	   the	  
performativity	   of	   actor-­‐networks,	   and	   those	   networks	   perform	   through	   a	  myriad	   of	   actors	   and	  
actants.	  	  
A	  preliminary	  answer	  to	  the	  research	  question,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  the	  narrative	  is	  inseparable	  from	  
the	  translation	  and	  the	  action	  of	  officials	  and	  actants;	  that	  in	  translating	  the	  SEM	  goal	  into	  action,	  
there	   are	   multiple	   narratives	   at	   play	   at	   once	   and	   that	   the	   mix	   and	   the	   emphasis	   changes,	  
depending	   on	   the	   current	   matter	   of	   concern.388	   These	   changing	   matters	   of	   concern	   create	   an	  
inherent	  instability	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  narratives	  and	  therefore	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  action.	  Some	  of	  the	  
narratives	  are	  complementary,	  others	  intersect,	  others	  interfere	  and	  still	  others	  do	  not	  touch	  one	  
another	  or	  do	   so	   intermittently.	   	   These	  narratives	  have	  both	   long	  and	   short	   connections	   to	   the	  
narratives	  of	  the	  global	  trading	  system,	  of	  regional	  integration	  and	  particularly	  that	  of	  the	  EU,	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




border	  management	  and	  of	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship,	  and	  all	   these	  narratives	   form	  part	  of	  
the	  performativity	  of	  policy	  practice	  in	  the	  specific	  locality	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  management.	  	  	  
This	  answer	  is	  expanded	  in	  the	  next	  Chapter.	  








Chapter 8  
Conclusions: extending the boundaries – ANT, narrative and policy 
practice  
8.1 Introduction	  
I	   began	   this	   thesis	  with	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   of	   border	  management	   in	  
regional	   economic	   integration	   and	   on	   the	   theory	   of	   policy	   narrative.	   I	   identified	   the	   lack	   of	  
attention	  paid	   to	   that	   role	   in	   single	  markets	  outside	   the	  EU	  and	  argued	   that	   the	  study	  of	  policy	  
narrative	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  lead	  us	  any	  closer	  to	  understanding	  how	  policy	  narrative,	  and	  future-­‐
focused	  policy	  narrative	  in	  particular,	  is	  translated	  into	  action	  by	  officials.	  	  
To	   explore	   these	   matters	   of	   concern,	   I	   have	   taken	   the	   reader	   on	   a	   journey	   through	   border	  
management,	   the	  global	   trading	   system	  and	   regional	   integration,	  until	  we	   reached	   the	   ‘land’	  of	  
Australian	  and	  New	  Zealand	  border	   stories.	   In	   telling	   those	  stories,	   I	  have	   revealed	  some	  of	   the	  
detailed	   performativity	   of	   border	  management	   policy,	   both	   specific	   to	   each	   country,	   and	   trans-­‐
Tasman.	  The	  detail	  is	  often	  mundane	  and	  unremarkable,	  but	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  everyday	  activities	  
such	   as	   email	   conversations,	   setting	   up	   meetings	   and	   getting	   an	   agreed	   set	   of	   minutes	   are	  
fundamental	   parts	   of	   policy	   activity,	   not	   just	   as	   steps	   in	   the	   process,	   and	   are	   fundamental	   	   to	  
creating	  and	  stabilising	  the	  narratives	  that	  bring	  meaning	  and	  shape	  to	  the	  work.	  	  
This	  Chapter	  examines	  the	  wider	  implications	  of	  the	  research	  for	  providing	  a	  new	  perspective	  on	  
narrative	  in	  regional	  integration	  and	  for	  illuminating	  the	  theory	  of	  narrative	  in	  policy	  .	  	  
8.2 Towards	  an	  anatomy	  for	  integrating	  regionally	  
Chapter	  7	  has	  provided	  new	  knowledge	  about	   the	  practice	  of	  border	  management	  policy	  within	  
the	   deeply	   integrated	   trans-­‐Tasman	   single	   economic	  market.	   As	   identified	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   this	   is	  
important	  because	  trans-­‐Tasman	  regional	  economic	  integration	  has	  not	  been	  widely	  recognised	  as	  
such	   and	   so	   has	   not	   been	   included	   in	   comparisons	   with	   other	   examples	   of	   regional	   economic	  
integration.	  This	  thesis	  helps	  address	  that	   imbalance.	  Nevertheless,	  while	  academic	  comparisons	  
with	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  may	  be	  missing,	  what	  Chapter	  7	  also	  showed	  is	  that	  government	  actors	  in	  
Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  look	  to	  compare	  themselves	  with,	  and	  even	  benchmark	  against, 	  other	  




In	  reflecting	  on	  Barry’s	  assertion	  that	  borders	  are	  a	  politicised	  translation	  zone	  (2013),	  we	  can	  see	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  politicisation	  revealed	  through	  policy-­‐in-­‐performance.	  This	  performance	  of	  trans-­‐
Tasman	   border	   management	   policy	   was	   shown	   to	   have	   drawn	   on	   the	   narratives	   of	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  relationship,	  the	  global	  trading	  system	  and	  border	  management	  practices.	  Reflecting	  back	  
on	  the	  integrating	  and	  separating	  forces	  playing	  out	  at	  borders	  (Paasi,	  1998;	  Walker,	  2010),	  we	  see	  
these	  narratives	  are	  intimately	  intertwined	  in	  border	  management	  	  policy	  practice.	  	  
Reflecting	   on	   Anderson	   and	   O’Dowd’s	   distinction	   in	   Chapter	   2	   between	   political	   and	   economic	  
communities,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  this	   is	   in	  some	  senses	  a	  false	  distinction	  in	  a	  regional	  economic	  
integration	  setting.	  For	  example,	  the	  narratives	  of	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  government	  relationship	  are	  
political	  but	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  CER	  mean	  that	  the	  economic	  narrative	  is	  unable	  to	  
be	  separated	  from	  it.	   	  What	  Anderson	  and	  O’Dowd’s	  distinction	  doesn’t	  take	   into	  account	   is	  the	  
narrative	  that	  prompted	  the	  economic	  integration.	  For	  the	  EU,	  the	  response	  was	  economic	  but	  the	  
driver	  was	  political;	  for	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia,	  the	  driver	  was	  economic,	  but	  underpinned	  by	  a	  
cultural	  expectation	  of	  connection	  and,	  from	  New	  Zealand,	  a	  position	  of	  political	  separation	  that	  
continues	  to	  provide	  a	  challenge,	  and	  even	  tension,	  to	  this	  day.	  	  
Another	  aspect	  of	   this	  distinction	   is	   that	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  the	   local	  narratives	  of	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
border	  policy	  practices	  include	  long	  and	  dense	  historical	  and	  geographical	  connections	  from	  both	  
political	   and	   economic	   communities	   and	   that	   they	   co-­‐exist	   and	   overlap.	   For	   example,	   the	  WCO	  
represents	  both	  economic	  and	  political	  communities	  in	  its	  dual	  focus	  on	  facilitation	  and	  control.	  	  
I	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  border	  management	  contributes	  to	  marketization	  of	  goods	  and	  people	  and	  
have	   extended	   the	   concepts	   of	   pacification	   and	   overflowing	   to	   people	   as	   well	   as	   goods.	   My	  
findings	   highlight	   that	   while	   both	   concepts	   are	   part	   of	   the	   global	   trading	   system,	   and	   can	   be	  
equated	   to	   border	  management	   concepts	   of	   facilitation	   and	   control,	   the	   global	   trading	   system	  
focuses	  on	  pacification,	  leaving	  most	  of	  the	  overflowing	  to	  be	  attended	  to	  by	  nation	  states.	  In	  the	  
trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   integration	   situation,	   the	   narrative	   contains	   a	   mix	   of	   pacification	   and	  
overflowing.	   Officials	   aimed	   to	   streamline	   trans-­‐Tasman	   trade	   and	   travel	   in	   answer	   to	   the	  
integration	   narrative	   but	   their	   actions	   were	   framed	   by	   the	   separation	   narrative,	   which	   was	   to	  




Another	  element	  of	  trans-­‐Tasman	  integration	  is	  that	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  narrative	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  
the	  global	  trading	  system	  was	  treated	  as	  if	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  and	  is	  currently	  not	  contested	  
by	   either	   of	   the	  major	   political	   parties	   likely	   to	   form	   a	   government	   in	   either	   Australia	   or	   New	  
Zealand	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.389	  For	  Australia	  and	  New	  Zealand	  to	  change	  this	  narrative	  would	  
be	  at	  least	  as	  difficult	  as	  the	  examples	  in	  the	  science	  world	  described	  in	  Latour’s	  book	  Science	  in	  
Action	  (Latour,	  1987).390	  This	  is	  because	  changing	  the	  narrative	  would	  require	  changing	  the	  many	  
connections	  invested	  in	  the	  current	  narrative	  such	  as	  the	  banking	  system,	  the	  trading	  community	  
and	  international	  commitments,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  examine	  other	  deep-­‐
seated	  narratives	  in	  the	  public	  policy	  world	  where	  this	  dynamic	  exists.	  
To	   summarise,	   these	   findings	   highlight	   that	   the	   border	  management	   policy	   narratives	   in	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  regional	  economic	   integration	  are	  a	  mix	  of	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  connections,	  
and	  of	  matters	  of	  concern	  relating	  to	  pacification	  and	  overflowing.	  Some	  of	  these	  narratives	  are	  so	  
deep-­‐seated	   they	   are	   not	   contested	  within	   the	   regional	   setting.	   The	   implication	   is	   that	  we	   can	  
expect	  a	  different	  example	  of	  regional	  economic	  integration	  will	  display	  a	  different	  mix,	  with	  some	  
narratives	  common	  to	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  and	  some	  narratives	  specific	  to	  the	  particular	  integration.	  	  
I	   indicated	   in	  Chapter	  3.5	   that	   the	  effects	  of	   this	   sort	  of	   interplay	  between	  specific	  narratives	   is	  
missing	  from	  current	  approaches	  to	  policy	  narrative.	  	  
The	  preliminary	  examination	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  performative	  covered	  in	  Chapter	  5	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  
explore	   this	   implication	   a	   little.	   First,	   we	   can	   see	   different	   emphases	   on	   the	   integration	   and	  
separation	   narratives	   from	   the	   trans-­‐Tasman	   on	   the	   regional,	   with	   its	   own	   regional	   economic	  
integration	   narrative	   being	   very	   strong.	   At	   the	   macro-­‐actor	   level,	   the	   EU	   supranational	  
infrastructure	  created	  and	   is	  actively	  maintaining	  a	  powerful	   set	  of	  connections	   that	   interweave	  
with	  the	  28	  member	  countries391,	  creating	  a	  strong	  but	  intricate	  web	  that	  is	  contained	  within	  and	  
maintained	   by	   an	   integration	   narrative.	   This	   web	   has	   destabilised	   on	   several	   occasions	   in	   the	  
history	  of	   the	  EU,	  with	  the	  Euro-­‐crisis	  being	  the	  most	   recent	  example.	  From	  the	   local	   (the	  near)	  
position,	   the	   web	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   performance	   and	   the	  many	   little	   narratives	   of	   individual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Some minor parties in New Zealand (New Zealand First, Greens) contest parts of the narrative that remove national 
choices. 
390 Although the debates about the merits or otherwise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations have the potential to 
challenge this consensus.  




connections	  –	  the	  disagreements	  and	  negotiations	  and	  compromises	  involved	  in	  making	  policies,	  
stabilised	  by	  structures	  and	  processes	  that	  need	  to	  be	  constantly	  maintained.	  	  
This	  integration	  narrative	  flows	  into	  EU	  border	  management	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  maintenance	  and	  
further	  development	  of	  the	  Customs	  Union	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Frontex	  organisation	  to	  help	  
member	   states	   deal	   with	   integration	   ‘overflowings’.	   The	   Customs	   Strategy	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  
actant	   that	   has	   caused	  member	   state	   Customs	   administrations	   together	  with	   the	   EC	   to	   build	   a	  
shared	   story	   about	   the	   future.	   Each	  member	   state	  performs	   that	   Strategy	   in	   a	   slightly	   different	  
way,	   which	   has	   effects	   on	   the	   whole	   Customs	   actor-­‐network.	   A	   separation	   policy	   narrative	   for	  
managing	  the	  external	  border	  is	  built	  out	  of	  the	  structural	  separation	  of	  policy	  on	  flows	  of	  goods	  
from	   that	   of	   flows	   of	   people.	   In	   both	   areas	   of	   border	   management,	   the	   pacification	   and	  
overflowing	   narratives	   are	   reinforced	   by	   the	   EU	   structure,	   but	   in	   essence	   they	   are	   no	   different	  
from	  those	  of	  border	  management	  anywhere.	  The	  emphases	  and	  nuances	  on	  different	  aspects	  of	  
border	  management	  policy	  are	  different	  but	  the	  framing	  is	  consistent.392	  	  
This	  discussion	  suggests	  that	  there	  could	  be	  an	  anatomy	  of	  border	  management	  that	  is	  particular	  
to	  each	   type	  of	   regional	   integration,	  but	  which	  connects	   to	  all	  other	   regions	   through	   the	  global	  
trading	  narrative	  and	  a	  mix	  of	  other	  narratives	  from	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  WCO	  and	  APEC.	  By	  
understanding	  the	  anatomy	  –	  where	  the	  stable	  and	  unstable	  connections	  are,	  where	  the	  shared	  
stories	  and	  matters	  of	  concern	  are	  and	  where	  they	  need	  to	  be	  further	  developed,	  what	  sorts	  of	  
activities	  and	  circulating	  meanings	  make	  up	  the	  actor-­‐networks	  that	  are	  the	  relationship,	  and	  what	  
sorts	   of	   mechanisms	   stabilise	   the	   actor-­‐networks	   –	   it	   may	   be	   possible	   for	   border	   agencies	   to	  
contribute	  more	  to	  regional	  integration	  efforts	  than	  currently.	  This	  approach	  is	  different	  from	  the	  
Balassa	  model,	  in	  that	  it	  doesn't	  expect	  or	  imply	  a	  movement	  toward	  ever	  greater	  integration.	  	  
This	  approach	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  policy	  business	  of	  Customs	  administrations	  in	  an	  integrated	  
(or	   integrating)	  market	   is	  specific	  to	  those	  administrations.	  For	  example,	   in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  
management	   policy,	   there	  was	   no	   desire	   at	   any	   level	   of	   government	   for	   officials	   to	   debate	   the	  
difficult	   immigration	   and	   biosecurity	   issues	   that	   would	   have	   had	   to	   be	   resolved	   to	   create	   a	  
common	   border.	   Instead,	   the	   common	   border	   appeared	   in	   the	   narrative	   as	   an	   aspiration.	   This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 In New Zealand in particular, there is a conceptual connection between goods and people that flows into processes. The 
premise, often mentioned, is that movements of people and goods across borders are interrelated – that it is people who 




enabled	  officials	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  safe	  ground	  of	  the	  connecting	  narrative.	  The	  nuances	  of	  these	  local	  
narratives	   are	  not	   something	   that	   can	  be	   regulated	  at	   a	   global	   level.	  However,	   global	   tools	   and	  
global	  networks	  like	  the	  Customs	  family	  can	  be	  used	  to	  help	  stabilise	  new	  connections	  and	  bring	  
about	  change,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  continue	  to	  enable	  supply	  chain	  connections	  between	  regions.	  	  	  
Further	  research	  to	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  anatomy	  could	  add	  greatly	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  border	  management	  in	  an	  integrated	  economic	  market.	  
8.3 Narrative	  in	  policy	  practice	  and	  areas	  of	  further	  research	  
In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  noted	  Hajer	  and	  Law’s	  call	  for	  the	  concrete	  application	  of	  narrative	  and	  discourse	  
tools	   to	  help	  policy	  analysts	  deal	  with	  controversies,	  and	   to	  help	   them	   innovate.	  This	   thesis	  has	  
shown	  that	  ANT	  is	  an	  approach	  that	  reveals	  the	  interdependence	  of	  narrative	  and	  action	  in	  policy	  
practice	  and	  has	  revealed	  some	  of	  what	  Hajer	  and	  Laws	  might	  have	  meant	  by	  the	  term	  ‘relational	  
ontology’	  (Hajer	  &	  Laws,	  2006,	  p.	  260).	  An	  ANT	  approach	  enables	  the	  interactions	  of	  officials	  to	  be	  
traced,	   and	   through	   the	   tracing,	   reveals	   their	   narratives.	   This	   is	   consistent	  with	   Latour’s	   whole	  
approach	   to	   social	   groupings	   –	   trace	   the	   actors	   and	   the	   translations,	   and	   they	  will	   tell	   you	   the	  
story,	  or,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  stories.	  	  
While	  Latour	  asserts	  that	  the	  tracing	  of	  particular	  social	  groupings	  is	  specific,	  and	  by	  implication,	  
cannot	   be	   generalised	   (Latour,	   2007),	   the	   results	   in	   this	   thesis	   suggest	   that	   something	   more	  
fundamental	   is	   happening	   –	   that	   as	   any	   actor-­‐network	   performs,	   it	   carries	   the	   stories	   of	   the	  
matters	  of	  concern,	  which	  unfold	  according	  to	  the	  translations	  and	  debates	   involved,	  and	   it	  also	  
creates	  its	  own	  narrative.	  In	  the	  policy	  world,	  this	  conclusion	  could	  be	  taken	  one	  step	  further.	  We	  
saw	  in	  the	  SmartGate	  story	  that	  a	  goal	  for	  officials	  was	  to	  move	  the	  stories	  of	  the	  multiple	  matters	  
of	  concern	  toward	  a	  single	  matter	  of	  concern,	  epitomised	  by	  agreement	  around	  the	  Cabinet	  table	  
to	   the	   uncontested	   recommendations	   in	   the	   Cabinet	   paper.	   	  My	   own	   experience	   suggests,	   but	  
further	  research	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  confirm,	  that	  this	  could	  apply	  to	  any	  performance	  of	  policy	  
practice	  where	  a	  Cabinet	  decision	  was	  required.	  	  
This	  thesis	  has	  shown	  a	  performative	  picture	  of	  policy	  practice	  (policy-­‐in-­‐performance)	  that	  sees	  
human	  and	  non-­‐human	  actors	  equally	  having	  effects	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  policy	  practice,	  and	  
shows	   that	   the	   end	   ‘deliverables’	   so	   sought	   for	   by	   politicians	   are	   made	   up	   of	   the	   many	   little	  




make	   up	   policy	   practice	   create	   networks	   that	   take	   effort	   to	   maintain;	   they	   involve	   everyday	  
components	   such	   as	   emails	   and	   meetings,	   the	   effects	   of	   which	   are	   often	   ignored	   unless	   they	  
malfunction;	   and	   the	   way	   they	   are	   assembled	   is	   unique	   to	   a	   specific	   situation	   –	   in	   this	   thesis,	  
border	   management	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   regional	   economic	   integration.	   Annemarie	   Mol	   draws	   a	  
compelling	   picture	   of	   the	   effort	   involved	   in	   ‘making	   networks	   that	   hold’	   and	   highlights	   that	  
markets,	  so	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis,	  ‘depend	  on	  devices’:	  
Making	  networks	  that	  hold,	  does	  not	  come	  easy.	  Call	  a	  meeting	  together,	  get	  on	  the	  phone,	  
use	  a	  spread	  sheet,	  make	  an	  inspiring	  speech,	  convey	  to	  those	  involved	  what	  might	  be	  in	  it	  
for	   them,	   design	   an	   artefact	   that	   condenses	   a	   relation.	   Things	   are	   crucial	   to	   the	   ordering	  
work	  at	  hand.	  The	  phone	  that	   links	  voices	  and	  ears	  over	   long	  distances,	   the	  spread	  sheets	  
that	  provide	  managers	  with	  an	  overview,	  the	  doors	  that	  allow	  walls	  to	  be	  opened	  and	  closed.	  
And	  such	  things	  are	  not	   just	  crucial	   to	  what	   in	  other	  theoretical	   traditions	  would	  be	  called	  
“governance”,	   but	   likewise	   to	   the	  market.	  Markets	   are	   composed	   of	   far	  more	   “variables”	  
than	  the	   few	  that	  are	  mentioned	   in	   the	   textbook	   formulae	  of	  neoclassical	  economics.	  Like	  
laboratories,	   hospitals,	   nursing	   homes,	   schools	   and	   practices	   in	   ever	   so	  many	   other	   sites,	  
markets	  depend	  on	  devices	  	  (Mol,	  2010,	  p.	  263).	  
In	  short,	  performativity	  takes	  effort.	  The	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  this	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  
sub-­‐section.	  
A	  notable	  aspect	  of	  performativity,	  as	  noted	   in	  Chapter	  3,	   is	  the	  relational	  nature	  of	  power.	  The	  
SmartGate	  and	  the	  Streamlining	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  Trade	  stories	  suggest	  that	  power	  in	  policy	  practice	  
emerges	   from	   the	   translations	   and	   renegotiations	   as	   the	   language	   of	   an	   agreed,	   or	   stabilised,	  
story.	  	  We	  would	  therefore	  expect	  power	  to	  emerge	  when	  matters	  of	  concern	  become	  matters	  of	  
fact	  and	  turn	  into	  a	  ‘black	  box’,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  illustrated	  in	  those	  stories	  in	  particular.	  But	  even	  
matters	   of	   fact	  will	   not	   remain	   so	   forever,393	   and	  when	   they	   become	   contested	   again	   they	  will	  
revert	   to	  being	  matters	  of	   concern.	  We	  might	  also	  expect	  power	   to	  appear	   in	  a	   temporary	  way	  
every	  time	  there	  is	  a	  stabilising	  point	  –	  an	  agreed	  record	  of	  a	  meeting,	  an	  agreed	  diagrammatical	  
depiction	  of	  the	  future	  state.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  would	  imply	  that	  as	  the	  narrative	  of	  translation	  
progresses,	  so	  does	  the	  relational	  power,	  if	  the	  relational	  power	  sits	  with	  the	  same	  actor-­‐network	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and	  is	  mediated	  through	  the	  same	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  in	  the	  two	  stories	  of	  the	  
longer	   term	  work.	   In	   this	   case,	   does	   the	   relational	   power	   associated	  with	   the	   end	   product	   in	   a	  
policy	  process	  equal	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  the	  intermediary	  expressions	  of	  relational	  power?	  Does	  it	  get	  
stronger	   as	   the	   intermediary	   expressions	   accumulate?	   And	   if	   so,	   what	   is	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  
accumulation	  on	  the	  narrative/s	  involved?	  	  These	  are	  questions	  worth	  investigating	  further.	  
Another	   aspect	   of	   relational	   power	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   findings	   is	   that	   who	   does	   the	  
translating	  and	  whom	  they	  are	  speaking	  for	  affects	  the	  action	  and	  the	  deliverables.	  In	  the	  period	  
from	   March	   to	   August	   2009,	   the	   Border	   Secretariat	   spoke	   on	   behalf	   of	   New	   Zealand	   border	  
agencies	  and	  DPMC,	  who	  in	  turn	  spoke	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  This	  created	  an	  intense	  set	  
of	  connections	  for	  the	  Border	  Secretariat	  that	  helped	  them	  deliver	  a	  new	  model	  and	  a	  supporting	  
Cabinet	  paper	  in	  a	  very	  short	  timeframe.	  Those	  connections	  also	  severed	  some	  of	  the	  connections	  
with	  normal	  policy	  processes	   that	  would	  have	  seen	  them	  consulting	  widely	  on	  and	   iterating	   the	  
design	  of	   the	  model	  before	   submitting	   it	   to	  Cabinet.394	  When	  we	  compare	   this	  with	   the	  Border	  
Secretariat	   in	  the	   longer	  term	  work,	  we	  see	  that	  these	  connections	  were	  much	  less	   intense.	  The	  
Border	  Secretariat	  was	  still	  talking	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  New	  Zealand	  border	  agencies,	  but	  the	  border	  
sector	  matters	  of	  concern	  were	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  and	  toward	  domestic	  border	  
arrangements,	  and	  the	  connections	  with	  DPMC	  were	  much	  weaker.	  In	  addition,	  as	  the	  ‘domestic-­‐
like’	  model	  began	   to	   take	  shape,	   it	  began	   to	   speak	   through	  officials	  who	  began	   to	   translate	   the	  
picture	   of	   the	   model	   into	   a	   series	   of	   questions	   about	   implementation,	   the	   answers	   to	   which	  
started	  to	  weaken	  the	  network	  and	  thus	  the	  connection	  with	  action.	  	  	  
This	  thesis	  has	  also	  highlighted	  the	  presence	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  policy	  practice.	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  
the	  stories	  and	  narratives	  that	  carry	  action	  can	  aid,	  slow	  or	  block	  action	  and	  that	  those	  that	  are	  
carried,	  or	  created,	  by	  action	  can	  stabilise	  or	  destabilize	  that	  action.	  These	  effects	  occur	  through	  
the	   process	   of	   translation,	   which	   appears	   to	   affect	   action	   differently	   depending	   on	   officials’	  
connections	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  concern.	  For	  example,	  officials	  from	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  were	  able	  
to	  move	  quickly	  on	  SmartGate	  because	  of	   their	   extended	   connections	  with	   the	  development	  of	  
SmartGate	   in	   Australia;	   the	   other	   border	   agencies	   had	   no	   such	   connections,	   and	   it	   took	  many	  
iterations	   and	  discussions	   to	   get	   to	   an	   agreed	  narrative	   for	   SmartGate	   in	  New	  Zealand.	   For	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




longer	   term	   work,	   some	   officials	   had	   a	   connection	   to	   the	   IATA	   passenger	   model,	   and	   all	   had	  
multiple	   connections	   into	   the	   work	   of	   their	   own	   agencies,	   but	   they	   all	   had	   to	   build	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  model	  through	  many	  translations,	  and	  this	  took	  time.	   I	  wonder,	  then,	   if	  officials	  have	  to	  
translate	  more	  when	  they	  do	  not	  have	  long	  extended	  connections	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  concern.	  This	  
could	  have	  implications	  for	  understanding	  the	  dynamics	  of	  policy	  practice,	  particularly	  for	  planning	  
and	  management	  of	  new	  initiatives.	  	  
We	  saw	  the	  role	  not	  only	  of	  narrative	  but	  also	  inscriptions	  in	  stabilising	  uncertainty,	   if	  only	  for	  a	  
short	   time.	  This	   is	  particularly	   important	   for	   situations	  where	  officials	  are	  moving	   into	  unknown	  
territory,	  such	  as	  developing	  a	  new	  model,	  or	  designing	  new	  ways	  of	  working	  where	  the	  outcomes	  
have	   to	   be	   inferred	   and	   imagined,	   or	   where	   who	   is	   acting	   for	   whom	   is	   unclear.	   The	   role	   of	  
inscriptions	  as	  stabilisers	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  sub-­‐section	  in	  relation	  to	  temporality.	  	  
The	  lived	  experience	  of	  officials	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  relevant	  element	  of	  the	  performativity	  of	  policy	  
practice	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  making	  connections	  from	  that	  experience,	  such	  as	  accessing	  black	  boxes	  
closed	  to	  others,	  and	  in	  making	  conceptual	  leaps	  that	  lead	  to	  action,	  such	  as	  the	  representations	  
of	   different	   types	   of	   borders	   in	   Figure	   8	   in	   Chapter	   6.5.	   This	   thesis	   has	   shown	   that	   officials	  
remember	   their	   lived	  experience,	  which	  over	   time	   forms	  part	  of	   their	   institutional	  memory	  and	  
which	  can	  help	  to	  unpack	  those	  black	  boxes	  in	  times	  of	  renewal	  or	  review.	  	  
This	   is	  different	   from	  written	  narratives	   in	  which	  officials’	   individual	  voices	  become	  anonymous,	  
although	   individual	   officials	   involved	   in	   the	   development	   of	   these	   written	   narratives	   will	  
remember	  their	  own	  role,	  as	  described	  in	  Stories	  3	  and	  4	  in	  particular.	  For	  example,	  interviewees	  
remembered	   the	   significant	   inscriptions	   developed	   for	   the	   new	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   model	  
through	  their	  colour,	  their	  symbols	  and	  their	  form,	  all	  of	  which	  feature	  in	  this	  quote:	  ‘.	  .	  .	  our	  lovely	  
A3	  –	  I	  can	  remember	  the	  light	  blue	  bits	  and	  a	  map	  of	  New	  Zealand	  and	  some	  arrows	  and	  the	  flow	  
numbers’	  (Official	  16,	  lines	  316-­‐317).	  The	  other	  interviewee	  who	  referred	  to	  a	  significant	  A3	  talked	  
about	   the	  dogs	   and	  Hawaiian	   shirts	   in	   the	  diagram	  and	  observed	   that	   it	  was	   cheeky.	   These	  are	  
examples	  of	  often	  evocative	  images	  that	  have	  an	  emotional	  connection	  for	  the	  person	  using	  them.	  
But	  these	  images	  are	  not	  just	  descriptions	  and	  representations.	  As	  inscriptions,	  they	  also	  form	  part	  




Likewise,	  emotion	  appears,	  though	  less	  positively,	  in	  the	  expressions	  of	  uncertainty,	  confusion	  and	  
disagreement.	   	   Law	   has	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   actors	   (Law	   &	  
Singleton,	   2006).	   Officials’	   lived	   experience	   in	   policy	   practice	   is	   worthy	   of	   further	   academic	  
attention	  as	  this	  thesis	  has	  shown	  it	  has	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  action,	  through	  matters	  of	  concern	  
and	  through	  translation	  in	  particular.395	  
An	  ANT	   approach	   has	   revealed	   the	   coexistence	   and	   interrelationship	   of	  multiple	   narratives	   and	  
how	  they	   impacted	  on	  one	  another	   in	   the	  performativity	  of	   trans-­‐Tasman	  policy	  practice.	  Those	  
multiple	   narratives	   result	   from	   different	   matters	   of	   concern,	   different	   historical,	   cultural	   and	  
geographical	   ‘long’	   narratives,	   different	   types	   of	   narratives,	   such	   as	   ‘what’,	   ‘why’	   and	   ‘how’,	  
uncertainty	   and	   feasibility	   narratives,	   and	   visible	   and	   less	   visible	   narratives.	   One	   of	   the	  
implications	  for	  policy	  practice	  is	  that	  officials’	  narratives	  within	  their	  own	  agencies	  could	  result	  in	  
translations	   that	   later	   intersect	   or	   oppose	   the	   primary	  matter	   of	   concern,	   such	   as	   seen	   in	   the	  
SmartGate	   story	   and	   the	   ‘domestic-­‐like’	   work	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2011.	   For	   example,	   the	   Customs	  
organisational	   narratives	   are	   so	   strongly	   connected	   to	   the	   stabilised	   global	   trading	   system	   that	  
they	  appear	  to	  crowd	  out	  competing	  narratives	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  few	  competing	  narratives	  
appeared	  in	  the	  data.	  	  
One	   implication	   of	   officials	   from	   different	   agencies	   seeking	   to	   achieve	   an	   agreed	   goal	   is	   that	  
dialogue	   and	   interactions	   may	   need	   to	   address	   organisational	   narratives	   at	   the	   outset	   so	   that	  
narrative	  worlds	   can	  be	   revealed	  and	  used	  appropriately	   to	   create	  a	   shared	   story.	  Not	   to	  do	   so	  
creates	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  ‘crowding	  out’	  effect	  will	  interfere	  with	  officials’	  ability	  to	  create	  a	  shared	  
story.	   However,	   mitigating	   the	   risk	   means	   officials	   have	   to	   be	   conscious	   of	   the	   particular	  
organisational	  narratives	  that	  dominate	  their	  thinking.	  One	  official,	  when	  reflecting	  on	  the	  events	  
surrounding	   the	   introduction	   of	   SmartGate,	   articulated	   how	   not	   addressing	   organisational	  
narratives	  affected	  progress:	  
So	  all	  the	  discussions	  that	  we	  had	  with	  other	  agencies	  about	  the	  value	  and	  the	  cost	  benefit	  I	  
think	   if	  we	   .	   .	   .	  were	   really	  much	   clearer	   at	   the	   very	   start	   about	   “Don’t	   look	   for	   the	   cost-­‐
benefit.	  There	  are	  other	  reasons	  for	  pushing	  this”,	  and	  if	  we’d	  got	  other	  agencies	  on	  board	  
with	  that	  understanding	  and	  maybe	  got	  the	  key	  players	  to	  kind	  of	  reinforce	  that	  message,	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not	   just	  us	   trying	   to	   say	   it	  but	  other	   people	   sort	  of	   coming	  down	  with	   that	  message,	   that	  
might	   have	   cut	   through	   a	   lot	   of	   that	   real	   stressful	   time	   that	  we	   did	   have,	   as	  we	   put	   the	  
business	  case	  together	  (Official	  21,	  lines	  370-­‐377).	  	  
In	  this	  example,	  New	  Zealand	  Customs	  officials	  did	  not	  realise	  what	  their	  organisational	  narratives	  
were	  at	   the	  outset	  and	   tried	   to	   change	   the	  other	  agencies’	  narratives	  without	   first	   creating	   the	  
right	  connections	  with,	  and	  then	  out	  of,	  their	  own	  organisational	  narratives.	  One	  connection	  was	  
with	  the	  right	  story	  to	  be	  told;	  another	  was	  getting	  key	  players	  (those	  with	  strong	  connections	  to	  
all	  the	  border	  agencies,	  such	  as	  DPMC)	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  New	  Zealand	  Customs.	  
Another	   implication	   is	   that	   overlapping	   narratives	   could	   indicate	   an	   opportunity	   for	   translating	  
compatible	  matters	   of	   concern	   into	   cooperation	   or	   collaboration.	   Understanding	   the	   particular	  
performativity	   of	   a	   policy	   practice	   and	   the	   interplay	   of	   its	   narratives	   could	   therefore	   provide	  
insights	   that	   enable	   stalemates	   to	   be	   broken	   through	   or	   risks	   to	   be	   managed.	   	   Further	  
investigation	  into	  the	  role	  different	  types	  of	  narratives	  play	  in	  the	  performativity	  of	  policy	  practice	  
could	  be	  worthwhile.	  
8.4 Reflections	  on	  theory	  
Focusing	  now	  on	  aspects	  of	  this	  research	  that	  impact	  on	  existing	  literature,	  I	  return	  to	  Chapter	  3,	  
where	   I	   established	   the	   close	   relationship	  between	  ANT	  and	  narrative.	  By	  using	  ANT	   to	   analyse	  
and	  draw	  out	  the	  narratives	  contained	  within	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  stories,	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  
human	  and	  non-­‐human	  actors	  have	  assembled	  into	  actor-­‐networks	  that	  have	  ebbed	  and	  flowed	  as	  
they	  have	  moved	  from	  instability	  to	  stability	  and	  back	  again.	  I	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  these	  actor-­‐
networks	  both	  carry	  narratives	  through	  the	  action	  of	  translation	  and	  are	  narratives	  through	  their	  
performativity.	  	  The	  dual	  nature	  of	  narratives	  in	  ANT	  revealed	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  similar	  to	  but	  slightly	  
different	   from	  John	  Law’s	   ‘two	  stories’,	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  3.5.	   	  He	  characterises	  ANT	   itself	  as	  
these	  stories.	  This	  thesis,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  specific	  actor-­‐networks	  carry	  the	  
narratives	   of	   their	   actors’	  matters	   of	   concern,	  which	   span	   the	   ‘why’,	   ‘what’	   and	   ‘how’	   of	   policy	  
practice.	  It	  has	  also	  shown	  that	  actor-­‐networks	  are	  their	  own	  narratives	  through	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
the	  connections	  are	  formed,	  strengthened	  or	  weakened	  and	  how	  matters	  of	  concern	  coalesce	  into	  
matters	  of	  fact,	  or	  how	  they	  don’t.	  This	  is	  the	  interaction	  between	  Law’s	  two	  stories	  I	  referred	  to	  
in	  Chapter	  3.5.	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  said	  this	  thesis	  would	  test	  Law’s	  assertion	  that	  ‘[t]his	  performativity	  




interaction	  between	  his	   two	  stories	   is	   an	  enacted	  or	   living	  narration,	  as	  described	   in	  Chapter	  7.	  	  
This	   is	   different	   from	   the	   ‘life	   as	   narrative’	   of	   Ricoeur	   or	   Bruner,	   distinguished	   as	   it	   is	   by	   the	  
continuing	  performance	  –	  the	  metaphor	  of	  ‘living’	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  simile	  of	  ‘life	  as’	  –	  and	  what	  
is	  really	  meant	  by	  the	  category	  ‘enacted	  narrative’	  in	  Table	  2	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
In	  the	  previous	  sub-­‐section,	  I	  highlighted	  the	  effort	  involved	  in	  maintaining	  the	  connections	  in	  an	  
actor-­‐network;	   that	   this	   is	   part	   of	   performativity.	   The	   narrative	   implications	   of	   this	   are	   that	   a	  
narrative	  is	  being	  maintained	  as	  part	  of	  the	  translating	  and	  stabilising	  of	  policy	  practice,	  and	  at	  the	  
same	  time,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  maintained	  to	  reflect	  the	  result	  of	  those	  actions.	  Thus	  this	  thesis	  shows	  
narrative	  itself	   is	  performative,	  confirming	  John	  Law’s	  assertion	  that	  ‘stories	  perform	  themselves	  
into	  the	  world’	  (Law,	  2000,	  p.	  2),	  as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  	  
Also	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   I	   queried	   Arendt’s	   view	   of	   action	   as	   fragile,	   and	   asked	   if	   the	   original	   action	  
disappears	   through	   translation	   or	   is	   it	   incorporated	   within	   that	   translation.	   The	   trans-­‐Tasman	  
border	  stories	  support	  Latour’s	  assertion	  that	  there	  is	  no	  pure	  beginning	  to	  any	  action	  because	  it	  is	  
always	   able	   to	   be	   connected	   back	   to	   something	   else.	   There	   is	   no	   ‘undisputed	   starting	   point’	  
(Latour,	  2007,	  p.	  208).	  	  If	  the	  action	  is	  not	  connected	  to	  something	  else,	  it	  will	  have	  ceased	  to	  exist	  
through	   not	   being	   translated	   and	   thus	   through	   its	   failure	   to	   create	   or	   maintain	   connections.	  
Where	  there	  is	  an	  observable	  focal	  point,	  as	  in	  the	  2	  March	  2009	  joint	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  
of	   this	   thesis,	   that	   focal	   point	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   incorporated	  within	   the	   narratives	   of	   the	  
translations.	  The	  findings	  in	  this	  thesis	  suggest	  that	  an	  original	  action	  does	  disappear	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  be	  traced,	  but	  that	  it	  can	  exist	  in	  some	  form	  within	  the	  translations	  of	  an	  actor-­‐
network	  and	  may	  be	  contained	  in	  some	  sense	  within	  a	  stabilised	  inscription	  such	  as	  a	  diagram	  or	  a	  
cabinet	  paper.	  This	  conclusion	   is	  different	   from	  Arendt’s	  not	  only	   in	   respect	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  an	  
original	   action	   but	   also	   raises	   questions	   about	   her	   condition	   that	   action	   stabilised	   by	   an	   end	  
product	  can	  only	  do	  so	  through	  its	  authentic,	  non-­‐tangible	  meaning	  being	  destroyed.	  In	  ANT,	  the	  
act	   of	   translation	   could	   be	   said	   to	   change,	   to	   transform,	   rather	   than	   destroy	   the	   authentic	  
meaning	  of	  the	  thing	  being	  translated.	  To	  change	  is	  not	  necessarily	  to	  destroy.	  	  
As	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  a	  significant,	  element	  of	  narrative	  theory	  is	  temporality.	  I	  suggested	  that	  
time	  would	  appear	  in	  my	  stories	  as	  an	  actor	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  element	  of	  narrative.	  We	  have	  seen	  
in	  Chapter	  6	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  short	  timeframes	  created	  instability	  and	  made	  officials	  uncertain	  




	  We	  have	  also	  seen	  in	  the	  border	  stories	  a	  different	  view	  of	  temporal	  shifting	  than	  that	  described	  
by	  Ricoeur.	  His	  analysis	  of	  temporal	  shifting	  focuses	  on	  a	  known	  story	  that	   is	  told	  over	  and	  over	  
again.	  The	   implication	   is	   that	   the	  substance	  of	   the	  story	   is	   the	   same	   for	  each	   retelling.	  One	  can	  
envisage	  narrators	   embellishing	   the	  details	   of	   the	   story	   as	   they	   tell	   it,	   but	   the	  essential	   aspects	  
remain	   the	   same	   so	   that	   listeners’	   anticipation	   is	   satisfied	   at	   the	   end.	   In	   the	   longer	   term	  work	  
however,	   the	  end	  was	  not	   fully	   known	  at	   the	   start	  and	   therefore	   couldn’t	  be	  anticipated	   in	   the	  
sense	  that	  Ricoeur	  described.396	  How	  the	  goal	  (the	  end)	  was	  conceived	  changed	  as	  the	  iterations	  
added	  more	  detail.	  	  
The	  story	  of	  the	  new	  models	  –	  both	  the	  one	  developed	  unilaterally	  by	  New	  Zealand	  agencies,	  and	  
the	  one	  developed	  with	  and	  for	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  agencies	  –	  involved	  bringing	  the	  future	  
into	  the	  present.	  This	  action	  was	  similar	  to	  temporal	  shifting,	  as	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3.5.1.2,	  but	  
contained	  two	  essential	  differences.	  The	  first	  was	  that	  the	  inscriptions	  were	  visible.	  	  In	  the	  stories	  
about	   the	   new	   trans-­‐Tasman	   travel	   model,	   the	   future	   was	   brought	   into	   the	   present	   through	  
translating	  the	  goal	  (the	  matter	  of	  concern)	  into	  something	  conceptually	  tangible	  –	  a	  diagram.	  	  As	  
highlighted	  in	  some	  of	  the	  stories,	  inscriptions	  played	  an	  important	  part	  in	  creating	  fixed	  reference	  
points,	  and	  were	  particularly	  important	  in	  pinning	  down	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  future.	  These	  inscriptions	  
of	  the	  future	  were	  iterative,	  with	  each	  new	  level	  of	  detail	  making	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  future	  more	  
and	  more	  tangible.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  made	  the	  future	  goal	  (the	  end)	  less	  and	  less	  uncertain.	  This	  
observation	   is	   similar	   to	   that	  made	   by	   Erica	  Wagner	   in	   her	   thesis	   on	   Ivy	   University,	  where	   she	  
noted	  the	  role	  of	   inscriptions	   in	  stabilising	  connections	  between	  translations,	   ‘creating	  a	  durable	  
time	  zone’	  (Wagner,	  2003,	  p.	  100).	  
Another	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  future	  time	  was	  officials’	  actions	  in	  the	  Streamlining	  Trans-­‐Tasman	  
Trade	  story.	  They	  knew	  in	  general	  terms	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story	  they	  wanted	  to	  tell	  –	  that	  customs	  
and	  biosecurity	   regulations	  and	  practice	  were	  not	  barriers	   to	   trans-­‐Tasman	  trade.	  They	  then	  set	  
about	  creating	  the	  connections	  that	  would	  make	  the	  story	  ‘stick’	  with	  industry.	  The	  evidence	  (the	  
TRS)	  filled	  in	  the	  gaps	  of	  the	  general	  story.	  This	  example	  differs	  from	  Ricoeur’s	  temporal	  shifting	  in	  
that	  the	  people	  being	  told	  the	  story	  didn’t	  know	  the	  end	  at	  the	  beginning.	  However,	  what	  we	  see	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





from	  this	  and	  the	  previous	  example	   is	   the	  potential	   for	   the	   idea	  of	   temporal	  shifting	  to	  be	  used	  
consciously	  in	  narrative	  to	  help	  achieve	  a	  future	  goal.	  	  	  	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  story	  was	  revisited,	  if	  not	  exactly	  ‘retold’.	  
Streamlining	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  started	  as	  the	  common	  border	  work	  in	  the	  1990s,	  was	  revisited	  
in	   2004,	   in	   2009,	   and	   again	   in	   2014.	   The	   processes	   kept	   being	   re-­‐examined	   because	   the	   policy	  
issues	  were	  not	  being	  addressed	  (Official	  16	  referred	  to	  this	  explicitly).	  While	  we	  don’t	  know	  how	  
the	  revisiting	  was	  addressed	  on	  those	  earlier	  occasions,	  we	  do	  know	  that	   in	   the	  2009	  revisiting,	  
the	  past	  was	  turned	  into	  something	  new,	  as	  Official	  16	  related,	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  repeating	  the	  past.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  discussion	  above,	  repetition	  that	  makes	  the	  future	  more	  and	  more	  visible	  
can	   work	   for	   officials	   who	   are	   dealing	   with	   strategic	   narrative,	   but	   where	   repetition	   results	   in	  
defaulting	  back	  to	  the	  past,	   it	  appears	  to	  create	  a	  risk	  of	  a	  predetermined	  answer,	  thus	  working	  
against	  officials.	  Therefore,	  the	  repetition	  that	  brings	  the	  end	  to	  the	  beginning	  creates	  a	  dynamic	  
that	  can	  work	  either	  for	  or	  against	  officials	  moving	  on	  or	  creating	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  the	  task	  to	  be	  
done.	  
Another	  feature	  of	  narrative	  theory	  is	  the	  study	  of	  metaphors,	  signs	  and	  symbols.	  While	  this	  was	  
not	  a	  focus	  of	  the	  research,397	   I	  could	  not	   ignore	  the	  recurring	  metaphor	  of	   ‘family’.	   ‘Family’	   is	  a	  
metaphor	   for	   the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship	   (Mein	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister	  
Julia	  Gillard’s	  use	  of	  this	  term	  in	  her	  visit	   to	  New	  Zealand	   in	  2012398	  was	  significant	  because	  she	  
reassured	  New	  Zealanders	  that	  Australia	  still	  viewed	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  relationship	  as	  special.	  It	  is	  
also	  a	  metaphor	   for	  Customs	  administrations	  –	  the	   ‘Customs	  family’	   referred	  to	  by	  officials,	  and	  
which	   I	   experienced	  myself	  when	   conducting	  my	   research	   in	   the	  EU.	   	   Because	   I	  was	   a	  Customs	  
official	  as	  well	  as	  a	  researcher,	  I	  was	  welcomed	  as	  one	  of	  the	  family.	  There	  is	  also	  an	  extra	  sense	  of	  
family	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  because	  of	  our	  colonial	  heritage	  and	  our	  
continued	  constitutional	  linkages,399	  as	  described	  by	  one	  UK	  official:	  
And	   probably	   something	   about	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   UK	   also	   views	   itself	   as	   having	   special	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 The study of metaphor on its own is generating a whole body of work. See, for example, (Hanne, 2011; Hanne, Crano, & 
Mio, 2015). 
398 See the Stuff article on the Gillard visit to New Zealand in January 2012, retrieved 23 January, 2015 from 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/6335351/Gillard-We-re-trans-Tasman-family. 




relationships	  with	   those	   outside	   the	   EU	   –	   our	   Commonwealth	   neighbours	   .	   .	   .	   that	   those	  
relationships	  are	  really	  hugely	  	  importance	  to	  us	  (Official	  E1,	  lines	  380	  –	  383).	  
Neither	  could	  I	  ignore	  the	  emergence	  of	  two	  symbols.	  The	  first	  is	  activities	  in	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  
practice	  being	  seen	  as	   symbols	  of	   the	  narrative	  of	  close	  connection	  between	  Australia	  and	  New	  
Zealand	   (as	  members	  of	   the	   same	   family)	   –	   activities	   such	  as	  New	  Zealand’s	   implementation	  of	  
SmartGate	  and	  the	  SmartGate	  integration	  trial:	  
I	  think	  what	  we’re	  doing	  at	  the	  moment	  on	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  travel	  front	  and	  SmartGate	  in	  
particular	  is	  demonstrating	  that	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  can	  actually	  do	  some	  like-­‐minded	  
stuff	   and	   have	   similar	   sorts	   of	   systems	   that	   link	   us,	  make,	   in	   this	   case,	   that	   domestic-­‐like	  
experience	  a	  bit	  closer,	  but	  I	  think	  they’re	  sort	  of	  quite	  small	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  we	  would	  really	  
think	  about	  the	  bigger	  single	  economic	  market	  picture.	   I	  think	  they	  are	  important,	  smallish	  
symbols	  of	  how	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia	  can	   line	  up	  some	  of	  things	  that	  we	  do	  to	  have	  
things	  that	  are	  quite	  common	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Tasman	  (Official	  21,	  lines	  329-­‐337).	  	  
The	  second	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  integration.	  These	  are	  examples	  of	  living	  symbols	  
that,	  as	  part	  of	  officials’	  narratives,	  affect	  their	  actions,	  thus	  becoming	  actants.	  Being	  aware	  of	  the	  
symbols	  being	  used	  in	  policy	  practice	  could	  therefore	  help	  with	  the	  translation	  of	  ideas	  and	  goals	  
into	  action.	  	  
Let	   us	   return	   to	   the	   current	   state	   of	   knowledge	   on	   policy	   narrative	   covered	   in	   Chapter	   2.3.	   In	  
addition	  to	  the	  new	  areas	  covered	  above,	  I	  consider	  an	  ANT	  approach	  could	  contribute	  to	  existing	  
approaches400	   in	   four	   areas	   –	   performativity	   in	   policy	   practice,	   letting	   the	   actors	   speak,	   local	  
narratives	  and	  relational	  power.	  
The	  ANT	  concept	  of	  performativity	  could	  add	  an	  important	  dimension	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Rod	  Rhodes,	  
Dvora	  Yanow	  and	  Emery	  Roe.	  For	  Rhodes,	  by	  extending	  the	  concept	  of	  actor	  to	  non-­‐humans,	  he	  
would	   be	   able	   to	   enrich	   his	   analysis	   of	   policy	   networks;	   it	   could	   also	   contribute	   to	   his	  
understanding	   of	   implementation	   and,	   through	   extending	   the	   concept	   of	   narrative	   itself	   as	  
performative,	   to	  deepen	   the	  understanding	  of	   the	   role	  of	  narrative	   in	   implementation.	  Another	  
aspect	  emerging	  from	  this	  thesis	  that	  could	  help	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  implementation	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




creation	  of	  actor-­‐networks.	   In	  the	  longer	  term	  work	  (stories	  3	  and	  4)	  we	  saw	  actor-­‐networks	  set	  
up	   to	   build	   a	   new	   actor-­‐network	   (the	   new	   model).	   Creating	   new	   connections	   is	   an	   unstable	  
business.	   Investigating	  the	  performance	  of	  actor-­‐networks	   in	  this	  situation	  could	  shine	  new	  light	  
on	   implementation	  failures.	  For	  Yanow,	  performativity	  builds	  on	  and	  adds	  another	  dimension	  to	  
Yanow’s	  argument	  that	  the	  policy	  analysts’	  role	  is	  to	  translate	  and	  interpret,	  and	  stories	  are	  a	  part	  
of	  this.	  Translation	  occurs	  when	  there	  are	  one	  or	  more	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  be	  worked	  through.	  
As	  argued	   in	   the	  previous	  Chapter,	  a	  matter	  of	   concern	  coupled	  with	   translation	   results	   in	  both	  
narrative	  and	  action.	  Not	  only	  do	  policy	  analysts	  tell	  other	  people’s	  stories,	  but	  their	  own	  process	  
of	  translation	  acts	  out	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  tells	   its	  own	  story.	  Part	  of	  this	  story	   is	   that	  when	  a	  
policy	   has	   been	   implemented	   and	   is	   stabilised,	   the	   translating	   has	   been	  done,	   and	   the	   debates	  
have	  been	  ‘black	  boxed’.	  A	  performative	  perspective	  on	  Roe’s	  work	  on	  policy	  disputes	  would	  see	  
the	   policy	   analyst	   as	   participating	   in	   the	   actor-­‐network	   by	   providing	   a	   way	   in	   which	   blocked	  
translation	  can	  start	  flowing	  again.	  
My	   findings	   reveal	   the	   power	   of	   ANT	   narrative	   from	   letting	   the	   actors	   speak.	   Rather	   than	   the	  
researcher	   or	   the	   policy	   analyst,	   the	   actors	   order	   their	   emotions.	   They	   assign	   meaning;	   they	  
describe	   their	   own	   frames.	   This	   differs	   from	   Hajer	   and	   Laws,	   who	   translate	   emotions	   into	   a	  
depersonalised	  form	  —‘three	  ordering	  devices	  .	  .	  .	  beliefs,	  frames	  and	  discourses’	  (Hajer	  &	  Laws,	  
2006,	  p.	  254).	   The	   research	  approach	   in	   this	   thesis	   shows	   that	   incorporating	  actors’	  own	  voices	  
into	   policy	   practice	   allows	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   policy	   officials	   to	   become	   visible.	   This	   is	  
important	  because	   it	   creates	   stronger	   connections	  between	  officials	   and	   their	  work.	  My	   role	   as	  
researcher	  has	  been	  to	  capture	  and	  reveal	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  officials	  and	  the	  meaning	  they	  
assign	  to	  events,	  not	  to	  interpret	  it.	  We	  saw	  this	  in	  officials’	  descriptions	  of	  why	  they	  thought	  the	  
HLSG	   changed,	   or	   needed	   to	   change.	   	   This	   is	   not	   dissimilar	   to	   Jay	  White’s	   assertion	   that	   actors	  
participate	  in	  their	  own	  understanding.	  Unlike	  Reissman	  or	  Roe,	  an	  ANT	  approach	  relays	  the	  words	  
of	  the	  actors	  as	  they	  describe	  their	  own	  actions	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  non-­‐human	  actors	  played	  a	  
part	  in	  their	  stories,	  rather	  than	  the	  double	  interpretation	  –	  by	  the	  person	  experiencing	  an	  event,	  
and	   by	   others	   interpreting	   that	   person’s	   interpretation	   (Giddens,	   1979).	   This	   thesis	   has	   also	  
demonstrated	   that	   an	  ANT	  approach	   to	  narrative	  enables	  more	   than	  one	   storyteller	   and	  makes	  




narrative	  than	  relying	  solely	  on	  a	  single	  authorial	  representation	  of	  those	  voices.401	  While	  it	  must	  
be	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   researcher	   decides	   which	   of	   the	   actors’	   words	   to	   use	   and	   which	   to	  
discard,	   those	   that	  are	   chosen	   are	  what	   the	   actors	   said.	  My	   findings	   demonstrate	   that	  Hannah	  
Arendt	  is	  only	  partly	  right	  in	  asserting	  a	  narrative	  can	  only	  be	  told	  by	  the	  storyteller,	  not	  the	  actors	  
within	   the	   story	  (Arendt,	   1998).	   We	   have	   seen	   in	   this	   thesis	   that	   actors	   themselves	   are	   quite	  
capable	  of	  telling	  their	  story.	  They	  might	  be	  retrospectively	  reflecting	  on	  what	  happened,	  but	  they	  
were	  still	  actors	  within	  their	  story.	  This	  view	  of	  actors	  as	  storytellers	  adds	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Reissman	  
and	  Roe.	  
The	   third	   contribution	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘local	   narratives’.	   An	   ANT	   approach	   gives	   only	   a	   local	  
narrative,	  as	  we	  have	  seen.	  There	  may	  be	  connections	  back	  into	  history,	  or	  geographically	  distant,	  
but	   they	   are	   folded	   into	   the	   matters	   of	   concern	   being	   played	   out	   locally.	   	   This	   would	   satisfy	  
White’s	   call	   for	   more	   local	   narratives	   in	   public	   administration	   (White,	   1999,	   p.	   103)	   and	   Roe’s	  
‘metanarrative’	   would	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   narrative	   with	   long	   connections	   that	   linked	   strongly	   to	   all	  
parties,	  and	  enabled	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  actor-­‐network.	  	  
The	  fourth	  area	   is	  relational	  power.	  By	  tracing	  the	  connections	  and	  the	  translations,	   it	  would	  be	  
possible	  to	  get	  a	  different	  view	  of	  power	  in	  Roe’s	  work	  that	  was	  not	  solely	  related	  to	  people.	  	  The	  
narratives	  drawn	  out	   in	  this	   thesis	  suggest	  an	  ANT	  analysis	  would	  reveal	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  
action	  within	   the	  actor-­‐networks	  wherein	   the	  policy	  dilemmas	  occurred.	   Thus	  an	  ANT	  approach	  
might	  provide	  insights	  into	  the	  role	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  officials	  and	  others	  that	  would	  otherwise	  
be	  invisible.	  These	  insights	  could	  contribute	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  policy	  dilemmas.	  	  
8.5 Extending	  the	  boundaries	  –	  ANT,	  narrative	  and	  policy	  practice	  
This	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  the	  literature	  in	  several	  areas.	  The	  first	  is	  by	  using	  ANT	  as	  a	  philosophical	  
base	  and	  a	  practical	  tool	  for	  tracing	  and	  revealing	  narratives,	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  action,	  in	  
policy	   practice.	   I	   have	   shown	   in	   this	   thesis	   how	   this	   approach	   has	   provided	   a	   richer	   view	   of	  
narrative	   and	   a	   richer	   view	   of	   action	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   ‘performativity’,	   including	   the	   role	   of	  
narrative	   itself	   as	   performative.	   There	   is	   potential	   for	   ANT	   to	   be	   used	  within	   policy	   practice	   to	  
improve	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  performativity	  of	  policy	  practice	  and	   to	   raise	   the	  profile	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




need	   for	  policy	  practitioners	   to	  consciously	  attend	   to	   the	  performative	  narrative	  aspects	  of	   that	  
practice.	  	  
The	   second	   contribution	   is	   by	   combining	   the	   use	   of	   ANT	  with	   conventional	   narrative	   theory	   to	  
examine	   particular	   aspects	   of	   the	   narratives,	   such	   as	   the	   narrative	   voice,	   the	   treatment	   of	   the	  
future,	  and	  the	  playing	  out	  of	  power.	  	  	  
The	   third	   is	   by	   revealing	   the	   framing	   narratives	   that	   underpin	   and	   drive	   policy	   performance	   in	  
border	   management,	   particularly	   that	   of	   Customs	   administrations,	   within	   a	   regional	   economic	  
integration	  setting.	  	  
The	   fourth	   is	   in	   providing	   a	   new	   lens	   on	   the	   regional	   economic	   integration	   story	   of	   the	   trans-­‐
Tasman	  through	  examining	  and	  revealing	  its	  specific	  border	  management	  policy	  practices.	  
This	  thesis	  is	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  investigating	  each	  of	  these	  elements	  further.	  There	  are	  more	  
aspects	   of	   ANT,	   policy	   narrative	   and	   action	   that	   could	   be	   explored,	   for	   example,	   tracing	   the	  
performativity	  of	  more	  contested	  policy	  areas.	  My	  examination	  of	  connections	  between	  ANT	  and	  
narrative	   theory	   have	   been	   limited	   to	   several	   specific	   areas.	   A	   wider	   examination	   of	   the	  
connections	  and	  the	  interplay	  between	  these	  two	  disciplines	  could	  yield	  further	  insights	  of	  value	  
to	  both.	  Comparing	  the	  findings	  in	  this	  thesis	  with	  another	  example	  of	  regional	  integration	  would	  
reveal	   further	   insights,	   and	   test	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   anatomy	   of	   border	   management	   in	   regional	  
economic	  integration.	  	  
And	  now	  I	  return	  to	  the	  beginning	  to	  see	  if	  I	  have	  ‘scratched	  my	  itch’	  sufficiently.	  I	  reread	  my	  initial	  
frustrations	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  kindly	  forgiveness.	  I	  did	  not	  know	  then	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  strand	  
to	  the	  answer	  –	  that	  it	  is	  made	  up	  of	  many	  interwoven	  narratives	  and	  actions.	  I	  did	  not	  know	  that	  
there	   is	   nothing	   ‘wrong’	   with	   the	   two	   countries’	   interactions	   and	   that	   there	   is	   no	   inherent	  
contradiction	   between	   economic	   and	   political	   dimensions	   at	   the	   border,	   but	   rather	   a	  mixing	   of	  
narratives	   that	   results	   in	   differing	   emphases	   between	   them	   in	   different	   aspects	   of	   border	  
management.	  I	  have	  a	  much	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  tensions	  and	  mismatches	  in	  policy	  
practice	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	  management,	   and	   have	   tools	   with	   which	   I	   can	   help	   others	   to	  
understand	   and	  work	  with	   them.	   I	   have	   a	   changed	   outlook	   on	   life,	  where	   I	   no	   longer	   separate	  




insights	  to	  benefit	  my	  own	  work,	  and	  that	  my	  findings	  may	  in	  some	  small	  way	  benefit	  the	  work	  of	  
others.	  This,	  then,	  is	  the	  ‘lived	  experience’	  answer	  to	  my	  research	  question.	  	  




 Interview	  Guide	  For	  Research	  Pilot	  Appendix	  A
Topic	  areas:	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  
o Opinions/values:	  What	  do	  you	  think	  the	  trans-­‐Tasman	  border	  is?	  
o Knowledge:	  When/how	  did	  trans-­‐Tasman	  come	  into	  the	  picture?	  
o How	  relevant	  was	   the	  TT	  border	   to	   the	  SmartGate	  story?	   Is	   it	   still	   that	   relevant?	  Has	  
anything	  changed,	  and	  if	  so,	  what?	  




Narrative	  about	  SmartGate	  	  
• Background:	  Involvement	  with	  SmartGate?	  (when,	  how	  long,	  what	  capacity);	  	  
• Background:	  who	  else	  was	  involved?	  
• Experience:	  What	  was	  it	  like	  being	  in	  your	  position?	  
	  
• Time	  –	  past,	  present	  or	  future?	  (explore	  all)	  	  
o What	  is	  happening	  now	  with	  SmartGate?	  	  
o Where	  did	  it	  come	  from?/what	  led	  up	  to	  it?	  
o Over	  what	  period	  did	  this	  happen?	  	  
o How	  relevant	  was	  the	  future	  picture/intent/goal?	  
• Intentionality	  
o What	  was	  the	  intent/direction?	  
o How	  clear	  was/is	  it	  to	  you?	  How	  do	  you	  know?	  
o Did	  you	  see	  different	  interpretations	  of	  intent/direction?	  What	  and	  by	  whom?	  	  	  
o Did	  you	  agree	  with/believe	  in	  the	  intent/direction?	  	  
• Moving	  from	  intention	  to	  action	  




o Opinion:	   What	   was	   the	   relationship	   between	   when	   the	   action	   occurred	   and	   the	  
intention	  for	  the	  action	  to	  occur?	  
o Knowledge:	  Who	  acted?	  (intender	  or	  someone	  else?)	  
o Opinions:	  what	  did	  you/they	  intend	  to	  happen?	  How	  do	  you	  know?	  
o Opinions:	  what	  did	  you	  expect	  to	  happen?	  
o Sensory:	  Perceptions	  of	  others’	  action	  or	  inaction	  
o Sensory:	  Perceptions	  of	  completed	  action	  
• Action	  	  
o Knowledge:	  What	  did	  happen?	  what	  was	  done;	  	  
o Knowledge:	  What	  did	  that	  lead	  to?	  (anything?)	  	  
o Opinions/values:	  What	  do	  you	  make	  of	  what	  happened?	  
o Knowledge:	   Source	   of	   information:	   (personal	   experience/was	   told/read	   about)	   How	  
reliable?	  How	  do	  you	  know?	  
o Opinions/values:	  Voice	  –	  whose	  perspective?	  	  




 Trans-Tasman Interview Guide  Appendix B
Note	  that	  these	  are	  starter	  questions.	  Further	  questions	  will	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  information	  provided	  
by	  the	  interviewee.	  
Background/starter	  
Introduce	  self	  and	  explain	  research,	  and	  my	  place	  in	  it.	  
Introductory	  questions	  –	  about	  the	  interviewee	  
• Personal	  history	  –	  who	  work	  for,	  how	  long,	  role	  
• What	  do	  you	  like	  about	  your	  work?	  
• Past	  roles	  relevant	  to	  the	  topic	  
Trans-­‐Tasman	  involvement	  
Read	  out	  March	  2009	  joint	  Australia-­‐New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Ministerial	  statement	  relating	  to	  border	  
management:	  
“The	  two	  Prime	  Ministers	  committed	  to:…	  reduce	  remaining	  barriers	  at	  the	  borders	  to	  ensure	  that	  
people	  and	  goods	  can	  move	  more	  easily	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  including	  through	  effective	  air	  
links	  “	  
	  I	   am	   going	   to	   ask	   you	   about	   your	   role	   in	   trans-­‐Tasman	   border	   arrangements	   since	   that	  
announcement,	  what	  happened	  and	  what	  you	  observed.	  	  	  
Action	  
• What	  were	  you	  aiming	  to	  achieve?	  
• What	  circumstances	  or	  events	  in	  the	  working	  environment	  affected	  your	  ability	  to	  achieve	  
results	  and	  in	  what	  ways?	  
• What	  got	  done	  and	  what	  didn’t?	  	  
Connections	  
• Whom	  did	  you	  interlink	  with?	  
• What	  enabled	  you	  to	  create	  connections	  with	  others?	  
• What	  role	  did	  technology	  play	  in	  linking	  you	  with	  others?	  





• What	  debates	  did	  you	  have,	  and	  what	  were	  they	  about?	  
• Were	  those	  debate	  resolved,	  and	  if	  they	  were,	  how?	  
• If	  they	  weren’t,	  what	  happened	  as	  a	  result	  (probe	  re	  associations	  e.g.	  what	  fell	  away?)	  
Enrolling	  
• Were	  you	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  anyone?	  
Surprises	  








 EU Interview Guide Appendix C
Note	  that	  these	  are	  prompt	  questions,	  covering	  areas	  I	  want	  to	  ensure	  get	  explored.	  I	  will	  not	  be	  
asking	  all	  these	  questions.	  
Background/starter	  
Introduce	  self	  and	  explain	  research,	  and	  my	  place	  in	  it.	  
Introductory	  questions	  
• Personal	  history	  –	  who	  work	  for,	  how	  long,	  role	  
• What	  do	  they	  like	  about	  their	  work?	  
• Past	  roles	  relevant	  to	  the	  topic	  
European	  Border	  Management	  
In	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Australia,	  we	  talk	  about	  ‘border	  management’.	  	  
• What	  does	  the	  term	  ‘border	  management’	  mean	  to	  you?	  
• How	  do	  you	  and	  others	  talk	  about	  Europe’s	  borders?	  Border	  controls?	  Border	  facilitation?	  
• Is	  the	  narrative	  you	  use	  different	  from	  other	  regions	  of	  Europe?	  [probe]	  	  
• Are	  there	  any	  differences	  between	  land	  and	  non-­‐contiguous	  border	  arrangements?	  
• What	  are	  those	  differences?	  
• What	  effect	  do	  political	  and	  economic	  direction/imperatives	  have	  on	  border	  arrangements?	  
[probe]	  	  
• Are	   the	   two	   strands	   of	   trade/goods	   flows	   and	   security/mobility	   of	   people	   brought	  
together/considered	  together	  anywhere?	  	  
• Tell	  me	  about	  that	  –	  who’s	  talking	  about	  it,	  how	  you	  became	  aware	  of	  it.	  
Time	  –	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  
I’m	  interested	  in	  how	  European	  border	  arrangements	  evolved	  and	  what	  they	  mean	  today.	  	  
• How	  do	  you	  think	  the	  narratives	  of	  European	  borders,	  and	  their	  management,	  have	  evolved	  
since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Customs	  Union?	  





• How	   much	   do	   historical	   narratives	   from	   and	   about	   different	   countries	   colour/influence	  
border	  relationships	  and	  networks?	  [probe]	  
• Is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  border	  management	   is	   talked	   about	   changed/is	   it	   changing	   and	   if	   so,	  
when?	  	  
• What	  do	  you	  think	  caused/is	  causing	  the	  change?	  
Strategy	  and	  Action	  
I	  am	  looking	  at	  the	  way	  in	  which	  political	  direction	  gets	  translated	  into	  action	  at	  the	  level	  of	  border	  
authorities	  
• What	  drives	  your	  work?	  
• What	  are	  the	  main	  things	  you	  talk	  about	  in	  your	  organisation’s/part	  of	  the	  organisation?	  
• What	  do	  you	  take	  notice	  of	  (in	  terms	  of	  getting	  things	  done)?	  
• What’s	  a	  typical	  conversation	  about	  when	  you	  work	  with	  other	  organisations/countries?	  
• Where	  do	  you	  see/hear	  change/development	  in	  border	  management	  come	  from,	  and	  how	  
does	  it	  play	  out?	  E.g.	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Strategy	  for	  the	  EU	  Customs	  Union	  (2008).	  	  
• What	   sorts	  of	   aspirations	  are	   there	   for	  Europe’s	  border	  arrangements?	  Whose	  aspirations	  
are	  they?	  	  
• How	  visible	  are	  these	  aspirations?	  How	  often	  do	  they	  come	  up	  in	  officials’	  work?	  Do	  people	  
talk	  about	   them?	   If	   so,	  who	   talks	  about	   them?	  Does	   it	  make	  a	  difference	  who	   talks	  about	  
them?	  
• What	  are	  the	  expectations	  about	  evolution/development	  of	  border	  policies	  and	  processes?	  
Whose	  expectations	  are	  they?	  	  
• What	  place	  do	  theories	  like	  economic	  integration	  play?	  	  
Governance	  and	  Policy	  Networks	  
• What	   are	   the	   layers	   of	   governance	   for	   European	   border	   management	   and	   how	   do	   they	  
interact?	  	  
• How	  well	  do	  officials	  at	  different	  layers	  talk	  with	  one	  another?	  	  
• How	  do	  officials’	  relationships	  and	  networks	  affect	  what	  gets	  done?	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